--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-00.txt 2020-11-02 08:14:26.929958306 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-01.txt 2020-11-02 08:14:26.965959210 -0800 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ LAMPS Working Group H. Brockhaus Internet-Draft Siemens -Intended status: Standards Track October 24, 2020 -Expires: April 27, 2021 +Intended status: Standards Track November 2, 2020 +Expires: May 6, 2021 CMP Algorithms - draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-00 + draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-01 Abstract This document describes the conventions for using several cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of X.509 certificates. Status of This Memo @@ -22,21 +22,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -56,45 +56,52 @@ 3.1. DSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Key Management Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Key Agreement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.1. Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.2. ECDH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Key Transport Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1. RSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.3.1. AES Key Wrap with Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 4.3.1. AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4.1. Password-based Key Derivation Function 2 . . . . . . 8 5. Content Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6.1. Password-based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6.2. Diffie-Hellman-based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 6.3. HMAC SHA2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - Appendix A. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 6.1. Password-based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 6.2. Diffie-Hellman-based MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 6.3. SHA2-based HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + Appendix A. Algorithm Use Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + A.1. Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles . . 15 + A.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile . . . . . . 16 + Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1. Introduction + [RFC Editor: please delete]: !!! The change history was moved to + Appendix B !!! + 1.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] + [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. Message Digest Algorithms This section specifies the conventions employed by CMP implementations that support SHA-1 or SHA2 algorithm family. Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the hashAlg field of OOBCertHash, the owf field of Challenge, PBMParameter, and @@ -143,21 +150,21 @@ field of PKIHeader, the algorithmIdentifier field of POPOSigningKey, signatureAlgorithm field of p10cr, SignKeyPairTypes, and the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData. Signature values are located in the protection field of PKIMessage, signature field of POPOSigningKey, signature field of p10cr, and SignerInfo signature field of SignedData. 3.1. DSA - The DSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-5 [FIPS186-5] + The DSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-4 [FIPS186-4] and MAY be used with SHA-224 and SHA-256 as specified in RFC 5754 [RFC5754]. The algorithm identifiers for DSA with SHA2 signature values are: id-dsa-with-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 1 } id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) @@ -192,22 +199,22 @@ sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 12 } sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 13 } Further conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 5754 Section 3.2 [RFC5754]. 3.3. ECDSA - The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-5 - [FIPS186-5] and MAY be used with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or + The ECDSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186-4 + [FIPS186-4] and MAY be used with SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 as specified in RFC 5754 [RFC5754]. The algorithm identifiers for ECDSA with SHA2 signature values are: ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } @@ -325,33 +332,40 @@ Key-encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm and EnvelopedData RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm fields. Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos KeyAgreeRecipientInfo RecipientEncryptedKeys encryptedKey and EnvelopedData RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo encryptedKey fields. -4.3.1. AES Key Wrap with Padding +4.3.1. AES Key Wrap - The AES key encryption algorithm is defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] and - the respective padding is defined in RFC 5649 [RFC5649]. + The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIBS Pub 197 [FIPS197] and + the key wrapping is defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394]. AES key encryption has the algorithm identifier: - id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) - nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 48 } + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 5 } + id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 25 } + id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 45 } - Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap with padding - are specified in RFC 5649 Section 4 [RFC5649]. + Further conventions to be considered for AES key wrap are specified + in RFC 3394 Section 2.2 [RFC3394] and RFC 3565 Section 2.3.2 + [RFC3565]. 4.4. Key Derivation Algorithms Key derivation algorithms are only used in CMP when using CMS [RFC5652] EnvelopedData together with password-based key management technique. Key derivation algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos PassworRecipientInfo keyDerivationAlgorithm field. @@ -383,105 +397,162 @@ Content encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithmrithm field. Encrypted content is located in the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field. 5.1. AES - Since the using CMP, the content encrypted is a cryptographic key and - its attributes, a certificate or a password, the same algorithms as - specified in Section 4.3.1 are used for content encryption. + The AES encryption algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 197 [FIPS197]. + Details of usage of AES-CCM and AES-GCM in CMS [RFC5652] + EnvelopedData is specified in RFC 5084 [RFC5084]. + + AES content encryption has the algorithm identifier: + + id-aes128-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 7 } + id-aes192-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 27 } + id-aes256-CCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 47 } + id-aes128-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 6 } + id-aes192-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 26 } + id-aes256-GCM OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) + country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) + nistAlgorithm(4) aes(1) 46 } + + Further conventions to be considered for AES content encryption are + specified in RFC 5084 [RFC5084]. 6. Message Authentication Code Algorithms The message authentication code algorithm is also referred to as MSG_MAC_ALG in RFC 4210 Appendix D and E [RFC4210] and in the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. Message authentication code algorithm identifiers are located in the mac field of PBMParameter and DHBMParameter, the PBKDF2-params prf field. Message authentication code values are located in the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field. 6.1. Password-based MAC The password-based MAC is defined in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. - The algorithm identifiers for password-based MAC is: + The algorithm identifier for password-based MAC as specified in + RFC 4210 [RFC4210] is: id-PasswordBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 13 } Further conventions to be considered for password-based MAC are specified in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.1 [RFC4210]. 6.2. Diffie-Hellman-based MAC The Diffie-Hellman-based MAC is defined in RFC 4210 [RFC4210]. The algorithm identifiers for Diffie-Hellman-based MAC is: id-DHBasedMac OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) nt(113533) nsn(7) algorithms(66) 30 } Further conventions to be considered for Diffie-Hellman-based MAC are specified in RFC 4210 Section 5.1.3.2 [RFC4210]. -6.3. HMAC SHA2 +6.3. SHA2-based HMAC - The HMAC is defined in RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. + The HMAC is defined in RFC 2104 [RFC2104] and FIPS Pub 198-1 + [FIPS198-1]. The SHA2 algorithms are defined in + Section 2.1Section 2.1 and FIPS Pub 180-4 [FIPS180-4]. - The algorithm identifiers for HMAC with SHA2 as specified in RFC 4231 - [RFC4231] are: + The algorithm identifiers for SHA2-based HMAC as specified in + RFC 4231 [RFC4231] are: id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } - Further conventions to be considered for HMAC with SHA2 are specified - in RFC 4231 Section 3.1 [RFC4231]. + Further conventions to be considered for SHA2-based HMAC are + specified in RFC 4231 Section 3.1 [RFC4231]. 7. IANA Considerations - TBD + This document does not request changes to the IANA registry. 8. Security Considerations - TBD + RFC 4210 Appendix D.2 [RFC4210] contains a set of algorithms, + mandatory to be supported by conforming implementations. Theses + algorithms were appropriate at the time CMP war releases, but as + cryptographic algorithms weaken over time, some of them should not be + uses anymore. In general, new attacks are emerging due to research + cryptoanalysis or increase in computing power. new algorithms were + introduced that are more resistant to today's attacks. + + This document lists many cryptographic algorithms usable with CMP to + offer implementers a more up to date choice. Finally, the algorithms + to be supported also heavily depend on the utilizes certificates in + the target environment. + + In the appendix of this document there is also an update to the + Appendix D.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] and a set of algorithms to be + supported when implementing the Lightweight CMP Profile + [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. + + To keep the list of algorithms to be used with CMP up to date to + enlist secure algorithms resisting known attack scenarios, future + algorithms should be added and weakened algorithms should be + deprecated. 9. Acknowledgements - TBD + Thanks to Russ Housley for his input and feedback to this document. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [FIPS180-4] NIST, "FIPS Pub 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHA)", August 2015 , . - [FIPS186-5] - NIST, "FIPS Pub 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", - October 2019, . + [FIPS186-4] + NIST, "FIPS Pub 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", + July 2013, . + + [FIPS197] NIST, "FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", + November 2001, . + + [FIPS198-1] + NIST, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)", + July 2008, . [I-D.ietf-lamps-cmp-updates] Brockhaus, H., "CMP Updates", draft-ietf-lamps-cmp- updates-05 (work in progress), September 2020. [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, . @@ -500,20 +571,25 @@ [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394, September 2002, . [RFC3560] Housley, R., "Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3560, DOI 10.17487/RFC3560, July 2003, . + [RFC3565] Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) + Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax + (CMS)", RFC 3565, DOI 10.17487/RFC3565, July 2003, + . + [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005, . [RFC4056] Schaad, J., "Use of the RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 4056, DOI 10.17487/RFC4056, June 2005, @@ -528,24 +604,24 @@ [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, . [RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA- 224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512", RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005, . - [RFC5649] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard - (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, - DOI 10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009, - . + [RFC5084] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated + Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", + RFC 5084, DOI 10.17487/RFC5084, November 2007, + . [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, . [RFC5753] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5753, DOI 10.17487/RFC5753, January 2010, . @@ -572,21 +648,125 @@ 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 10.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP Profile", draft-ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-03 (work in progress), October 2020. -Appendix A. History of changes +Appendix A. Algorithm Use Profiles + + This appendix provides profiles of algorithms and respective + conventions for different application use cases. + +A.1. Algorithm Profile for PKI Management Message Profiles + + The following table contains definitions of algorithm used within PKI + Management Message Profiles as defined in CMP Appendix D.2 [RFC4210]. + The columns in the table are: + + Name: an identifier used for message profiles + + Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used + + Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by + conforming implementations + + Name Use Mandatory + ------------ --------------------------------------- ---------------- + MSG_SIG_ALG protection of PKI messages using RSA + signature + MSG_MAC_ALG protection of PKI messages using MACing PasswordBasedMac + SYM_PENC_ALG symmetric encryption of an end entity's AES-wrap + private key where symmetric key is + distributed out-of-band + PROT_ENC_ALG asymmetric algorithm used for D-H + encryption of (symmetric keys for + encryption of) private keys transported + in PKIMessages + PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric encryption algorithm used for AES + encryption of private key bits (a key + of this type is encrypted using + PROT_ENC_ALG) + + Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers and Specifications: + + RSA: sha256WithRSAEncryption with 2048 bit, see Section 3.2 + + PasswordBasedMac: id-PasswordBasedMac, see Section 6.1 (with id- + sha256 as the owf parameter, see Section 2.1 and id-hmacWithSHA256 as + the mac parameter, see Section 6.3) + + D-H: id-alg-ESDH, see Section 4.1.1 + + AES-wrap: id-aes256-wrap, see Section 4.3.1 + + AES: id-aes256-GCM, see Section 5.1 + +A.2. Algorithm Profile for Lightweight CMP Profile + + The following table contains definitions of algorithm which MUST be + supported by conforming implementations This profile is referenced in + the Lightweight CMP Profile [I-D.ietf-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]. + The columns in the table are: + + Name: an identifier used for message profiles + + Use: description of where and for what the algorithm is used + + Mandatory: an AlgorithmIdentifier which MUST be supported by + conforming implementations + Name Use Mandatory + ------------ --------------------------------------- ---------------- + MSG_SIG_ALG protection of PKI messages using ECDSA + signature + MSG_MAC_ALG protection of PKI messages using MACing PasswordBasedMac + KM_KA_ALG asymmetric key agreement algorithm used ECDH + for agreement of a symmetric keys for + encryption of EnvelopedData, e.g., a + private key transported in PKIMessages + KM_KT_ALG asymmetric key encryption algorithm RSA + used for transport of a symmetric keys + for encryption of EnvelopedData, e.g., + a private key transported in + PKIMessages + KM_PB_ALG symmetric derivation algorithm used to PBKDF2 + derive a symmetric key for encryption + of EnvelopedData, e.g., a private key + transported in PKIMessages, from a + password + PROT_ENC_ALG Symmetric key encryption algorithm to AES-wrap + encrypt a content encryption key + PROT_SYM_ALG symmetric content encryption algorithm AES + used for encryption of, e.g., private + key bits (a key of this type is + encrypted using PROT_ENC_ALG) + + Mandatory Algorithm Identifiers and Specifications: + + < TBD: The list of mandatory algorithms has to be defined later. > + +Appendix B. History of changes Note: This appendix will be deleted in the final version of the document. + From version 00 -> 01: + + o Changed sections Symmetric Key-Encryption Algorithms and Content + Encryption Algorithms based on the discussion on the mailing list + (see thread "[CMP Algorithms] Use Key-Wrap with or without padding + in Section 4.3 and Section 5") + + o Added Appendix A with updated algorithms profile for RDC4210 + Appendix D.2 and first proposal for the Lightweight CMP Profile + + o Minor changes in wording + Author's Address Hendrik Brockhaus Siemens AG Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com