LAMPS Working Group                                    H. Brockhaus, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved)                          Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track                                 J. Gray
Expires: 25 June 16 July 2022                                            Entrust
                                                        22 December 2021
                                                         12 January 2022

             Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
                    draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-16
                    draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-17

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of
   Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This document
   updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.

   The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
   instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
   improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
   types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
   and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.

   To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
   EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
   is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

   CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
   EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
   explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
   needed.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Convention and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
           (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header  . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . .   8
     2.6.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . .   8
     2.7.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . .   9
     2.8.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response  . . . . .  11
     2.9.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
            Content  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . .  13
     2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
            Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . .  13
     2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update  . . .  14
     2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template  . .  15
     2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval  . . . . . .  16
     2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . .  17
     2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . .  18
     2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation  . . . . . . . . .  22
     2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
            Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and
            CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and
            shared secret information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24

     2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP
            messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . .  26
     2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase  . .  28
     2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
            Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
            These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile  . . . . . .  30
     2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
            (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
           Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     3.1.  Update Section 1. - Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     3.2.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . .  31
     3.3.  Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . .  31
     3.4.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . .  32
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36  37
     A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   Appendix B.  History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63  64
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69

1.  Introduction

   While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
   developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
   identified in the original CMP specification.  This document updates
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
   limitations.

   Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which
   means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.

   This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
   endpoints on registration and certification authorities.

1.1.  Convention and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
   RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  The following key words
   are used:

   CA:   Certification authority, which issues certificates.

   RA:   Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
         CA delegates certificate management functions such as
         authorization checks.

   KGA:  Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
         of an EE.  The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.

   EE:   End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
         certificate.  An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
         of the certificate.

2.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

2.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
   [RFC4210].  They are always related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:

   1.1.  Changes since RFC 4210

   The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:

   *  Add new extended key usages for various CMP server types, e.g.,
      registration authority and certification authority, to express the
      authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
      containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
      the indicated PKI management entity.

   *  Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
      use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.

   *  Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
      EncryptedValue to better support crypto agility in CMP.  Note that
      according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1. point 9 the use of
      the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
      EnvelopedData structure.  RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
      EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
      EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData.  For reasons of
      completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been
      exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  This includes
      the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
      certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases.  To
      properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
      EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a
      transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

   *  Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting
      confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
      e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to
      use to compute the certHash.

   *  Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
      root CA update, a certificate request template, or a CRL update.

   *  Extend the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and
      error messages.

   *  Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2
      [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].

2.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage

   The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP
   servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end
   entities.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4:

   4.5.  Extended Key Usage

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
   which the certified key pair may be used.  It therefore restricts the
   use of a certificate to specific applications.

   A CA may want to delegate parts of its duties to other PKI management
   entities.  The mechanism to prove this delegation explained in this
   section offers an automatic way of checking the authorization of such
   delegation.  Such delegation MAY also be expressed by other means,
   e.g., explicit configuration.

   To offer automatic validation for the delegation of a role by a CA to
   another entity, the certificates used for CMP message protection or
   signed data for central key generation MUST be issued by the
   delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs.  This proves the
   authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act in the given
   role as described below.

   The OIDs to be used for these EKUs are:

      id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 27 }

      id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 28 }

      id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) 32 }

   Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
   a CMC RA.  As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
   using CMC or CMP as the certificate management protocol, these OIDs
   MAY be re-used.

   The meaning of the id-kp-cmKGA EKU is as follows:

   CMP KGA:  CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
             cmKGA extended key usage.  The CMP KGA knows the private
             key it generated on behalf of the end entity.  This is a
             very sensitive service and therefore needs specific
             authorization.  This authorization is with the CA
             certificate itself.  Alternatively, the CA MAY delegate the
             authorization by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage
             in the certificate used to authenticate the origin of the
             generated private key or the delegation MAY be determined
             through local configuration of the end entity.

   Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates
   IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018], CA certificates may
   have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
   99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
   specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and
   RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]).  Such validity periods SHOULD
   NOT be used for protection of CMP messages and key generation.
   Certificates containing one of the above EKUs SHOULD NOT use
   indefinite expiration date.

2.3.  Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header

   Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header.
   This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of
   EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7.

   Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
   of pvno with the following text:

      PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
         pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                           cmp2021(3) },
         sender              GeneralName,
         recipient           GeneralName,
         messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
         protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                             OPTIONAL,
         senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
         recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
         transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
         freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
         generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                             InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
      }

      PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String

   The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.

2.4.  New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile

   Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
   OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field.  This section introduces
   id-it-certProfile.

   Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:

   5.1.1.3.  CertProfile
   This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
   e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
   template, see Section 5.3.19.16.

      id-it-certProfile  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
      CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String

   When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
   elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
   and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
   order.

   When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
   profile names.

2.5.  Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information

   Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based
   protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.

   Replace the first paragraph with the following text:

   In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
   sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
   previous PKI management operation).  PKIProtection will contain a MAC
   value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
   CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].  The PasswordBasedMac
   is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):

   Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes
   Errata ID 2616):

   Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain
   constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g.,
   ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with
   PasswordBasedMac computation.

2.6.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection

   Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
   This document enables using nested messages also for batch-delivery
   transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with
   mixed body types.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.1.3.4.  Multiple Protection
   When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such
   as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which
   MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
   certificates shared between the RA and the CA).  Moreover, multiple
   PKI messages MAY be aggregated.  There are several use cases for such
   messages.

   *  The RA confirms having validated and authorized a message and
      forwards the original message unchanged.

   *  The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., adds or modifies
      particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
      them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody.  If the changes
      made by the RA to PKIMessage break the POP of a certificate
      request, the RA MUST set the POP RAVerified.  It MAY include the
      original PKIMessage from the EE in the generalInfo field of
      PKIHeader of a nested message (to accommodate, for example, cases
      in which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the
      original EE message).  The infoType to be used in this situation
      is {id-it 15} (see Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the
      infoValue is PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as
      the message in PKIBody).

   *  The RA collects several messages that are to be forwarded in the
      same direction and forwards them in a batch.  In communication to
      the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response
      or announcement messages will be collected.  This can for instance
      be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
      management entities.

   These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
   PKI message.  The structure used is as follows:

      NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

2.7.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values

   Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of
   EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data.  This document extends
   the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.2.2.  Encrypted Values

   Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
   certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the
   EncryptedKey data structure is used.

      EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
         encryptedValue        EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
         envelopedData     [0] EnvelopedData }

   See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
   [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax.  Using the EncryptedKey data
   structure offers the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for
   backward compatibility only) or EnvelopedData.  The use of the
   EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
   EnvelopedData structure.  Therefore, it is recommended to use
   EnvelopedData.

   Note: The EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF [RFC4211] is reused
   here, which makes the update backward compatible.  Using the new
   syntax with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bits-on-
   the-wire compatible with the old syntax.

   To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced
   by this document.  Details on the usage of pvno values is described
   in Section 7.

   The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
   key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

   EnvelopedData is used as follows:

   *  It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
      is encrypted only for one recipient.

   *  It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
      as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure
      as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] and [RFC8933] signed by
      the Key Generation Authority.

   *  It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
      the encryptedContent field.

   The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
   section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
   symmetric content-encryption key.  This content-encryption key MUST
   be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
   management techniques.

   The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
   depends on the credential available at the recipient:

   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].  This is the preferred
      technique.

   *  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key transport key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].

   *  A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the password-based key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].

2.8.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response

   Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
   Response.  This document updates the syntax by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
   Section 2.7 above.  Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used
   in response to a p10cr message.

   Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also
   fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):

      CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
          caPubs          [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                              OPTIONAL,
          response            SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
      }

      CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
          certReqId           INTEGER,
          status              PKIStatusInfo,
          certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
          rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
          -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
          -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] [RFC4211]
      }

      CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
         certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
         privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
         -- see [CRMF] [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
         publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
      }

      CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
         certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
         encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
      }

   Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:

   A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
   structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
   Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
   (cp) message MUST be set to -1.

   Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.

   Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
   introduced by this document.  Details on the usage of different pvno
   values are described in Section 7.

2.9.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content

   This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
   type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
   algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
   in the signatureAlgorithm field.

   Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:

      CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
         certHash    OCTET STRING,
         certReqId   INTEGER,
         statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
         hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                     OPTIONAL
      }

   The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
   signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
   specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters.
   In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify
   the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value.
   Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash
   algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature.  If
   hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message
   header must be cmp2021(3).

2.10.  Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types

   The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
   Types on referencing EC curves.

   Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:

   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements need to be given, one per named curve.

2.11.  Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
       Types

   The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
   Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.

   Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:

   Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
   elements need to be given, one per named curve.

2.12.  Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase

   Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
   a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
   request.  This document updates the handling by using the parent
   structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
   information as described in Section 2.7 above.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   5.3.19.9.  Revocation Passphrase

   This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
   purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
   that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
   authenticate the request).  See Appendix B for further details on the
   use of this mechanism.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
      GenRep:    {id-it 12}, < absent >

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.

2.13.  New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates

   The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
   caCerts.  The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile
   Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:

   2.3.19.14 CA Certificates

   This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 17}, < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                             CMPCertificate | < absent >

2.14.  New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update

   The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
   rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate.  The use is specified in
   Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:

   5.3.19.15.  Root CA Certificate Update

   This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA
   certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message.
   In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
   response model.

   The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor
   structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if
   available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >

      RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate

      RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent

      RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
         newWithNew       CMPCertificate,
         newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
         oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
         }

   Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
   newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
   needs of the EE.

2.15.  New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template

   The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
   it-certReqTemplate.  Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
   Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].

   Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:

   5.3.19.16.  Certificate Request Template

   This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
   requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions.  The
   controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
   details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
   certify.

   The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
   algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than
   rsaEncryption.  The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
   algorithm.  The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
   according to the algorithm identified.  For example, when the
   algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
   elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480].

   The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
   rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
   the RSA key.

      GenMsg:    {id-it 19}, < absent >
      GenRep:    {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >

      CertReqTemplateValue  ::= CertReqTemplateContent

      CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
        certTemplate           CertTemplate,
        keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL }

      Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue

      id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
         mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }

      AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}

      id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
         mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }

      RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)

   The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
   used for a future certificate request.  The publicKey field in the
   certTemplate MUST NOT be used.  In case the PKI management entity
   wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
   MUST be used.  One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
   RSA key length MUST be used.

   Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]

2.16.  New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval

   The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
   it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls.  Details are specified in the
   Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].  Insert this section after
   new Section 5.3.19.16:

   5.3.19.17.  CRL update retrieval

   This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
   of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
   has, if available.  A CRL source is given either by a
   DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA.  The
   DistributionPointName should be treated as an internal pointer to
   identify a CRL that the server already has and not as a way to ask
   the server to fetch CRLs from external locations.  The server shall
   provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the ones indicated
   by the client.

      GenMsg:    {id-it TBD1}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
      GenRep:    {id-it TBD2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                               CertificateList  |  < absent >

      CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
         dpn          [0] DistributionPointName,
         issuer       [1] GeneralNames }

      CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
         source       CRLSource,
         thisUpdate   Time OPTIONAL }

   < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
   crls (TBD2). >

2.17.  Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content

   Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of
   error messages.  This document adds a use by a PKI management entity
   to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
   requests and to error messages.

   Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
   one:

   This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info
   and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of
   responses.

   Replace the second paragraph with the following text:

   This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
   If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
   PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
   not valid.  In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to
   the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting",
   the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.
   Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the
   transaction (if a transaction is in progress).

2.18.  Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response

   Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
   messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages.  This document
   extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind
   of request message.  This update also fixes the inconsistent use of
   the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.

   Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text:

   This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
   client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an
   outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been
   received).

      PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
         certReqId    INTEGER }

      PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
         certReqId    INTEGER,
         checkAfter   INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
         reason       PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is
   initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status
   "waiting".  For any type of request message, polling can be initiated
   with an error response messages with status "waiting".  The following
   clauses describe how polling messages are used.  It is assumed that
   multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions.  There
   will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a
   CertStatus for an issued certificate.

   1  In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
      certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each
      certConf.  An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each
      CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status
      "waiting" and in response to an error message with status
      "waiting".  Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
      CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring
      to the complete response.

   2  In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
      one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or
      the final response to some other type of request is available;
      otherwise, it will return a pollRep.

   3  If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
      of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
      pollReq..

   4  If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
      the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
      response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
      original request.

   The following client-side state machine describes polling for
   individual CertResponse elements.

                               START
                                 |
                                 v
                              Send ir
                                 | ip
                                 v
                            Check status
                            of returned <------------------------+
                               certs                             |
                                 |                               |
       +------------------------>|<------------------+           |
       |                         |                   |           |
       |        (issued)         v       (waiting)   |           |
     Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to       |
    conf list           for each certificate      pending list   |
                                 /                               |
                                /                                |
                   (conf list) /     (empty conf list)           |
                              /                     ip           |
                             /                 +-----------------+
      (empty pending list)  /                  |    pollRep
        END <---- Send certConf        Send pollReq---------->Wait
                         |                 ^   ^               |
                         |                 |   |               |
                         +-----------------+   +---------------+
                            (pending list)

   In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two
   certificates in one request.

    Step  End Entity                       PKI
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    1   Format ir
    2                    -> ir      ->
    3                                    Handle ir
    4                                    Manual intervention is
                                         required for both certs.
    5                    <- ip      <-
    6   Process ip
    7   Format pollReq
    8                    -> pollReq  ->
    9                                    Check status of cert requests
    10                                   Certificates not ready
    11                                   Format pollRep
    12                   <- pollRep  <-
    13  Wait
    14  Format pollReq
    15                   -> pollReq  ->
    16                                   Check status of cert requests
    17                                   One certificate is ready
    18                                   Format ip
    19                   <- ip       <-
    20  Handle ip
    21  Format certConf
    22                   -> certConf ->
    23                                   Handle certConf
    24                                   Format ack
    25                   <- pkiConf   <-
    26  Format pollReq
    27                   -> pollReq  ->
    28                                   Check status of certificate
    29                                   Certificate is ready
    30                                   Format ip
    31                   <- ip       <-
    31  Handle ip
    32  Format certConf
    33                   -> certConf ->
    34                                   Handle certConf
    35                                   Format ack
    36                   <- pkiConf  <-

   The following client-side state machine describes polling for a
   complete response message.

                                   Start
                                     |
                                     | Send request
                                     |
                +----------- Receive response ------------+
                |                                         |
                | ip/cp/kup/error with                    | other
                | status "waiting"                        | response
                |                                         |
                v                                         |
    +------> Polling                                      |
    |           |                                         |
    |           | Send pollReq                            |
    |           | Receive response                        |
    |           |                                         |
    |   pollRep | other response                          |
    +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
                                     |
                                     v
                               Handle response
                                     |
                                     v
                                    End

   In the following exchange, the end-entity is sending a general
   message request, and the response is delayed by the server.

    Step  End Entity                       PKI
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    1   Format genm
    2                  -> genm     ->
    3                                 Handle genm
    4                                 delay in response is necessary
    5                                 Format error message "waiting"
                                        with certReqId set to -1
    6                   <- error   <-
    7   Process error
    8   Format pollReq
    9                   -> pollReq ->
    10                                Check status of original request
                                      general message response not ready
    11                                Format pollRep
    12                  <- pollRep <-
    13  Wait
    14  Format pollReq
    15                  -> pollReq ->
    16                                Check status of original request
                                      general message response is ready
    17                                Format genp
    18                  <- genp    <-
    19  Handle genp

2.19.  Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation

   Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol
   versions.  This document describes the handling of the additional CMP
   version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
   hashAlg.

   Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following
   text:

   This section defines the version negotiation between client and
   server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510
   [RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021
   (specified in this document).  The only difference between protocol
   versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces
   EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus.

   If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a
   request as follows:

   *  If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
      server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-
      of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest
      version supported by both itself and the server.

   *  If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports,
      then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it
      supports.

   If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be
   transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose
   the version for a request message containing the CertReqMessages data
   structure as follows:

   *  If the client accepts EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then
      it MUST use cmp2021.

   *  If the client does not accept EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue,
      then it MUST use cmp2000.

   *  If the client accepts both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue:

      -  If the client knows that the Server supports EnvelopedData
         (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-
         band means), then it MUST use cmp2021.

      -  If the client knows that the server supports only
         EncryptedValue, then it MUST use cmp2000.

      -  If the client does not know whether the server supports
         EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue, then it MUST send the request
         message using cmp2021.

   If a client sends a certConf message and the signatureAlgorithm of
   the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash algorithm
   (neither in its OID nor in its parameters) there are two cases:

   *  A client supporting cmp2021 MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf
      message.

   *  A client not supporting cmp2021 will not be able to handle this
      situation and will fail or reject the certificate.

   If a server receives a message with version cmp1999 and supports it,
   then the version of the response message MUST also be cmp1999.  If a
   server receives a message with a version higher or lower than it
   supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the
   unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the
   pKIStatusInfo).  If the received version is higher than the highest
   supported version for this request message, then the version in the
   error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for
   this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest
   supported version for this request message then the version in the
   error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this
   message type.

2.20.  Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers

   Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a
   client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server.  This
   document extends the section to clients with any higher version than
   cmp1999.

   Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text:

   If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
   than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
   cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.

2.21.  Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and CMP
       message protection

   The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the
   CA private key for CMP message protection.

   Insert this section after Section 8.3:

   8.4.  Private keys for certificate signing and CMP message protection

   When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private
   key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to
   reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required.

2.22.  Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and
       shared secret information

   The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
   of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.

   8.5.  Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret
   information

   Implementations must generate nonces and private keys from random
   input.  The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs)
   to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security.
   An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment
   that produced the keys and to search the resulting small set of
   possibilities than brute-force searching the whole key space.  As an
   example of predictable random numbers see CVE-2008-0166
   [CVE-2008-0166]; consequences of low-entropy random numbers are
   discussed in Mining Your Ps and Qs [MiningPsQs].  The generation of
   quality random numbers is difficult.  ISO/IEC 20543:2019
   [ISO.20543-2019], NIST SP 800-90A Rev.1 [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1], BSI AIS
   31 V2.0 [AIS31], and others offer valuable guidance in this area.

   If shared secret information is generated by a cryptographically
   secure random-number generator (CSRNG) it is safe to assume that the
   entropy of the shared secret information equals its bit length.  If
   no CSRNG is used, the entropy of a shared secret information depends
   on the details of the generation process and cannot be measure
   securely after it has been generated.  If user-generated passwords
   are used as shared secret information, their entropy cannot be
   measured and are typically insufficient for protected delivery of
   centrally generated keys or trust anchors.

   If the entropy of a shared secret information protecting the delivery
   of a centrally generated key pair is known, it should not be less
   than the security strength of that key pair; if the shared secret
   information is re-used for different key pairs, the security of the
   shared secret information should exceed the security strength of each
   key pair.

   For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
   anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs or genm (a) that is
   not concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
   information is re-used for several key management operations, the
   entropy of the shared secret information, if known, should not be
   less than the security strength of the trust anchor being managed by
   the operation.  For other cases it is recommended to (a) use a shared
   secret information of possibly low security strength (e.g., a
   password) only for a single PKI management operation or (b) use a
   shared secret information with an entropy that at least matches the
   security strength of the key material being managed by the operation.

2.23.  Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages

   The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band
   provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.

   Insert this section after new Section 8.5:

   8.6.  Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages
   The provider of trust anchors, which typically will be an RA involved
   in configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
   trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless it can take
   responsibility for making the recipient trust them.  When doing so,
   it MUST exert the same due diligence as for its own trust anchors.

   Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field
   of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA
   certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate
   the message sender without already trusting any of the CA
   certificates given in the message.

   Moreover, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized source
   of trust anchors.  This authorization is typically indicated using
   shared secret information or with a signature-based message
   protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly
   authorized for this purpose.

2.24.  Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations

   Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
   the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.

   Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
   section:

   In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
   Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
   numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] one
   addition has been performed.

   One new entry has been added:

   +=========+=============+============+
   | Decimal | Description | References |
   +=========+=============+============+
   | 32      | id-kp-cmKGA | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-------------+------------+

       Table 1: Addition to the PKIX
      Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
                  registry

   In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
   Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
   numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
   RFC 7299 [RFC7299] seven additions have been performed.

   Seven new entries have been added:

   +=========+=======================+============+
   | Decimal | Description           | References |
   +=========+=======================+============+
   | 17      | id-it-caCerts         | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 18      | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 19      | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 20      | id-it-rootCaCert      | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | 21      | id-it-certProfile     | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | TBD1    | id-it-crlStatusList   | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+
   | TBD2    | id-it-crls            | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+-----------------------+------------+

          Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP
              Information Types registry

   < TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
   crls (TBD2). >

   In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
   Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
   defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.

   Two new entries have been added:

   +=========+======================+============+
   | Decimal | Description          | References |
   +=========+======================+============+
   | 11      | id-regCtrl-algId     | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+----------------------+------------+
   | 12      | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC]  |
   +---------+----------------------+------------+

          Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
            Registration Controls registry

2.25.  Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase

   Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
   passphrase.  As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
   the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
   described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated
   accordingly.

   Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
   text:

   *  The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
      GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
      field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time.  (In
      particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section
      5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that
      confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an initialization
      request or certificate request message.)  This conveys a
      revocation passphrase chosen by the entity to the relevant CA/RA.
      For use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
      encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
      the decrypted bytes of the encValue field.  Furthermore, the
      transfer is accomplished with appropriate confidentiality
      characteristics.

   Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
   text:

   *  When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
      RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
      field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
      with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
      correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
      constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).

2.26.  Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications

   Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
   request message behavior.  As this document updates RFC 4210
   [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
   EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is
   updated accordingly.

   Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
   definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This
   fixes Errata ID 2615):

   -- **********
   -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
   -- * given in [CRMF] [RFC4211] pertains not only to certTemplate, but
   -- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
   -- **********
   -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
   -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
   -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER).  NOTE: If CertReqMsg
   -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
   -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
   -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
   -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
   -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate).  If
   -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
   -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
   -- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
   -- * and MUST be signed.
   -- **********

   Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
   definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:

   -- **********
   -- *  the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
   -- *  Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
   -- *  document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
   -- *  that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
   -- *  "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
   -- *  compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.  This
   -- *  allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
   -- *  private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
   -- *  with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
   -- **********

2.27.  Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
       Profiles

   Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
   interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
   Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210].  This document
   updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.

   Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
   the following text:

   Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
   (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).

2.28.  Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile

   Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
   implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
   Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
   [RFC4210].  This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
   specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   D.2.  Algorithm Use Profile

   For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
   conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
   Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].

2.29.  Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
       Authenticated Scheme)

   Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
   certification scheme.  This scheme shall continue using
   EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.

   Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization
   Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID
   5201):

   protectionAlg        MSG_MAC_ALG

   Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
   crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
   message with the following text:

      -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
      -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue

3.  Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP)

3.1.  Update Section 1. - Introduction

   To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of
   PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the
   introduction of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] is updated.

   Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:

   In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error
   handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP.
   Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at
   transfer level regardless of the message contents.  Since CMP Updates
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates]
   [thisRFC] extends the polling mechanism specified in the second
   version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI management
   transactions, delays detected at application level may also be
   handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages.

3.2.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712

   The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
   [RFC6712].  They are related to the base specification.  Hence
   references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:

   1.1 Changes since RFC 6712

   The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:

   *  Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.

   *  Extend the URI structure.

3.3.  Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI

   Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs.  This
   document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the
   URIs.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text:

   3.6.  HTTP Request-URI

   Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
   transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
   defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
   interworking in a multi-vendor environment.

   The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
   form the CMP server URI.  This is at least the authority portion of
   the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
   segment of the PKI management entity.  Additionally, OPTIONAL path
   segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
   of the full operation path to provide further distinction.  A path
   segment could for example support the differentiation of specific
   CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations.  A valid
   full CMP path can look like this:

      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
      http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel

3.4.  Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations

   Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
   that document.  As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI
   prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.

   Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
   section:

   In the registry of well-known URIs (see
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
   uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the
   following change has been performed.

   One new name entry has been added:

   +============+===================+============+
   | URI suffix | Change controller | References |
   +============+===================+============+
   | cmp        | IETF              | [thisRFC]  |
   +------------+-------------------+------------+

       Table 4: Addition to the well-known URI
                       registry

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
   to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].

   This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
   [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912].  The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
   cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
   Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
   ASN.1 modules.

   < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires
   2022-05-20.  The registration must be extended in time or update from
   provisional to permanent. >

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in
   Section 2.21 to Section 2.23.  No changes are made to the existing
   security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712].

6.  Acknowledgements

   Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
   on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
   updates CMC.  Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun
   Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
   valuable suggestions on improving this document.

   We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
   feedback.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
              Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
              "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
              in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
              algorithms-08, 17 November
              algorithms-09, 22 December 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              cmp-algorithms-08>.
              cmp-algorithms-09>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2510]  Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
              RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

   [RFC6712]  Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.

   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8615]  Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
              (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.

   [RFC8933]  Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.

   [RFC9045]  Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
              Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [AIS31]    Bundesamt für fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
              (BSI), Killmann, W., and W. Schindler, "A proposal for:
              Functionality classes for random number generators,
              version 2.0", 18 September 2011,
              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/
              Zertifizierung/Interpretationen/AIS_31_Functionality_class
              es_for_random_number_generators_e.pdf>.

   [CVE-2008-0166]
              National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
              "National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2008-0166", 13 May
              2008, <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0166>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Oheimb, D. V., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
              Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
              cmp-profile-08, 19 November
              cmp-profile-09, 17 December 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              lightweight-cmp-profile-08>.
              lightweight-cmp-profile-09>.

   [IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
              DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
              <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.

   [ISO.20543-2019]
              International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
              "Information technology -- Security techniques -- Test and
              analysis methods for random bit generators within ISO/IEC
              19790 and ISO/IEC 15408", ISO Draft Standard 20543-2019,
              October 2019.

   [MiningPsQs]
              Security'12: Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on
              Security symposium, Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow,
              E., and J. A. Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection
              of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices", August 2012,
              <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
              technical-sessions/presentation/heninger>.

   [NIST.SP.800-90Ar1]
              Barker, Elaine B. and John M. Kelsey, "Recommendation for
              Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
              Generators", NIST NIST SP 800-90Ar1,
              DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1, June 2015,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.

   [PKCS11]   RSA Laboratories, "The Public-Key Cryptography Standards -
              Cryptographic Token Interface Standard. Version 2.10",
              December 1999,
              <https://www.cryptsoft.com/pkcs11doc/STANDARD/
              pkcs11v2-10.pdf>.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.

   [RFC2202]  Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
              SHA-1", RFC 2202, DOI 10.17487/RFC2202, September 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2202>.

   [RFC5912]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
              Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules
A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210].  This
   module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document.  Although
   a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
   normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.

   PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
         dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
         id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

       Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time,
       AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
       --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
              FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
       -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
       -- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]

       DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
              FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}

       CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
       CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
              FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
              dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
              id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to
       -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.

       -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
       -- Appendix C of this specification

       EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
              FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
              member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
              smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- The import of Attribute is added to define
       -- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
       -- PKCS#10 [RFC2986]

       ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
       x509v3PKCert        Certificate
   }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL
   }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                         cmp2021(3) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                              InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: Each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text
       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10] [RFC2986]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.

       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody
   }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
   }   -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])

   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted                (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
          -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
          -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
          -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
          -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
          -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
          -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
          -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
       unacceptedExtension (16),
          -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
          -- the additional information requested could not be
          -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
          -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
          -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
          -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
          -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
          -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
          -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
          -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier     OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier  OPTIONAL,
       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand.
   }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
   -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
   -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
      int                  INTEGER,
      -- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      sender               GeneralName
      -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                        OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse

   }

   CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
       certificationRequestInfo  SEQUENCE {
         version                   INTEGER,
         subject                   Name,
         subjectPublicKeyInfo      SEQUENCE {
           algorithm                 AlgorithmIdentifier,
           subjectPublicKey          BIT STRING },
         attributes                [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
       signatureAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
       signature                 BIT STRING
   }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] [RFC4211]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }
   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                           CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
   }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions       OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
                                           OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
                                           OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }

   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }
   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
      -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
      -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
      -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
   }

   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and
   -- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
      -- be used.
      keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
      -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
      -- Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
      }

   id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
      AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
      -- public-key certificate

   id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
      AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA

   id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
      RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths

   -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate,
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
      -- signed with the new private root CA key
      }

   CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
      dpn          [0] DistributionPointName,
      issuer       [1] GeneralNames }

   CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      source       CRLSource,
      thisUpdate   Time OPTIONAL }

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       infoValue              ANY DEFINED BY infoType  OPTIONAL
   }
   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                        AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                        AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                          OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
   --      - syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue            ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                             CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue    ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue    ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaCert       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
   --      RootCaCertValue         ::= CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certProfile      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
   --      CertProfileValue        ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                 UTF8String
   --      - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-crlStatusList    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
   --   CRLStatusListValue         ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                  CRLStatus
   --      - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-crls             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
   --   CRLsValue                  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                            CertificateList
   --      - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
   -- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER
   }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
   }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   -- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the
   -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
   -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}

   pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}

   LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING

   END -- of CMP module

A.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module

   This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
   This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document.  The
   module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
   RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1
   standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.

   PKIXCMP-2021
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN
   IMPORTS

   AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
   FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}

   AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
       DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
   FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}

   Certificate, CertificateList, Time, id-kp
   FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}

   DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
   FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}

   CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
       CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
   FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
       -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
       -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to
       -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.

   -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
   -- Appendix C of this specification

   CertificationRequest
   FROM PKCS-10
       {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
   -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
   -- tags).  Alternatively, implementers may directly include
   -- the [PKCS10] [RFC2986] syntax in this module

   localKeyId
   FROM PKCS-9
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
       -- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   EnvelopedData, SignedData
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
       {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
       -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
       -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   ;

   -- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
   -- constructs

   CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
   -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
   -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
   -- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
   -- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
   -- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
   -- should a need ever arise to support such generality.  Those
   -- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
   -- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
   -- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
   -- compiling this ASN.1 module.  (Note that interoperability
   -- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
   -- this change.)

   -- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate

   PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       header           PKIHeader,
       body             PKIBody,
       protection   [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
       extraCerts   [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL }

   PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage

   PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
       pvno                INTEGER     { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
                                         cmp2012(3) },
       sender              GeneralName,
       -- identifies the sender
       recipient           GeneralName,
       -- identifies the intended recipient
       messageTime     [0] GeneralizedTime         OPTIONAL,
       -- time of production of this message (used when sender
       -- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
       -- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
       protectionAlg   [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,
       -- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
       senderKID       [2] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       recipKID        [3] KeyIdentifier           OPTIONAL,
       -- to identify specific keys used for protection
       transactionID   [4] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
       -- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
       -- messages
       senderNonce     [5] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       recipNonce      [6] OCTET STRING            OPTIONAL,
       -- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
       -- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
       -- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
       -- the intended recipient of this message
       freeText        [7] PKIFreeText             OPTIONAL,
       -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
       -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
       generalInfo     [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                           InfoTypeAndValue     OPTIONAL
       -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
       -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
   }

   PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
       -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
       -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
       -- to indicate the language of the contained text;
       -- see [RFC2482] for details)

   PKIBody ::= CHOICE {       -- message-specific body elements
       ir       [0]  CertReqMessages,        --Initialization Request
       ip       [1]  CertRepMessage,         --Initialization Response
       cr       [2]  CertReqMessages,        --Certification Request
       cp       [3]  CertRepMessage,         --Certification Response
       p10cr    [4]  CertificationRequest,   --imported from [PKCS10] [RFC2986]
       popdecc  [5]  POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
       popdecr  [6]  POPODecKeyRespContent,  --pop Response
       kur      [7]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Update Request
       kup      [8]  CertRepMessage,         --Key Update Response
       krr      [9]  CertReqMessages,        --Key Recovery Request
       krp      [10] KeyRecRepContent,       --Key Recovery Response
       rr       [11] RevReqContent,          --Revocation Request
       rp       [12] RevRepContent,          --Revocation Response
       ccr      [13] CertReqMessages,        --Cross-Cert. Request
       ccp      [14] CertRepMessage,         --Cross-Cert. Response
       ckuann   [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent,     --CA Key Update Ann.
       cann     [16] CertAnnContent,         --Certificate Ann.
       rann     [17] RevAnnContent,          --Revocation Ann.
       crlann   [18] CRLAnnContent,          --CRL Announcement
       pkiconf  [19] PKIConfirmContent,      --Confirmation
       nested   [20] NestedMessageContent,   --Nested Message
       genm     [21] GenMsgContent,          --General Message
       genp     [22] GenRepContent,          --General Response
       error    [23] ErrorMsgContent,        --Error Message
       certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,     --Certificate confirm
       pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,         --Polling request
       pollRep  [26] PollRepContent          --Polling response
   }

   PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING

   ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
       header    PKIHeader,
       body      PKIBody }

   id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
   PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       salt                OCTET STRING,
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       iterationCount      INTEGER,
       -- number of times the OWF is applied
       -- note:  implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
       -- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
       -- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
   DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
       -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
       mac                 AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
       -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
       -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
   }

   PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
       accepted               (0),
       -- you got exactly what you asked for
       grantedWithMods        (1),
       -- you got something like what you asked for; the
       -- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
       rejection              (2),
       -- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
       waiting                (3),
       -- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
       -- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
       -- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
       -- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
       -- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
       revocationWarning      (4),
       -- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
       -- imminent
       revocationNotification (5),
       -- notification that a revocation has occurred
       keyUpdateWarning       (6)
       -- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
       -- CertReqMsg
   }

   PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
   -- since we can fail in more than one way!
   -- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
       badAlg              (0),
       -- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
       badMessageCheck     (1),
       -- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
       badRequest          (2),
       -- transaction not permitted or supported
       badTime             (3),
       -- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
       -- as defined by local policy
       badCertId           (4),
       -- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
       badDataFormat       (5),
       -- the data submitted has the wrong format
       wrongAuthority      (6),
       -- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
       -- one creating the response token
       incorrectData       (7),
       -- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
       missingTimeStamp    (8),
       -- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
       -- (by policy)
       badPOP              (9),
       -- the proof-of-possession failed
       certRevoked         (10),
       -- the certificate has already been revoked
       certConfirmed       (11),
       -- the certificate has already been confirmed
       wrongIntegrity      (12),
       -- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
       -- vice versa
       badRecipientNonce   (13),
       -- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
       timeNotAvailable    (14),
       -- the TSA's time source is not available
       unacceptedPolicy    (15),
       -- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
       unacceptedExtension (16),
       -- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
       addInfoNotAvailable (17),
       -- the additional information requested could not be
       -- understood or is not available
       badSenderNonce      (18),
       -- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
       badCertTemplate     (19),
       -- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
       signerNotTrusted    (20),
       -- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
       transactionIdInUse  (21),
       -- the transaction identifier is already in use
       unsupportedVersion  (22),
       -- the version of the message is not supported
       notAuthorized       (23),
       -- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
       -- request or perform the preceding action
       systemUnavail       (24),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
       systemFailure       (25),
       -- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
       duplicateCertReq    (26)
       -- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
       -- certificate already exists
   }

   PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       status        PKIStatus,
       statusString  PKIFreeText     OPTIONAL,
       failInfo      PKIFailureInfo  OPTIONAL }

   OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate

   OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
       hashAlg     [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                           OPTIONAL,
       certId      [1] CertId                  OPTIONAL,
       hashVal         BIT STRING
       -- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
       -- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
   }

   POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
   -- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).

   Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
       owf                 AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
                               OPTIONAL,

       -- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
       -- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
       -- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
       -- Challenge is to be used).
       witness             OCTET STRING,
       -- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
       -- randomly-generated INTEGER, A.  [Note that a different
       -- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
       challenge           OCTET STRING
       -- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
       -- request is being made) of Rand.
   }

   -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
   -- Rand is encrypted under the public key to form the challenge
   -- in POPODecKeyChallContent
      int                  INTEGER,
      -- the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
      sender               GeneralName
      -- the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
   }

   POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
   -- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
   -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).  The
   -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
   -- corresponding Challenge.

   CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
       caPubs       [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
                     OPTIONAL,
       response         SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }

   CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
       certReqId           INTEGER,
       -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
       -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
       -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
       status              PKIStatusInfo,
       certifiedKeyPair    CertifiedKeyPair    OPTIONAL,
       rspInfo             OCTET STRING        OPTIONAL
       -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
       -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
   }

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey      OPTIONAL,
       -- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
       -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
       -- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
       -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
       -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
       -- syntax without this change
   }

   KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status                  PKIStatusInfo,
       newSigCert          [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       caCerts             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
       keyPairHist         [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
                                        CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }

   RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails

   RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
       certDetails         CertTemplate,
       -- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
       -- the cert. for which revocation is requested
       -- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
       crlEntryDetails     Extensions{{...}}    OPTIONAL
       -- requested crlEntryExtensions
   }

   RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status       SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
       -- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
       revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
       -- IDs for which revocation was requested
       -- (same order as status)
       crls     [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
       -- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
   }
   CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       oldWithNew   CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
       newWithOld   CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
       newWithNew   CMPCertificate  -- new pub signed with new priv
   }

   CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate

   RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       status              PKIStatus,
       certId              CertId,
       willBeRevokedAt     GeneralizedTime,
       badSinceDate        GeneralizedTime,
       crlDetails          Extensions{{...}}  OPTIONAL
       -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
   }

   CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
   PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL

   NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages

   -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
   -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
   -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
   -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
   -- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      certTemplate           CertTemplate,
      -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
      -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
      -- be used.
      keySpec                Controls OPTIONAL
      -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
      -- Controls  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
      }

   AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}

   ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
      regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }

   regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }

   id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
   AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
      -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
      -- public-key certificate

   regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }

   id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }

   AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA

   regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
      { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }

   id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }

   RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
      -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths

   -- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]

   RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
      newWithNew       CMPCertificate,
      -- new root CA certificate
      newWithOld   [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
      -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
      -- signed with the old private root CA key
      oldWithNew   [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
      -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
      -- signed with the new private root CA key
      }

   CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
      dpn          [0] DistributionPointName,
      issuer       [1] GeneralNames }

   CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      source       CRLSource,
      thisUpdate   Time OPTIONAL }

   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

   InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
       infoType    INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
                       &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
       infoValue   INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.

                       &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }

   SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }

   -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
   -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
   -- appropriate for a given environment):
   --
   --   id-it-caProtEncCert    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
   --      CAProtEncCertValue      ::= CMPCertificate
   --   id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
   --      SignKeyPairTypesValue   ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-encKeyPairTypes  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
   --      EncKeyPairTypesValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                      AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
   --      PreferredSymmAlgValue   ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
   --      CAKeyUpdateInfoValue    ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
   --   id-it-currentCRL       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
   --      CurrentCRLValue         ::= CertificateList
   --   id-it-unsupportedOIDs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
   --      UnsupportedOIDsValue    ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                          OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamReq  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
   --      KeyPairParamReqValue    ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
   --   id-it-keyPairParamRep  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
   --      KeyPairParamRepValue    ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey
   --      - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
   --      - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
   --      - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --      - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
   --      - the syntax without this change
   --   id-it-implicitConfirm  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
   --      ImplicitConfirmValue    ::= NULL
   --   id-it-confirmWaitTime  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
   --      ConfirmWaitTimeValue    ::= GeneralizedTime
   --   id-it-origPKIMessage   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
   --      OrigPKIMessageValue     ::= PKIMessages
   --   id-it-suppLangTags     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
   --      SuppLangTagsValue       ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
   --   id-it-caCerts          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
   --      CaCertsValue            ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                             CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
   --      RootCaKeyUpdateValue    ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
   --      - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certReqTemplate  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
   --      CertReqTemplateValue    ::= CertReqTemplateContent
   --      - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-rootCaCert       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
   --      RootCaCertValue         ::= CMPCertificate
   --      - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-certProfile      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
   --      CertProfileValue        ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                 UTF8String
   --      - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-crlStatusList    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
   --   CRLStatusListValue         ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                                  CRLStatus
   --      - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --   id-it-crls             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
   --   CRLsValue                  ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
   --                                            CertificateList
   --      - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   --
   -- where
   --
   --   id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
   --      iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   --      dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
   -- and
   --   id-it   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
   --
   --
   -- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
   -- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
   -- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
   -- specific environments.

   GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue

   -- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
   -- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
   -- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
   -- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
   -- does not recognize.  If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
   -- indicates that the CA may send
   -- any/all information that it wishes.

   GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
   -- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
   -- recognize.

   ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
       pKIStatusInfo          PKIStatusInfo,
       errorCode              INTEGER           OPTIONAL,
       -- implementation-specific error codes
       errorDetails           PKIFreeText       OPTIONAL
       -- implementation-specific error details
   }

   CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
       certHash    OCTET STRING,
       -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
       -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
       certReqId   INTEGER,
       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL
       -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
       -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
       -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
      }

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId              INTEGER,
       checkAfter             INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason                 PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
   -- operations, added due to the changes made in
   -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
   -- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
   -- [RFC6402]
   --

   -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
   -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
   id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }

   END

Appendix B.  History of changes

   Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
   document.

   From version 16 -> 17:

   *  Removed the pre-RFC5378 work disclaimer after the RFC 4210 authors
      granted BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust
   *  Removed note on usage of language tags in UTF8String due to
      reference to references to outdated/historic RFCs
   *  Resolved some nits reported by I-D nit checker tool

   From version 15 -> 16:

   *  Updated IPR disclaimer

   From version 14 -> 15:

   *  Updated Section 2.16 clarifying the usage of CRLSource (see thread
      "CRL update retrieval - WG Last Call for draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
      updates-14 and draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-08")
   *  Updated Section 2.22 adding further references regarding random
      number generation (see thread "CMP draft WGLC: measuring entropy,
      CA certificates")
   *  Fixed some nits

   From version 13 -> 14:

   *  Extended id-it-caCerts support message to allow transporting to-
      be-trusted root CA certificates; added respective security
      consideration (see thread "Generalizing the CMP "Get CA
      certificates" use case")
   *  Rolled back changes made in previous version regarding root CA
      update to avoid registration of new OIDs.  Yet we sticked to using
      id-it-rootCaCert in the genm body instead its headers' generalInfo
      field and removed the ToDos and TBDs on re-arranging id-it OIDs
      (see thread "Allocation of OIDs for CRL update retrieval (draft-
      ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13)")

   From version 12 -> 13:

   *  Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion
      and important proposals
   *  Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210
   *  Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to
      Section 2.7

   *  Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of
      the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg
      in certStatus")
   *  Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized
      to "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to
      "trustAnchorUpdate" in Sections 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing
      former Section 2.4
   *  Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1,
      and A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL")
   *  Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of
      CMP request messages initiated by an error message with status
      "waiting" as initially discussed at IETF 111
   *  Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling
   *  Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs
   *  Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and
      updated Section 5 accordingly
   *  Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering
   *  Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712
   *  Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-
      lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and
      "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1
      Module")
   *  Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to
      prevent confusion
   *  Minor editorial changes

   From version 11 -> 12:

   *  Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow
      a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread
      "id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")

   From version 10 -> 11:

   *  Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
      CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
      algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the
      AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for
      calculating certHash")
   *  Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix
   *  Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the
      definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of
      CertificationRequest")
   *  Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1
   *  Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs draft-lamps-crmf-update-algs

   From version 9 -> 10:

   *  Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1

   From version 08 -> 09:

   *  Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2
      and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-
      kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas
      Gustavsson
   *  Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-
      certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15
   *  Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8
   *  Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update
      is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1
      syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the
      response message
   *  Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate
      request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details
      of the newly introduced controls
   *  Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-
      rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19
   *  Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in
      both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A
   *  Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes

   From version 07 -> 08:

   *  Added a ToDo to Section 2.2 to reflect a current discussion on the
      need of an additional CMP-CA role and EKU and differentiation from
      CMP-RA
   *  Added ToDos to Section 2.12 and 2.13

   From version 06 -> 07:

   *  Added David von Oheimb as co-author
   *  Changed to XML V3
   *  Added Section 2.3 to enable a CMP protocol version number 3 in the
      PKIHeader for cases where EnvelopedData is to be used (see thread
      "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
   *  Added Section 2.4 to refer to [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs] draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs
      for the update of id-PasswordBasedMac for PKI message protection
      using passwords or shared secrets.
   *  Updated Section 2.6 to introduce the protocol version number 3 to
      properly indicate support of EnvelopedData instead of
      EncryptedValue in case a transaction requires use of EnvelopedData
      (see thread "Mail regarding draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates").
   *  Update Section 2.14 to make the minimal changes to the respective
      section in CMP more explicit.

   *  Added Sections 2.15 and 2.16 to address the new cmp2021 protocol
      version in Section 7 Version Negotiation.
   *  Updated Section 2.17 to add new OIDs for id-regCtrl-algId and id-
      regCtrl-rsaKeyLen for registration at IANA.
   *  Added Section 2.20 to update the general rules of interpretation
      in Appendix D.1 regarding the new cmp2021 version.
   *  Added Section 2.21 to update the Algorithm Use Profile in
      Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document
      as decided at IETF 108.
   *  Updates Section 3.1 to delete the description of a discovery
      mechanism as decided at IETF 108.
   *  Various changes and corrections in wording.

   From version 05 -> 06:

   *  Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
      Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
      regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
   *  Minor changes and corrections

   From version 04 -> 05:

   *  Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these
      general messages types with EC curves (see thread
      "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
      in CMP headers")
   *  Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
      Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
      separate sections for easier readability
   *  Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
      from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
      Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
      rsaKeyLen")
   *  Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.24 to introduce new
      OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
      "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
      new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
      draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
   *  Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
      types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
      "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
   *  Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
      thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
   *  Minor changes and corrections

   From version 03 -> 04:

   *  Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
      general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
      updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
      rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
   *  Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
      Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25
   *  Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
      Martin Peylo

   From version 02 -> 03:

   *  Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
      be set up as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the
      AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
      private key as decided in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25
   *  Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.25 and the ASN.1 module
   *  Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
      regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
      known/' as discussed in IETF 108
   *  Updated the IANA Considerations section
   *  Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
      Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
      2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
   *  Minor changes in wording

   From version 01 -> 02:

   *  Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
   *  Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
      management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim
      on the mailing list
   *  Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
      revocation passphrase in Section 2.25
   *  Moved the change history to the Appendix

   From version 00 -> 01:

   *  Minor changes in wording

   From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
   updates-00:

   *  Changes required to reflect WG adoption

   From version 02 -> 03:

   *  Added some clarification in Section 2.1

   From version 01 -> 02:

   *  Added clarification to section on multiple protection
   *  Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
      Gustavsson
   *  Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
      IETF 106
   *  Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
      a revocation passphrase
   *  Minor changes in wording

   From version 00 -> 01:

   *  Added a section describing the new extended key usages
   *  Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
      values
   *  Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
   *  Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
      5.3.22
   *  Minor changes in wording

Authors' Addresses

   Hendrik Brockhaus (editor)
   Siemens AG

   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com

   David von Oheimb
   Siemens AG

   Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com

   John Gray
   Entrust

   Email: john.gray@entrust.com