draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-02.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft Siemens Internet-Draft Siemens
Updates: 4210 (if approved) July 6, 2020 Updates: 4210, 6712 (if approved) August 7, 2020
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: January 7, 2021 Expires: February 8, 2021
CMP Updates CMP Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-02 draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-03
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax of This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax and
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document transport of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This
updates RFC 4210. document updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.
Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and the enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue, the
definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
endpoints on certification and registration authorities. endpoints on certification and registration authorities, and adds an
HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 18 skipping to change at page 2, line 19
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 3 2. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 3
2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 6 2.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 6
2.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 8 2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 9
2.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 9 2.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 9
2.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 9 2.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 10
2.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 10 2.8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 2.9. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 11
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.10. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
2.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.11. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Management Protocol (CMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712 . . . . . . . . 13
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.2. New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to overcome these limitations. RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712] to overcome these
limitations.
In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP
to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities. endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
1.1. Convention and Terminology 1.1. Convention and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence [RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible. whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
1.1 Changes since RFC 4210 1.1 Changes since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates: The following updates are made in [thisRFC]:
o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g. o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
registration authority and certification authority, to express the registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management entity. the indicated PKI management entity.
o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages. use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
o Offering EnvelopedData as the prefered choice next to o Offering EnvelopedData as the preferred choice next to
EncryptedValue to extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that EncryptedValue to extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that
according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of
completeness and consistency the exchange of EncryptedValue is completeness and consistency the exchange of EncryptedValue is
performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes the performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes the
protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
certificates, and revocation passphrases. certificates, and revocation passphrases.
o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages. o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages.
< TBD: The specification of algorithm profiles seed to be moved to a
separate document. >
2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage 2.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
The following subsection describes new extended key usages for The following subsection describes new extended key usages for
different CMP server typesspecitied in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. different CMP server types specified in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4.
4.5 Extended Key Usage 4.5 Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications. the use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI
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To offer automatic validation means for the delegation of a role by a To offer automatic validation means for the delegation of a role by a
CA, the certificates used by PKI management entities for CMP message CA, the certificates used by PKI management entities for CMP message
protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued protection or signed data for central key generation MUST be issued
by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This by the delegating CA and MUST contain the respective EKUs. This
proves the authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act proves the authorization of this entity by the delegating CA to act
as the PKI management entity as described below. as the PKI management entity as described below.
The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is: The ASN.1 to define these EKUs is:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
< TBD: id-kp-cmKGA to be defined. >
Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and Note: RFC 6402 section 2.10 [RFC6402] specifies OIDs for a CMC CA and
a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to a CMC RA. As the functionality of a CA and RA is not specific to
whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same
OIDs SHALL be used for a CMP CA and a CMP RA. OIDs SHALL be used for a CMP CA and a CMP RA.
< TBD: The Description of the OIDs needs to be extended to avoid < TBD: The Description of the OIDs for id-kp-cmcCA and id-kp-cmcRA
confusion as they currently only refer to CMC endpoints. > needs to be extended to avoid confusion as they currently only refer
to CMC. >
The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is
as follows: as follows:
CMP CA: CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA CMP CA: CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA
equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in
the context of CMP management operations, especially CMP the context of CMP management operations, especially CMP
message protection, need not be the same key that signs the message protection, need not be the same key that signs the
certificates. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the certificates. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the
entity acting as CMP CA is authorized to do so. Therefore, entity acting as CMP CA is authorized to do so. Therefore,
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CMP RA: CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA CMP RA: CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA
equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3. A CMP RA is equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3. A CMP RA is
identified by the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage. This identified by the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage. This
extended key usage is placed into RA certificates. The CA extended key usage is placed into RA certificates. The CA
that delegated this role is identified by the CA that issued that delegated this role is identified by the CA that issued
the CMP RA certificate. the CMP RA certificate.
CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp- CMP KGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
cmKGA extended key usage. Though the CMP KGA knows the cmKGA extended key usage. Though the CMP KGA knows the
private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This
is a very sensible service and needs specific authorization. is a very sensitive service and needs specific
This authorization is either with the CA certificate itself, authorization. This authorization is either with the CA
or indicated by placing the id-kp-cmKGA extended key usage certificate itself, or indicated by placing the id-kp-cmKGA
into the CMP RA or CMP CA certificate used to authenticate extended key usage into the CMP RA or CMP CA certificate
the origin of the private key, and to express the used to authenticate the origin of the private key, and to
authorization to offer this service. express the authorization to offer this service.
Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates, Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates,
CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as 99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280 specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280
Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used
for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP
message protection (CMP CA, CMP RA, CMP KGA) MUST NOT use indefinite message protection (CMP CA, CMP RA, CMP KGA) MUST NOT use indefinite
expiration date. expiration date.
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envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for
EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652]. Using the EncryptedKey data EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652]. Using the EncryptedKey data
structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward
compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered. The use of the compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered. The use of the
EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use EnvelopedData structure. Therefore, it is recommended to use
EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
Note: As we reuse the EncryptedKey structure defined in CRMF
[RFC4211], the update is backward compatible. Using the new syntax
with the untagged default choice EncryptedValue is bitwise compatible
with the old syntax.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form. private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows: EnvelopedData is used as follows:
o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
encrypted only for one recipient. encrypted only for one recipient.
o Contains a private key in a SignedData structure as specified in o Contains a private key in the AsymmetricKeyPackage structure as
CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation Authority. defined in RFC 5958 [RFC5958] wrapped in a SignedData structure as
specified in CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation
Authority.
o Contains a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the o Contains a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
encryptedContent field. encryptedContent field.
Note: When transferring a centrally generated private key in a Note: To ensure explicit control of the encoding of the private key
certificate response message to the EE, the algorithm identifier and according to the specific algorithm the new key pair in an asymmetric
the associated public key will anyhow be transported in this response key package structure as specified in [RFC5958].
message. Therefore, the private key will not be delivered in a key
package structure as specified in [RFC5958] and [RFC6032]. But the
wrapping of the private key in a SignedData structure that is wrapped
in the EnvelopedData structure as specified in [RFC6032] is applied.
The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated section 6 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST symmetric content-encryption key. This content-encryption key MUST
be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
management techniques. management techniques.
The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
depends on the credential available for the recipient: depends on the credential available for the recipient:
o Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key agreement key management technique, as protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.2 [RFC5652].
o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension o Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the key transport key management technique, as protected using the key transport key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652]. specified in CMS section 6.2.1 [RFC5652].
o Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
protected using the password-based key management technique, as
specified in CMS section 6.2.4 [RFC5652].
2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response 2.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response
Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent Response. This document updates the syntax by using the parent
structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in structure EncryptedKey instead of EncryptedValue as described in
Section 2.1 above. Section 2.1 above.
Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
the following text. the following text.
skipping to change at page 10, line 40 skipping to change at page 11, line 5
the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq. the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.
4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it 4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
will be treated in the same way as the initial response. will be treated in the same way as the initial response.
Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo
data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
following messages of this transaction. following messages of this transaction.
2.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 2.8. IANA Considerations
Section 9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] contains the IANA Considerations of
that document. As this document defines a new and updates two
existing Extended Key Usages, the IANA Considerations need to be
updated accordingly.
Add the following paragraphs between the first and second paragraph
of the section.
Within the SMI-numbers registry "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key
Purpose Identifiers (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3)" (see
https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-
numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) as defined in RFC 7299 [RFC7299] three
changes have been performed.
Two existing entries have been updated to also point to this
document:
Decimal Description References
------- ----------- ------------------
27 id-kp-cmcCA [RFC6402][thisRFC]
28 id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402][thisRFC]
One new entry has been added:
Decimal Description References
------- ----------- ----------
32 id-kp-cmKGA [thisRFC]
2.9. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
text. text.
skipping to change at page 11, line 29 skipping to change at page 12, line 21
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text. text.
o When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in o When using EnvelopedData the localKeyId attribute as specified in
RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint RFC 2985 [RFC2985] and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint
field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along field MAY contain a key identifier (chosen by the entity, along
with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the with the passphrase itself) to assist in later retrieval of the
correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is correct passphrase (e.g., when the revocation request is
constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA). constructed by the entity and received by the CA/RA).
2.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications 2.10. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210 request message behavior. As this document updates RFC 4210
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 2.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
section with the following text. section with the following text.
skipping to change at page 12, line 5 skipping to change at page 12, line 45
-- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document
-- * makes the behavioral clarification of specifying that the -- * makes the behavioral clarification of specifying that the
-- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as -- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows
-- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key -- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
-- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211 -- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]. -- * [RFC4211].
-- ********** -- **********
2.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 2.11. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
certification scheme. This scheme shall continue to use certification scheme. This scheme shall continue to use
EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons. EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.
Replace the comment after the privateKey field of Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
message with the following text. message with the following text.
-- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
-- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue
3. IANA Considerations 3. Updates to RFC 6712 - HTTP Transfer for the Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP)
< TBD: A new OID for id-kp-cmKGA needs to be requested. > 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 6712
The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 6712
[RFC6712]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 6712 [RFC6712] are used
whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
1.1 Changes since RFC 6712
The following updates are made in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates:
o Add an HTTP URI discovery mechanism and extend the URI structure.
3.2. New Section 3.6. - HTTP Request-URI
Section 3.6 of RFC 6712 [RFC6712] specifies the used HTTP URIs. This
document adds a discovery mechanism and extends the URIs.
Replace the text of the section with the following text.
Each PKI management entity supporting HTTP or HTTPS transport MUST
support the use of the path-prefix of '/.well-known/' as defined in
RFC 5785 [RFC5785] and the registered name of 'cmp' to ease
interworking in a multi-vendor environment.
The CMP client MUST be configured with sufficient information to form
the CMP server URI. This MUST be at least the authority portion of
the URI, e.g., 'www.example.com:80', or the full operational path of
the PKI management entity. Additional arbitrary label, e.g.,
'profileLabel' and 'operationLabel', MAY be configured as a separate
component or as part of the full operational path to provide further
information. The 'profileLabel' MAY support addressing multiple CAs
or certificate profiles and the 'operationLabel' may support
addressing PKI management operation specific endpoints. A valid full
operational path can look like this:
1 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp
2 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/operationLabel
3 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel
4 http://www.example.com/.well-known/cmp/profileLabel/operationLabel
The discovery of supported endpoints as defined above will provide
the information to the EE, how to contact the PKI management entity
and, if available, how to request enrolment for a specific
certificate profile or revoke a certificate at a specific CA.
Querying the PKI management entity, the EE will get a list of
potential endpoints supported by the PKI management entity.
Performing a GET on "/.well-known/cmp" to the default port MUST
return a set of links to endpoints available from the server. In
addition to the link also the expected format of the data object is
provided as content type (ct).
< TBD: It needs to be discussed if the discovery should be performed
using GET on "/.well-known/cmp" or GET on "/.well-known" only. >
The following provides an illustrative example for a PKI management
entity supporting different PKI management operations for different
certificate profiles and CAs.
Detailed message description:
REQ: GET /.well-known/cmp
RES: Content
</cmp/certprofile1/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile2/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile3/operation1>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile1/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile2/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/certprofile3/operation2>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/ca1/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp
</cmp/ca2/operation3>;ct=pkixcmp
4. IANA Considerations
This document contains an update to the IANA Considerations section
to be added to [RFC4210].
< TBD: The existing description and information of id-kp-cmcRA and < TBD: The existing description and information of id-kp-cmcRA and
id-kp-cmcCA need to be updated to reflect their extended usage. > id-kp-cmcCA need to be updated to reflect their extended usage. >
4. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
No changes are made to the existing security considerations of No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and RFC 6712 [RFC6712].
5. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration Special thank goes to Jim Schaad for his guidance and the inspiration
on structuring and writing this document I got from [RFC6402] that on structuring and writing this document I got from [RFC6402] that
updates CMC. updates CMC. Special thank also goes also to Russ Housley and Tomas
Gustavsson for reviewing and providing valuable suggestions on the
approvement of this document.
I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their
valuable feedback. valuable feedback.
6. References 7. References
6.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
skipping to change at page 13, line 31 skipping to change at page 16, line 15
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011, Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
6.2. Informative References [RFC6712] Kause, T. and M. Peylo, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer for the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 6712,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6712, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-01 Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-02
(work in progress), March 2020. (work in progress), July 2020.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax [IEEE802.1AR]
(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032, IEEE, "802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", June 2018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/802.1AR-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>. 2009.html>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
Changes to the following parts are needed A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module
o Import from PKCS-9 This section contains the updated ASN.1 module for [RFC4210]. This
module replaces the module in Appendix F of that document. Although
a 2002 ASN.1 module is provided, this remains the normative module as
per the policy of the PKIX working group.
localKeyId PKIXCMP {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)} id-mod(0) id-mod-cmp2000(16)}
o Import from PKIKXCRMF-2005 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue, BEGIN
CertId, CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
o Import from CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 -- EXPORTS ALL --
EnvelopedData, SignedData IMPORTS
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) Certificate, CertificateList, Extensions, AlgorithmIdentifier,
modules(0) cms-2004(24) } UTF8String, id-kp -- if required; otherwise, comment out
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
CertId, CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}
-- The import of EncryptedKey is added due to the updates made
-- in this document
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10 {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-10(10) modules(1) pkcs-10(1)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- this document
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in this document
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally-defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE {
x509v3PKCert Certificate
}
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "un-comment" the following one prior to
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL
}
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody
}
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 2 840 113533 7 66 30}
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA.
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA.
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL
}
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
-- Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- int INTEGER,
-- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
-- sender GeneralName
-- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
-- }
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse
}
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [CRMF]
}
o In CertifiedKeyPair, CertOrEncCert and id-it-revPassphrase
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE { CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert, certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL, privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL
} }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE { CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate, certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL
}
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId
OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList
OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
} }
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
}
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
infoValue ANY DEFINED BY infoType OPTIONAL
}
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (un-comment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12} -- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey -- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- -- made in this document
-- -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- -- syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJ. IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER
}
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
}
-- --
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- CMP operations -- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
-- --
id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 } -- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 } -- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... } id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
< TBD: id-kp-cmKGA to be defined. > END -- of CMP module
< TBD: If needed the complete ASN.1 Module from RFC 4210 section A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module
needs to be copied here. >
This section contains the updated 2002 ASN.1 module for [RFC5912].
This module replaces the module in Section 9 of that document. The
module contains those changes that were done to update to 2002 ASN.1
standard done in [RFC5912] as well as changes made for this document.
< TBD: Dose this document then also updates [RFC5912]? >
< In case the working group sees a need to provide this ASN.1 module
in 2015 syntax, please let me know. >
PKIXCMP-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-cmp2000-02(50) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AttributeSet{}, Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
Certificate, CertificateList, id-kp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
GeneralName, KeyIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, EncryptedValue,
CertId,CertReqMessages
FROM PKIXCRMF-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-crmf2005-02(55) }
-- see also the behavioral clarifications to CRMF codified in
-- Appendix C of this specification
CertificationRequest
FROM PKCS-10
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69)}
-- (specified in RFC 2986 with 1993 ASN.1 syntax and IMPLICIT
-- tags). Alternatively, implementers may directly include
-- the [PKCS10] syntax in this module
localKeyId
FROM PKCS-9
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
modules(0) pkcs-9(1)}
-- The import of localKeyId is added due to the updates made in
-- this document
EnvelopedData, SignedData
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41)}
-- The import of EnvelopedData and SignedData is added due to
-- the updates made in this document
;
-- the rest of the module contains locally defined OIDs and
-- constructs
CMPCertificate ::= CHOICE { x509v3PKCert Certificate, ... }
-- This syntax, while bits-on-the-wire compatible with the
-- standard X.509 definition of "Certificate", allows the
-- possibility of future certificate types (such as X.509
-- attribute certificates, WAP WTLS certificates, or other kinds
-- of certificates) within this certificate management protocol,
-- should a need ever arise to support such generality. Those
-- implementations that do not foresee a need to ever support
-- other certificate types MAY, if they wish, comment out the
-- above structure and "uncomment" the following one prior to
-- compiling this ASN.1 module. (Note that interoperability
-- with implementations that don't do this will be unaffected by
-- this change.)
-- CMPCertificate ::= Certificate
PKIMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody,
protection [0] PKIProtection OPTIONAL,
extraCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL }
PKIMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIMessage
PKIHeader ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno INTEGER { cmp1999(1), cmp2000(2) },
sender GeneralName,
-- identifies the sender
recipient GeneralName,
-- identifies the intended recipient
messageTime [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
-- time of production of this message (used when sender
-- believes that the transport will be "suitable"; i.e.,
-- that the time will still be meaningful upon receipt)
protectionAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier{ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- algorithm used for calculation of protection bits
senderKID [2] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
recipKID [3] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
-- to identify specific keys used for protection
transactionID [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- identifies the transaction; i.e., this will be the same in
-- corresponding request, response, certConf, and PKIConf
-- messages
senderNonce [5] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
recipNonce [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
-- nonces used to provide replay protection, senderNonce
-- is inserted by the creator of this message; recipNonce
-- is a nonce previously inserted in a related message by
-- the intended recipient of this message
freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
-- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
-- (this field is intended for human consumption)
generalInfo [8] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
InfoTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
-- this may be used to convey context-specific information
-- (this field not primarily intended for human consumption)
}
PKIFreeText ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String
-- text encoded as UTF-8 String [RFC3629] (note: each
-- UTF8String MAY include an [RFC3066] language tag
-- to indicate the language of the contained text;
-- see [RFC2482] for details)
PKIBody ::= CHOICE { -- message-specific body elements
ir [0] CertReqMessages, --Initialization Request
ip [1] CertRepMessage, --Initialization Response
cr [2] CertReqMessages, --Certification Request
cp [3] CertRepMessage, --Certification Response
p10cr [4] CertificationRequest, --imported from [PKCS10]
popdecc [5] POPODecKeyChallContent, --pop Challenge
popdecr [6] POPODecKeyRespContent, --pop Response
kur [7] CertReqMessages, --Key Update Request
kup [8] CertRepMessage, --Key Update Response
krr [9] CertReqMessages, --Key Recovery Request
krp [10] KeyRecRepContent, --Key Recovery Response
rr [11] RevReqContent, --Revocation Request
rp [12] RevRepContent, --Revocation Response
ccr [13] CertReqMessages, --Cross-Cert. Request
ccp [14] CertRepMessage, --Cross-Cert. Response
ckuann [15] CAKeyUpdAnnContent, --CA Key Update Ann.
cann [16] CertAnnContent, --Certificate Ann.
rann [17] RevAnnContent, --Revocation Ann.
crlann [18] CRLAnnContent, --CRL Announcement
pkiconf [19] PKIConfirmContent, --Confirmation
nested [20] NestedMessageContent, --Nested Message
genm [21] GenMsgContent, --General Message
genp [22] GenRepContent, --General Response
error [23] ErrorMsgContent, --Error Message
certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
}
PKIProtection ::= BIT STRING
ProtectedPart ::= SEQUENCE {
header PKIHeader,
body PKIBody }
id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 }
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this string to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
iterationCount INTEGER,
-- number of times the OWF is applied
-- note: implementations MAY wish to limit acceptable sizes
-- of this integer to values appropriate for their environment
-- in order to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
usa(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 }
DHBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
mac AlgorithmIdentifier{MAC-ALGORITHM, {...}}
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
-- or HMAC [RFC2104, RFC2202])
}
PKIStatus ::= INTEGER {
accepted (0),
-- you got exactly what you asked for
grantedWithMods (1),
-- you got something like what you asked for; the
-- requester is responsible for ascertaining the differences
rejection (2),
-- you don't get it, more information elsewhere in the message
waiting (3),
-- the request body part has not yet been processed; expect to
-- hear more later (note: proper handling of this status
-- response MAY use the polling req/rep PKIMessages specified
-- in Section 5.3.22; alternatively, polling in the underlying
-- transport layer MAY have some utility in this regard)
revocationWarning (4),
-- this message contains a warning that a revocation is
-- imminent
revocationNotification (5),
-- notification that a revocation has occurred
keyUpdateWarning (6)
-- update already done for the oldCertId specified in
-- CertReqMsg
}
PKIFailureInfo ::= BIT STRING {
-- since we can fail in more than one way!
-- More codes may be added in the future if/when required.
badAlg (0),
-- unrecognized or unsupported Algorithm Identifier
badMessageCheck (1),
-- integrity check failed (e.g., signature did not verify)
badRequest (2),
-- transaction not permitted or supported
badTime (3),
-- messageTime was not sufficiently close to the system time,
-- as defined by local policy
badCertId (4),
-- no certificate could be found matching the provided criteria
badDataFormat (5),
-- the data submitted has the wrong format
wrongAuthority (6),
-- the authority indicated in the request is different from the
-- one creating the response token
incorrectData (7),
-- the requester's data is incorrect (for notary services)
missingTimeStamp (8),
-- when the timestamp is missing but should be there
-- (by policy)
badPOP (9),
-- the proof-of-possession failed
certRevoked (10),
-- the certificate has already been revoked
certConfirmed (11),
-- the certificate has already been confirmed
wrongIntegrity (12),
-- invalid integrity, password based instead of signature or
-- vice versa
badRecipientNonce (13),
-- invalid recipient nonce, either missing or wrong value
timeNotAvailable (14),
-- the TSA's time source is not available
unacceptedPolicy (15),
-- the requested TSA policy is not supported by the TSA
unacceptedExtension (16),
-- the requested extension is not supported by the TSA
addInfoNotAvailable (17),
-- the additional information requested could not be
-- understood or is not available
badSenderNonce (18),
-- invalid sender nonce, either missing or wrong size
badCertTemplate (19),
-- invalid cert. template or missing mandatory information
signerNotTrusted (20),
-- signer of the message unknown or not trusted
transactionIdInUse (21),
-- the transaction identifier is already in use
unsupportedVersion (22),
-- the version of the message is not supported
notAuthorized (23),
-- the sender was not authorized to make the preceding
-- request or perform the preceding action
systemUnavail (24),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system unavailability
systemFailure (25),
-- the request cannot be handled due to system failure
duplicateCertReq (26)
-- certificate cannot be issued because a duplicate
-- certificate already exists
}
PKIStatusInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
statusString PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
failInfo PKIFailureInfo OPTIONAL }
OOBCert ::= CMPCertificate
OOBCertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
certId [1] CertId OPTIONAL,
hashVal BIT STRING
-- hashVal is calculated over the DER encoding of the
-- self-signed certificate with the identifier certID.
}
POPODecKeyChallContent ::= SEQUENCE OF Challenge
-- One Challenge per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages).
Challenge ::= SEQUENCE {
owf AlgorithmIdentifier{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}
OPTIONAL,
-- MUST be present in the first Challenge; MAY be omitted in
-- any subsequent Challenge in POPODecKeyChallContent (if
-- omitted, then the owf used in the immediately preceding
-- Challenge is to be used).
witness OCTET STRING,
-- the result of applying the one-way function (owf) to a
-- randomly-generated INTEGER, A. [Note that a different
-- INTEGER MUST be used for each Challenge.]
challenge OCTET STRING
-- the encryption (under the public key for which the cert.
-- request is being made) of Rand, where Rand is specified as
-- Rand ::= SEQUENCE {
-- int INTEGER,
-- - the randomly-generated INTEGER A (above)
-- sender GeneralName
-- - the sender's name (as included in PKIHeader)
-- }
}
POPODecKeyRespContent ::= SEQUENCE OF INTEGER
-- One INTEGER per encryption key certification request (in the
-- same order as these requests appear in CertReqMessages). The
-- retrieved INTEGER A (above) is returned to the sender of the
-- corresponding Challenge.
CertRepMessage ::= SEQUENCE {
caPubs [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CMPCertificate
OPTIONAL,
response SEQUENCE OF CertResponse }
CertResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this response with the corresponding request (a value
-- of -1 is to be used if certReqId is not specified in the
-- corresponding request)
status PKIStatusInfo,
certifiedKeyPair CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL,
rspInfo OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
-- analogous to the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs string defined
-- for regInfo in CertReqMsg [RFC4211]
}
CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
certOrEncCert CertOrEncCert,
privateKey [0] EncryptedKey OPTIONAL,
-- see [RFC4211] for comment on encoding
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo OPTIONAL }
CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
certificate [0] CMPCertificate,
encryptedCert [1] EncryptedKey
-- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE of
-- EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes made in
-- this document
-- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to the
-- syntax without this change
}
KeyRecRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatusInfo,
newSigCert [0] CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
caCerts [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CMPCertificate OPTIONAL,
keyPairHist [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CertifiedKeyPair OPTIONAL }
RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
RevDetails ::= SEQUENCE {
certDetails CertTemplate,
-- allows requester to specify as much as they can about
-- the cert. for which revocation is requested
-- (e.g., for cases in which serialNumber is not available)
crlEntryDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- requested crlEntryExtensions
}
RevRepContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PKIStatusInfo,
-- in same order as was sent in RevReqContent
revCerts [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertId OPTIONAL,
-- IDs for which revocation was requested
-- (same order as status)
crls [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateList OPTIONAL
-- the resulting CRLs (there may be more than one)
}
CAKeyUpdAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
oldWithNew CMPCertificate, -- old pub signed with new priv
newWithOld CMPCertificate, -- new pub signed with old priv
newWithNew CMPCertificate -- new pub signed with new priv
}
CertAnnContent ::= CMPCertificate
RevAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE {
status PKIStatus,
certId CertId,
willBeRevokedAt GeneralizedTime,
badSinceDate GeneralizedTime,
crlDetails Extensions{{...}} OPTIONAL
-- extra CRL details (e.g., crl number, reason, location, etc.)
}
CRLAnnContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList
PKIConfirmContent ::= NULL
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
InfoTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
infoType INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&id({SupportedInfoSet}),
infoValue INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE.
&Type({SupportedInfoSet}{@infoType}) }
SupportedInfoSet INFO-TYPE-AND-VALUE ::= { ... }
-- Example InfoTypeAndValue contents include, but are not limited
-- to, the following (uncomment in this ASN.1 module and use as
-- appropriate for a given environment):
--
-- id-it-caProtEncCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 1}
-- CAProtEncCertValue ::= CMPCertificate
-- id-it-signKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 2}
-- SignKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-encKeyPairTypes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 3}
-- EncKeyPairTypesValue ::= SEQUENCE OF
-- AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-preferredSymmAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 4}
-- PreferredSymmAlgValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifier{{...}}
-- id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 5}
-- CAKeyUpdateInfoValue ::= CAKeyUpdAnnContent
-- id-it-currentCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 6}
-- CurrentCRLValue ::= CertificateList
-- id-it-unsupportedOIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 7}
-- UnsupportedOIDsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 10}
-- KeyPairParamReqValue ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- id-it-keyPairParamRep OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 11}
-- KeyPairParamRepValue ::= AlgorithmIdentifer
-- id-it-revPassphrase OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
-- RevPassphraseValue ::= EncryptedKey
-- -- Changed from Encrypted Value to EncryptedKey as a CHOICE
-- -- of EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData due to the changes
-- -- made in this document
-- -- Using the choice EncryptedValue is bit-compatible to
-- -- the syntax without this change
-- id-it-implicitConfirm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 13}
-- ImplicitConfirmValue ::= NULL
-- id-it-confirmWaitTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 14}
-- ConfirmWaitTimeValue ::= GeneralizedTime
-- id-it-origPKIMessage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 15}
-- OrigPKIMessageValue ::= PKIMessages
-- id-it-suppLangTags OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 16}
-- SuppLangTagsValue ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String
--
-- where
--
-- id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
-- iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)}
-- and
-- id-it OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pkix 4}
--
--
-- This construct MAY also be used to define new PKIX Certificate
-- Management Protocol request and response messages, or general-
-- purpose (e.g., announcement) messages for future needs or for
-- specific environments.
GenMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- May be sent by EE, RA, or CA (depending on message content).
-- The OPTIONAL infoValue parameter of InfoTypeAndValue will
-- typically be omitted for some of the examples given above.
-- The receiver is free to ignore any contained OBJECT IDs that it
-- does not recognize. If sent from EE to CA, the empty set
-- indicates that the CA may send
-- any/all information that it wishes.
GenRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF InfoTypeAndValue
-- Receiver MAY ignore any contained OIDs that it does not
-- recognize.
ErrorMsgContent ::= SEQUENCE {
pKIStatusInfo PKIStatusInfo,
errorCode INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-- implementation-specific error codes
errorDetails PKIFreeText OPTIONAL
-- implementation-specific error details
}
CertConfirmContent ::= SEQUENCE OF CertStatus
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING,
-- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
-- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
certReqId INTEGER,
-- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
statusInfo PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER }
PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
certReqId INTEGER,
checkAfter INTEGER, -- time in seconds
reason PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }
--
-- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in CMP
-- operations, added due to the changes made in this document
-- The EKUs for the CA and RA are reused from CMC as defined in
-- [RFC6402]
--
-- id-kp-cmcCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 27 }
-- id-kp-cmcRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 28 }
id-kp-cmKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 32 }
END
Appendix B. History of changes Appendix B. History of changes
Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the
document.
From version 02 -> 03:
o Added a ToDo on aligning with the CMP Algorithms draft that will
be set up as decided in IETF 108
o Updated section on Encrypted Values in Section 2.4 to add the
AsymmetricKey Package structure to transport a newly generated
private key as decided in IETF 108
o Updated the IANA Considerations of [RFC4210] in Section 2.9
o Added the pre-registered OID in Section 2.9 and the ASN.1 module
o Added Section 3Section 3 to document the changes to RFC 6712
[RFC6712] regarding URI discovery and using the path-prefix of
'/.well-known/' as discussed in IETF 108
o Updated the IANA Considerations section
o Added a complete updated ASN.1 module in 1988 syntax to update
Appendix F of [RFC4210] and a complete updated ASN.1 module in
2002 syntax to update Section 9 of [RFC5912]
o Minor changes in wording
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
o Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107 o Updated section on EKU OIDs in Section 2.2 as decided in IETF 107
o Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key o Changed from symmetric key-encryption to password-based key
management technique in Section 2.4 as discussed with Russ and Jim management technique in Section 2.4 as discussed with Russ and Jim
on the mailing list on the mailing list
o Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the o Defined the attribute containing the key identifier for the
revocation passphrase in Section 2.8 revocation passphrase in Section 2.9
o Moved the change history to the Appendix o Moved the change history to the Appendix
From version 00 -> 01: From version 00 -> 01:
o Minor changes in wording o Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00: updates-00:
o Changes required to reflect WG adoption o Changes required to reflect WG adoption
From version 02 -> 03: From version 02 -> 03:
o Added some clarification in Section 2.1 o Added some clarification in Section 2.1
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
 End of changes. 58 change blocks. 
99 lines changed or deleted 1319 lines changed or added

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