draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-00.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-01.txt 
LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft Siemens Internet-Draft Siemens
Updates: 4210 (if approved) February 16, 2020 Updates: 4210 (if approved) March 4, 2020
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: August 19, 2020 Expires: September 5, 2020
CMP Updates CMP Updates
draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-00 draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-01
Abstract Abstract
This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax of This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax of
Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2. This document
updates RFC 4210. updates RFC 4210.
Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and the enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and the
definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 17 skipping to change at page 2, line 17
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Convention and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 4 3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) . 4
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 6 3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . . 7
3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 9 3.5. Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response . . . . . 9
3.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 9 3.6. Replace Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase . . . . 10
3.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 10 3.7. Update Section 5.3.22 - Polling Request and Response . . 10
3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 11 3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase . . 11
3.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral 3.9. Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification 3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
(Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 (Basic Authenticated Scheme) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. History of changes 1. History of changes
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-brockhaus-lamps- From version 00 -> 01:
cmp-updates-03:
o Changes required to reflect WG adoption
o Minor changes in wording o Minor changes in wording
From draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-03 -> draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-
updates-00:
o Changes required to reflect WG adoption
From version 02 -> 03: From version 02 -> 03:
o Added some clarification in Section 3.1 o Added some clarification in Section 3.1
From version 01 -> 02: From version 01 -> 02:
o Added clarification to section on multiple protection o Added clarification to section on multiple protection
o Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas o Added clarification on new EKUs after some exchange with Tomas
Gustavsson Gustavsson
o Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at o Reused OIDs from RFC 6402 [RFC6402] as suggested by Sean Turner at
IETF 106 IETF 106
o Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for o Added clarification on the field containing the key identifier for
a revocation passphrase a revocation passphrase
o Minor changes in wording o Minor changes in wording
skipping to change at page 3, line 33 skipping to change at page 3, line 36
o Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and o Minor generalization in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] Sections 5.1.3.4 and
5.3.22 5.3.22
o Minor changes in wording o Minor changes in wording
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
developing the Lightweight CMP Profile developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
[I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates identified in the original CMP specification. This document updates
RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to overcome these limitations. RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to overcome these limitations.
In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP In general, this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP
to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography. to be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.
This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
endpoints on registration and certification authorities. endpoints on registration and certification authorities.
2.1. Convention and Terminology 2.1. Convention and Terminology
skipping to change at page 4, line 26 skipping to change at page 4, line 30
an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA. an EE. The KGA could be co-located with an RA or a CA.
EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI EE: End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject certificate. An identifier for the EE is given as its subject
of the certificate. of the certificate.
3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) 3. Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 3.1. New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210
The following subsections describe feature updates to RFC 4210 The following subsection describes feature updates to RFC 4210
[RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence [RFC4210]. They are always related to the base specification. Hence
references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
whenever possible. whenever possible.
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1. Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.
The following updates are made in draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates: 1.1 Changes since RFC 4210
The following updates are made in draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates:
o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g. o Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
registration authority and certification authority, to express the registration authority and certification authority, to express the
authorization of the entity identified in the certificate authorization of the entity identified in the certificate
containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as containing the respective extended key usage extension to act as
the indicated PKI management component. the indicated PKI management entity.
o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional o Extend the description of multiple protection to cover additional
use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages. use cases, e.g., batch processing of messages.
o Offering EnvelopedData as another choice next to EncryptedValue to o Offering EnvelopedData as the prefered choice next to
extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that according to RFC 4211 EncryptedValue to extend crypto agility in CMP. Note that
[RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the EncryptedValue structure according to RFC 4211 [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the
has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData structure. EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EnvelopedData structure. RFC 4211 [RFC4211] offers the
EncryptedValue and EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. EncryptedKey structure, a choice of EncryptedValue and
For reasons of completeness and consistency the exchange of EnvelopedData for migration to EnvelopedData. For reasons of
EncryptedValue is performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. completeness and consistency the exchange of EncryptedValue is
performed for all usages in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. This includes the
This includes the protection of centrally generated private keys, protection of centrally generated private keys, encryption of
encryption of certificates, and revocation passphrases. certificates, and revocation passphrases.
o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages. o Extend the usage of polling also to p10cr messages.
3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage 3.2. New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage
Insert this section. The following subsection describes new extended key usages for
different CMP server typesspecitied in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].
Insert this section at the end of the current Section 4.
4.5 Extended Key Usage
The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts which the certified public key may be used. It therefore restricts
the use of a certificate to specific applications. the use of a certificate to specific applications.
A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI A CA may want to delegate parts of their duties to other PKI
management entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation management entities. The mechanism to prove this delegation
explained in this section offers zero-touch means to check the explained in this section offers zero-touch means to check the
authorization of such delegation. Such delegation could also be authorization of such delegation. Such delegation could also be
expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration. expressed by other means, e.g., explicit configuration.
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whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same whether use CMC or CMP as certificate management protocol, the same
OIDs SHALL be used for a cmpCA and a cmpRA. OIDs SHALL be used for a cmpCA and a cmpRA.
< TBD: It needs to be clarified, if the Name and Description of the < TBD: It needs to be clarified, if the Name and Description of the
OIDs can be adapted or extended to avoid confusion as they currently OIDs can be adapted or extended to avoid confusion as they currently
only refer to CMC endpoints. > only refer to CMC endpoints. >
The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is The description of the PKI management entity for each of the EKUs is
as follows: as follows:
CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA equipment as cmpCA: CMP Certification Authorities are CMP endpoints on CA
described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in the context of CMP equipment as described in section 3.1.1.2. The key used in
management operations, especially CMP message protection, need not be the context of CMP management operations, especially CMP
the same key that signs the certificates. It is necessary, however, message protection, need not be the same key that signs the
to ensure that the entity acting as cmpCA is authorized to do so. certificates. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the
Therefore, the cmpCA MUST do one of the following, entity acting as cmpCA is authorized to do so. Therefore,
the cmpCA MUST do one of the following,
o use the CA private key on the CMP endpoint, or * use the CA private key on the CMP endpoint, or
o explicitly designate this authority to another entity. * explicitly designate this authority to another entity.
For automatic validation of such delegation it MUST be indicated by For automatic validation of such delegation it MUST be
the id-kp-cmpCA extended key usage. This extended key usage MUST be indicated by the id-kp-cmpCA extended key usage. This
placed into the certificate used on the CA equipment and the CA that extended key usage MUST be placed into the certificate used
delegates this role MUST issue the cmpCA certificate. on the CA equipment and the CA that delegates this role MUST
issue the cmpCA certificate.
Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP management Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP management
operations at the CA decreases the number of operations of the operations at the CA decreases the number of operations of
private key used to sign certificates. the private key used to sign certificates.
CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA equipment as cmpRA: CMP Registration Authorities are CMP endpoints on RA
described in section 3.1.1.3. A cmpRA is identified by the id-kp- equipment as described in Section 3.1.1.3. A cmpRA is
cmpRA extended key usage. This extended key usage is placed into RA identified by the id-kp-cmpRA extended key usage. This
certificates. The CA that delegated this role is identified by the extended key usage is placed into RA certificates. The CA
CA that issued the cmpRA certificate. that delegated this role is identified by the CA that issued
the cmpRA certificate.
CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmpKGA cmpKGA: CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-
extended key usage. Though the cmpKGA knows the private key it cmpKGA extended key usage. Though the cmpKGA knows the
generated on behalf of the end entity, this is a very sensible private key it generated on behalf of the end entity. This
service and needs specific authorization. This authorization is is a very sensible service and needs specific authorization.
either with the CA certificate itself, or indicated by placing the This authorization is either with the CA certificate itself,
id-kp-cmpKGA extended key usage into the cmpRA or cmpCA certificate or indicated by placing the id-kp-cmpKGA extended key usage
used to authenticate the origin of the private key to express the into the cmpRA or cmpCA certificate used to authenticate the
authorization to offer this service. origin of the private key, and to express the authorization
to offer this service.
Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates, Note: In device PKIs, especially those issuing IDevID certificates,
CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value CA may have very long validity (including the GeneralizedTime value
99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as 99991231235959Z to indicate a not well-defined expiration date as
specified in IEEE 802.1AR section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280 specified in IEEE 802.1AR Section 8.5 [IEEE802.1AR] and RFC 5280
Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used Section 4.1.2.5 [RFC5280]). Such validity periods SHOULD NOT be used
for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP for protection of CMP messages. Certificates for delegated CMP
message protection (cmpCA, cmpRA, cmpKGA) MUST NOT use indefinite message protection (cmpCA, cmpRA, cmpKGA) MUST NOT use indefinite
expiration date. expiration date.
3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection 3.3. Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection
Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message. Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested message.
This document opens the usage of nested messages also for batch This document opens the usage of nested messages also for batch
transport of PKI messages between different PKI management entities. transport of PKI messages between different PKI management entities.
skipping to change at page 7, line 20 skipping to change at page 7, line 35
certificates shared between the RA and the CA). There are different certificates shared between the RA and the CA). There are different
use cases for such multi protected messages. use cases for such multi protected messages.
o The RA confirms the validation and authorization of a message and o The RA confirms the validation and authorization of a message and
forwards the original message unchanged. forwards the original message unchanged.
o The RA collects several messages and forwards them in a batch. o The RA collects several messages and forwards them in a batch.
This can for instance be used to bridge an off-line connection This can for instance be used to bridge an off-line connection
between two PKI management entities. In communication to the CA between two PKI management entities. In communication to the CA
request messages and in communication from the CA response or request messages and in communication from the CA response or
announcement messages will be collected in the batch. announcement messages will be collected in such batch.
o The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify o The RA modifies the message(s) in some way (e.g., add or modify
particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding particular field values or add new extensions) before forwarding
them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. In case the them, then it MAY create its own desired PKIBody. In case the
changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP, the RA MUST changes made by the RA to PKIMessage breaks the POP, the RA MUST
either set the POP RAVerified or include the original PKIMessage either set the POP RAVerified or include the original PKIMessage
from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of the nested from the EE in the generalInfo field of PKIHeader of the nested
message (to force the CA to check POP on the original message). message (to force the CA to check POP on the original message).
The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15} (see
Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is
PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in
PKIBody). For simplicity reasons, if batching is used in PKIBody). For simplicity reasons, if batching is used in
combination with inclusion of the original PKIMessage in the combination with inclusion of the original PKIMessage in the
generalInfo field, all messages in the batch MUST be of the same generalInfo field, all messages in the batch MUST be of the same
type (e.g., ir). type (e.g., ir).
These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the These use cases are accomplished by nesting the messages sent by the
end entity within a new PKI message. The structure used is as PKI entity within a new PKI message. The structure used is as
follows. follows.
NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages NestedMessageContent ::= PKIMessages
(The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch (The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch
the requests of several EEs in a single new message.) the requests of several EEs in a single new message.)
3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values 3.4. Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values
Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of
EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data. This document extends
the encryption of data to also use EnvelopedData. the encryption of data to preferably use EnvelopedData.
Replace the text of the section with the following text. Replace the text of the section with the following text.
Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either
private keys, certificates, or passwords) are sent in PKI messages, private keys, certificates, or passwords) are sent in PKI messages,
the EncryptedKey data structure is used. the EncryptedKey data structure is used.
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated encryptedValue EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
skipping to change at page 8, line 29 skipping to change at page 8, line 46
EnvelopedData. EnvelopedData.
The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form. private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.
EnvelopedData is used as follows: EnvelopedData is used as follows:
o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is o Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
encrypted only for one recipient. encrypted only for one recipient.
o Contains private key in a SignedData structure as specified in CMS o Contains a private key in a SignedData structure as specified in
section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation Authority. CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation Authority.
o Contains certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the o Contains a certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
encryptedContent field. encryptedContent field.
Note: When transferring a centrally generated private key in a Note: When transferring a centrally generated private key in a
certificate response message to the EE, the algorithm identifier and certificate response message to the EE, the algorithm identifier and
the associated public key will anyhow be transported in this response the associated public key will anyhow be transported in this response
message. Therefore, the private key will not be delivered in a key message. Therefore, the private key will not be delivered in a key
package structure as specified in [RFC5958] and [RFC6032]. But the package structure as specified in [RFC5958] and [RFC6032]. But the
wrapping of the private key in a SignedData structure that is wrapped wrapping of the private key in a SignedData structure that is wrapped
in the EnvelopedData structure as specified in [RFC6032] is applied. in the EnvelopedData structure as specified in [RFC6032] is applied.
skipping to change at page 11, line 12 skipping to change at page 11, line 36
one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it
will return a pollRep. will return a pollRep.
3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as 3 If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as
the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq. the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.
4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it 4 If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
will be treated in the same way as the initial response. will be treated in the same way as the initial response.
Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo Note: A p10cr message contains exactly one CertificationRequestInfo
data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but not certificate data structure as specified in PKCS#10 [RFC2986] but no certificate
request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all request number. Therefore, the certReqId MUST be set to 0 in all
following messages of this transaction. following messages of this transaction.
3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase 3.8. Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase
Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210] revocation passphrase. As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
skipping to change at page 11, line 36 skipping to change at page 12, line 14
o The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 o The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210
[RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be [RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be
sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage
at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in at any time. (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in
section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
initialization request or certificate request message.) This initialization request or certificate request message.) This
conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for
use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
encryptedContent of the EnvelopedData structure and for use of encryptedContent field and for use of EncryptedValue this is in
EncryptedValue this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue the decrypted bytes of the encValue field) to the relevant CA/RA;
field) to the relevant CA/RA; furthermore, the transfer is furthermore, the transfer is accomplished with appropriate
accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics. confidentiality characteristics.
Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
text. text.
o When using EnvelopedData the unprotectedAttrs and when using o When using EnvelopedData the unprotectedAttrs and when using
EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a key identifier EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a key identifier
(chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase itself) to assist
in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the in later retrieval of the correct passphrase (e.g., when the
revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by revocation request is constructed by the entity and received by
the CA/RA). the CA/RA).
skipping to change at page 12, line 21 skipping to change at page 13, line 8
[RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of [RFC4210] to utilize the parent structure EncryptedKey instead of
EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above, the description is EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above, the description is
updated accordingly. updated accordingly.
Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
section with the following text. section with the following text.
-- ********** -- **********
-- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211 -- * the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with -- * [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
-- * Section 5.2.2, "Encrypted Values", of this specification). -- * Section 5.2.2 of this specification). Therefore, this document
-- * Therefore, this document makes the behavioral clarification of -- * makes the behavioral clarification of specifying that the
-- * specifying that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded -- * contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded either as
-- * either as EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue (only for backward -- * "EnvelopedData" or "EncryptedValue" (only for backward
-- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows -- * compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING. This allows
-- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key -- * the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
-- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211 -- * while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
-- * [RFC4211]. -- * [RFC4211].
-- ********** -- **********
3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic 3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
Authenticated Scheme) Authenticated Scheme)
Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/ Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
skipping to change at page 14, line 21 skipping to change at page 15, line 7
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) [RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011, Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
Profile", draft-brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-03 Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-00
(work in progress), January 2020. (work in progress), February 2020.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax [RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032, (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>.
 End of changes. 35 change blocks. 
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