--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03.txt	2019-05-10 08:13:45.885546789 -0700
+++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-04.txt	2019-05-10 08:13:45.945548310 -0700
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 
 INTERNET-DRAFT                                                R. Housley
 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                    Vigil Security
 Intended Status: Proposed Standard
-Expires: 8 September 2019                                   8 March 2019
+Expires: 11 November 2019                                    10 May 2019
 
   Using Pre-Shared Key (PSK) in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
-               <draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-03.txt>
+               <draft-ietf-lamps-cms-mix-with-psk-04.txt>
 
 Abstract
 
    The invention of a large-scale quantum computer would pose a serious
    challenge for the cryptographic algorithms that are widely deployed
    today.  The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) supports key transport
    and key agreement algorithms that could be broken by the invention of
    such a quantum computer.  By storing communications that are
    protected with the CMS today, someone could decrypt them in the
    future when a large-scale quantum computer becomes available.  Once
@@ -33,21 +33,21 @@
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
    Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
 Copyright Notice
 
-   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
@@ -454,20 +454,22 @@
       OKM is the output keying material, which is exactly L octets.  The
       OKM is the key-encryption key that is used to encrypt the content-
       encryption key or the content-authenticated-encryption key.
 
 6.  ASN.1 Module
 
    This section contains the ASN.1 module for the two key management
    techniques defined in this document.  This module imports types from
    other ASN.1 modules that are defined in [RFC5911] and [RFC5912].
 
+   <CODE BEGINS>
+
    CMSORIforPSK-2019
      { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
        smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-ori-psk-2019(TBD0) }
 
    DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
    BEGIN
 
    -- EXPORTS All
 
    IMPORTS
@@ -546,20 +548,22 @@
      psk                    OCTET STRING,
      keyMgmtAlgType         ENUMERATED {
        keyTrans               (5),
        keyAgree               (10) },
      keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
      pskLength              INTEGER (1..MAX),
      kdkLength              INTEGER (1..MAX) }
 
    END
 
+   <CODE ENDS>
+
 7.  Security Considerations
 
    Implementations must protect the pre-shared key (PSK), key transport
    private key, the agreement private key, the key-derivation key, and
    the key-encryption key.  Compromise of the PSK will make the
    encrypted content vulnerable to the future invention of a large-scale
    quantum computer.  Compromise of the PSK and either the key transport
    private key or the agreement private key may result in the disclosure
    of all contents protected with that combination of keying material.
    Compromise of the PSK and the key-derivation key may result in
@@ -719,24 +723,20 @@
 
    [IANA-SMIME] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
               numbers.xhtml#security-smime.
 
    [IANA-ORI] https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
               numbers.xhtml#security-smime-13.
 
    [RFC2631]  Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
               RFC 2631, June 1999.
 
-   [RFC3560]  Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
-              Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
-              RFC 3560, July 2003.
-
    [RFC4086]  D. Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
               "Randomness Requirements for Security", RFC 4086,
               June 2005.
 
    [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
               Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
               Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
               (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
 
    [RFC5753]  Turner, S., and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve