--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12.txt 2021-10-25 07:14:52.915731174 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13.txt 2021-10-25 07:14:53.043734361 -0700 @@ -1,25 +1,26 @@ -LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus +LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed. Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens -Intended status: Standards Track 9 July 2021 -Expires: 10 January 2022 +Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray +Expires: 28 April 2022 Entrust + 25 October 2021 Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates - draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12 + draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13 Abstract - This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport - of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document - updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712. + This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of + Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document + updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712. The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. @@ -37,90 +38,98 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2022. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 - 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 - 2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 - 2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 - 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 - 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation + 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 + 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 + 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 + 2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 + 2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 12 - 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key + 2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13 + 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 - 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 13 - 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 - 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 14 - 2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 16 - 2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 16 - 2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 - Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 17 - 2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 19 - 2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral - Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of - These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 + 2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14 + 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 + 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15 + 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 17 + 2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17 + 2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18 + 2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 23 + 2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 + Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and + CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and + shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 21 - 2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification - (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using + caPubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26 + 2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28 + 2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral + Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of + These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 31 + 2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification + (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate - Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 21 - 3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 22 - 3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 22 - 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 - Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 32 + 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 32 + 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 33 + 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 + Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 1. Introduction While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and developing the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these limitations. @@ -193,23 +202,24 @@ properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. * Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to use to compute the certHash. * Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a - root CA update, or a certificate request template. + root CA update, a certificate request template, or a CRL update. - * Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages. + * Extend the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and + error messages. * Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end entities. @@ -272,107 +282,106 @@ specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used for protection of CMP messages and key generation. Certificates containing one of the above EKUs SHOULD NOT use indefinite expiration date. 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header. This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of - EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.8. + EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7. Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description of pvno with the following text: PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), cmp2021(3) }, sender GeneralName, recipient GeneralName, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, - protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, + protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} + OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7. -2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert - - Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it - OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces - id-it-rootCaCert. - - Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2: - - 5.1.1.3. RootCaCert - - This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate, - e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see - Section 5.3.19.15. - - id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} - RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate - -2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile +2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces id-it-certProfile. Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3: 5.1.1.4. CertProfile This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles, e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request template, see Section 5.3.19.16. id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String - When used in a ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more + < TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs, + if possible. See also IANA Consideration. + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + > + + When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given order. When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate profile names. -2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information +2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac. Replace the first paragraph with the following text: In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]): -2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection + Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes + Errata ID 2616): + + Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain + constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g., + ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with + PasswordBasedMac computation. + +2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. - This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport - of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body - types. + This document enables using nested messages also for batch-delivery + transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with + mixed body types. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such @@ -399,29 +408,30 @@ the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI management entities. These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new PKI message. The structure used is as follows: NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages -2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values +2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 5.2.2. Encrypted Values + Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the EncryptedKey data structure is used. EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data @@ -443,22 +453,22 @@ The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form. EnvelopedData is used as follows: * It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content is encrypted only for one recipient. * It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure - as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key - Generation Authority. + as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] and [RFC8933] signed by + the Key Generation Authority. * It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the encryptedContent field. The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key management techniques. @@ -473,180 +483,214 @@ * Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be protected using the key transport key management technique, as specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. * A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be protected using the password-based key management technique, as specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652]. -2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response +2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in - Section 2.8 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used + Section 2.7 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used in response to a p10cr message. - Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with - the following text: + Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also + fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078): + + CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { + caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate + OPTIONAL, + response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse + } + + CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + certReqId INTEGER, + status PKIStatusInfo, + certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, + rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL + -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined + -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] + } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL } CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { - certificate [0] Certificate, + certificate [0] CMPCertificate, encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey } Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId. Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response - (cp) message MUST be set to 0. + (cp) message MUST be set to -1. Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno values are described in Section 7. -2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content +2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field. Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, certHash OCTET STRING, certReqId INTEGER, - statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL + statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}} + OPTIONAL } The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message header must be cmp2021(3). -2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types +2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair +2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase +2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this - information as described in Section 2.8 above. + information as described in Section 2.7 above. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the use of this mechanism. GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. -2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates +2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- - caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf- - lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. + caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 + [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and issuing CA certificates. GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > - GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent > + GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + CMPCertificate | < absent > -2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update +2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- - rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I- - D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. + oldTrustAnchor and id-it-trustAnchorUpdate. The use is specified in + Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 + [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update - This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root - CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see - Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In + This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a trust anchor, + which usually is provided in the form of a root CA Certificate. In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/ response model. - GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent > - GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > + The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor + structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if + available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor. - RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent + GenMsg: {id-it 20}, OldTrustAnchor | < absent > + GenRep: {id-it 18}, TrustAnchorUpdate | < absent > - RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { + OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE { + certificate CMPCertificate, + publicKey BIT STRING } + + TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, - oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL - } + oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } + + < TBD: Rename OIDs + id-it-rootCaCert --> id-it-oldTrustAnchor + id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate --> id-it-trustAnchorUpdate + The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs, + if possible. See also IANA Consideration. + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + > Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE. -2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template +2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP - Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. + Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to certify. @@ -663,66 +707,301 @@ rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of the RSA key. GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, - keySpec Controls OPTIONAL - } + keySpec Controls OPTIONAL } Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 } + AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 } - RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER + RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) + + < TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs, + if possible. See also IANA Consideration. + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + > The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key length MUST be used. Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] -2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response +2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval + + The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- + it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the + Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3 + [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after + new Section 5.3.19.16: + + 5.3.19.17. CRL update retrieval + + This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source + of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already + has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a + DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The + server shall provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the + ones indicated by the client. + + GenMsg: {id-it TBD1}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus + GenRep: {id-it TBD2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + CertificateList | < absent > + + CRLSource ::= CHOICE { + dpn [0] DistributionPointName, + issuer [1] GeneralNames } + + CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + source CRLSource, + thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } + + < TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls + (TBD2). > + +2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content + + Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of + error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity + to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm + requests and to error messages. + + Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following + one: + + This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info + and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of + responses. + + Replace the second paragraph with the following text: + + This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction. + If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a + PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is + not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to + the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting", + the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22. + Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the + transaction (if a transaction is in progress). + +2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling - messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for - outstanding responses to a p10cr. + messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document + extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind + of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of + the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'. - Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add - just before the state machine diagram the following text: + Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text: - A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data - structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate - request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all - subsequent messages of this transaction. + This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the + client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an + outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been + received). -2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation + PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + certReqId INTEGER } + + PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + certReqId INTEGER, + checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds + reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } + + In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is + initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status + "waiting". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated + with an error response messages with status "waiting". The following + clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that + multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There + will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a + CertStatus for an issued certificate. + + 1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a + certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each + certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each + CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status + "waiting" and in response to an error message with status + "waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a + CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring + to the complete response. + + 2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if + one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or + the final response to some other type of request is available; + otherwise, it will return a pollRep. + + 3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number + of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another + pollReq.. + + 4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in + the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other + response, then this will be treated as the final response to the + original request. + + The following client-side state machine describes polling for + individual CertResponse elements. + + START + | + v + Send ir + | ip + v + Check status + of returned <------------------------+ + certs | + | | + +------------------------>|<------------------+ | + | | | | + | (issued) v (waiting) | | + Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to | + conf list for each certificate pending list | + / | + / | + (conf list) / (empty conf list) | + / ip | + / +-----------------+ + (empty pending list) / | pollRep + END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait + | ^ ^ | + | | | | + +-----------------+ +---------------+ + (pending list) + + In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two + certificates in one request. + + Step End Entity PKI + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + 1 Format ir + 2 -> ir -> + 3 Handle ir + 4 Manual intervention is + required for both certs. + 5 <- ip <- + 6 Process ip + 7 Format pollReq + 8 -> pollReq -> + 9 Check status of cert requests + 10 Certificates not ready + 11 Format pollRep + 12 <- pollRep <- + 13 Wait + 14 Format pollReq + 15 -> pollReq -> + 16 Check status of cert requests + 17 One certificate is ready + 18 Format ip + 19 <- ip <- + 20 Handle ip + 21 Format certConf + 22 -> certConf -> + 23 Handle certConf + 24 Format ack + 25 <- pkiConf <- + 26 Format pollReq + 27 -> pollReq -> + 28 Check status of certificate + 29 Certificate is ready + 30 Format ip + 31 <- ip <- + 31 Handle ip + 32 Format certConf + 33 -> certConf -> + 34 Handle certConf + 35 Format ack + 36 <- pkiConf <- + + The following client-side state machine describes polling for a + complete response message. + + Start + | + | Send request + | + +----------- Receive response ------------+ + | | + | ip/cp/kup/error with | other + | status "waiting" | response + | | + v | + +------> Polling | + | | | + | | Send pollReq | + | | Receive response | + | | | + | pollRep | other response | + +-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+ + | + v + Handle response + | + v + End + + In the following exchange, the end-entity is sending a general + message request, and the response is delayed by the server. + + Step End Entity PKI + -------------------------------------------------------------------- + 1 Format genm + 2 -> genm -> + 3 Handle genm + 4 delay in response is necessary + 5 Format error message "waiting" + with certReqId set to -1 + 6 <- error <- + 7 Process error + 8 Format pollReq + 9 -> pollReq -> + 10 Check status of original request + general message response not ready + 11 Format pollRep + 12 <- pollRep <- + 13 Wait + 14 Format pollReq + 15 -> pollReq -> + 16 Check status of original request + general message response is ready + 17 Format genp + 18 <- genp <- + 19 Handle genp + +2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and hashAlg. - Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text: + Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following + text: This section defines the version negotiation between client and server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510 [RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021 (specified in this document). The only difference between protocol versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus. If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a request as follows: @@ -731,62 +1010,145 @@ server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out- of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported by both itself and the server. * If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it supports. If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose - the version for a request as follows: + the version for a request message containing the CertReqMessages data + structure as follows: - * If the client supports EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then - it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. + * If the client accepts EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then + it MUST use cmp2021. - * If the client does not support EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue, - then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2000. + * If the client does not accept EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue, + then it MUST use cmp2000. - * If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue: + * If the client accepts both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue: - - If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the - server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some - out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the - highest version supported the server. + - If the client knows that the Server supports EnvelopedData + (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of- + band means), then it MUST use cmp2021. - - If the client does not know what version(s) the server - supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. + - If the client knows that the server supports only + EncryptedValue, then it MUST use cmp2000. - If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the - hashAlg field the client MUST choose the version for a request as - follows: + - If the client does not know whether the server supports + EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue, then it MUST send the request + message using cmp2021. - * If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf + If a client sends a certConf message and the signatureAlgorithm of + the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash algorithm + (neither in its OID nor in its parameters) there are two cases: + + * A client supporting cmp2021 MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf message. - * If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the - certificate. + * A client not supporting cmp2021 will not be able to handle this + situation and will fail or reject the certificate. -2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers + If a server receives a message with version cmp1999 and supports it, + then the version of the response message MUST also be cmp1999. If a + server receives a message with a version higher or lower than it + supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the + unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the + pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest + supported version for this request message, then the version in the + error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for + this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest + supported version for this request message then the version in the + error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this + message type. + +2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This document extends the section to clients with any higher version than cmp1999. Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. -2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations +2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and CMP + message protection + + The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the + CA private key for CMP message protection. + + Insert this section after Section 8.3: + + 8.4. Private keys for certificate signing and CMP message protection + + When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private + key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to + reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required. + +2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and + shared secret information + + The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy + of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information. + + 8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret + information + + For requirements regarding proper random number and key generation + please refer to [RFC4086]. + + For the case of centrally generated key pairs, the entropy of the + shared secret information SHALL not be less than the security + strength of the centrally generated key pair; if the shared secret + information is re-used for different key pairs, the entropy and the + security of the underlying cryptographic mechanisms SHOULD exceed the + security strength of the key pairs. + + For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust + anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs, (a) that is not + concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret + information is re-used for several key management operations, the + entropy of the shared secret information SHALL not be less than the + security strength of the key material being managed by the operation. + For other cases it is recommended to (a) either use a shared secret + information of possibly low entropy (e.g., a password) only for a + single PKI management operation or (b) use a shared secret + information with an entropy that matches the security strength of the + key material being managed by the operation. + +2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs + + The following subsection addresses the risk arising from provisioning + a new trust anchor in-band in a CMP management operation. + + Insert this section after new Section 8.5: + + 8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs + + In case an EE receives a CA certificate in the caPubs field for + installation as a new trust anchor, it is advised to properly + authenticate the message and authorize the sender as trusted source + of the new trust anchor. This authorization is typically indicated + using shared secret information for protecting an initialization + response (ir) message. Authorization can also be signature-based + using a certificate issued by another PKI that is explicitly + authorized for this purpose. A certificate received in caPubs MUST + NOT be accepted as trust anchor if the CMP message was protected + using a certificate issued by this same CA or one of its subordinate + CAs. + +2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the section: In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see @@ -806,61 +1168,87 @@ Extended Key Purpose Identifiers registry In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi- numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed. Fife new entries have been added: - +=========+=======================+============+ + +=========+=========================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | - +=========+=======================+============+ + +=========+=========================+============+ | 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] | - +---------+-----------------------+------------+ - | 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] | - +---------+-----------------------+------------+ + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 18 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ | 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | - +---------+-----------------------+------------+ - | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | - +---------+-----------------------+------------+ + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 20 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | - +---------+-----------------------+------------+ + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ - Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP - Information Types registry + Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Information + Types registry + + < TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls + (TBD2). + Preferred ordering, if possible: + +=========+=========================+============+ + | Decimal | Description | References | + +=========+=========================+============+ + | 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + | TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] | + +---------+-------------------------+------------+ + > In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. Two new entries have been added: +=========+======================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+======================+============+ | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Registration Controls registry -2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase +2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as - described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated + described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following text: * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that @@ -876,140 +1264,186 @@ Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following text: * When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). -2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications +2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of - EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is + EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the + definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This + fixes Errata ID 2615): + + -- ********** + -- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment + -- * given in [CRMF] pertains not only to certTemplate, but + -- * also to the altCertTemplate control. + -- ********** + -- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the + -- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs + -- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg + -- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control) + -- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput + -- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the + -- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER- + -- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If + -- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the + -- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only + -- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present + -- * and MUST be signed. + -- ********** + + Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text: -- ********** -- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211 -- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- ********** -2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These +2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with the following text: Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). -2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile +2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Replace the text of the section with the following text: D.2. Algorithm Use Profile For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. -2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic +2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. + Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization + Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID + 5201): + + protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG + Replace the comment after the privateKey field of crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response message with the following text: -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) -3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 +3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction + + To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of + PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the + introduction of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] is updated. + + Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text: + + In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error + handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP. + Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at + transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since CMP Updates + [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates] extends the polling mechanism specified + in the second version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI + management transactions, delays detected at application level may + also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages. + +3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used whenever possible. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: 1.1 Changes since RFC 6712 The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: * Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'. * Extend the URI structure. -3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI +3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the URIs. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 3.6. HTTP Request-URI Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS - transport MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as + transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease interworking in a multi-vendor environment. The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path segment could for example support the differentiation of specific CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid - full operation path segment can look like this: + full CMP path can look like this: http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel -3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations +3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the section: In the registry of well-known URIs (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known- @@ -1017,64 +1451,66 @@ following change has been performed. One new name entry has been added: +============+===================+============+ | URI suffix | Change controller | References | +============+===================+============+ | cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] | +------------+-------------------+------------+ - Table 4 + Table 4: Addition to the well-known URI + registry 4. IANA Considerations This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod- cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated ASN.1 modules. < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from provisional to permanent. > 5. Security Considerations - No changes are made to the existing security considerations of - RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. + The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in + Section 2.21 to Section 2.23. No changes are made to the existing + security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. 6. Acknowledgements Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which - updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas - Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on - improving this document. + updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun + Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing + valuable suggestions on improving this document. We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedback. 7. References 7.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- - algorithms-05, 7 May 2021, + algorithms-07, 22 August 2021, . + cmp-algorithms-07>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, . @@ -1082,20 +1518,25 @@ [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, . [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, . + [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, + "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, + . + [RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005, . [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, . @@ -1139,35 +1580,40 @@ . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, . + [RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax + (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933, + DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020, + . + [RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045, DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021, . 7.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- - cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021, + cmp-profile-06, 9 July 2021, . + lightweight-cmp-profile-06>. [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, . Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module @@ -1183,35 +1629,35 @@ DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, - AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String, - id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out + AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp + --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest -- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986] GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, - CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl + CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of this specification @@ -1287,21 +1733,21 @@ freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- (this field is intended for human consumption) generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL -- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) } PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String - -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each + -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: Each -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag -- to indicate the language of the contained text -- see [RFC2482] for details) PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10] @@ -1518,21 +1965,21 @@ algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value - -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the + -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, @@ -1604,124 +2050,157 @@ badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, - -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash - -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier - -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep - statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL + statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL + -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash + -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier + -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm } PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL - -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - - RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { - newWithNew CMPCertificate, - -- new root CA certificate - newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, - -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key - -- signed with the old private root CA key - oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL - -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key - -- signed with the new private root CA key - } - - -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and + -- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) } + id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } + AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue + -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 + -- public-key certificate + id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier - -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA + -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } - RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER - -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths + RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) + -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths + + -- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and + -- CRLStatus were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + + OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE { + certificate CMPCertificate, + publicKey BIT STRING + } + + TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE { + newWithNew CMPCertificate, + -- new root CA certificate + newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, + -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key + -- signed with the old private root CA key + oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL + -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key + -- signed with the new private root CA key + } + + CRLSource ::= CHOICE { + dpn [0] DistributionPointName, + issuer [1] GeneralNames } + + CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + source CRLSource, + thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): -- -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} - -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier + -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} - -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier + -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} - -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} - -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer + -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - syntax without this change -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} - -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate + -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} - -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent - -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} + -- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate + -- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} - -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate - -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} + -- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor + -- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} - -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String + -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1} + -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CRLStatus + -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2} + -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CertificateList + -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- -- @@ -1796,21 +2277,21 @@ standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document. PKIXCMP-2021 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS - AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE + AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} @@ -1819,21 +2300,21 @@ FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, - CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl + CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of this specification @@ -2141,21 +2622,21 @@ -- corresponding Challenge. CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value - -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the + -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] } CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, @@ -2223,118 +2703,169 @@ badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages - -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - - RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { - newWithNew CMPCertificate, - -- new root CA certificate - newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, - -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key - -- signed with the old private root CA key - oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL - -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key - -- signed with the new private root CA key - } - - -- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue, + -- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate, + -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl, + -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl + -- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) } + AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }} + + ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet | + regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... } + + regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate } + + id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 } + + AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue + -- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3 + -- public-key certificate + + regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId } + id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } + AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} - -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA + -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA + + regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::= + { TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } - RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER - -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths + + RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX) + -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths + + -- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus + -- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + + OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE { + certificate CMPCertificate, + publicKey BIT STRING + } + + TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE { + newWithNew CMPCertificate, + -- new root CA certificate + newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, + -- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key + -- signed with the old private root CA key + oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL + -- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key + -- signed with the new private root CA key + } + + CRLSource ::= CHOICE { + dpn [0] DistributionPointName, + issuer [1] GeneralNames } + + CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + source CRLSource, + thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL } INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &id({SupportedInfoSet}), infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): -- -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} - -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF + -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} - -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF + -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} - -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER + -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} - -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer + -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - the syntax without this change -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} - -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate + -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} - -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent - -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} + -- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate + -- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} - -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate - -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} + -- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor + -- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} - -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String + -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1} + -- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CRLStatus + -- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] + -- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2} + -- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + -- CertificateList + -- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- -- @@ -2361,30 +2892,31 @@ pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- implementation-specific error codes errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL -- implementation-specific error details } CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, - -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash - -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier - -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep - statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } + statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL, + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL + -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash + -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier + -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm + } PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } -- @@ -2399,20 +2931,53 @@ -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } END Appendix B. History of changes Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document. + From version 12 -> 13: + + * Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion + and important proposals + * Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210 + * Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to + Section 2.7 + * Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of + the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg + in certStatus") + * Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized + to "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to + "trustAnchorUpdate" in Sections 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing + former Section 2.4 + * Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1, + and A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL") + * Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of + CMP request messages initiated by an error message with status + "waiting" as initially discussed at IETF 111 + * Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling + * Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs + * Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and + updated Section 5 accordingly + * Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering + * Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712 + * Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf- + lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and + "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1 + Module") + * Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to + prevent confusion + * Minor editorial changes + From version 11 -> 12: * Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread "id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates") From version 10 -> 11: * Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature @@ -2428,28 +2993,29 @@ From version 9 -> 10: * Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1 From version 08 -> 09: * Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id- kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas - Gustavesson + Gustavsson * Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it- certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15 * Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8 * Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1 syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the response message + * Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details of the newly introduced controls * Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it- rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19 * Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A * Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes From version 07 -> 08: @@ -2491,84 +3057,83 @@ From version 05 -> 06: * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. * Minor changes and corrections From version 04 -> 05: - * Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these + * Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these general messages types with EC curves (see thread "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue in CMP headers") - * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three separate sections for easier readability - * Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue - from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF + * Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue + from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") - * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.20 to introduce new + * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.24 to introduce new OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Minor changes and corrections From version 03 -> 04: * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from Martin Peylo From version 02 -> 03: * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will be set up as decided in IETF 108 - * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the + + * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated private key as decided in IETF 108 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 - * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.21 and the ASN.1 module + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25 + * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.25 and the ASN.1 module * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- known/' as discussed in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA Considerations section * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] - * Minor changes in wording From version 01 -> 02: * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key - management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim + management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim on the mailing list * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the - revocation passphrase in Section 2.21 + revocation passphrase in Section 2.25 * Moved the change history to the Appendix From version 00 -> 01: * Minor changes in wording From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates-00: * Changes required to reflect WG adoption @@ -2592,19 +3156,25 @@ * Added a section describing the new extended key usages * Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted values * Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4 * Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and 5.3.22 * Minor changes in wording Authors' Addresses - Hendrik Brockhaus + + Hendrik Brockhaus (editor) Siemens AG Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com David von Oheimb Siemens AG Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com + + John Gray + Entrust + + Email: john.gray@entrust.com