draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-10.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb Internet-Draft D. von Oheimb
Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens Updates: 4210, 5912, 6712 (if approved) Siemens
Intended status: Standards Track 4 May 2021 Intended status: Standards Track 30 June 2021
Expires: 5 November 2021 Expires: 1 January 2022
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-10 draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport
of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712. updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.
The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages, instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP, types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
and '.well-known' HTTP path segments. and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.
To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
is supposed to use EnvelopedData. is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
needed.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 November 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 January 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 22 skipping to change at page 2, line 27
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol
(CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Update Section 5.1.1. - PKI Message Header . . . . . . . 7
2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. New Section 5.1.1.3. - RootCaCert . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8 2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information . . . 8
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8 2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 8
2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9 2.8. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 9
2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11 2.9. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 11
2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 11 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types . . . . 12
2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key
Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Pair Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 12 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 13
2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 12 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . 13
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 13 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update . . . 13
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 13 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template . . 14
2.16. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 15 2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 15
2.17. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 15 2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . 16
2.18. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.19. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 16 2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 17
2.20. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 18 2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 19
2.21. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.22. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of 2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of
These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 These Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.23. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 19
2.24. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification 2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile . . . . . . 20
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 20 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 21
3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2. Replace Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 21 3.3. Update Section 6. - IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 22
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations. limitations.
Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which Among others, this document improves the crypto agility of CMP, which
means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. means to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities. endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
1.1. Convention and Terminology 1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
here. capitals, as shown here.
Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210], Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280]. The following key words
are used: are used:
CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates. CA: Certification authority, which issues certificates.
RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a RA: Registration authority, an optional system component to which a
CA delegates certificate management functions such as CA delegates certificate management functions such as
authorization checks. authorization checks.
skipping to change at page 4, line 48 skipping to change at page 5, line 20
EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of
completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been completeness and consistency the type EncryptedValue has been
exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes exchanged in all occurrences in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes
the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of the protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To certificates, and protection of revocation passphrases. To
properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a
transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData. transaction is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
* Offering an optional hashAlg field in CertStatus supporting
confirmation of certificates signed with signature algorithms,
e.g., EdDSA, not directly indicating a specific hash algorithm to
use to compute the certHash.
* Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a * Adding new general message types to request CA certificates, a
root CA update, or a certificate request template. root CA update, or a certificate request template.
* Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages. * Extend the usage of polling to p10cr messages.
* Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 * Delete the mandatory algorithm profile in RFC 4210 Appendix D.2
[RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7 [RFC4210] and refer to CMP Algorithms Section 7
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
skipping to change at page 7, line 39 skipping to change at page 7, line 48
id-it-rootCaCert. id-it-rootCaCert.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2: Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.2:
5.1.1.3. RootCaCert 5.1.1.3. RootCaCert
This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate, This is used by the EE to indicate a specific root CA certificate,
e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see e.g., when requesting a root CA certificate update, see
Section 5.3.19.15. Section 5.3.19.15.
id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
< TBD: The OID TBD5 has to be registered at IANA. >
2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile 2.5. New Section 5.1.1.4. - CertProfile
Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it Section 5.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] defines the PKIHeader and id-it
OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces OIDs to be used in the generalInfo field. This section introduces
id-it-certProfile. id-it-certProfile.
Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3: Insert this section after Section 5.1.1.3:
5.1.1.4. CertProfile 5.1.1.4. CertProfile
This is used by the EE to indicate a specific certificate profile, This is used by the EE to indicate a specific certificate profile,
e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request e.g., when requesting a new certificate or a certificate request
template, see Section 5.3.19.16. template, see Section 5.3.19.16.
id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String
< TBD: The OID TBD6 has to be registered at IANA. >
2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information 2.6. Update Section 5.1.3.1. - Shared Secret Information
Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based Section 5.1.3.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the MAC based
protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac. protection of a PKIMessage using the algorithm id-PasswordBasedMac.
Replace the first paragraph with the following text: Replace the first paragraph with the following text:
In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with In this case, the sender and recipient share secret information with
sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a sufficient entropy (established via out-of-band means or from a
previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC previous PKI management operation). PKIProtection will contain a MAC
value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in value and the protectionAlg MAY be one of the options described in
CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac CMP Algorithms [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. The PasswordBasedMac
is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and is specified as follows (see also [RFC4211] and [RFC9045]):
[I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]):
2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection 2.7. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport This document enables using nested messages also for batch transport
of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body of PKI messages between PKI management entities and with mixed body
types. types.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
skipping to change at page 11, line 41 skipping to change at page 11, line 50
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId. structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certReqId.
Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response Therefore, the certReqId in the corresponding certification response
(cp) message MUST be set to 0. (cp) message MUST be set to 0.
Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section: Add the following as new paragraphs to the end of the section:
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is Note: To indicate support for EnvelopedData the pvno cmp2021 is
introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno introduced by this document. Details on the usage of different pvno
values is described in Section 7. values are described in Section 7.
2.10. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types 2.10. Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus
type used in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash
algorithm for those certificates where no hash algorithm is specified
in the signatureAlgorithm field.
Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certHash OCTET STRING,
certReqId INTEGER,
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
}
The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not
specify a hash algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters.
In such cases, e.g., for EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify
the hash algorithm to be used for calculating the certHash value.
Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be computed using the same hash
algorithm as used to create and verify the certificate signature. If
hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the certConf message
header must be cmp2021(3).
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.2. - Signing Key Pair Types
The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair The following section clarifies the usage of the Signing Key Pair
Types on referencing EC curves. Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.2:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.11. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair 2.12. Update Section 5.3.19.3. - Encryption/Key Agreement Key Pair
Types Types
The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key The following section clarifies the use of the Encryption/Key
Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves. Agreement Key Pair Types on referencing EC curves.
Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3: Insert this note at the end of Section 5.3.19.3:
Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey Note: In case several EC curves are supported, several id-ecPublicKey
elements need to be given, one per named curve. elements need to be given, one per named curve.
2.12. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase 2.13. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase
Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
request. This document updates the handling by using the parent request. This document updates the handling by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue to transport this
information as described in Section 2.8 above. information as described in Section 2.8 above.
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase 5.3.19.9. Revocation Passphrase
skipping to change at page 12, line 39 skipping to change at page 13, line 28
purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case purpose of authenticating a later revocation request (in the case
that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to that the appropriate signing private key is no longer available to
authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the authenticate the request). See Appendix B for further details on the
use of this mechanism. use of this mechanism.
GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey GenMsg: {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent > GenRep: {id-it 12}, < absent >
The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2. The use of EncryptedKey is described in Section 5.2.2.
2.13. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates 2.14. New Section 5.3.19.14 - CA Certificates
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf- caCerts. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-
lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13: Insert this section after Section 5.3.19.13:
2.3.19.14 CA Certificates 2.3.19.14 CA Certificates
This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and This MAY be used by the client to get the current CA intermediate and
issuing CA certificates. issuing CA certificates.
GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 17}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 17}, SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate | < absent >
2.14. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update 2.15. New Section 5.3.19.15 - Root CA Certificate Update
The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it- The following subsection describes PKI general messages using id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I- rootCaKeyUpdate. The use is specified in Lightweight CMP Profile [I-
D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.14:
5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update 5.3.19.15. Root CA Certificate Update
This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root This MAY be used by the client to get an update of an existing root
CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see CA Certificate, which MAY be indicated in the rootCaCert field, see
Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In Section 5.1.1.3, of the PKIHeader of the request message. In
contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/ contrast to the ckuann message this approach follows the request/
response model. response model.
GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 18}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 18}, RootCaKeyUpdateContent | < absent >
RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE { RootCaKeyUpdateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
newWithNew CMPCertificate, newWithNew CMPCertificate,
newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL, newWithOld [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL oldWithNew [1] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL
} }
Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting Note: In contrast to CAKeyUpdAnnContent, this type offers omitting
newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the newWithOld and oldWithNew in the GenRep message, depending on the
needs of the EE. needs of the EE.
2.15. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template 2.16. New Section 5.3.19.16 - Certificate Request Template
The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id- The following subsection introduces the PKI general message using id-
it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP it-certReqTemplate. Details are specified in the Lightweight CMP
Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4. Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Section 4.4.
Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15: Insert this section after new Section 5.3.19.15:
5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template 5.3.19.16. Certificate Request Template
This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing This MAY be used by the client to get a template containing
skipping to change at page 14, line 14 skipping to change at page 14, line 50
The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic The id-regCtrl-algId control MAY be used to identify a cryptographic
algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than algorithm, see RFC 5280 Section 4.1.2.7 [RFC5280], other than
rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic rsaEncryption. The algorithm field SHALL identify a cryptographic
algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary algorithm. The contents of the optional parameters field will vary
according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the according to the algorithm identified. For example, when the
algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the algorithm is set to id-ecPublicKey, the parameters identify the
elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480]. elliptic curve to be used, see [RFC5480].
The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm The id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen control SHALL be used for algorithm
rsaEncrytion and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of the rsaEncryption and SHALL contain the intended modulus bit length of
RSA key. the RSA key.
GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent > GenMsg: {id-it 19}, < absent >
GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent > GenRep: {id-it 19}, CertReqTemplateContent | < absent >
CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE { CertReqTemplateContent ::= SEQUENCE {
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
} }
Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD3 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) TBD4 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) pkip(5) regCtrl(1) 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
< TBD: The OIDs TBD3 and TBD4 have to be registered at IANA. >
The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be The CertReqTemplateValue contains the prefilled certTemplate to be
used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the used for a future certificate request. The publicKey field in the
certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity certTemplate MUST NOT be used. In case the PKI management entity
wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field wishes to specify supported public-key algorithms, the keySpec field
MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or MUST be used. One AttributeTypeAndValue per supported algorithm or
RSA key length MUST be used. RSA key length MUST be used.
Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211] Note: The Controls ASN.1 type is defined in CRMF Section 6 [RFC4211]
2.16. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response 2.17. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response
Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for messages are used. This document adds the polling mechanism also for
outstanding responses to a p10cr. outstanding responses to a p10cr.
Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add Replace in the first paragraph the word 'cr' by 'cr, p10cr' and add
just before the state machine diagram the following text: just before the state machine diagram the following text:
A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo data
structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all request identifier. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
subsequent messages of this transaction. subsequent messages of this transaction.
2.17. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation 2.18. Update Section 7 - Version Negotiation
Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol Section 7 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of CMP protocol
versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP versions. This document describes the handling of the additional CMP
version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData. version cmp2021 introduced to indicate support of EnvelopedData and
hashAlg.
Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text: Replace the text of the first two paragraphs with the following text:
This section defines the version negotiation between client and This section defines the version negotiation between client and
server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510 server used to choose among cmp1999 (specified in RFC 2510
[RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021 [RFC2510]), cmp2000 (specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]), and cmp2021
(specified in this document). The only difference between protocol (specified in this document). The only difference between protocol
versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces versions cmp2021 and cmp2000 is that EnvelopedData replaces
EncryptedValue. EncryptedValue and the optional hashAlg field is added to CertStatus.
If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a If a client does not support cmp2021 it chooses the versions for a
request as follows: request as follows:
* If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the * If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out- server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some out-
of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the highest
version supported by both itself and the server. version supported by both itself and the server.
* If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports, * If the client does not know what version(s) the server supports,
skipping to change at page 16, line 18 skipping to change at page 17, line 5
* If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue: * If the client supports both EnvelopedData and EncryptedValue:
- If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the - If the client knows the protocol version(s) supported by the
server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some server (e.g., from a previous PKIMessage exchange or via some
out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the out-of-band means), then it MUST send a PKIMessage with the
highest version supported the server. highest version supported the server.
- If the client does not know what version(s) the server - If the client does not know what version(s) the server
supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021. supports, then it MUST send a PKIMessage using cmp2021.
2.18. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the
hashAlg field the client MUST choose the version for a request as
follows:
* If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf
message.
* If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the
certificate.
2.19. Update Section 7.1.1. - Clients Talking to RFC 2510 Servers
Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a Section 7.1.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the behavior of a
client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This client sending a cmp2000 message talking to a cmp1999 server. This
document extends the section to clients with any higher version than document extends the section to clients with any higher version than
cmp1999. cmp1999.
Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text: Replace the first sentence of Section 7.1.1 with the following text:
If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher If, after sending a message with a protocol version number higher
than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of than cmp1999, a client receives an ErrorMsgContent with a version of
cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction. cmp1999, then it MUST abort the current transaction.
2.19. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations 2.20. Update Section 9 - IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage, that document. As this document defines a new Extended Key Usage,
the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly. the IANA Considerations need to be updated accordingly.
Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the Add the following paragraphs after the third paragraph of the
section: section:
In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key In the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
skipping to change at page 17, line 24 skipping to change at page 18, line 33
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+=======================+============+ +=========+=======================+============+
| 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] | | 17 | id-it-caCerts | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] | | 18 | id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] | | 19 | id-it-certReqTemplate | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| TBD5 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] | | 20 | id-it-rootCaCert | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
| TBD6 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] | | 21 | id-it-certProfile | [thisRFC] |
+---------+-----------------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------------+------------+
Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP Table 2: Addition to the PKIX CMP
Information Types registry Information Types registry
In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration In the SMI-numbers registry " SMI Security for PKIX CRMF Registration
Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/ Controls (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1)" (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.5.1) as
defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed. defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] two additions have been performed.
Two new entries have been added: Two new entries have been added:
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | References |
+=========+======================+============+ +=========+======================+============+
| TBD3 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] | | 11 | id-regCtrl-algId | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
| TBD4 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] | | 12 | id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen | [thisRFC] |
+---------+----------------------+------------+ +---------+----------------------+------------+
Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF Table 3: Addition to the PKIX CRMF
Registration Controls registry Registration Controls registry
2.20. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 2.21. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the use of the revocation
passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to utilize
the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as
described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated described in Section 2.8 above, the description is updated
accordingly. accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
skipping to change at page 18, line 40 skipping to change at page 19, line 45
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text: text:
* When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in * When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.21. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 2.22. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.8 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the Replace the comment within the ASN.1 syntax coming after the
definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text: definition of POPOPrivKey with the following text:
skipping to change at page 19, line 18 skipping to change at page 20, line 21
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this
-- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying -- * document makes the behavioral clarification of specifying
-- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This
-- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the -- * allows the necessary conveyance and protection of the
-- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility -- * private key while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility
-- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211]. -- * with RFC 4211 [RFC4211].
-- ********** -- **********
2.22. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These 2.23. Update Appendix D.1. - General Rules for Interpretation of These
Profiles Profiles
Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for Appendix D.1 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides general rules for
interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in interpretation of the PKI management messages profiles specified in
Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document Appendix D and Appendix E of RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This document
updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021. updates a sentence regarding the new protocol version cmp2021.
Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with Replace the last sentence of the first paragraph of the section with
the following text: the following text:
Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value Mandatory fields are not mentioned if they have an obvious value
(e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000). (e.g., in this version of these profiles, pvno is always cmp2000).
2.23. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile 2.24. Update Appendix D.2. - Algorithm Use Profile
Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides a list of algorithms that
implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI implementations must support when claiming conformance with PKI
Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2 Management Message Profiles as specified in CMP Appendix D.2
[RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as [RFC4210]. This document redirects to the new algorithm profile as
specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms specified in Appendix A.1 of CMP Algorithms
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
Replace the text of the section with the following text: Replace the text of the section with the following text:
D.2. Algorithm Use Profile D.2. Algorithm Use Profile
For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective For specifications of algorithm identifiers and respective
conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP conventions for conforming implementations, please refer to CMP
Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]. Algorithms Appendix A.1 [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms].
2.24. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 2.25. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using certification scheme. This scheme shall continue using
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text: message with the following text:
skipping to change at page 21, line 36 skipping to change at page 22, line 36
Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the Add the following text between the first and second paragraph of the
section: section:
In the registry of well-known URIs (see In the registry of well-known URIs (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known- https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the uris.xhtml#well-known-uris-1) as defined in RFC 8615 [RFC8615] the
following change has been performed. following change has been performed.
One new name entry has been added: One new name entry has been added:
+============+===================+ +============+===================+============+
| URI suffix | Change controller | | URI suffix | Change controller | References |
+============+===================+ +============+===================+============+
| cmp | IETF | | cmp | IETF | [thisRFC] |
+------------+-------------------+ +------------+-------------------+------------+
Table 4 Table 4
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections This document contains an update to the IANA Consideration sections
to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712]. to be added to [RFC4210] and [RFC6712].
< TBD: This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F This document updates the ASN.1 modules of RFC 4210 Appendix F
[RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. New OIDs TBD1 and TBD2 [RFC4210] and RFC 5912 Section 9 [RFC5912]. The OIDs 99 (id-mod-
need to be registered to identify the updated ASN.1 modules. > cmp2021-88) and 100 (id-mod-cmp2021-02) were registered in the SMI
< TBD: New OIDs TBD3 (id-regCtrl-algId) and TBD4 (id-regCtrl- Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry to identify the updated
rsaKeyLen) need to be registered. > ASN.1 modules.
< TBD: New OIDs TBD5 (id-it-rootCaCert) and TBD6 (id-it-certProfile) < TBD: The temporary registration of cmp URI suffix expires
need to be registered. > 2022-05-20. The registration must be extended in time or update from
provisional to permanent. >
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712]. RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which on structuring and writing this document we got from [RFC6402] which
skipping to change at page 22, line 31 skipping to change at page 23, line 36
improving this document. improving this document.
We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable We also thank all reviewers of this document for their valuable
feedback. feedback.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms] [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms]
Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and S. Mister, Brockhaus, H., Aschauer, H., Ounsworth, M., and J. Gray,
"Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work "Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
algorithms-03, 22 February 2021, algorithms-05, 7 May 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
algorithms-03>. cmp-algorithms-05>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs]
Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07, 8
April 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
crmf-update-algs-07>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC2510] Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols",
RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999, RFC 2510, DOI 10.17487/RFC2510, March 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2510>.
skipping to change at page 24, line 31 skipping to change at page 25, line 23
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC9045] Housley, R., "Algorithm Requirements Update to the
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 9045,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9045, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. V. Oheimb, "Lightweight
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-
cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021, cmp-profile-05, 22 February 2021,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cmp-profile-05>. lightweight-cmp-profile-05>.
[IEEE.802.1AR_2018] [IEEE.802.1AR_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018, networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this 1988 ASN.1 module remains the
normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group. normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group.
PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(TBD1)} id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2021-88(99)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS IMPORTS
Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier, Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, Name,
UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out AlgorithmIdentifier, UTF8String,
id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(18)}
-- The import of Name is added to define CertificationRequest
-- instead of importing it from PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)} id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(19)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId, CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl CertReqMessages, Controls, id-regCtrl
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)} id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made -- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to -- in CMP Updates [thisRFC]]. EncryptedValue does not need to
-- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here. -- be imported anymore and is therefore removed here.
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in -- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification -- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2) EnvelopedData, SignedData, Attribute
us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) } smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to -- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- the updates made in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- The import of Attribute is added to define
-- CertificationRequest instead of importing it from
-- PKCS#10 [RFC2986]
; ;
-- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and -- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
-- constructs -- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate x509v3PKCert Certificate
} }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the -- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the -- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
skipping to change at page 32, line 11 skipping to change at page 32, line 51
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The -- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the -- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge. -- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE { CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL, OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
} }
CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
certificationRequestInfo SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER,
subject Name,
subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING },
attributes [0] IMPLICIT SET OF Attribute },
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value -- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
-- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the -- of 0 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr) -- corresponding request, which can only be a p10cr)
status PKIStatusInfo, status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL, certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined -- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF] -- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
skipping to change at page 33, line 45 skipping to change at page 35, line 4
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE { RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus, status PKIStatus,
certId CertId, certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime, willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime, badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.) -- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
} }
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
} }
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
skipping to change at page 34, line 37 skipping to change at page 35, line 47
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
} }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
} }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited -- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as -- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment): -- appropriate for a given environment):
skipping to change at page 35, line 39 skipping to change at page 36, line 48
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- - syntax without this change -- - syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String -- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
skipping to change at page 37, line 26 skipping to change at page 38, line 36
-- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the -- There is no 1988 ASN.1 module of PKCS#9 available to import the
-- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore, -- syntax of the localKeyId attribute type and value from. Therefore,
-- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in -- the syntax is added here as needed for the updates made in
-- CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- CMP Updates [thisRFC]
pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9} rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9}
pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21} pkcs-9-at-localKeyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 21}
localKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING LocalKeyIdValue ::= OCTET STRING
END -- of CMP module END -- of CMP module
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912]. This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The
module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from module contains those changes to the normative ASN.1 module from
RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1 RFC4210 Appendix F [RFC4210] that were to update to 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document. standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made in this document.
PKIXCMP-2021 PKIXCMP-2021
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2021-02(TBD2) } id-mod-cmp2021-02(100) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM, AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
skipping to change at page 47, line 18 skipping to change at page 48, line 30
certTemplate CertTemplate, certTemplate CertTemplate,
-- prefilled certTemplate structure elements -- prefilled certTemplate structure elements
-- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field in the certTemplate MUST NOT
-- be used. -- be used.
keySpec Controls OPTIONAL keySpec Controls OPTIONAL
-- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms. -- MAY be used to specify supported algorithms.
-- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue -- Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
-- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211) -- as specified in CRMF (RFC4211)
} }
id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD3 } id-regCtrl-algId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 11 }
AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}} AlgIdCtrl ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA -- SHALL be used to specify suported algorithms other than RSA
id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl TBD4 } id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 12 }
RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER RsaKeyLenCtrl ::= INTEGER
-- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths -- SHALL be used to specify suported RSA key lengths
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}), &id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE. infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) } &Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
skipping to change at page 48, line 26 skipping to change at page 49, line 39
-- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to -- - Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- - the syntax without this change -- - the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13} -- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL -- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14} -- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime -- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15} -- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages -- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16} -- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String -- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
-- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 17} -- id-it-caCerts OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 17}
-- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate -- CaCertsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-caCerts added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 18} -- id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 18}
-- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent -- RootCaKeyUpdateValue ::= RootCaKeyUpdateContent
-- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-rootCaKeyUpdate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-it 19} -- id-it-certReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 19}
-- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent -- CertReqTemplateValue ::= CertReqTemplateContent
-- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certReqTemplate added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD5} -- id-it-rootCaCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 20}
-- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate -- RootCaCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-rootCaCert added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it TBD6} -- id-it-certProfile OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 21}
-- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String -- CertProfileValue ::= UTF8String
-- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC] -- - id-it-certProfile added in CMP Updates [thisRFC]
-- --
-- where -- where
-- --
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { -- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3) -- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)} -- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and -- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4} -- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
skipping to change at page 49, line 33 skipping to change at page 50, line 46
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo, pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL, errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes -- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details -- implementation-specific error details
} }
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE { CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
-- SHOULD NOT be used in all cases where the AlgorithmIdentifier
-- of the certificate signature specifies a hash algorithm
certHash OCTET STRING, certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER, certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL } statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER } certReqId INTEGER }
skipping to change at page 50, line 19 skipping to change at page 51, line 36
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END END
Appendix B. History of changes Appendix B. History of changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document. document.
From version 10 -> 11:
* Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the
AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for
calculating certHash")
* Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix
* Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the
definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of
CertificationRequest")
* Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1
* Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs
From version 9 -> 10: From version 9 -> 10:
* Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1 * Added 1988 ASN.1 syntax for localKeyId attribute to Appendix A.1
From version 08 -> 09: From version 08 -> 09:
* Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2 * Deleted specific definition of CMP CA and CMP RA in Section 2.2
and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id- and only reference RFC 6402 for definition of id-kp-cmcCA and id-
kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas kp-cmcRA to resolve the ToDo below based on feedback of Tomas
Gustavesson Gustavesson
skipping to change at page 51, line 43 skipping to change at page 53, line 28
From version 05 -> 06: From version 05 -> 06:
* Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP * Added the update of Appendix D.2 with the reference to the new CMP
Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108 Algorithms document as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id- * Updated the IANA considerations to register new OIDs for id-
regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen. regCtrl-algId and d-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen.
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 04 -> 05: From version 04 -> 05:
* Added Section 2.10 and Section 2.11 to clarify the usage of these * Added Section 2.11 and Section 2.12 to clarify the usage of these
general messages types with EC curves (see thread general messages types with EC curves (see thread
"AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue "AlgorithmIdentifier parameters NULL value - Re: InfoTypeAndValue
in CMP headers") in CMP headers")
* Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA * Split former section 2.7 on adding 'CA Certificates', 'Root CA
Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three Certificates Update', and 'Certificate Request Template' in three
separate sections for easier readability separate sections for easier readability
* Changed in Section 2.15 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
* Changed in Section 2.14 the ASN.1 syntax of CertReqTemplateValue
from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF from using reaKeyLen to usage of controls as specified in CRMF
Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and Section 6 [RFC4211] (see thread "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and
rsaKeyLen") rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.19 to introduce new * Updated the IANA considerations in Section 2.20 to introduce new
OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread OID for id-regCtrl-algId and id-regCtrl-rsaKeyLen (see thread
"dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen") "dtaft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and rsaKeyLen")
* Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce * Updated the IANA Considerations in and the Appendixes to introduce
new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action: new OID for the updates ASN.1 modules (see thread "I-D Action:
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt") draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-04.txt")
* Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of * Removed EncryptedValue from and added Controls to the list of
types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread types imported from CRMF [RFC4211] in ASN.1 modules (see thread
"draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see * Moved declaration of Rand out of the comment in ASN.1 modules (see
thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules") thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates and the ASN.1 modules")
* Minor changes and corrections * Minor changes and corrections
From version 03 -> 04: From version 03 -> 04:
* Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in * Added Section 2.7 to introduce three new id-it IDs for uses in
general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- general messages as discussed (see thread "draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it- updates add section to introduce id-it-caCerts, id-it-
rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate") rootCaKeyUpdate, and id-it-certReqTemplate")
* Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA * Added the new id-it IDs and the /.well-known/cmp to the IANA
Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9 Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.20 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21
* Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from * Some changes in wording on Section 3 due to review comments from
Martin Peylo Martin Peylo
From version 02 -> 03: From version 02 -> 03:
* Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will * Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108 be set up as decided in IETF 108
* Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the * Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.8 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108 private key as decided in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.20 * Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.21
* Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.20 and the ASN.1 module * Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.21 and the ASN.1 module
* Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712] * Added Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712 [RFC6712]
regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well- regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of '/.well-
known/' as discussed in IETF 108 known/' as discussed in IETF 108
* Updated the IANA Considerations section * Updated the IANA Considerations section
* Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update * Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912] 2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
* Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 * Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
* Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key * Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim management technique in Section 2.8 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list on the mailing list
* Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the * Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.20 revocation passphrase in Section 2.21
* Moved the change history to the Appendix * Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01: From version 00 -> 01:
* Minor changes in wording * Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00: updates-00:
* Changes required to reflect WG adoption * Changes required to reflect WG adoption
 End of changes. 88 change blocks. 
144 lines changed or deleted 221 lines changed or added

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