draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-02.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-03.txt
	INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley		INTERNET-DRAFT R. Housley
	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Vigil Security
	Intended Status: Proposed Standard		Intended Status: Proposed Standard
	Expires: 17 April 2019 17 October 2018		Expires: 20 June 2019 20 December 2018
	Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm		Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-based Signature Algorithm
	in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
	<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-02>		<draft-ietf-lamps-cms-hash-sig-03>
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS		This document specifies the conventions for using the the HSS/LMS
	hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax		hash-based signature algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax
	(CMS). The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital		(CMS). The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital
	signature; it is described in [HASHSIG].		signature; it is described in [HASHSIG].
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	skipping to change at page 9, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 18 ¶
	Implementations must protect the private keys. Compromise of the		Implementations must protect the private keys. Compromise of the
	private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Along		private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Along
	with the private key, the implementation must keep track of which		with the private key, the implementation must keep track of which
	leaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of this		leaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of this
	tracking data can cause an one-time key to be used more than once.		tracking data can cause an one-time key to be used more than once.
	As a result, when a private key and the tracking data are stored on		As a result, when a private key and the tracking data are stored on
	non-volatile media or stored in a virtual machine environment, care		non-volatile media or stored in a virtual machine environment, care
	must be taken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.		must be taken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.
			When a LMS key pair is generating a LMS key pair, an implementation
			must must generate the key pair and the corresponding identifier
			independently of all other key pairs in the HSS tree.
	An implementation must ensure that a LM-OTS private key is used to		An implementation must ensure that a LM-OTS private key is used to
	generate a signature only one time, and ensure that it cannot be used		generate a signature only one time, and ensure that it cannot be used
	for any other purpose.		for any other purpose.
	The generation of private keys relies on random numbers. The use of		The generation of private keys relies on random numbers. The use of
	inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate these		inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate these
	values can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it		values can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it
	much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,		much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,
	searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute		searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute
	force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality		force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality
End of changes. 3 change blocks.
	2 lines changed or deleted		6 lines changed or added
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