--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-10.txt 2021-06-30 06:13:49.333334306 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt 2021-06-30 06:13:49.445337101 -0700 @@ -1,52 +1,57 @@ LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens -Intended status: Standards Track 4 May 2021 -Expires: 5 November 2021 +Intended status: Standards Track 30 June 2021 +Expires: 1 January 2022 Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates - draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-10 + draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11 Abstract This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712. The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. + CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of + EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an + explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as + needed. + Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 November 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 January 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights @@ -56,86 +61,89 @@ provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 6 + 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 - 2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 11 - 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key + 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation + Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 12 + 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 12 - 2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 12 - 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 13 - 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 13 - 2.16. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 15 - 2.17. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 15 - 2.18. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 - Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 2.19. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 16 - 2.20. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 18 - 2.21. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral - Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 2.22. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of - These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 2.23. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 19 - 2.24. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification - (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13 + 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 13 + 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 13 + 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 14 + 2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 15 + 2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 16 + 2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 + Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 17 + 2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 19 + 2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral + Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of + These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + + 2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 20 + 2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification + (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate - Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 20 - 3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 20 - 3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 21 - 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 21 + 3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 21 + 3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 22 + 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 - Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 + Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 1. Introduction While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and developing the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these limitations. Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP endpoints on registration and certification authorities. 1.1. Convention and Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] - [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown - here. + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and + "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP + 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210], RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words are used: CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates. RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a CA delegates certificate management functions such as authorization checks. @@ -179,20 +187,25 @@ EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. + * Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting + confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms, + e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to + use to compute the certHash. + * Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a root CA update, or a certificate request template. * Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages. * Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage @@ -298,57 +311,53 @@ id-it-rootCaCert. Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2: 5.1.1.3. RootCaCert This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate, e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see Section 5.3.19.15. - id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} + id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate - < TBD: The OID TBD5 has to be registered at IANA. > - 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces id-it-certProfile. Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3: 5.1.1.4. CertProfile + This is used by the EE to indicate a specific certificate profile, e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request template, see Section 5.3.19.16. - id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} + id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String - < TBD: The OID TBD6 has to be registered at IANA. > - 2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac. Replace the first paragraph with the following text: In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac - is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and - [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]): + is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]): 2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body types. Replace the text of the section with the following text: @@ -493,44 +502,70 @@ structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId. Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response (cp) message MUST be set to 0. Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno - values is described in Section 7. + values are described in Section 7. -2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types +2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content + + This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus + type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash + algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified + in the signatureAlgorithm field. + + Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text: + + CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, + certHash OCTET STRING, + certReqId INTEGER, + statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL + } + + The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the + signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not + specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. + In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify + the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value. + Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash + algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If + hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message + header must be cmp2021(3). + +2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair +2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey elements need to be given, one per named curve. -2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase +2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation request. This document updates the handling by using the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information as described in Section 2.8 above. Replace the text of the section with the following text: 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase @@ -539,66 +574,67 @@ purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the use of this mechanism. GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. -2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates +2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf- lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and issuing CA certificates. GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent > -2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update +2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I- D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update - This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/ response model. GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > + RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent + RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL } Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the needs of the EE. -2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template +2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing @@ -609,83 +645,83 @@ The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480]. The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm - rsaEncrytion and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of the - RSA key. + rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of + the RSA key. GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent + CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { certTemplate CertTemplate, keySpec Controls OPTIONAL } Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) - mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD3 } + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) - mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD4 } + mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER - < TBD: The OIDs TBD3 and TBD4 have to be registered at IANA. > - The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or RSA key length MUST be used. Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] -2.16. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response +2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for outstanding responses to a p10cr. Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add just before the state machine diagram the following text: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all subsequent messages of this transaction. -2.17. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation +2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP - version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData. + version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and + hashAlg. Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text: This section defines the version negotiation between client and server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510 [RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021 (specified in this document). The only difference between protocol versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces - EncryptedValue. + EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus. If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a request as follows: * If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out- of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported by both itself and the server. * If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports, @@ -705,34 +741,44 @@ * If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue: - If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest version supported the server. - If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. -2.18. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers + If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the + hashAlg field the client MUST choose the version for a request as + follows: + + * If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf + message. + + * If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the + certificate. + +2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This document extends the section to clients with any higher version than cmp1999. Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. -2.19. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations +2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the section: In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see @@ -760,47 +807,47 @@ +=========+=======================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+=======================+============+ | 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ | 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ | 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ - | TBD5 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | + | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ - | TBD6 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | + | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | +---------+-----------------------+------------+ Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Information Types registry In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. Two new entries have been added: +=========+======================+============+ | Decimal | Description | References | +=========+======================+============+ - | TBD3 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | + | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ - | TBD4 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | + | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | +---------+----------------------+------------+ Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Registration Controls registry -2.20. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase +2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following text: @@ -821,21 +868,21 @@ Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following text: * When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). -2.21. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications +2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated accordingly. Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text: @@ -845,52 +892,52 @@ -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- ********** -2.22. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These +2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These Profiles Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with the following text: Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). -2.23. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile +2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Replace the text of the section with the following text: D.2. Algorithm Use Profile For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. -2.24. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic +2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic Authenticated Scheme) Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. Replace the comment after the privateKey field of crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response message with the following text: @@ -956,41 +1003,42 @@ Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the section: In the registry of well-known URIs (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known- uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the following change has been performed. One new name entry has been added: - +============+===================+ - | URI suffix | Change controller | - +============+===================+ - | cmp | IETF | - +------------+-------------------+ + +============+===================+============+ + | URI suffix | Change controller | References | + +============+===================+============+ + | cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] | + +------------+-------------------+------------+ Table 4 4. IANA Considerations This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. - < TBD: This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F - [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. New OIDs TBD1 and TBD2 - need to be registered to identify the updated ASN.1 modules. > - < TBD: New OIDs TBD3 (id-regCtrl-algId) and TBD4 (id-regCtrl- - rsaKeyLen) need to be registered. > + This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F + [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod- + cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI + Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated + ASN.1 modules. - < TBD: New OIDs TBD5 (id-it-rootCaCert) and TBD6 (id-it-certProfile) - need to be registered. > + < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires + 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from + provisional to permanent. > 5. Security Considerations No changes are made to the existing security considerations of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. 6. Acknowledgements Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which @@ -999,34 +1047,26 @@ improving this document. We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable feedback. 7. References 7.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] - Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and S. Mister, + Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray, "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- - algorithms-03, 22 February 2021, - . - - [I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs] - Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate - Request Message Format (CRMF)", Work in Progress, - Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07, 8 - April 2021, . + algorithms-05, 7 May 2021, + . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, . @@ -1091,92 +1131,98 @@ . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, . + [RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the + Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate + Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045, + DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021, + . + 7.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021, - . + . [IEEE.802.1AR_2018] IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, . Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules + A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group. PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) - id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(TBD1)} + id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL -- IMPORTS - Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier, - UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out + Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name, + AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String, + id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} + -- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest + -- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986] GeneralName, KeyIdentifier FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- Appendix C of this specification - CertificationRequest - FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2) - us(840) rsadsi(113549) - pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)} - -- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT - -- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include - -- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module - EnvelopedData, SignedData + + EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - + -- The import of Attribute is added to define + -- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from + -- PKCS#10 [RFC2986] ; -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and -- constructs CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate } -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the @@ -1449,20 +1495,32 @@ -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- corresponding Challenge. CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse } + CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE { + version INTEGER, + subject Name, + subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE { + algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }, + attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute }, + signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + signature BIT STRING + } + CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) status PKIStatusInfo, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] @@ -1532,24 +1591,27 @@ RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { status PKIStatus, certId CertId, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) } CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList - CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash + -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier + -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL @@ -1572,25 +1634,25 @@ certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) } - id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 } + id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA - id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 } + id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL } -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- appropriate for a given environment): @@ -1631,24 +1692,24 @@ -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17} -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18} -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} + -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} + -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} @@ -1705,36 +1766,36 @@ -- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore, -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in -- CMP Updates [thisRFC] pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9} pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21} - localKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING + LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING END -- of CMP module A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912]. This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1 standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document. PKIXCMP-2021 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) - id-mod-cmp2021-02(TBD2) } + id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, @@ -2176,25 +2237,25 @@ certTemplate CertTemplate, -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- be used. keySpec Controls OPTIONAL -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) } - id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 } + id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 } AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA - id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 } + id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 } RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &id({SupportedInfoSet}), infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } @@ -2242,24 +2303,24 @@ -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17} -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18} -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19} -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} + -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20} -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] - -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} + -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21} -- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- -- where -- -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- and -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} @@ -2288,20 +2349,24 @@ pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- implementation-specific error codes errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL -- implementation-specific error details } CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, + -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash + -- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier + -- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm certHash OCTET STRING, -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature certReqId INTEGER, -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { certReqId INTEGER } @@ -2322,20 +2387,34 @@ -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } END Appendix B. History of changes Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document. + From version 10 -> 11: + + * Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the + CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature + algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the + AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for + calculating certHash") + * Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix + * Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the + definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of + CertificationRequest") + * Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1 + * Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs + From version 9 -> 10: * Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1 From version 08 -> 09: * Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id- kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas Gustavesson @@ -2393,83 +2474,82 @@ From version 05 -> 06: * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. * Minor changes and corrections From version 04 -> 05: - * Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these + * Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these general messages types with EC curves (see thread "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue in CMP headers") * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three separate sections for easier readability - - * Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue + * Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") - * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.19 to introduce new + * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.20 to introduce new OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") * Minor changes and corrections From version 03 -> 04: * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.20 + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from Martin Peylo From version 02 -> 03: * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will be set up as decided in IETF 108 * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated private key as decided in IETF 108 - * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.20 - * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.20 and the ASN.1 module + * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21 + * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.21 and the ASN.1 module * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- known/' as discussed in IETF 108 * Updated the IANA Considerations section * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] * Minor changes in wording From version 01 -> 02: * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim on the mailing list * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the - revocation passphrase in Section 2.20 + revocation passphrase in Section 2.21 * Moved the change history to the Appendix From version 00 -> 01: * Minor changes in wording From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates-00: * Changes required to reflect WG adoption