draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus, Ed.
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track 9 July 2021 Intended status: Standards Track J. Gray
Expires: 10 January 2022 Expires: 28 April 2022 Entrust
25 October 2021
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12 draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-13
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transfer of
of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712. updates RFC 4210, RFC 5912, and RFC 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.
To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
is supposed to use EnvelopedData. is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
skipping to change at page 1, line 48 skipping to change at page 1, line 49
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9
2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 12 2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 13
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 13 2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 14
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 14
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 14 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 15
2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 16 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval . . . . . . 17
2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 16 2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content . . . . . . 17
2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 18
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 23
2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 17 2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 19 Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 CMP message protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of 2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 shared secret information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 21 2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using
2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification caPubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 26
2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 28
2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 31
2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 21 3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 32
3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 32
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 33
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations. limitations.
skipping to change at page 5, line 26 skipping to change at page 5, line 26
properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a
transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
* Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting * Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to
use to compute the certHash. use to compute the certHash.
* Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a * Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
root CA update, or a certificate request template. root CA update, a certificate request template, or a CRL update.
* Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages. * Extend the usage of polling to p10cr, certConf, rr, genm, and
error messages.
* Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 * Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2
[RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP The following subsection introduces a new extended key usage for CMP
servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end servers authorized to centrally generate key pairs on behalf of end
entities. entities.
skipping to change at page 7, line 9 skipping to change at page 7, line 13
specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] and
RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD
NOT be used for protection of CMP messages and key generation. NOT be used for protection of CMP messages and key generation.
Certificates containing one of the above EKUs SHOULD NOT use Certificates containing one of the above EKUs SHOULD NOT use
indefinite expiration date. indefinite expiration date.
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header. Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the PKI message header.
This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of This document introduces the new version 3 indicating support of
EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.8. EnvelopedData as specified in Section 2.7.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of PKIHeader and the subsequent description
of pvno with the following text: of pvno with the following text:
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE { PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2), pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2),
cmp2021(3) }, cmp2021(3) },
sender GeneralName, sender GeneralName,
recipient GeneralName, recipient GeneralName,
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7. The usage of pvno values is described in Section 7.
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
id-it-rootCaCert.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:
5.1.1.3. RootCaCert
This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate,
e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see
Section 5.3.19.15.
id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
id-it-certProfile. id-it-certProfile.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3: Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3:
5.1.1.4. CertProfile 5.1.1.4. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles, This is used by the EE to indicate specific certificate profiles,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template, see Section 5.3.19.16. template, see Section 5.3.19.16.
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
When used in a ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more < TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
>
When used in an ir/cr/kur/genm, the value MUST NOT contain more
elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements elements than the number of CertReqMsg or InfoTypeAndValue elements
and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given and the certificate profile names refer to the elements in the given
order. order.
When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate When used in a p10cr, the value MUST NOT contain multiple certificate
profile names. profile names.
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information 2.5. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information
Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based
protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac. protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.
Replace the first paragraph with the following text: Replace the first paragraph with the following text:
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC
value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac
is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]): is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection Replace the last paragraph with the following text (Note: This fixes
Errata ID 2616):
Note: It is RECOMMENDED that the fields of PBMParameter remain
constant throughout the messages of a single transaction (e.g.,
ir/ip/certConf/pkiConf) to reduce the overhead associated with
PasswordBasedMac computation.
2.6. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport This document enables using nested messages also for batch-delivery
of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with
types. mixed body types.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection 5.1.3.4. Multiple Protection
When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such When receiving a protected PKI message, a PKI management entity such
as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which as an RA MAY forward that message adding its own protection (which
MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and MAY be a MAC or a signature, depending on the information and
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple certificates shared between the RA and the CA). Moreover, multiple
PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such PKI messages MAY be aggregated. There are several use cases for such
skipping to change at page 9, line 44 skipping to change at page 9, line 42
the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response the CA request messages and in communication from the CA response
or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance or announcement messages will be collected. This can for instance
be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI be used when bridging an off-line connection between two PKI
management entities. management entities.
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages within a new
PKI message. The structure used is as follows: PKI message. The structure used is as follows:
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values 2.7. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData. the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.2.2. Encrypted Values 5.2.2. Encrypted Values
Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys, Where encrypted data (in this specification, private keys,
certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the certificates, or revocation passphrase) are sent in PKI messages, the
EncryptedKey data structure is used. EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and CMS
[RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data [RFC5652] for EnvelopedData syntax. Using the EncryptedKey data
skipping to change at page 10, line 39 skipping to change at page 10, line 44
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to transport a private
key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form. key, certificate, or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows: EnvelopedData is used as follows:
* It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content * It contains only one RecipientInfo structure because the content
is encrypted only for one recipient. is encrypted only for one recipient.
* It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure * It may contain a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure
as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure as defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure
as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key as specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] and [RFC8933] signed by
Generation Authority. the Key Generation Authority.
* It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in * It may contain a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in
the encryptedContent field. the encryptedContent field.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
management techniques. management techniques.
skipping to change at page 11, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 29
* Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension * Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].
* A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be * A password or shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response 2.8. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.8 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used Section 2.7 above. Moreover, it clarifies the certReqId to be used
in response to a p10cr message. in response to a p10cr message.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with Replace the ASN.1 syntax with the following text (Note: This also
the following text: fixes Errata ID 3949 and 4078):
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] Certificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
} }
Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax: Add the following as a new paragraph right after the ASN.1 syntax:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId. structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
(cp) message MUST be set to 0. (cp) message MUST be set to -1.
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno
values are described in Section 7. values are described in Section 7.
2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content 2.9. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field. in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL
} }
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters.
In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify
the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value.
Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash
algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If
hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message
header must be cmp2021(3). header must be cmp2021(3).
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types 2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing EC curves. Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
Types Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase 2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent request. This document updates the handling by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
information as described in Section 2.8 above. information as described in Section 2.7 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the This MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase to a CA/RA for the
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism. use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates 2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf- caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:
2.3.19.14 CA Certificates 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and
issuing CA certificates. issuing CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I- oldTrustAnchor and id-it-trustAnchorUpdate. The use is specified in
D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root This MAY be used by the client to get an update of a trust anchor,
CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see which usually is provided in the form of a root CA Certificate. In
Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In
contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/ contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
response model. response model.
GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent > The EE SHOULD reference its current trust anchor in a TrustAnchor
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > structure in the request body, giving the root CA certificate if
available, otherwise the public key value of the trust anchor.
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent GenMsg: {id-it 20}, OldTrustAnchor | < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, TrustAnchorUpdate | < absent >
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {
certificate CMPCertificate,
publicKey BIT STRING }
TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL }
}
< TBD: Rename OIDs
id-it-rootCaCert --> id-it-oldTrustAnchor
id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate --> id-it-trustAnchorUpdate
The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
>
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE. needs of the EE.
2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Profile Section 4.3 [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile].
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The requirements for certificate request attributes and extensions. The
controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain controls id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen MAY contain
details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to details on the types of subject public keys the CA is willing to
certify. certify.
skipping to change at page 15, line 34 skipping to change at page 16, line 24
rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
the RSA key. the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL }
}
Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
< TBD: The authors would prefer re-ordering the newly requested OIDs,
if possible. See also IANA Consideration.
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
>
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used. RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]
2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.17 - CRL update retrieval
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-crlStatusList and id-it-crls. Details are specified in the
Lightweight CMP Profile Section 4.3
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Insert this section after
new Section 5.3.19.16:
5.3.19.17. CRL update retrieval
This MAY be used by the client to get new CRLs, specifying the source
of the CRLs and the thisUpdate value of the latest CRL it already
has, if available. A CRL source is given either by a
DistributionPointName or the GeneralNames of the issuing CA. The
server shall provide only those CRLs that are more recent than the
ones indicated by the client.
GenMsg: {id-it TBD1}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CRLStatus
GenRep: {id-it TBD2}, SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertificateList | < absent >
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
< TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls
(TBD2). >
2.17. Update Section 5.3.21 - Error Message Content
Section 5.3.21 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the regular use of
error messages. This document adds a use by a PKI management entity
to initiate delayed delivery in response to certConf, rr, and genm
requests and to error messages.
Replace the first sentence of the first paragraph with the following
one:
This data structure MAY be used by EE, CA, or RA to convey error info
and by a PKI management entity to initiate delayed delivery of
responses.
Replace the second paragraph with the following text:
This message MAY be generated at any time during a PKI transaction.
If the client sends this request, the server MUST respond with a
PKIConfirm response, or another ErrorMsg if any part of the header is
not valid. In case a PKI management entity sends an error message to
the EE with the pKIStatusInfo field containing the status "waiting",
the EE will initiate polling as described in Section 5.3.22.
Otherwise, both sides MUST treat this message as the end of the
transaction (if a transaction is in progress).
2.18. Replace Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for messages are used for ir, cr, and kur messages. This document
outstanding responses to a p10cr. extends the polling mechanism for outstanding responses to any kind
of request message. This update also fixes the inconsistent use of
the terms 'rReq' vs. 'pollReq' and 'pRep' vs. 'pollRep'.
Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add Replace Section 5.3.22 with following text:
just before the state machine diagram the following text:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate client needs to poll the server to determine the status of an
request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all outstanding response (i.e., when the "waiting" PKIStatus has been
subsequent messages of this transaction. received).
2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
In response to an ir, cr, p10cr, or kur request message, polling is
initiated with an ip, cp, or kup response message containing status
"waiting". For any type of request message, polling can be initiated
with an error response messages with status "waiting". The following
clauses describe how polling messages are used. It is assumed that
multiple certConf messages can be sent during transactions. There
will be one sent in response to each ip, cp, or kup that contains a
CertStatus for an issued certificate.
1 In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
certConf for all issued certificates and expect a PKIconf for each
certConf. An EE will send a pollReq message in response to each
CertResponse element of an ip, cp, or kup message with status
"waiting" and in response to an error message with status
"waiting". Its certReqId MUST be either the index of a
CertResponse data structure with status "waiting" or -1 referring
to the complete response.
2 In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
one or more of still pending requested certificates are ready or
the final response to some other type of request is available;
otherwise, it will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least the number
of seconds given in the checkAfter field before sending another
pollReq..
4 If the EE receives an ip, cp, or kup, then it will be treated in
the same way as the initial response; if it receives any other
response, then this will be treated as the final response to the
original request.
The following client-side state machine describes polling for
individual CertResponse elements.
START
|
v
Send ir
| ip
v
Check status
of returned <------------------------+
certs |
| |
+------------------------>|<------------------+ |
| | | |
| (issued) v (waiting) | |
Add to <----------- Check CertResponse ------> Add to |
conf list for each certificate pending list |
/ |
/ |
(conf list) / (empty conf list) |
/ ip |
/ +-----------------+
(empty pending list) / | pollRep
END <---- Send certConf Send pollReq---------->Wait
| ^ ^ |
| | | |
+-----------------+ +---------------+
(pending list)
In the following exchange, the end entity is enrolling for two
certificates in one request.
Step End Entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format ir
2 -> ir ->
3 Handle ir
4 Manual intervention is
required for both certs.
5 <- ip <-
6 Process ip
7 Format pollReq
8 -> pollReq ->
9 Check status of cert requests
10 Certificates not ready
11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait
14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of cert requests
17 One certificate is ready
18 Format ip
19 <- ip <-
20 Handle ip
21 Format certConf
22 -> certConf ->
23 Handle certConf
24 Format ack
25 <- pkiConf <-
26 Format pollReq
27 -> pollReq ->
28 Check status of certificate
29 Certificate is ready
30 Format ip
31 <- ip <-
31 Handle ip
32 Format certConf
33 -> certConf ->
34 Handle certConf
35 Format ack
36 <- pkiConf <-
The following client-side state machine describes polling for a
complete response message.
Start
|
| Send request
|
+----------- Receive response ------------+
| |
| ip/cp/kup/error with | other
| status "waiting" | response
| |
v |
+------> Polling |
| | |
| | Send pollReq |
| | Receive response |
| | |
| pollRep | other response |
+-----------+------------------->+<-------------------+
|
v
Handle response
|
v
End
In the following exchange, the end-entity is sending a general
message request, and the response is delayed by the server.
Step End Entity PKI
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Format genm
2 -> genm ->
3 Handle genm
4 delay in response is necessary
5 Format error message "waiting"
with certReqId set to -1
6 <- error <-
7 Process error
8 Format pollReq
9 -> pollReq ->
10 Check status of original request
general message response not ready
11 Format pollRep
12 <- pollRep <-
13 Wait
14 Format pollReq
15 -> pollReq ->
16 Check status of original request
general message response is ready
17 Format genp
18 <- genp <-
19 Handle genp
2.19. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol
versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP
version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg. hashAlg.
Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text: Replace the text of the first three paragraphs with the following
text:
This section defines the version negotiation between client and This section defines the version negotiation between client and
server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510 server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510
[RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021 [RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021
(specified in this document). The only difference between protocol (specified in this document). The only difference between protocol
versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces
EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus. EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus.
If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a
request as follows: request as follows:
skipping to change at page 17, line 7 skipping to change at page 24, line 16
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out- server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-
of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest
version supported by both itself and the server. version supported by both itself and the server.
* If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports, * If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports,
then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it then it MUST send a PKIMessage using the highest version it
supports. supports.
If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be If a client supports cmp2021 and encrypted values are supposed to be
transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose transferred in the PKI management operation the client MUST choose
the version for a request as follows: the version for a request message containing the CertReqMessages data
structure as follows:
* If the client supports EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then * If the client accepts EnvelopedData, but not EncryptedValue, then
it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. it MUST use cmp2021.
* If the client does not support EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue, * If the client does not accept EnvelopedData, but EncryptedValue,
then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2000. then it MUST use cmp2000.
* If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue: * If the client accepts both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue:
- If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the - If the client knows that the Server supports EnvelopedData
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-
out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the band means), then it MUST use cmp2021.
highest version supported the server.
- If the client does not know what version(s) the server - If the client knows that the server supports only
supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. EncryptedValue, then it MUST use cmp2000.
If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the - If the client does not know whether the server supports
hashAlg field the client MUST choose the version for a request as EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue, then it MUST send the request
follows: message using cmp2021.
* If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf If a client sends a certConf message and the signatureAlgorithm of
the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash algorithm
(neither in its OID nor in its parameters) there are two cases:
* A client supporting cmp2021 MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf
message. message.
* If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the * A client not supporting cmp2021 will not be able to handle this
certificate. situation and will fail or reject the certificate.
2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers If a server receives a message with version cmp1999 and supports it,
then the version of the response message MUST also be cmp1999. If a
server receives a message with a version higher or lower than it
supports, then it MUST send back an ErrorMsg with the
unsupportedVersion bit set (in the failureInfo field of the
pKIStatusInfo). If the received version is higher than the highest
supported version for this request message, then the version in the
error message MUST be the highest version the server supports for
this message type; if the received version is lower than the lowest
supported version for this request message then the version in the
error message MUST be the lowest version the server supports for this
message type.
2.20. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a
client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This
document extends the section to clients with any higher version than document extends the section to clients with any higher version than
cmp1999. cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations 2.21. Add Section 8.4 - Private keys for certificate signing and CMP
message protection
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from reusing the
CA private key for CMP message protection.
Insert this section after Section 8.3:
8.4. Private keys for certificate signing and CMP message protection
When a CA acts as a CMP endpoint, it should not use the same private
key for issuing certificates and for protecting CMP responses, to
reduce the number of usages of the key to the minimum required.
2.22. Add Section 8.5 - Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and
shared secret information
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from low entropy
of random numbers, asymmetric keys, and shared secret information.
8.5. Entropy of random numbers, key pairs, and shared secret
information
For requirements regarding proper random number and key generation
please refer to [RFC4086].
For the case of centrally generated key pairs, the entropy of the
shared secret information SHALL not be less than the security
strength of the centrally generated key pair; if the shared secret
information is re-used for different key pairs, the entropy and the
security of the underlying cryptographic mechanisms SHOULD exceed the
security strength of the key pairs.
For the case of a PKI management operation that delivers a new trust
anchor (e.g., a root CA certificate) using caPubs, (a) that is not
concluded in a timely manner or (b) where the shared secret
information is re-used for several key management operations, the
entropy of the shared secret information SHALL not be less than the
security strength of the key material being managed by the operation.
For other cases it is recommended to (a) either use a shared secret
information of possibly low entropy (e.g., a password) only for a
single PKI management operation or (b) use a shared secret
information with an entropy that matches the security strength of the
key material being managed by the operation.
2.23. Add Section 8.6 - Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs
The following subsection addresses the risk arising from provisioning
a new trust anchor in-band in a CMP management operation.
Insert this section after new Section 8.5:
8.6. Trust anchor provisioning using caPubs
In case an EE receives a CA certificate in the caPubs field for
installation as a new trust anchor, it is advised to properly
authenticate the message and authorize the sender as trusted source
of the new trust anchor. This authorization is typically indicated
using shared secret information for protecting an initialization
response (ir) message. Authorization can also be signature-based
using a certificate issued by another PKI that is explicitly
authorized for this purpose. A certificate received in caPubs MUST
NOT be accepted as trust anchor if the CMP message was protected
using a certificate issued by this same CA or one of its subordinate
CAs.
2.24. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
section: section:
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
skipping to change at page 18, line 33 skipping to change at page 27, line 30
Extended Key Purpose Identifiers Extended Key Purpose Identifiers
registry registry
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX CMP Information
Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi- Types (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-
numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.4) as defined in
RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed. RFC 7299 [RFC7299] fife additions have been performed.
Fife new entries have been added: Fife new entries have been added:
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=========================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] | | 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] | | 18 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | | 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | | 20 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+------------+
| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Information
Information Types registry Types registry
< TBD: Request OID for id-it-crlStatusList (TBD1) and id-it-crls
(TBD2).
Preferred ordering, if possible:
+=========+=========================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=========================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-oldTrustAnchor | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-trustAnchorUpdate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 20 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| 21 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| TBD1 | id-it-crlStatusList | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
| TBD2 | id-it-crls | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+
>
In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
Two new entries have been added: Two new entries have been added:
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
| 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls registry Registration Controls registry
2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 2.25. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated described in Section 2.7 above, the description is updated
accordingly. accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a * The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 MAY be sent in a
GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be sent in the generalInfo
field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage at any time. (In
particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section particular, the EncryptedKey structure as described in section
5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message that
skipping to change at page 20, line 12 skipping to change at page 29, line 32
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in * When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 2.26. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.7 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOSigningKey with the following text (Note: This
fixes Errata ID 2615):
-- **********
-- * For the purposes of this specification, the ASN.1 comment
-- * given in [CRMF] pertains not only to certTemplate, but
-- * also to the altCertTemplate control.
-- **********
-- * The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
-- * DER-encoded value of poposkInput (i.e., the "value" OCTETs
-- * of the POPOSigningKeyInput DER). NOTE: If CertReqMsg
-- * certReq certTemplate (or the altCertTemplate control)
-- * contains the subject and publicKey values, then poposkInput
-- * MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be computed on the
-- * DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq (or the DER-
-- * encoded value of AltCertTemplate). If
-- * certTemplate/altCertTemplate does not contain both the
-- * subject and public key values (i.e., if it contains only
-- * one of these, or neither), then poposkInput MUST be present
-- * and MUST be signed.
-- **********
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text: definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
-- ********** -- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211 -- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with -- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This
-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
-- ********** -- **********
2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These 2.27. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles Profiles
Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document
updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text: the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile 2.28. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 2.29. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the line specifying protectionAlg of the Initialization
Response message with the following text (Note: This fixes Errata ID
5201):
protectionAlg MSG_MAC_ALG
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text: message with the following text:
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP) Protocol (CMP)
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 3.1. Update Section 1. - Introduction
To indicate and explain why delayed delivery of all kinds of
PKIMessages may be handled at transfer level and/or at CMP level, the
introduction of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] is updated.
Replace the third paragraph of this section with the following text:
In addition to reliable transport, CMP requires connection and error
handling from the transfer protocol, which is all covered by HTTP.
Moreover, delayed delivery of CMP response messages may be handled at
transfer level regardless of the message contents. Since CMP Updates
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates] extends the polling mechanism specified
in the second version of CMP [RFC4210] to cover all types of PKI
management transactions, delays detected at application level may
also be handled within CMP, using pollReq and pollReq messages.
3.2. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
[RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence [RFC6712]. They are related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
whenever possible. whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1: Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1:
1.1 Changes since RFC 6712 1.1 Changes since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in [thisRFC]: The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
* Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'. * Introduce the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp'.
* Extend the URI structure. * Extend the URI structure.
3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI 3.3. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This
document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the document introduces the HTTP path '/.well-known/cmp' and extends the
URIs. URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
3.6. HTTP Request-URI 3.6. HTTP Request-URI
Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS Each CMP server on a PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS
transport MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as transfer MUST support the use of the path prefix '/.well-known/' as
defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] and the registered name 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment. interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to The CMP client needs to be configured with sufficient information to
form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of form the CMP server URI. This is at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operation path
segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path segment of the PKI management entity. Additionally, OPTIONAL path
segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part segments MAY be added after the registered application name as part
of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path of the full operation path to provide further distinction. A path
segment could for example support the differentiation of specific segment could for example support the differentiation of specific
CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid CAs, certificate profiles, or PKI management operations. A valid
full operation path segment can look like this: full CMP path can look like this:
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel
3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations 3.4. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations
Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of Section 6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI that document. As this document defines a new '.well-known' URI
prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. prefix, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
section: section:
In the registry of well-known URIs (see In the registry of well-known URIs (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known- https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
skipping to change at page 23, line 13 skipping to change at page 33, line 34
following change has been performed. following change has been performed.
One new name entry has been added: One new name entry has been added:
+============+===================+============+ +============+===================+============+
| URI suffix | Change controller | References | | URI suffix | Change controller | References |
+============+===================+============+ +============+===================+============+
| cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] | | cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] |
+------------+-------------------+------------+ +------------+-------------------+------------+
Table 4 Table 4: Addition to the well-known URI
registry
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].
This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
[RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod- [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
ASN.1 modules. ASN.1 modules.
< TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires
2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from
provisional to permanent. > provisional to permanent. >
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of The security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are extended in
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. Section 2.21 to Section 2.23. No changes are made to the existing
security considerations of RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley, Lijun
Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on Liao, Martin Peylo, and Tomas Gustavsson for reviewing and providing
improving this document. valuable suggestions on improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback. feedback.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
algorithms-05, 7 May 2021, algorithms-07, 22 August 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cmp-algorithms-05>. cmp-algorithms-07>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
skipping to change at page 24, line 29 skipping to change at page 35, line 5
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, [RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
skipping to change at page 25, line 40 skipping to change at page 36, line 23
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC8933] Housley, R., "Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection", RFC 8933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8933, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the [RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045, Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021, cmp-profile-06, 9 July 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
lightweight-cmp-profile-05>. lightweight-cmp-profile-06>.
[IEEE.802.1AR_2018] [IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
skipping to change at page 26, line 41 skipping to change at page 37, line 27
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name,
AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String, AlgorithmIdentifier, id-kp
id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out --, UTF8String -- -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986] -- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, AttributeTypeAndValue, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification
skipping to change at page 28, line 47 skipping to change at page 39, line 34
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL, freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption) -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information -- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption) -- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
} }
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each -- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: Each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag -- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text -- to indicate the language of the contained text
-- see [RFC2482] for details) -- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10] p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
skipping to change at page 33, line 40 skipping to change at page 44, line 26
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING signature BIT STRING
} }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
-- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
skipping to change at page 35, line 30 skipping to change at page 46, line 14
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
} }
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
} }
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- CertReqTemplateContent, id-regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, and
-- id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
} }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and
-- CRLStatus were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {
certificate CMPCertificate,
publicKey BIT STRING
}
TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
} }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment): -- appropriate for a given environment):
-- --
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change -- - syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
skipping to change at page 39, line 29 skipping to change at page 50, line 49
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document. standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2021 PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE AttributeSet{}, SingleAttribute{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
skipping to change at page 40, line 4 skipping to change at page 51, line 23
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, RegControlSet, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009 FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) } id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification
skipping to change at page 46, line 37 skipping to change at page 58, line 8
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value -- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
} }
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
skipping to change at page 48, line 23 skipping to change at page 59, line 40
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
} }
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- CertReqTemplateContent, AttributeTypeAndValue,
-- ExpandedRegControlSet, id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate,
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { -- AltCertTemplate, regCtrl-algId, id-regCtrl-algId, AlgIdCtrl,
newWithNew CMPCertificate, -- regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, and RsaKeyLenCtrl
-- new root CA certificate -- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
-- Added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
} }
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SingleAttribute{{ ... }}
ExpandedRegControlSet ATTRIBUTE ::= { RegControlSet |
regCtrl-altCertTemplate | regCtrl-algId | regCtrl-rsaKeyLen, ... }
regCtrl-altCertTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AltCertTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate }
id-regCtrl-altCertTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 7 }
AltCertTemplate ::= AttributeTypeAndValue
-- specifies a template for a certificate other than an X.509v3
-- public-key certificate
regCtrl-algId ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE AlgIdCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-algId }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify supported algorithms other than RSA
regCtrl-rsaKeyLen ATTRIBUTE ::=
{ TYPE RsaKeyLenCtrl IDENTIFIED BY id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen }
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)
-- SHALL be used to specify supported RSA key lengths
-- OldTrustAnchor, TrustAnchorUpdateContent, CRLSource, and CRLStatus
-- were added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
OldTrustAnchor ::= CHOICE {
certificate CMPCertificate,
publicKey BIT STRING
}
TrustAnchorUpdate ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate,
-- new root CA certificate
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
-- X.509 certificate containing the new public root CA key
-- signed with the old private root CA key
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
-- X.509 certificate containing the old public root CA key
-- signed with the new private root CA key
}
CRLSource ::= CHOICE {
dpn [0] DistributionPointName,
issuer [1] GeneralNames }
CRLStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
source CRLSource,
thisUpdate Time OPTIONAL }
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}), &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... } SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment): -- appropriate for a given environment):
-- --
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1} -- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2} -- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF -- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3} -- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF -- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4} -- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}} -- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5} -- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent -- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6} -- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList -- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7} -- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10} -- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER -- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11} -- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer -- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE -- - Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes -- - of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change -- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18} -- id-it-trustAnchorUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- TrustAnchorUpdateValue ::= TrustAnchorUpdate
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-trustAnchorUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- id-it-oldTrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- OldTrustAnchorValue ::= OldTrustAnchor
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-oldTrustAnchor added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String -- CertProfileValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-crlStatusList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD1}
-- CRLStatusListValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CRLStatus
-- - id-it-crlStatusList added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-crls OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD2}
-- CRLsValue ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
-- CertificateList
-- - id-it-crls added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
-- --
-- --
skipping to change at page 51, line 16 skipping to change at page 63, line 37
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL,
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL } reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
-- --
skipping to change at page 52, line 5 skipping to change at page 64, line 29
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
Appendix B. History of changes Appendix B. History of changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document. document.
From version 12 -> 13:
* Added John Gray to the list of authors due to fruitful discussion
and important proposals
* Fixed errata no. 2615, 2616, 3949, 4078, and 5201 on RFC 4210
* Added reference on RFC 8933 regarding CMS signedAttrs to
Section 2.7
* Updated Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 modules moving the position of
the hashAlg field (see thread "[CMP Updates] position of hashAlg
in certStatus")
* Changed "rootCaCert" from generalInfo to genm body and generalized
to "oldTrustAnchor", renaming "rootCaKeyUpdate" to
"trustAnchorUpdate" in Sections 2.14, A.1, and A.2, removing
former Section 2.4
* Added genm use case "CRL update retrieval" in Section 2.16, A.1,
and A.2. (see thread "[CMP Updates] Requesting a current CRL")
* Updated Section 2.18 and 2.17 to support polling for all kinds of
CMP request messages initiated by an error message with status
"waiting" as initially discussed at IETF 111
* Updated Sections 2.19 and 2.20 regarding version handling
* Added further OIDs and a TBD regarding reordering of the OIDs
* Added Sections 2.21 to 2.23 with new security considerations and
updated Section 5 accordingly
* Added a ToDo regarding OID registration, renaming, and re-ordering
* Added Section 3.1 updating the introduction of RFC 6712
* Fixed some nits in the ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-
lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module" and
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-12: Comments on A.2. 2002 ASN.1
Module")
* Replaced the term "transport" by "transfer" where appropriate to
prevent confusion
* Minor editorial changes
From version 11 -> 12: From version 11 -> 12:
* Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow * Extended Section 2.5 and the ASN.1 modules in Appendix A to allow
a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread a sequence of certificate profiles in CertProfileValue (see thread
"id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates") "id-it-CertProfile in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates")
From version 10 -> 11: From version 10 -> 11:
* Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the * Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
skipping to change at page 52, line 34 skipping to change at page 65, line 42
From version 9 -> 10: From version 9 -> 10:
* Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1 * Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1
From version 08 -> 09: From version 08 -> 09:
* Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 * Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2
and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id- and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-
kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas
Gustavesson Gustavsson
* Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it- * Added Section 2.4. and 2.5 to define id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-
certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15 certProfile to be used in Section 2.14 and 2.15
* Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8 * Added reference to CMP Algorithms in Section 2.8
* Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update * Extended Section 2.14 to explicitly indicate the root CA an update
is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1 is requested for by using id-it-rootCaCert and changing the ASN.1
syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the syntax to require providing the newWithOld certificate in the
response message response message
* Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate * Extended Section 2.15 to explicitly indicate the certificate
request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details request template by using id-it-certProfile and on further details
of the newly introduced controls of the newly introduced controls
* Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it- * Deleted the table on id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA and adding id-it-
rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19 rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in Section 2.19
* Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in * Adding the definition of id-it-rootCaCert and id-it-certProfile in
both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A both ASN.1 modules in Appendix A
* Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes * Minor editorial changes reflecting the above changes
From version 07 -> 08: From version 07 -> 08:
skipping to change at page 53, line 49 skipping to change at page 67, line 13
From version 05 -> 06: From version 05 -> 06:
* Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 04 -> 05: From version 04 -> 05:
* Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these * Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these
general messages types with EC curves (see thread general messages types with EC curves (see thread
"AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
in CMP headers") in CMP headers")
* Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
separate sections for easier readability separate sections for easier readability
* Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue * Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF from using rsaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
rsaKeyLen") rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.20 to introduce new * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.24 to introduce new
OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
"dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
* Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 03 -> 04: From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
* Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25
* Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
Martin Peylo Martin Peylo
From version 02 -> 03: From version 02 -> 03:
* Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108 be set up as decided in IETF 108
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.7 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108 private key as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.25
* Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.21 and the ASN.1 module * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.25 and the ASN.1 module
* Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
known/' as discussed in IETF 108 known/' as discussed in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations section * Updated the IANA Considerations section
* Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
* Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
* Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim management technique in Section 2.7 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list on the mailing list
* Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.21 revocation passphrase in Section 2.25
* Moved the change history to the Appendix * Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01: From version 00 -> 01:
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00: updates-00:
* Changes required to reflect WG adoption * Changes required to reflect WG adoption
skipping to change at page 56, line 4 skipping to change at page 69, line 15
* Added a section describing the new extended key usages * Added a section describing the new extended key usages
* Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted * Completed the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
values values
* Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4 * Added a section on clarification to Appendix D.4
* Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and * Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22 5.3.22
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hendrik Brockhaus
Hendrik Brockhaus (editor)
Siemens AG Siemens AG
Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
David von Oheimb David von Oheimb
Siemens AG Siemens AG
Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
John Gray
Entrust
Email: john.gray@entrust.com
 End of changes. 144 change blocks. 
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