--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17.txt 2022-04-07 00:13:59.175797604 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-18.txt 2022-04-07 00:13:59.315801134 -0700 @@ -1,32 +1,32 @@ LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed. Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray -Expires: 16 July 2022 Entrust - 12 January 2022 +Expires: 8 October 2022 Entrust + 6 April 2022 Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates - draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17 + draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-18 Abstract This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712. The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, - and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. + and well-known URI path segments. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as needed. @@ -38,21 +38,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 July 2022. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 October 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights @@ -60,92 +60,97 @@ extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 + 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 - 2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 - 2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation + 2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 + 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13 - 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key + 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13 + 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 - 2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14 - 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 - 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15 - 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 16 - 2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17 - 2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18 - 2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 22 - 2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 + 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 + 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14 + 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 + 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15 + 2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval . . . . . . 16 + 2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17 + 2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18 + 2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 22 + 2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and - CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and - shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and + CMP Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and + Shared Secret Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - 2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP - messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26 - 2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28 - 2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral + 2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP + Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 2.25. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26 + 2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28 + 2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - 2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of + 2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 - 2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 30 - 2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification + 2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 30 + 2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 - 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 31 + 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 31 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 31 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 32 - 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 + A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + Appendix B. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 1. Introduction While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and developing the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these limitations. Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP endpoints on registration and certification authorities. + As the main content of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] + stays unchanged, this document lists all sections that are updated, + replaced, or added to the current text of the respective RFCs. + 1.1. Convention and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210], RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words @@ -159,30 +164,30 @@ KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf of an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA. EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject of the certificate. 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) -2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 +2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used whenever possible. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: - 1.1. Changes since RFC 4210 + 1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210 The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: * Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., registration authority and certification authority, to express the authorization of the entity identified in the certificate containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as the indicated PKI management entity. * Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional @@ -226,24 +231,24 @@ Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4: 4.5. Extended Key Usage The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for which the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the use of a certificate to specific applications. A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management - entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation explained in this - section offers an automatic way of checking the authorization of such - delegation. Such delegation MAY also be expressed by other means, - e.g., explicit configuration. + entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this + delegation and enable an automated means for checking the + authorization of this delegation. Such delegation MAY also be + expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration. To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given role as described below. The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are: @@ -378,38 +383,39 @@ as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such messages. * The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and forwards the original message unchanged. * The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies - particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding + particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate - request, the RA MUST set the POP RAVerified. It MAY include the - original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of - PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases - in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the - original EE message). The infoType to be used in this situation - is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the - infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as - the message in PKIBody). + request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVerified. It MAY + include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo + field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for + example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other + information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used + in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value + of id-it) and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in + the same order as the message in PKIBody). - * The RA collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the - same direction and forwards them in a batch. In communication to - the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response - or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance - be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI - management entities. + * A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be + forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch. + Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the + CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch + downstream (towards an RA, but not to the EE). This can for + instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two + PKI management entities. These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows: NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends @@ -425,21 +431,21 @@ EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the - EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use + EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use EnvelopedData. Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on- the-wire compatible with the old syntax. To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced by this document. Details on the usage of pvno values is described in Section 7. @@ -477,21 +483,33 @@ * Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be protected using the key transport key management technique, as specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. * A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be protected using the password-based key management technique, as specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652]. -2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response +2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime + + The following subsection point implementers to [RFC5280] regarding + usage of GeneralizedTime. + + Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4: + + 5.2.9 GeneralizedTime + + GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as + specified in RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5.2 [RFC5280]. + +2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used in response to a p10cr message. Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078): @@ -530,69 +548,69 @@ (cp) message MUST be set to -1. Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno values are described in Section 7. -2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content +2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field. Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { certHash OCTET STRING, certReqId INTEGER, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL } The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not - specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. - In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify - the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. - Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash - algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If - hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message - header must be cmp2021(3). + specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such + cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash + algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, + the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as + used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is + used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must + be cmp2021(3). -2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types +2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair +2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase +2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information as described in Section 2.7 above. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase @@ -601,37 +619,37 @@ purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the use of this mechanism. GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. -2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates +2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- caCerts. The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates. GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate | < absent > -2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update +2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update @@ -654,21 +672,21 @@ RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE. -2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template +2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing @@ -714,29 +732,29 @@ The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key length MUST be used. Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] -2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval +2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.16: - 5.3.19.17. CRL update retrieval + 5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated by the client. @@ -749,21 +767,21 @@ dpn [0] DistributionPointName, issuer [1] GeneralNames } CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { source CRLSource, thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it- crls (TBD2). > -2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content +2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm requests and to error messages. Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following one: This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info @@ -774,21 +792,21 @@ This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the transaction (if a transaction is in progress). -2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response +2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'. Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text: This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the @@ -822,21 +840,21 @@ CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring to the complete response. 2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or the final response to some other type of request is available; otherwise, it will return a pollRep. 3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another - pollReq.. + pollReq. 4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other response, then this will be treated as the final response to the original request. The following client-side state machine describes polling for individual CertResponse elements. START @@ -958,21 +976,21 @@ 12 <- pollRep <- 13 Wait 14 Format pollReq 15 -> pollReq -> 16 Check status of original request general message response is ready 17 Format genp 18 <- genp <- 19 Handle genp -2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation +2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and hashAlg. Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following text: This section defines the version negotiation between client and @@ -1034,59 +1052,61 @@ supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest supported version for this request message, then the version in the error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest supported version for this request message then the version in the error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this message type. -2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers +2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This document extends the section to clients with any higher version than cmp1999. Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. -2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and CMP - message protection +2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP + Message Protection The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the CA private key for CMP message protection. - Insert this section after Section 8.3: + Insert this section after Section 8.3 (Note: This fixes Errata ID + 5731): - 8.4. Private keys for certificate signing and CMP message protection + 8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required. -2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and - shared secret information +2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and + Shared Secret Information The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information. - 8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret - information + 8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret + Information Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random input. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. + An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an example of predictable random numbers see CVE-2008-0166 [CVE-2008-0166]; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are discussed in Mining Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019 [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1 [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and others offer valuable guidance in this area. @@ -1106,78 +1126,79 @@ information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each key pair. For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret information is re-used for several key management operations, the entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by - the operation. For other cases it is recommended to (a) use a shared - secret information of possibly low security strength (e.g., a - password) only for a single PKI management operation or (b) use a - shared secret information with an entropy that at least matches the - security strength of the key material being managed by the operation. + the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy + that at least matches the security strength of the key material being + managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared + secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a + human generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret + information be limited to a single PKI management operation. -2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages +2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation. Insert this section after new Section 8.5: - 8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages - The provider of trust anchors, which typically will be an RA involved - in configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be- - trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless it can take - responsibility for making the recipient trust them. When doing so, - it MUST exert the same due diligence as for its own trust anchors. + 8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages + A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in + configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be- + trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific + deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving + EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust + store. Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate the message sender without already trusting any of the CA certificates given in the message. Moreover, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized source - of trust anchors. This authorization is typically indicated using - shared secret information or with a signature-based message - protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly - authorized for this purpose. + of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local policy and + typically indicated using shared secret information or with a + signature-based message protection using a certificate issued by a + PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose. -2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations +2.25. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. - Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the - section: + Replace the fourth paragraph of this section with the following text: In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi- numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one addition has been performed. One new entry has been added: +=========+=============+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+=============+============+ | 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC] | +---------+-------------+------------+ Table 1: Addition to the PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers - registry + Registry In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi- numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] seven additions have been performed. Seven new entries have been added: +=========+=======================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | @@ -1191,79 +1212,79 @@ | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ | TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ | TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP - Information Types registry + Information Types Registry < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it- crls (TBD2). > In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. Two new entries have been added: +=========+======================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+======================+============+ | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF - Registration Controls registry + Registration Controls Registry -2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase +2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following text: * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization request or certificate request message.) This conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. - For use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of - encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in + When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of + encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics. Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following text: - * When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in - RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint - field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along - with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the - correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is - constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). + * Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in + RFC 2985 [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY + contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the + passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct + passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by + the entity and received by the CA/RA). -2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications +2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 2615): @@ -1296,52 +1317,52 @@ -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- ********** -2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These +2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with the following text: Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). -2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile +2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Replace the text of the section with the following text: D.2. Algorithm Use Profile For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. -2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic +2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID 5201): @@ -1367,30 +1388,30 @@ In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since CMP Updates [thisRFC] extends the polling mechanism specified in the second version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management transactions, delays detected at application level may also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages. -3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 +3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used whenever possible. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: - 1.1 Changes since RFC 6712 + 1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712 The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: * Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'. * Extend the URI structure. 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This @@ -1404,98 +1425,123 @@ Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment. The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part - of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path - segment could for example support the differentiation of specific - CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid - full CMP path can look like this: + of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path + segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel could for example + support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles. + Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the Lightweight CMP + Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile], could indicate PKI + management operations using an operationLabel . A valid + full CMP URI can look like this: http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp - http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel - http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel - http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel + http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/ + http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/ + http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p// 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of - that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI - prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. + that document. As this document defines a new well-known URI suffix, + the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. - Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the - section: + Replace the second paragraph of this section with the following text: - In the registry of well-known URIs (see - https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known- - uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the - following change has been performed. + 6.1. Well-Known URI Registration - One new name entry has been added: + This document defines a new entry with the following content in the + "Well-Known URIs" registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ + well-known-uris/) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615]. - +============+===================+============+ - | URI suffix | Change controller | References | - +============+===================+============+ - | cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] | - +------------+-------------------+------------+ + URI Suffix: cmp + Change Controller: IETF + References: [thisRFC] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] + Related Information: CMP has a sub-registry at + [https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/] - Table 4: Addition to the well-known URI - registry + 6.2. CMP Well-Known URI Registry + + This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled + "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at + https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/) with a new registry "CMP Well- + Known URI Path Segments" containing three columns: Path Segment, + Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the + Specification Required RFC 8615 [RFC8615] process. The initial + contents of this registry is: + + Path Segment: p + Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g., + a CA or certificate profile name + References: [thisRFC] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] 4. IANA Considerations This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod- cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules. < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from provisional to permanent. > + < TBD: New protocol registry group "Certificate Management Protocol + (CMP)" (at https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp) and new registry + "CMP Well-Known URI Path Segments" with the initial entry 'p' must be + registered at IANA. > + 5. Security Considerations The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in - Section 2.21 to Section 2.23. No changes are made to the existing + Section 2.22 to Section 2.24. No changes are made to the existing security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. 6. Acknowledgements Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on improving this document. We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedback. 7. References 7.1. Normative References + [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport] + Sahni, M. and S. Tripathi, "CoAP Transfer for the + Certificate Management Protocol", Work in Progress, + Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04, 8 + November 2021, . + [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- - algorithms-09, 22 December 2021, + algorithms-12, 6 April 2022, . + cmp-algorithms-12>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, . @@ -1589,23 +1635,23 @@ [CVE-2008-0166] National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May 2008, . [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- - cmp-profile-09, 17 December 2021, + cmp-profile-10, 1 February 2022, . + lightweight-cmp-profile-10>. [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, . [ISO.20543-2019] International Organization for Standardization (ISO), "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and @@ -2940,25 +2987,37 @@ -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in -- [RFC6402] -- -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } END -Appendix B. History of changes +Appendix B. History of Changes Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document. + From version 17 -> 18: + + * Addressed comments from AD Evaluation (see thread "AD Review of + draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17") + * Added Section 2.8 to clarify on the usage of GeneralizedTime (see + thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: fractional seconds") + * Updated Section 3.4 introducing the path segment 'p' to indicate + the following arbitrary label according to the discussion during + IETF 113 (see thread "/.well-known/brski reference to brski- + registry") + * Capitalized all headlines + From version 16 -> 17: * Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust * Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs * Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool From version 15 -> 16: @@ -3107,82 +3166,82 @@ From version 05 -> 06: * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. * Minor changes and corrections From version 04 -> 05: - * Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these + * Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these general messages types with EC curves (see thread "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue in CMP headers") * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three separate sections for easier readability - * Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue + * Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") - * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.24 to introduce new + * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.25 to introduce new OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Minor changes and corrections From version 03 -> 04: * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26 * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from Martin Peylo From version 02 -> 03: * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will be set up as decided in IETF 108 * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated private key as decided in IETF 108 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 - * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.25 and the ASN.1 module + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26 + * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.26 and the ASN.1 module * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- known/' as discussed in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA Considerations section * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] * Minor changes in wording From version 01 -> 02: * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim on the mailing list * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the - revocation passphrase in Section 2.25 + revocation passphrase in Section 2.26 * Moved the change history to the Appendix From version 00 -> 01: * Minor changes in wording From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates-00: * Changes required to reflect WG adoption