draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-18.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed. LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed.
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray
Expires: 16 July 2022 Entrust Expires: 8 October 2022 Entrust
12 January 2022 6 April 2022
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17 draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-18
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712. updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. and well-known URI path segments.
To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
is supposed to use EnvelopedData. is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
needed. needed.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 July 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 October 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 25 skipping to change at page 2, line 25
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9
2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13
2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 16 2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval . . . . . . 16
2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17 2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17
2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18 2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18
2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 22 2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 22
2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and 2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and
CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 CMP Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and 2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Shared Secret Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP 2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26 2.25. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26
2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28 2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28
2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of 2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 30 2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 30
2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification 2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 31 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 31
3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 31 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 32 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 32
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Appendix B. History of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations. limitations.
Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which
means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities. endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
As the main content of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
stays unchanged, this document lists all sections that are updated,
replaced, or added to the current text of the respective RFCs.
1.1. Convention and Terminology 1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210], Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words
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KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf KGA: Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
of an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA. of an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate. of the certificate.
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 4210
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence [RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible. whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:
1.1. Changes since RFC 4210 1.1. Changes Since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
* Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g., * Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
registration authority and certification authority, to express the registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management entity. the indicated PKI management entity.
* Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional * Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
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Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4: Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4:
4.5. Extended Key Usage 4.5. Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the which the certified key pair may be used. It therefore restricts the
use of a certificate to specific applications. use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation explained in this entities. This section provides a mechanism to both prove this
section offers an automatic way of checking the authorization of such delegation and enable an automated means for checking the
delegation. Such delegation MAY also be expressed by other means, authorization of this delegation. Such delegation MAY also be
e.g., explicit configuration. expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.
To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This proves the
authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given
role as described below. role as described below.
The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are: The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:
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as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which
MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple
PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such
messages. messages.
* The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and * The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
forwards the original message unchanged. forwards the original message unchanged.
* The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies * The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding particular field values or adds new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. If the changes
made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate
request, the RA MUST set the POP RAVerified. It MAY include the request, the RA MUST set the popo field to RAVerified. It MAY
original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of include the original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo
PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases field of PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for
in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the example, cases in which the CA wishes to check POP or other
original EE message). The infoType to be used in this situation information on the original EE message). The infoType to be used
is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the in this situation is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value
infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as of id-it) and the infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in
the message in PKIBody). the same order as the message in PKIBody).
* The RA collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the * A PKI management entity collects several messages that are to be
same direction and forwards them in a batch. In communication to forwarded in the same direction and forwards them in a batch.
the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response Request messages can be transferred as batch upstream (towards the
or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance CA); response or announce messages can be transferred as batch
be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI downstream (towards an RA, but not to the EE). This can for
management entities. instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two
PKI management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows: PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
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EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
[RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data
structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for
backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData. The use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED to use
EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new here, which makes the update backward compatible. Using the new
syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on- syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
the-wire compatible with the old syntax. the-wire compatible with the old syntax.
To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced
by this document. Details on the usage of pvno values is described by this document. Details on the usage of pvno values is described
in Section 7. in Section 7.
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* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension * Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].
* A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be * A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response 2.8. New Section 5.2.9 - GeneralizedTime
The following subsection point implementers to [RFC5280] regarding
usage of GeneralizedTime.
Insert this section after Section 5.2.8.4:
5.2.9 GeneralizedTime
GeneralizedTime is a standard ASN.1 type and SHALL be used as
specified in RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5.2 [RFC5280].
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.7 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used Section 2.7 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used
in response to a p10cr message. in response to a p10cr message.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also
fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078): fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):
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(cp) message MUST be set to -1. (cp) message MUST be set to -1.
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno
values are described in Section 7. values are described in Section 7.
2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field. in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL OPTIONAL
} }
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. specify a hash algorithm in the OID or in the parameters. In such
In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash
the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise,
Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as
algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is
hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must
header must be cmp2021(3). be cmp2021(3).
2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing EC curves. Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
Types Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent request. This document updates the handling by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
information as described in Section 2.7 above. information as described in Section 2.7 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
skipping to change at page 14, line 20 skipping to change at page 14, line 20
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism. use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile caCerts. The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile
Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:
2.3.19.14 CA Certificates 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates. This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate | < absent > CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in
Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
skipping to change at page 15, line 26 skipping to change at page 15, line 26
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
} }
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE. needs of the EE.
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
skipping to change at page 16, line 37 skipping to change at page 16, line 37
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used. RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval 2.17. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL Update Retrieval
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the
Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after
new Section 5.3.19.16: new Section 5.3.19.16:
5.3.19.17. CRL update retrieval 5.3.19.17. CRL Update Retrieval
This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a
DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The
DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall the server to fetch CRLs from external locations. The server shall
provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated
by the client. by the client.
skipping to change at page 17, line 23 skipping to change at page 17, line 23
dpn [0] DistributionPointName, dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames } issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource, source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
< TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it- < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
crls (TBD2). > crls (TBD2). >
2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content 2.18. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of
error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity
to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
requests and to error messages. requests and to error messages.
Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
one: one:
This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info
skipping to change at page 18, line 5 skipping to change at page 18, line 5
This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to
the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting",
the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.
Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the
transaction (if a transaction is in progress). transaction (if a transaction is in progress).
2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response 2.19. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document
extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind
of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of
the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'. the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.
Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text: Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text:
This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
skipping to change at page 19, line 7 skipping to change at page 19, line 7
CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring
to the complete response. to the complete response.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if 2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or
the final response to some other type of request is available; the final response to some other type of request is available;
otherwise, it will return a pollRep. otherwise, it will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number 3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
pollReq.. pollReq.
4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in 4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
response, then this will be treated as the final response to the response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
original request. original request.
The following client-side state machine describes polling for The following client-side state machine describes polling for
individual CertResponse elements. individual CertResponse elements.
START START
skipping to change at page 22, line 30 skipping to change at page 22, line 30
12 <- pollRep <- 12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait 13 Wait
14 Format pollReq 14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq -> 15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of original request 16 Check status of original request
general message response is ready general message response is ready
17 Format genp 17 Format genp
18 <- genp <- 18 <- genp <-
19 Handle genp 19 Handle genp
2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation 2.20. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol
versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP
version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg. hashAlg.
Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following
text: text:
This section defines the version negotiation between client and This section defines the version negotiation between client and
skipping to change at page 24, line 12 skipping to change at page 24, line 12
supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the
unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the
pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest
supported version for this request message, then the version in the supported version for this request message, then the version in the
error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for
this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest
supported version for this request message then the version in the supported version for this request message then the version in the
error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this
message type. message type.
2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers 2.21. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a
client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This
document extends the section to clients with any higher version than document extends the section to clients with any higher version than
cmp1999. cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and CMP 2.22. Add Section 8.4 - Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP
message protection Message Protection
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the
CA private key for CMP message protection. CA private key for CMP message protection.
Insert this section after Section 8.3: Insert this section after Section 8.3 (Note: This fixes Errata ID
5731):
8.4. Private keys for certificate signing and CMP message protection 8.4. Private Keys for Certificate Signing and CMP Message Protection
When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private
key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to
reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required. reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required.
2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and 2.23. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and
shared secret information Shared Secret Information
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information. of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.
8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret 8.5. Entropy of Random Numbers, Key Pairs, and Shared Secret
information Information
Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random
input. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) input. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs)
to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.
An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of
possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space. As an
example of predictable random numbers see CVE-2008-0166 example of predictable random numbers see CVE-2008-0166
[CVE-2008-0166]; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are [CVE-2008-0166]; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are
discussed in Mining Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of discussed in Mining Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs]. The generation of
quality random numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019 quality random numbers is difficult. ISO/IEC 20543:2019
[ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1 [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1 [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS
31 V2.0 [AIS31], and others offer valuable guidance in this area. 31 V2.0 [AIS31], and others offer valuable guidance in this area.
skipping to change at page 25, line 36 skipping to change at page 25, line 38
information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the
shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
key pair. key pair.
For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is
not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
information is re-used for several key management operations, the information is re-used for several key management operations, the
entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
the operation. For other cases it is recommended to (a) use a shared the operation. The shared secret information should have an entropy
secret information of possibly low security strength (e.g., a that at least matches the security strength of the key material being
password) only for a single PKI management operation or (b) use a managed by the operation. Certain use cases may require shared
shared secret information with an entropy that at least matches the secret information that may be of a low security strength, e.g., a
security strength of the key material being managed by the operation. human generated password. It is RECOMMENDED that such secret
information be limited to a single PKI management operation.
2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages 2.24. Add Section 8.6 - Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band
provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation. provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.
Insert this section after new Section 8.5: Insert this section after new Section 8.5:
8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages 8.6. Trust Anchor Provisioning Using CMP Messages
The provider of trust anchors, which typically will be an RA involved A provider of trust anchors, which may be an RA involved in
in configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be- configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless it can take trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless the specific
responsibility for making the recipient trust them. When doing so, deployment scenario can ensure that it is adequate that the receiving
it MUST exert the same due diligence as for its own trust anchors. EE trusts these certificates, e.g., by loading them into its trust
store.
Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field
of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA
certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate
the message sender without already trusting any of the CA the message sender without already trusting any of the CA
certificates given in the message. certificates given in the message.
Moreover, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized source Moreover, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized source
of trust anchors. This authorization is typically indicated using of trust anchors. This authorization is governed by local policy and
shared secret information or with a signature-based message typically indicated using shared secret information or with a
protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly signature-based message protection using a certificate issued by a
authorized for this purpose. PKI that is explicitly authorized for this purpose.
2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations 2.25. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the Replace the fourth paragraph of this section with the following text:
section:
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi- https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one
addition has been performed. addition has been performed.
One new entry has been added: One new entry has been added:
+=========+=============+============+ +=========+=============+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=============+============+ +=========+=============+============+
| 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC] | | 32 | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------+------------+ +---------+-------------+------------+
Table 1: Addition to the PKIX Table 1: Addition to the PKIX
Extended Key Purpose Identifiers Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
registry Registry
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi- Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
RFC 7299 [RFC7299] seven additions have been performed. RFC 7299 [RFC7299] seven additions have been performed.
Seven new entries have been added: Seven new entries have been added:
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
skipping to change at page 27, line 31 skipping to change at page 27, line 31
| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] | | TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] | | TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP
Information Types registry Information Types Registry
< TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it- < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
crls (TBD2). > crls (TBD2). >
In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
Two new entries have been added: Two new entries have been added:
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
| 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls registry Registration Controls Registry
2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 2.26. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated
accordingly. accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In
particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section
5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that
confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization
request or certificate request message.) This conveys a request or certificate request message.) This conveys a
revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA. revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA.
For use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of When EnvelopedData is used, this is in the decrypted bytes of
encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in encryptedContent field. When EncryptedValue is used, this is in
the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the the decrypted bytes of the encValue field. Furthermore, the
transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
characteristics. characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in * Either the localKeyId attribute of EnvelopedData as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint RFC 2985 [RFC2985] or the valueHint field of EncryptedValue MAY
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 2.27. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This
fixes Errata ID 2615): fixes Errata ID 2615):
skipping to change at page 29, line 40 skipping to change at page 29, line 40
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This
-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
-- ********** -- **********
2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These 2.28. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles Profiles
Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document
updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text: the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile 2.29. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 2.30. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization
Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID
5201): 5201):
skipping to change at page 31, line 14 skipping to change at page 31, line 14
In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error
handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP.
Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at
transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since CMP Updates transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since CMP Updates
[thisRFC] extends the polling mechanism specified in the second [thisRFC] extends the polling mechanism specified in the second
version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management
transactions, delays detected at application level may also be transactions, delays detected at application level may also be
handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages. handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages.
3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes Since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
[RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence [RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
whenever possible. whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:
1.1 Changes since RFC 6712 1.1 Changes Since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
* Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'. * Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.
* Extend the URI structure. * Extend the URI structure.
3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This
skipping to change at page 31, line 51 skipping to change at page 31, line 51
Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment. interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path
segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path of the full operation path to provide further distinction. The path
segment could for example support the differentiation of specific segment 'p' followed by an arbitraryLabel <name> could for example
CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid support the differentiation of specific CAs or certificate profiles.
full CMP path can look like this: Further path segments, e.g., as specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile], could indicate PKI
management operations using an operationLabel <operation>. A valid
full CMP URI can look like this:
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/<operation>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/p/<name>/<operation>
3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations
Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI that document. As this document defines a new well-known URI suffix,
prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the Replace the second paragraph of this section with the following text:
section:
In the registry of well-known URIs (see 6.1. Well-Known URI Registration
https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the
following change has been performed.
One new name entry has been added: This document defines a new entry with the following content in the
"Well-Known URIs" registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
well-known-uris/) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615].
+============+===================+============+ URI Suffix: cmp
| URI suffix | Change controller | References | Change Controller: IETF
+============+===================+============+ References: [thisRFC] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport]
| cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] | Related Information: CMP has a sub-registry at
+------------+-------------------+------------+ [https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/]
Table 4: Addition to the well-known URI 6.2. CMP Well-Known URI Registry
registry
This document defines a new protocol registry group entitled
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" (at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp/) with a new registry "CMP Well-
Known URI Path Segments" containing three columns: Path Segment,
Description, and Reference. New items can be added using the
Specification Required RFC 8615 [RFC8615] process. The initial
contents of this registry is:
Path Segment: p
Description: Indicates that the next path segment specifies, e.g.,
a CA or certificate profile name
References: [thisRFC] [I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport]
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
[RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod- [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
ASN.1 modules. ASN.1 modules.
< TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires
2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from
provisional to permanent. > provisional to permanent. >
< TBD: New protocol registry group "Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP)" (at https://www.iana.org/assignments/cmp) and new registry
"CMP Well-Known URI Path Segments" with the initial entry 'p' must be
registered at IANA. >
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in
Section 2.21 to Section 2.23. No changes are made to the existing Section 2.22 to Section 2.24. No changes are made to the existing
security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun
Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
valuable suggestions on improving this document. valuable suggestions on improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback. feedback.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport]
Sahni, M. and S. Tripathi, "CoAP Transfer for the
Certificate Management Protocol", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04, 8
November 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-ace-cmpv2-coap-transport-04>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
algorithms-09, 22 December 2021, algorithms-12, 6 April 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cmp-algorithms-09>. cmp-algorithms-12>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
skipping to change at page 35, line 43 skipping to change at page 36, line 22
[CVE-2008-0166] [CVE-2008-0166]
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
"National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May
2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>. 2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
cmp-profile-09, 17 December 2021, cmp-profile-10, 1 February 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
lightweight-cmp-profile-09>. lightweight-cmp-profile-10>.
[IEEE.802.1AR_2018] [IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
[ISO.20543-2019] [ISO.20543-2019]
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
"Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
skipping to change at page 64, line 5 skipping to change at page 64, line 34
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402] -- [RFC6402]
-- --
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
Appendix B. History of changes Appendix B. History of Changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document. document.
From version 17 -> 18:
* Addressed comments from AD Evaluation (see thread "AD Review of
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17")
* Added Section 2.8 to clarify on the usage of GeneralizedTime (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: fractional seconds")
* Updated Section 3.4 introducing the path segment 'p' to indicate
the following arbitrary label according to the discussion during
IETF 113 (see thread "/.well-known/brski reference to brski-
registry")
* Capitalized all headlines
From version 16 -> 17: From version 16 -> 17:
* Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors * Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors
granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust
* Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to * Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to
reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs
* Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool * Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool
From version 15 -> 16: From version 15 -> 16:
skipping to change at page 67, line 28 skipping to change at page 68, line 24
From version 05 -> 06: From version 05 -> 06:
* Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 04 -> 05: From version 04 -> 05:
* Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these * Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these
general messages types with EC curves (see thread general messages types with EC curves (see thread
"AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
in CMP headers") in CMP headers")
* Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
separate sections for easier readability separate sections for easier readability
* Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue * Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
rsaKeyLen") rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.24 to introduce new * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.25 to introduce new
OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
"dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
* Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 03 -> 04: From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
* Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26
* Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
Martin Peylo Martin Peylo
From version 02 -> 03: From version 02 -> 03:
* Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108 be set up as decided in IETF 108
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108 private key as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.26
* Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.25 and the ASN.1 module * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.26 and the ASN.1 module
* Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
known/' as discussed in IETF 108 known/' as discussed in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations section * Updated the IANA Considerations section
* Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
* Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
* Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list on the mailing list
* Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.25 revocation passphrase in Section 2.26
* Moved the change history to the Appendix * Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01: From version 00 -> 01:
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00: updates-00:
* Changes required to reflect WG adoption * Changes required to reflect WG adoption
 End of changes. 87 change blocks. 
162 lines changed or deleted 220 lines changed or added

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