draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13.txt		draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-14.txt
	LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed.		LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed.
	Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb		Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb
	Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens		Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens
	Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray		Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray
	Expires: 28 April 2022 Entrust		Expires: 23 May 2022 Entrust
	25 October 2021		19 November 2021
	Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates		Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
	draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13		draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-14
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of		This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of
	Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document		Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
	updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.		updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.
	The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData		The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
	instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,		instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
	improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message		improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
	skipping to change at page 1, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 49 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text		extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
	as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol		2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
	(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7		2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7
	2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8		2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8
	2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8		2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8
	2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9		2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9
	2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11		2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11
	2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation		2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
	Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13		2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13
	2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key		2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
	Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13		2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13
	2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14		2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14
	2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14		2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14
	2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15		2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15
	2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 17		2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 16
	2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17		2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17
	2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18		2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 17
	2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 23		2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 22
	2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510		2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
	Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and		2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and
	CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and		2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and
	shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using		2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP
	caPubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26		2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26
	2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28		2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 27
	2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral		2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
	Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of		2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
	These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 31		2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 29
	2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification		2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
	(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate		3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
	Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 32		3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 30
	3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 32		3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 31
	3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 33		3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 31
	4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50		A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64		Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and		While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
	developing the Lightweight CMP Profile		developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were		[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
	identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates		identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
	RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these		RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
	limitations.		limitations.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 37 ¶
	OPTIONAL,		OPTIONAL,
	senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,		senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
	recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,		recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
	transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,		transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,		senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,		recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
	freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,		freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
	generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL		InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
	}		}
	PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String		PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
	The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.		The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.
	2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile		2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - CertProfile
	Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it		Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
	OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces		OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
	id-it-certProfile.		id-it-certProfile.
	Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3:		Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:
	5.1.1.4. CertProfile
			5.1.1.3. CertProfile
	This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,		This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
	e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request		e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
	template, see Section 5.3.19.16.		template, see Section 5.3.19.16.
	id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}		id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
	CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String		CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
	< TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
	if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	>
	When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more		When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
	elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements		elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
	and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given		and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
	order.		order.
	When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate		When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
	profile names.		profile names.
	2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information		2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information
	skipping to change at page 14, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 23 ¶
	use of this mechanism.		use of this mechanism.
	GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey		GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
	GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >		GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
	The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.		The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
	2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates		2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
	The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-		The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
	caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3		caCerts. The intended use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].		Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
	Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:		Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:
	2.3.19.14 CA Certificates		2.3.19.14 CA Certificates
	This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and		This MAY be used by the client to get CA certificates.
	issuing CA certificates.
	GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >		GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
	GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	CMPCertificate | < absent >		CMPCertificate | < absent >
	2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update		2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
	The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-		The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
	oldTrustAnchor and id-it-trustAnchorUpdate. The use is specified in		rootCaCert and id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in
	Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3		Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].		[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
	Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:		Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:
	5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update		5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
	This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a trust anchor,		This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a root CA
	which usually is provided in the form of a root CA Certificate. In		certificate, which is provided in the body of the request message.
	contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/		In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
	response model.		response model.
	The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor		The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor
	structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if		structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if
	available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor.		available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor.
	GenMsg: {id-it 20}, OldTrustAnchor | < absent >		GenMsg: {id-it 20}, RootCaCertValue | < absent >
	GenRep: {id-it 18}, TrustAnchorUpdate | < absent >		GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
	OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {		RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
	certificate CMPCertificate,
	publicKey BIT STRING }
	TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {		RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
			RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
	newWithNew CMPCertificate,		newWithNew CMPCertificate,
	newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,		newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
	oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL }		oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
			}
	< TBD: Rename OIDs
	id-it-rootCaCert --> id-it-oldTrustAnchor
	id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate --> id-it-trustAnchorUpdate
	The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
	if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	>
	Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting		Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
	newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the		newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
	needs of the EE.		needs of the EE.
	2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template		2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
	The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-		The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
	it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP		it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
	Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].		Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
	skipping to change at page 16, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 28 ¶
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
	AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}		AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
	id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
	RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)		RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
	< TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
	if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	>
	The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be		The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
	used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the		used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
	certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity		certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
	wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field		wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
	MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or		MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
	RSA key length MUST be used.		RSA key length MUST be used.
	Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]		Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]
	2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval		2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval
	skipping to change at page 17, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 17 ¶
	CertificateList | < absent >		CertificateList | < absent >
	CRLSource ::= CHOICE {		CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
	dpn [0] DistributionPointName,		dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
	issuer [1] GeneralNames }		issuer [1] GeneralNames }
	CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {		CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
	source CRLSource,		source CRLSource,
	thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }		thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
	< TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls		< TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
	(TBD2). >		crls (TBD2). >
	2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content		2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
	Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of		Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of
	error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity		error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity
	to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm		to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
	requests and to error messages.		requests and to error messages.
	Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following		Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
	one:		one:
	skipping to change at page 26, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 25, line 6 ¶
	The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy		The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
	of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.		of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.
	8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret		8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret
	information		information
	For requirements regarding proper random number and key generation		For requirements regarding proper random number and key generation
	please refer to [RFC4086].		please refer to [RFC4086].
	For the case of centrally generated key pairs, the entropy of the		For the case of centrally generated key pairs, the entropy of the
	shared secret information SHALL not be less than the security		shared secret information SHALL NOT be less than the security
	strength of the centrally generated key pair; if the shared secret		strength of the centrally generated key pair; if the shared secret
	information is re-used for different key pairs, the entropy and the		information is re-used for different key pairs, the entropy and the
	security of the underlying cryptographic mechanisms SHOULD exceed the		security of the underlying cryptographic mechanisms SHOULD exceed the
	security strength of the key pairs.		security strength of the key pairs.
	For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust		For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
	anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs, (a) that is not		anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs, (a) that is not
	concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret		concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
	information is re-used for several key management operations, the		information is re-used for several key management operations, the
	entropy of the shared secret information SHALL not be less than the		entropy of the shared secret information SHALL NOT be less than the
	security strength of the key material being managed by the operation.		security strength of the key material being managed by the operation.
	For other cases it is recommended to (a) either use a shared secret		For other cases it is recommended to (a) either use a shared secret
	information of possibly low entropy (e.g., a password) only for a		information of possibly low entropy (e.g., a password) only for a
	single PKI management operation or (b) use a shared secret		single PKI management operation or (b) use a shared secret
	information with an entropy that matches the security strength of the		information with an entropy that matches the security strength of the
	key material being managed by the operation.		key material being managed by the operation.
	2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs		2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages
	The following subsection addresses the risk arising from provisioning		The following subsection addresses the risk arising from in-band
	a new trust anchor in-band in a CMP management operation.		provisioning of new trust anchors in a PKI management operation.
	Insert this section after new Section 8.5:		Insert this section after new Section 8.5:
	8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs		8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using CMP messages
	In case an EE receives a CA certificate in the caPubs field for		The provider of trust anchors, which typically will be an RA involved
	installation as a new trust anchor, it is advised to properly		in configuration management of its clients, MUST NOT include to-be-
	authenticate the message and authorize the sender as trusted source		trusted CA certificates in a CMP message unless it can take
	of the new trust anchor. This authorization is typically indicated		responsibility for making the recipient trust them. When doing so,
	using shared secret information for protecting an initialization		it MUST exert the same due diligence as for its own trust anchors.
	response (ir) message. Authorization can also be signature-based
	using a certificate issued by another PKI that is explicitly		Whenever an EE receives in a CMP message, e.g., in the caPubs field
	authorized for this purpose. A certificate received in caPubs MUST		of a certificate response or in a general response (genp), a CA
	NOT be accepted as trust anchor if the CMP message was protected		certificate for use as a trust anchor, it MUST properly authenticate
	using a certificate issued by this same CA or one of its subordinate		the message sender without already trusting any of the CA
	CAs.		certificates given in the message.
			Moreover, the EE MUST verify that the sender is an authorized source
			of trust anchors. This authorization is typically indicated using
			shared secret information or with a signature-based message
			protection using a certificate issued by a PKI that is explicitly
			authorized for this purpose.
	2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations		2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations
	Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of		Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
	that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,		that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
	the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.		the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
	Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the		Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
	section:		section:
	skipping to change at page 27, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 26, line 39 ¶
	Extended Key Purpose Identifiers		Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
	registry		registry
	In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information		In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
	Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-		Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
	numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in		numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
	RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed.		RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed.
	Fife new entries have been added:		Fife new entries have been added:
	+=========+=========================+============+		+=========+=======================+============+
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | References |
	+=========+=========================+============+		+=========+=======================+============+
	| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |		| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| 18 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |		| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |		| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| 20 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |		| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |		| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |		| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |		| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+		+---------+-----------------------+------------+
	Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Information		Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP
	Types registry		Information Types registry
	< TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls		< TBD: Add requested OIDs for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-
	(TBD2).		crls (TBD2). >
	Preferred ordering, if possible:
	+=========+=========================+============+
	| Decimal | Description | References |
	+=========+=========================+============+
	| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |
	+---------+-------------------------+------------+
	>
	In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration		In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
	Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/		Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
	smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as		smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
	defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.		defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
	Two new entries have been added:		Two new entries have been added:
	+=========+======================+============+		+=========+======================+============+
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | References |
	skipping to change at page 30, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 29, line 5 ¶
	-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If		-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If
	-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the		-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
	-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only		-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
	-- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present		-- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
	-- * and MUST be signed.		-- * and MUST be signed.
	-- **********		-- **********
	Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the		Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
	definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:		definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
	-- **********		-- **********
	-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211		-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
	-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with		-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
	-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this		-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
	-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying		-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
	-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as		-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
	-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward		-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
	-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This		-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This
	-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the		-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
	-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility		-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
	-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].		-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
	-- **********		-- **********
	2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These		2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
	Profiles		Profiles
	Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for		Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
	interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in		interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
	Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document		Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document
	updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.		updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.
	Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with		Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
	skipping to change at page 34, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 33, line 4 ¶
	Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration		Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
	on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which		on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
	updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun		updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun
	Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing		Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
	valuable suggestions on improving this document.		valuable suggestions on improving this document.
	We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable		We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
	feedback.		feedback.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]		[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
	Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,		Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
	"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work		"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
	in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-		in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
	algorithms-07, 22 August 2021,		algorithms-08, 17 November 2021,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
	cmp-algorithms-07>.		cmp-algorithms-08>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key		[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",		Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
	RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,		RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
	skipping to change at page 36, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 35, line 22 ¶
	Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,		Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,		DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]		[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
	Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight		Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight
	Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in		Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-		Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
	cmp-profile-06, 9 July 2021,		cmp-profile-07, 25 October 2021,
	<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-		<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
	lightweight-cmp-profile-06>.		lightweight-cmp-profile-07>.
	[IEEE.802.1AR_2018]		[IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
	IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area		IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
	networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,		networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
	DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,		DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
	<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.		<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
	Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules		Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
	A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module		A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
	skipping to change at page 37, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 36, line 4 ¶
	dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)		dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
	id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}		id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
	DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=		DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN		BEGIN
	-- EXPORTS ALL --		-- EXPORTS ALL --
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
			Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Time,
	Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name,
	AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp		AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
	--, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out		--, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
	FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)		FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
	dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)		dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
	id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}		id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
	-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest		-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
	-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]		-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
	GeneralName, KeyIdentifier		DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
	FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)		FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
	dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)		dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
	id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}		id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
	CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,		CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
	CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl		CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
	FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)		FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
	dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)		dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
	id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}		id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
	-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made		-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
	skipping to change at page 47, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 45, line 36 ¶
	-- public-key certificate		-- public-key certificate
	id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }		id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
	AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier		AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
	-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA		-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
	id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }		id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
	RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)		RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
	-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths		-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
	-- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and		-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
	-- CRLStatus were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {
	certificate CMPCertificate,
	publicKey BIT STRING
	}
	TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {		RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
	newWithNew CMPCertificate,		newWithNew CMPCertificate,
	-- new root CA certificate		-- new root CA certificate
	newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,		newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
	-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key		-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
	-- signed with the old private root CA key		-- signed with the old private root CA key
	oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL		oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
	-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key		-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
	-- signed with the new private root CA key		-- signed with the new private root CA key
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 48, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 47, line 10 ¶
	-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}		-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
	-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime		-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
	-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}		-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
	-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages		-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
	-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}		-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
	-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String		-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
	-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}		-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
	-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- CMPCertificate		-- CMPCertificate
	-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}		-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
	-- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate		-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
	-- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}		-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
	-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent		-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
	-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}		-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
	-- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor		-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
	-- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}		-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
	-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- UTF8String		-- UTF8String
	-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}		-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
	-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- CRLStatus		-- CRLStatus
	-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}		-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
	-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	skipping to change at page 51, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 36 ¶
	{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
	AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,		AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
	DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM		DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
	FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009		FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
	{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}		id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
	Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp		Certificate, CertificateList, Time, id-kp
	FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009		FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
	{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
	GeneralName, KeyIdentifier		DistributionPointName, GeneralNames, GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
	FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009		FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
	{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
	CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,		CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
	CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl		CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
	FROM PKIXCRMF-2009		FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }		id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
	skipping to change at page 60, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 59, line 15 ¶
	-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA		-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
	regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=		regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
	{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }		{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }
	id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }		id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
	RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)		RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
	-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths		-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
	-- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus		-- RootCaKeyUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus were added in
	-- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {
	certificate CMPCertificate,
	publicKey BIT STRING
	}
	TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {		RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
	newWithNew CMPCertificate,		newWithNew CMPCertificate,
	-- new root CA certificate		-- new root CA certificate
	newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,		newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
	-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key		-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
	-- signed with the old private root CA key		-- signed with the old private root CA key
	oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL		oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
	-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key		-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
	-- signed with the new private root CA key		-- signed with the new private root CA key
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 62, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 60, line 43 ¶
	-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}		-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
	-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime		-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
	-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}		-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
	-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages		-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
	-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}		-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
	-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String		-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
	-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}		-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
	-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- CMPCertificate		-- CMPCertificate
	-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}		-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
	-- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate		-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
	-- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}		-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
	-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent		-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
	-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}		-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
	-- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor		-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
	-- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}		-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
	-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- UTF8String		-- UTF8String
	-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}		-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
	-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	-- CRLStatus		-- CRLStatus
	-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]		-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
	-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}		-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
	-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF		-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
	skipping to change at page 63, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 62, line 4 ¶
	-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not		-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
	-- recognize.		-- recognize.
	ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {		ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
	pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,		pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
	errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,		errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
	-- implementation-specific error codes		-- implementation-specific error codes
	errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL		errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
	-- implementation-specific error details		-- implementation-specific error details
	}		}
	CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus		CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
	CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {		CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
	certHash OCTET STRING,		certHash OCTET STRING,
	-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm		-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
	-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature		-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
	certReqId INTEGER,		certReqId INTEGER,
	-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep		-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
	statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,		statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
	hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL		hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} OPTIONAL
	-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash		-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
	-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier		-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
	-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm		-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
	}		}
	PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {		PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
	certReqId INTEGER }		certReqId INTEGER }
	PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {		PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
	certReqId INTEGER,		certReqId INTEGER,
	skipping to change at page 64, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 62, line 46 ¶
	-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }		-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
	id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }		id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
	END		END
	Appendix B. History of changes		Appendix B. History of changes
	Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the		Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
	document.		document.
			From version 13 -> 14:
			* Extended id-it-caCerts support message to allow transporting to-
			be-trusted root CA certificates; added respective security
			consideration (see thread "Generalizing the CMP "Get CA
			certificates" use case")
			* Rolled back changes made in previous version regarding root CA
			update to avoid registration of new OIDs. Yet we sticked to using
			id-it-rootCaCert in the genm body instead its headers' generalInfo
			field and removed the ToDos and TBDs on re-arranging id-it OIDs
			(see thread "Allocation of OIDs for CRL update retrieval (draft-
			ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13)")
	From version 12 -> 13:		From version 12 -> 13:
	* Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion		* Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion
	and important proposals		and important proposals
	* Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210		* Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210
	* Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to		* Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to
	Section 2.7		Section 2.7
	* Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of		* Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of
	the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg		the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg
	in certStatus")		in certStatus")
End of changes. 61 change blocks.
	193 lines changed or deleted		156 lines changed or added
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