draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-02.txt   draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-03.txt 
KEYPROV Working Group A. Doherty KEYPROV Working Group A. Doherty
Internet-Draft RSA, The Security Division of EMC Internet-Draft RSA, The Security Division of EMC
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: July 28, 2008 Verisign, Inc. Expires: August 28, 2008 Verisign, Inc.
S. Machani S. Machani
Diversinet Corp. Diversinet Corp.
M. Nystrom M. Nystrom
RSA, The Security Division of EMC RSA, The Security Division of EMC
January 25, 2008 February 25, 2008
Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP) Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol (DSKPP)
draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-02.txt draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-03.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
DSKPP is a client-server protocol for initialization (and DSKPP is a client-server protocol for initialization (and
configuration) of symmetric keys to locally and remotely accessible configuration) of symmetric keys to locally and remotely accessible
cryptographic modules. The protocol can be run with or without cryptographic modules. The protocol can be run with or without
private-key capabilities in the cryptographic modules, and with or private-key capabilities in the cryptographic modules, and with or
without an established public-key infrastructure. without an established public-key infrastructure.
Two variations of the protocol support multiple usage scenarios. The Two variations of the protocol support multiple usage scenarios.
four-pass (i.e., two round-trip) variant enables key generation in With the four-pass variant, keys are mutually generated by the
near real-time. With the four-pass variant, keys are mutually provisioning server and cryptographic module; provisioned keys are
generated by the provisioning server and cryptographic module; not transferred over-the-wire or over-the-air. The two-pass variant
provisioned keys are not transferred over-the-wire or over-the-air. enables secure and efficient download and installation of pre-
The two-pass variant enables secure and efficient download and generated symmetric keys to a cryptographic module.
installation of symmetric keys to a cryptographic module in
environments where near real-time communication may not be possible.
This document builds on information contained in [RFC4758], adding This document builds on information contained in [RFC4758], adding
specific enhancements in response to implementation experience and specific enhancements in response to implementation experience and
liaison requests. It is intended that this document or a successor liaison requests. It is intended that this document or a successor
version thereto will become the basis for subsequent progression of a version thereto will become the basis for subsequent progression of a
symmetric key provisioning protocol specification on the standards symmetric key provisioning protocol specification on the standards
track. track.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1. Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.1. Single Key Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.1. Single Key Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.2. Multiple Key Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.2. Multiple Key Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.3. Session Time-Out Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.1.3. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.4. Outsourced Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.4. Provisioning Time-Out Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.5. Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.5. Key Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.6. Pre-Loaded Key Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.6. Pre-Loaded Key Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.7. Pre-Shared Transport Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.1.7. Pre-Shared Manufacturing Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.8. End-to-End Protection of Key Material . . . . . . . . 9 1.1.8. End-to-End Protection of Key Material . . . . . . . . 9
1.2. Protocol Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2. Protocol Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3. Initiating DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3. Initiating DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. Determining Which Protocol Variant to Use . . . . . . . . 11 1.4. Determining Which Protocol Variant to Use . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1. Criteria for Using the Four-Pass Protocol . . . . . . 11 1.4.1. Criteria for Using the Four-Pass Protocol . . . . . . 11
1.4.2. Criteria for Using the Two-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . 12 1.4.2. Criteria for Using the Two-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . 12
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.4. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. DSKPP Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. DSKPP Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1. Four-Pass Protocol Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1. Four-Pass Protocol Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.1. Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1.1. Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2. Generation of Symmetric Keys for Cryptographic 3.1.2. Generation of Symmetric Keys for Cryptographic
Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.3. MAC Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1.3. Encryption of Pseudorandom Nonces Sent from the
3.2. Two-Pass Protocol Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 DSKPP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1. Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1.4. MAC Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2. Key Protection Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2. Two-Pass Protocol Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.3. MAC Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.2.1. Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.2.2. Key Protection Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.1. Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2.3. MAC Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.2. Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.3. Device Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4. The DSKPP One-Way Pseudorandom Function, DSKPP-PRF . . . . 34 3.4. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3.4.1. Authentication Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.4.2. Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.4.2. Authentication Code Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5. Encryption of Pseudorandom Nonces Sent from the DSKPP 3.4.3. Authentication Data Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.5. The DSKPP One-Way Pseudorandom Function, DSKPP-PRF . . . . 35
3.5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.2. Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. DSKPP Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4. DSKPP Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1. General XML Schema Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.1. General XML Schema Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2. Components of the <KeyProvTrigger> Message . . . . . . . . 36 4.2. Components of the <KeyProvTrigger> Message . . . . . . . . 37
4.3. Components of the <KeyProvClientHello> Request . . . . . . 37 4.3. Components of the <KeyProvClientHello> Request . . . . . . 38
4.3.1. The DeviceIdentifierDataType Type . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.3.1. The DeviceIdentifierDataType Type . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3.2. The ProtocolVariantsType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.3.2. The ProtocolVariantsType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3.3. The KeyContainersFormatType Type . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4.3.3. The KeyPackagesFormatType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.4. The AuthenticationDataType Type . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.3.4. The AuthenticationDataType Type . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4. Components of the <KeyProvServerHello> Response (Used 4.4. Components of the <KeyProvServerHello> Response (Used
Only in Four-Pass DSKPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Only in Four-Pass DSKPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5. Components of a <KeyProvClientNonce> Request (Used 4.5. Components of a <KeyProvClientNonce> Request (Used
Only in Four-Pass DSKPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Only in Four-Pass DSKPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6. Components of a <KeyProvServerFinished> Response . . . . . 46 4.6. Components of a <KeyProvServerFinished> Response . . . . . 46
4.7. The StatusCode Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4.7. The StatusCode Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5. Protocol Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.1. The ClientInfoType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.1. The ClientInfoType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2. The ServerInfoType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2. The ServerInfoType Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6. Protocol Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6. Protocol Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.1. General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.2. HTTP/1.1 Binding for DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.2. HTTP/1.1 Binding for DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.2.2. Identification of DSKPP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6.2.2. Identification of DSKPP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2.3. HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 6.2.3. HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2.4. HTTP Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 6.2.4. HTTP Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2.5. HTTP Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 6.2.5. HTTP Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2.6. HTTP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 6.2.6. HTTP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2.7. Initialization of DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 6.2.7. Initialization of DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.2.8. Example Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 6.2.8. Example Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7. DSKPP Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7. DSKPP Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8. Conformance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 8. Conformance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.2. Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.2. Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.2.2. Message Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.2.2. Message Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
9.2.3. Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 9.2.3. Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9.2.4. Message Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 9.2.4. Message Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9.2.5. Message Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9.2.5. Message Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
9.2.6. Message Reordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9.2.6. Message Reordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.2.7. Man-in-the-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9.2.7. Man-in-the-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.3. Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 9.3. Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.4. Cryptographic Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 9.4. Cryptographic Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.5. Attacks on the Interaction between DSKPP and User 9.5. Attacks on the Interaction between DSKPP and User
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9.6. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 9.6. Miscellaneous Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
9.6.1. Client Contributions to K_TOKEN Entropy . . . . . . . 67 9.6.1. Client Contributions to K_TOKEN Entropy . . . . . . . 67
9.6.2. Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 9.6.2. Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9.6.3. Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 9.6.3. Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9.6.4. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 9.6.4. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9.6.5. Key Protection in the Two-Pass Passphrase Profile . . 68 9.6.5. Key Protection in Two-Pass DSKPP . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 10. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
12. Intellectual Property Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 12. Intellectual Property Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
15.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 15.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
15.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 15.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
A.1. Trigger Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 A.1. Trigger Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.2. Four-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 A.2. Four-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.2.1. <KeyProvClientHello> Without a Preceding Trigger . . . 73 A.2.1. <KeyProvClientHello> Without a Preceding Trigger . . . 76
A.2.2. <KeyProvClientHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger . . 74 A.2.2. <KeyProvClientHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger . . 77
A.2.3. <KeyProvServerHello> Without a Preceding Trigger . . . 75 A.2.3. <KeyProvServerHello> Without a Preceding Trigger . . . 78
A.2.4. <KeyProvServerHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger . . 76 A.2.4. <KeyProvServerHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger . . 79
A.2.5. <KeyProvClientNonce> Using Default Encryption . . . . 77 A.2.5. <KeyProvClientNonce> Using Default Encryption . . . . 79
A.2.6. <KeyProvServerFinished> Using Default Encryption . . . 78 A.2.6. <KeyProvServerFinished> Using Default Encryption . . . 81
A.3. Two-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 A.3. Two-Pass Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.3.1. Example Using the Key Transport Profile . . . . . . . 79 A.3.1. Example Using the Key Transport Profile . . . . . . . 81
A.3.2. Example Using the Key Wrap Profile . . . . . . . . . . 82 A.3.2. Example Using the Key Wrap Profile . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.3.3. Example Using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile . 85 A.3.3. Example Using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile . 87
Appendix B. Integration with PKCS #11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Appendix B. Integration with PKCS #11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
B.1. The 4-pass Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 B.1. The 4-pass Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
B.2. The 2-pass Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 B.2. The 2-pass Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix C. Example of DSKPP-PRF Realizations . . . . . . . . . . 91 Appendix C. Example of DSKPP-PRF Realizations . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 C.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.2. DSKPP-PRF-AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 C.2. DSKPP-PRF-AES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.2.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 C.2.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.2.2. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 C.2.2. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C.2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 C.2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
C.3. DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 C.3. DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C.3.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 C.3.1. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C.3.2. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 C.3.2. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C.3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 C.3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 96 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 98
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
A symmetric key cryptographic module provides data authentication and A symmetric key cryptographic module provides data authentication and
encryption services to software (or firmware) applications hosted on encryption services to software (or firmware) applications hosted on
hardware devices, such as personal computers, handheld mobile phones, hardware devices, such as personal computers, handheld mobile phones,
one-time password tokens, USB flash drives, tape drives, etc. Until one-time password tokens, USB flash drives, tape drives, etc. Until
recently, provisioning symmetric keys to these modules has been labor recently, provisioning symmetric keys to these modules has been labor
intensive, involving manual operations that are device-specific, and intensive, involving manual operations that are device-specific, and
inherently error-prone. inherently error-prone.
Fortunately, an increasing number of hardware devices enable Fortunately, an increasing number of hardware devices enable
programmatic initialization of their applications. For example, a programmatic initialization of their applications. For example, a
U3-ready thumb drive lets users load and configure applications U3-ready thumb drive lets users load and configure applications
locally through a USB port on their PC. Other hardware devices, such locally through a USB port on their PC. Other hardware devices, such
as Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) phones, allow users to load and as Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) phones, allow users to load and
configure applications over-the-air. Likewise, programmable configure applications over-the-air. Likewise, programmable
cryptographic modules enable issuers to provision symmetric keys via cryptographic modules enable key issuers to provision symmetric keys
the Internet, whether over-the-wire or over-the-air. via the Internet, whether over-the-wire or over-the-air.
This document describes the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning This document describes the Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning
Protocol (DSKPP), which leverages these recent technological Protocol (DSKPP), which leverages these recent technological
developments. DSKPP provides an open and interoperable mechanism for developments. DSKPP provides an open and interoperable mechanism for
initializing and configuring symmetric keys to cryptographic modules initializing and configuring symmetric keys to cryptographic modules
that are accessible over the Internet. The description is based on that are accessible over the Internet. The description is based on
the information contained in RFC4758, and contains specific the information contained in RFC4758, and contains specific
enhancements, such as User Authentication and support for the [PSKC] enhancements, such as User Authentication and support for the [PSKC]
format for transmission of key material. format for transmission of keying material.
DSKPP is a client-server protocol with two variations. One variation DSKPP is a client-server protocol with two variations. One variation
establishes a symmetric key by mutually authenticated key agreement. establishes a symmetric key by mutually authenticated key agreement.
The other variation relies on key distribution. In the former case, The other variation relies on key distribution. In the former case,
key agreement enables two parties (a cryptographic module and key key agreement enables two parties (a cryptographic module and key
provisioning server) to establish a symmetric cryptographic key using provisioning server) to establish a symmetric cryptographic key using
an exchange of four messages, such that the key is not transported an exchange of four messages, such that the key is not transported
over the Internet. In the latter case, key distribution enables a over the Internet. In the latter case, key distribution enables a
key provisioning server to transport a symmetric key to a key provisioning server to transport a symmetric key to a
cryptographic module over the Internet using an exchange of two cryptographic module over the Internet using an exchange of two
skipping to change at page 7, line 35 skipping to change at page 7, line 35
back-end issuance server. The provisioning server assigns a unique back-end issuance server. The provisioning server assigns a unique
key ID to the symmetric key and provisions it to the cryptographic key ID to the symmetric key and provisions it to the cryptographic
module. module.
1.1.2. Multiple Key Requests 1.1.2. Multiple Key Requests
A cryptographic module makes multiple requests for symmetric keys A cryptographic module makes multiple requests for symmetric keys
from the same provisioning server. The symmetric keys need not be of from the same provisioning server. The symmetric keys need not be of
the same type, i.e., the keys may be used with different symmetric the same type, i.e., the keys may be used with different symmetric
key cryptographic algorithms, including one-time password key cryptographic algorithms, including one-time password
authentication algorithms, and AES encryption algorithm. authentication algorithms, and the AES encryption algorithm.
1.1.3. Session Time-Out Policy 1.1.3. User Authentication
Once a cryptographic module initiates a symmetric key request, the In some deployment scenarios, a key issuer may rely on a third party
provisioning server may require that any subsequent actions to provisioning service. In this case, the issuer directs provisioning
complete the provisioning cycle occur within a certain time window. requests from the cryptographic module to the provisioning service.
For example, an issuer may provide a time-limited authentication code As such, it is the responsibility of the issuer to authenticate the
to a user during registration, which the user will input into the user through some out-of-band means before granting him rights to
cryptographic module to authenticate themselves with the provisioning acquire keys. Once the issuer has granted those rights, the issuer
server. If the user inputs a valid authentication code within the provides an authentication code to the user and makes it available to
fixed time period established by the issuer, the server will allow a the provisioning service, so that the user can prove that he is
key to be provisioned to the cryptographic module hosted by the authorized to acquire keys.
user's device.
1.1.4. Outsourced Provisioning 1.1.4. Provisioning Time-Out Policy
A symmetric key issuer outsources its key provisioning to a third- An issuer may provide a time-limited authentication code to a user
party key provisioning server provider. The issuer is responsible during registration, which the user will input into the cryptographic
for authenticating and granting rights to users to acquire keys while module to authenticate themselves with the provisioning server. The
acting as a proxy to the cryptographic module to acquire symmetric server will allow a key to be provisioned to the cryptographic module
keys from the provisioning server; the cryptographic module hosted by the user's device when user authentication is required only
communicates with the issuer proxy server, which forwards if the user inputs a valid authentication code within the fixed time
provisioning requests to the provisioning server. period established by the issuer.
1.1.5. Key Renewal 1.1.5. Key Renewal
A cryptographic module requests renewal of a symmetric key using the A cryptographic module requests renewal of a symmetric key using the
same key ID already associated with the key. Such a need may occur same key ID already associated with the key. Such a need may occur
in the case when a user wants to upgrade her device that houses the in the case when a user wants to upgrade her device that houses the
cryptographic module or when a key has expired. When a user uses the cryptographic module or when a key has expired. When a user uses the
same cryptographic module to, for example, perform strong same cryptographic module to, for example, perform strong
authentication at multiple Web login sites, keeping the same key ID authentication at multiple Web login sites, keeping the same key ID
removes the need for the user to register a new key ID at each site. removes the need for the user to register a new key ID at each site.
1.1.6. Pre-Loaded Key Replacement 1.1.6. Pre-Loaded Key Replacement
This scenario represents a special case of symmetric key renewal in This scenario represents a special case of symmetric key renewal in
which a local administrator can authenticate the user procedurally which a local administrator can authenticate the user procedurally
before initiating the provisioning process. It also allows for an before initiating the provisioning process. It also allows for a
issuer to pre-load a key onto a cryptographic module with a device issuer to pre-load a key onto a cryptographic module with a
restriction that the key is replaced with a new key prior to use of restriction that the key is replaced with a new key prior to use of
the cryptographic module. Another variation of this scenario is the the cryptographic module. Another variation of this scenario is the
issuer who recycles devices. In this case, an issuer would provision organization who recycles devices. In this case, a key issuer would
a new symmetric key to a cryptographic module hosted on a device that provision a new symmetric key to a cryptographic module hosted on a
was previously owned by another user. device that was previously owned by another user.
Note that this usage scenario is essentially the same as the last Note that this usage scenario is essentially the same as the last
scenario wherein the same key ID is used for renewal. scenario wherein the same key ID is used for renewal.
1.1.7. Pre-Shared Transport Key 1.1.7. Pre-Shared Manufacturing Key
A cryptographic module is loaded onto a smart card after the card is A cryptographic module is loaded onto a smart card after the card is
issued to a user. The symmetric key for the cryptographic module issued to a user. The symmetric key for the cryptographic module
will then be provisioned using a secure channel mechanism present in will then be provisioned using a secure channel mechanism present in
many smart card platforms. This allows a direct secure channel to be many smart card platforms. This allows a direct secure channel to be
established between the smart card chip and the provisioning server. established between the smart card chip and the provisioning server.
For example, the card commands (i.e., Application Protocol Data For example, the card commands (i.e., Application Protocol Data
Units, or APDUs) are encrypted with a pre-shared transport key and Units, or APDUs) are encrypted with a pre-issued card manufacturer's
sent directly to the smart card chip, allowing secure post-issuance key and sent directly to the smart card chip, allowing secure post-
in-the-field provisioning. This secure flow can pass Transport Layer issuance in-the-field provisioning. This secure flow can pass
Security (TLS) and other transport security boundaries. Transport Layer Security (TLS) and other transport security
boundaries.
Note that two pre-conditions for this usage scenario are for the Note that two pre-conditions for this usage scenario are for the
protocol to be tunneled and the provisioning server to know the protocol to be tunneled and the provisioning server to know the
correct pre-established transport key. correct pre-established manufacturer's key.
1.1.8. End-to-End Protection of Key Material 1.1.8. End-to-End Protection of Key Material
In this scenario, transport layer security does not provide end-to- In this scenario, transport layer security does not provide end-to-
end protection of key material transported from the provisioning end protection of keying material transported from the provisioning
server to the cryptographic module. For example, TLS may terminate server to the cryptographic module. For example, TLS may terminate
at an application hosted on a PC rather than at the cryptographic at an application hosted on a PC rather than at the cryptographic
module (i.e., the endpoint) located on a data storage device. module (i.e., the endpoint) located on a data storage device.
Mutually authenticated key agreement provides end-to-end protection, Mutually authenticated key agreement provides end-to-end protection,
which TLS cannot provide. which TLS cannot provide.
1.2. Protocol Entities 1.2. Protocol Entities
In principle, the protocol involves a DSKPP client and a DSKPP In principle, the protocol involves a DSKPP client and a DSKPP
server. The DSKPP client manages communication between the server. The DSKPP client manages communication between the
skipping to change at page 10, line 31 skipping to change at page 10, line 31
|Security Attribute List | |Security Attribute List |
|... | |... |
-------------------------- --------------------------
| 1 | 1
| |
| contains | contains
| |
| * | *
V V
----------------------- -----------------------
|Key Container | |Key Package |
|---------------------| |---------------------|
|Key ID | |Key ID |
|Key Type | |Key Type |
|... | |... |
----------------------- -----------------------
Figure 1: Object Model Figure 1: Object Model
It is assumed that a device will host an application layered above It is assumed that a device will host an application layered above
the cryptographic module, and this application will manage the cryptographic module, and this application will manage
skipping to change at page 11, line 28 skipping to change at page 11, line 28
server. server.
3. A user may be informed out-of-band about the location of the 3. A user may be informed out-of-band about the location of the
DSKPP server. DSKPP server.
Once the location of the DSKPP server is known, the DSKPP client and Once the location of the DSKPP server is known, the DSKPP client and
the DSKPP server engage in a 4-pass or 2-pass protocol. the DSKPP server engage in a 4-pass or 2-pass protocol.
1.4. Determining Which Protocol Variant to Use 1.4. Determining Which Protocol Variant to Use
The four-pass and two-pass protocols are appropriate in different The four-pass and two-pass protocols are appropriate in different
deployment scenarios, as described in the sub-sections below. deployment scenarios, as described in the sub-sections below. The
biggest differentiator between the two is that the two-pass protocol
supports transport of an existing key to a cryptographic module,
while the four-pass involves key generation on-the-fly via key
agreement. In either case, both protocol variants support algorithm
agility through negotiation of encryption mechanisms and key types at
the beginning of each protocol run.
1.4.1. Criteria for Using the Four-Pass Protocol 1.4.1. Criteria for Using the Four-Pass Protocol
The four-pass protocol is needed under one or more of the following The four-pass protocol is needed under one or more of the following
conditions: conditions:
o The cryptographic module is not pre-populated with a transport o Policy requires that both parties engaged in the protocol jointly
key, nor hosted on a pre-keyed device (e.g., a SIM card), nor has contribute entropy to the key. Enforcing this policy mitigates
a keypad that can be used for entering a passphrase (such as the risk of exposing a key during the provisioning process as the
present on a mobile phone). key is generated through mutual agreement without being
o The hardware device will be used within multiple security domains, transferred over-the-air or over-the-wire. It also mitigates risk
which means that each domain will need to provision its own of exposure after the key is provisioned, as the key will be not
symmetric key. However, the cryptographic module does not have a be vulnerable to a single point of attack in the system.
transport key, or other type of key that can be used with multiple
provisioning servers.
o A cryptographic module does not have private-key capabilities. o A cryptographic module does not have private-key capabilities.
o When the system provides a single point for exposing key material. o The cryptographic module is hosted by a device that was neither
This risk can be mitigated by ensuring that both parties pre-issued with a manufacturer's key or other form of pre-shared
contribute entropy to the key, such as with key agreement. key (as might be the case with a smart card or SIM card) nor has a
o A consumer of the protocol requires algorithm agility, esp. the keypad that can be used for entering a passphrase (such as present
ability to negotiate which encryption mechanisms and key types are on a mobile phone).
used during a protocol run.
1.4.2. Criteria for Using the Two-Pass Protocol 1.4.2. Criteria for Using the Two-Pass Protocol
The two-pass protocol is needed under one or more of the following The two-pass protocol is needed under one or more of the following
conditions: conditions:
o A device is not able to support near real-time communications. o Pre-existing (i.e., legacy) keys must be provisioned via transport
o Pre-existing (i.e., legacy) keys must be provisioned to the to the cryptographic module.
cryptographic module. o The cryptographic module is hosted on a device that was pre-issued
o The cryptographic module has a transport key and is capable of with a manufacturer's key (such as may exist on a smart card), or
performing private-key operations. other form of pre-shared key (such as may exist on a SIM-card),
o The cryptographic module has a pre-shared key (e.g., a mobile and is capable of performing private-key operations.
phone with a SIM card).\ o The cryptographic module is hosted by a device that has a built-in
o The cryptographic module has a keypad in which a user may enter a keypad with which a user may enter a passphrase, useful for
passphrase, useful for deriving a key-wrapping key for deriving a key wrapping key for distribution of keying material.
distribution of key material.
o A consumer of the protocol requires algorithm agility, esp. the
ability to negotiate which encryption mechanisms and key types are
used during a protocol run.
o Workflow dictates that an approval process is required as part of
the protocol run (e.g., for user authorization).
o Near real-time communication between the client and server is not
possible.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
2.1. Key Words 2.1. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.2. Definitions 2.2. Definitions
The definitions provided below are defined as used in this document.
The same terms may be defined differently in other documents.
Authentication Code (AC): Client Authentication Code comprised of a Authentication Code (AC): Client Authentication Code comprised of a
string of numeric characters known to the device and the server string of numeric characters known to the device and the server
and containing an identifier and a password and containing an identifier and a password
Authentication Data (AD): Client Authentication Data that may be Authentication Data (AD): Client Authentication Data that may be
derived from the Authentication Code (AC) derived from the Authentication Code (AC)
Cryptographic Module: A component of an application, which enables Cryptographic Module: A component of an application, which enables
symmetric key cryptographic functionality symmetric key cryptographic functionality
CryptoModule ID: A unique identifier for an instance of the CryptoModule ID: A unique identifier for an instance of the
cryptographic module cryptographic module
Device: A physical piece of hardware, or a software framework, that
Device: A physical piece of hardware or software framework that
hosts symmetric key cryptographic modules hosts symmetric key cryptographic modules
Device ID (DeviceID): A unique identifier for the device Device ID (DeviceID): A unique identifier for the device
DSKPP Client: Manages communication between the symmetric key DSKPP Client: Manages communication between the symmetric key
cryptographic module and the DSKPP server cryptographic module and the DSKPP server
DSKPP Server: The symmetric key provisioning server that DSKPP Server: The symmetric key provisioning server that
participates in the DSKPP protocol run participates in the DSKPP protocol run
DSKPP Server ID (ServerID): The unique identifier of a DSKPP server DSKPP Server ID (ServerID): The unique identifier of a DSKPP server
Key Container (KC): An object that encapsulates a symmetric key and Issuer: See "Key Issuer"
Key Issuer: An organization that issues symmetric keys to end-users
Key Package (KP): An object that encapsulates a symmetric key and
its configuration data its configuration data
Key Container Header (KCH): Information about the Key Container, Key Package Header (KPH): Information about the Key Package, useful
useful for two-pass DSKPP, e.g., the ServerID and KPM for two-pass DSKPP, e.g., the passing the ServerID and the Key
Protection Method
Key ID (KeyID): A unique identifier for the symmetric key Key ID (KeyID): A unique identifier for the symmetric key
Key Protection Method (KPM): The key protection profile used during Key Protection Method (KPM): The key transport method used during
two-pass DSKPP two-pass DSKPP
Key Protection Method List (KPML): The list of key protection Key Protection Method List (KPML): The list of key protection
methods supported by a cryptographic module methods supported by a cryptographic module
Key Provisioning Server: A lifecycle management system that provides
a key issuer with the ability to provision keys to cryptographic
modules hosted on end-users' devices
Key Transport: A key establishment procedure whereby the DSKPP
server selects and encrypts the keying material and then sends
the material to the DSKPP client [NIST-SP800-57]
Key Transport Key: The private key that resides on the cryptographic
module. This key is paired with the DSKPP client's public key,
which the DSKPP server uses to encrypt keying material during key
transport [NIST-SP800-57]
Key Type: The type of symmetric key cryptographic methods for which Key Type: The type of symmetric key cryptographic methods for which
the key will be used (e.g., OATH HOTP or RSA SecurID the key will be used (e.g., OATH HOTP or RSA SecurID
authentication, AES encryption, etc.) authentication, AES encryption, etc.)
Key Wrapping: A method of encrypting keys for key transport
[NIST-SP800-57]
Key Wrapping Key: A symmetric key encrypting key used for key
wrapping [NIST-SP800-57]
Keying Material: The data necessary (e.g., keys and key
configuration data) necessary to establish and maintain
cryptographic keying relationships [NIST-SP800-57]
Manufacturer's Key A unique master key pre-issued to a hardware
device, e.g., a smart card, during the manufacturing process. If
present, this key may be used by a cryptographic module to derive
secret keys
Provisioning Service: See "Key Provisioning Server"
Security Attribute List (SAL): A payload that contains the DSKPP Security Attribute List (SAL): A payload that contains the DSKPP
version, DSKPP variation (four- or two-pass), key container version, DSKPP variation (four- or two-pass), key package
formats, key types, and cryptographic algorithms that the formats, key types, and cryptographic algorithms that the
cryptographic module is capable of supporting cryptographic module is capable of supporting
Security Context (SC): A payload that contains the DSKPP version, Security Context (SC): A payload that contains the DSKPP version,
DSKPP variation (four- or two-pass), key container format, key DSKPP variation (four- or two-pass), key package format, key
type, and cryptographic algorithms relevant to the current type, and cryptographic algorithms relevant to the current
protocol run protocol run
User: The person or client to whom devices are issued User: The person or client to whom devices are issued
User ID: A unique identifier for the user or client User ID: A unique identifier for the user or client
2.3. Notation 2.3. Notation
|| String concatenation || String concatenation
[x] Optional element x [x] Optional element x
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User ID: A unique identifier for the user or client User ID: A unique identifier for the user or client
2.3. Notation 2.3. Notation
|| String concatenation || String concatenation
[x] Optional element x [x] Optional element x
A ^ B Exclusive-OR operation on strings A and B (where A A ^ B Exclusive-OR operation on strings A and B (where A
and B are of equal length) and B are of equal length)
<XMLElement> A typographical convention used in the body of the <XMLElement> A typographical convention used in the body of the
text text
DSKPP-PRF(k,x,l) A keyed psuedo-random function (see Section 3.4) DSKPP-PRF(k,x,l) A keyed pseudo-random function (see Section 3.5)
E(k,m) Encryption of m with the key k E(k,m) Encryption of m with the key k
K Key used to encrypt R_C (either K_SERVER, K_SHARED K Key used to encrypt R_C (either K_SERVER or
or K_DERIVED), or in MAC or DSKPP_PRF computations K_SHARED), or in MAC or DSKPP_PRF computations
K_AC Secret key that is derived from the Authentication K_AC Secret key that is derived from the Authentication
Code and used for user authentication purposes Code and used for user authentication purposes
K_CLIENT Public key of the DSKPP client K_MAC Secret key derived during a DSKPP exchange for use
with key confirmation
K_DERIVED Secret key derived from a passphrase that is known K_MAC' A second secret key used for server authentication
to both the DSKPP client or user and the DSKPP
server
K_MAC Secret key used for key confirmation and server K_PROV A provisioning master key from which two keys are
authentication purposes, and generated in DSKPP derived: K_TOKEN and K_MAC
K_MAC' A second secret key used for server authentication K_SERVER Public key of the DSKPP server; used for encrypting
purposes in 2-pass DSKPP R_C in the four-pass protocol variant
K_SERVER Public key of the DSKPP server K_SHARED Secret key that is pre-shared between the DSKPP
client and the DSKPP server; used for encrypting
R_C in the four-pass protocol variant
K_SHARED Secret key shared between the DSKPP client and the K_TOKEN Secret key that is established in a cryptographic
DSKPP server module using DSKPP
K_TOKEN Secret key used for cryptographic module
computations, and generated in DSKPP
R Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP client and R Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP client and
used for MAC computations used for MAC computations
R_C Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP client and R_C Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP client and
used as input to the generation of K_TOKEN used as input to the generation of K_TOKEN
R_S Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP server and R_S Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP server and
used as input to the generation of K_TOKEN used as input to the generation of K_TOKEN
R_TRIGGER Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP server and R_TRIGGER Pseudorandom value chosen by the DSKPP server and
used as input in a trigger message. used as input in a trigger message.
URL_S Server address as a URL
URL_S DSKPP server address, as a URL
2.4. Abbreviations 2.4. Abbreviations
AC Authentication Code AC Authentication Code
AD Authentication Data AD Authentication Data
DSKPP Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol DSKPP Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
KC Key Container KP Key Package
KCH Key Container Header KPH Key Package Header
KPM Key Protection Method KPM Key Protection Method
KPML Key Protection Method List KPML Key Protection Method List
MAC Message Authentication Code MAC Message Authentication Code
PC Personal Computer PC Personal Computer
PDU Protocol Data Unit PDU Protocol Data Unit
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PRF Pseudo-Random Function PRF Pseudo-Random Function
PSKC Portable Symmetric Key Container PSKC Portable Symmetric Key Container
SAL Security Attribute List (see Section 2.2) SAL Security Attribute List (see Section 2.2)
SC Security Context (see Section 2.2) SC Security Context (see Section 2.2)
skipping to change at page 17, line 13 skipping to change at page 18, line 13
random nonce, R_S. The response also consists of information random nonce, R_S. The response also consists of information
about either a shared secret key, or its own public key, that the about either a shared secret key, or its own public key, that the
DSKPP client uses when sending its protected random nonce, R_C, DSKPP client uses when sending its protected random nonce, R_C,
in the <KeyProvClientNonce> request (see below). in the <KeyProvClientNonce> request (see below).
Optionally, the DSKPP server may provide a MAC that the DSKPP Optionally, the DSKPP server may provide a MAC that the DSKPP
client may use for server authentication. client may use for server authentication.
<KeyProvClientNonce>: With this request, a DSKPP client and DSKPP <KeyProvClientNonce>: With this request, a DSKPP client and DSKPP
server securely exchange protected data, e.g., the protected server securely exchange protected data, e.g., the protected
random nonce R_C. In addition, the request may include client random nonce R_C. In addition, the request may include user
authentication data that the DSKPP server uses to verify proof- authentication data that the DSKPP server uses to verify proof-
of-possession of the device. of-possession of the device.
<KeyProvServerFinished>: The <KeyProvServerFinished> response is a <KeyProvServerFinished>: The <KeyProvServerFinished> response is a
confirmation message that includes a key container that holds confirmation message that includes a key package that holds
configuration data, and may also contain protected key material configuration data, and may also contain protected keying
(this depends on the protocol variation, as discussed below). material (this depends on the protocol variation, as discussed
below).
Optionally, the DSKPP server may provide a MAC that the DSKPP Optionally, the DSKPP server may provide a MAC that the DSKPP
client may use for server authentication. client may use for server authentication.
3.1. Four-Pass Protocol Usage 3.1. Four-Pass Protocol Usage
This section describes the message flow and methods that comprise the This section describes the message flow and methods that comprise the
four-pass protocol variant. four-pass protocol variant.
3.1.1. Message Flow 3.1.1. Message Flow
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2: Pass 3 = <KeyProvClientNonce>, Pass 4 = <KeyProvServerFinished> 2: Pass 3 = <KeyProvClientNonce>, Pass 4 = <KeyProvServerFinished>
The first pair of messages negotiate cryptographic algorithms and The first pair of messages negotiate cryptographic algorithms and
exchange nonces. The second pair of messages establishes a symmetric exchange nonces. The second pair of messages establishes a symmetric
key using mutually authenticated key agreement. key using mutually authenticated key agreement.
The DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with The DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with
the correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct the correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct
user. To do this, the DSKPP server MAY couple an initial user user. To do this, the DSKPP server MAY couple an initial user
authentication to the DSKPP execution using one of the mechanisms authentication to the DSKPP execution using one of the mechanisms
described in Section 3.3. described in Section 3.4.
The purpose and content of each message are described below, The purpose and content of each message are described below,
including the optional <KeyProvTrigger>. including the optional <KeyProvTrigger>.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
[<---] R_TRIGGER, [DeviceID], [<---] R_TRIGGER, [DeviceID],
[KeyID], [URL_S] [KeyID], [URL_S]
The DSKPP server optionally sends a <KeyProvTrigger> message to the The DSKPP server optionally sends a <KeyProvTrigger> message to the
DSKPP client. The trigger message MUST contain a nonce, R_TRIGGER, DSKPP client. The trigger message MUST contain a nonce, R_TRIGGER,
to allow the server to couple the trigger with a later to allow the server to couple the trigger with a later
<KeyProvClientHello> request. <KeyProvTrigger> MAY include DeviceID <KeyProvClientHello> request. <KeyProvTrigger> MAY include a DeviceID
to allow the client to select the device with which it will to allow the client to select the device with which it will
communicate. The DeviceID MAY also be used later to authenticate the communicate (for more information about device identification, refer
client (see Section 3.3.1). In the case of key renewal, to Section 3.3). In the case of key renewal, <KeyProvTrigger> MAY
<KeyProvTrigger> MAY include the identifier for the key, KeyID, that include the identifier for the key, KeyID, that is being replaced.
is being replaced. Finally, the trigger MAY contain a URL for the Finally, the trigger MAY contain a URL for the DSKPP client to use
DSKP client to use when contacting the DSKPP server. when contacting the DSKPP server.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
SAL, [R_TRIGGER], SAL, [R_TRIGGER],
[DeviceID], [KeyID] ---> [DeviceID], [KeyID] --->
The DSKPP client sends a <KeyProvClientHello> message to the DSKPP The DSKPP client sends a <KeyProvClientHello> message to the DSKPP
server. This message MUST contain a Security Attribute List (SAL), server. This message MUST contain a Security Attribute List (SAL),
identifying which DSKPP versions, protocol variations (in this case identifying which DSKPP versions, protocol variations (in this case
"four-pass"), key container formats, key types, encryption and MAC "four-pass"), key package formats, key types, encryption and MAC
algorithms that the client supports. In addition, if a trigger algorithms that the client supports. In addition, if a trigger
message preceded <KeyProvClientHello>, then it passes the parameters message preceded <KeyProvClientHello>, then it passes the parameters
received in <KeyProvTrigger> back to the DSKPP Server. In received in <KeyProvTrigger> back to the DSKPP Server. In
particular, it MUST include R_TRIGGER so that the DSKPP server can particular, it MUST include R_TRIGGER so that the DSKPP server can
associate the client with the trigger message, and SHOULD include associate the client with the trigger message, and SHOULD include
DeviceID and KeyID. DeviceID and KeyID.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
<--- SC, R_S, [K], [MAC] <--- SC, R_S, [K], [MAC]
The DSKPP server responds to the DSKPP client with a The DSKPP server responds to the DSKPP client with a
<KeyProvServerHello> message, whose content MUST include a Security <KeyProvServerHello> message, whose Status attribute is set to a
Context (SC). The client will use the SC to select the DSKPP version return code for <KeyProvClientHello>. If Status is not "Continue",
and variation (e.g., four-pass), type of key to generate, and only the Status and Version attributes will be present, and the DSKPP
cryptographic algorithms that it will use for the remainder of the client MUST abort the protocol. If Status is set to "Continue", then
protocol run. <KeyProvServerHello> MUST also include the server's the message MUST include a Security Context (SC). The DSKPP client
random nonce, R_S, whose length may depend on the selected key type. will use the SC to select the DSKPP version and variation (e.g.,
In addition, the <KeyProvServerHello> message MAY provide K, which four-pass), type of key to generate, and cryptographic algorithms
represents its own public key (K_SERVER) or information about a that it will use for the remainder of the protocol run.
shared secret key (K_SHARED) to use for encrypting the cryptographic <KeyProvServerHello> MUST also include the server's random nonce,
module's random nonce (see description of <KeyProvClientNonce> R_S, whose length may depend on the selected key type. In addition,
below). Optionally, <KeyProvServerHello> MAY include a MAC that the the <KeyProvServerHello> message MAY provide K, which represents its
DSKPP client can use for server authentication in the case of key own public key (K_SERVER) or information about a shared secret key
renewal (Section 3.1.3.1 describes how to calculate the MAC). (K_SHARED) to use for encrypting the cryptographic module's random
nonce (see description of <KeyProvClientNonce> below). Optionally,
<KeyProvServerHello> MAY include a MAC that the DSKPP client can use
for server authentication in the case of key renewal (Section 3.1.4.1
describes how to calculate the MAC).
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
E(K,R_C), [AD] ---> E(K,R_C), [AD] --->
Based on the Security Context (SC) provided in the Based on the Security Context (SC) provided in the
<KeyProvServerHello> message, the cryptographic module generates a <KeyProvServerHello> message, the cryptographic module generates a
random nonce, R_C. The length of the nonce R_C will depend on the random nonce, R_C. The length of the nonce R_C will depend on the
selected key type. The cryptographic module encrypts R_C using the selected key type. The cryptographic module encrypts R_C using the
selected encryption algorithm and with a key, K, that is either the selected encryption algorithm and with a key, K, that is either the
DSKPP server's public key, K_SERVER, or a shared secret key, DSKPP server's public key, K_SERVER, or a shared secret key,
K_SHARED, as indicated by the DSKPP server. K_SHARED, as indicated by the DSKPP server.
Note: If K is equivalent to K_SERVER, then the cryptographic module Note: If K is equivalent to K_SERVER, then the cryptographic module
SHOULD verify the server's certificate before using it to encrypt R_C SHOULD verify the server's certificate before using it to encrypt R_C
in accordance with [RFC3280]. in accordance with [RFC3280].
Note: If successful execution of the protocol will result in the Note: If successful execution of the protocol will result in the
replacement of an existing key with a newly generated one, the DSKPP replacement of an existing key with a newly generated one, the DSKPP
client MUST verify the MAC provided in the <KeyProvServer> message. client MUST verify the MAC provided in the <KeyProvServerHello>
The DSKPP client MUST terminate the DSKPP session if the MAC does not message. The DSKPP client MUST terminate the DSKPP session if the
verify, and MUST delete any nonces, keys, and/or secrets associated MAC does not verify, and MUST delete any nonces, keys, and/or secrets
with the failed run. associated with the failed run.
The DSKPP client MUST send the encrypted random nonce to the DSKPP The DSKPP client MUST send the encrypted random nonce to the DSKPP
server in a <KeyProvClientNonce> message, and MAY include client server in a <KeyProvClientNonce> message, and MAY include client
Authentication Data (AD), such as a MAC derived from an Authentication Data (AD), such as a MAC derived from an
authentication code and R_C (refer to Section 3.3.2). Finally, the authentication code and R_C (refer to Section 3.4.1). Finally, the
cryptographic module calculates and stores a symmetric key, K_TOKEN, cryptographic module calculates and stores a symmetric key, K_TOKEN,
of the key type specified in the SC received in <KeyProvServerHello> of the key type specified in the SC received in <KeyProvServerHello>
(refer to Section 3.1.2.2.<KeyProvServerFinished> for a description (refer to Section 3.1.2.2.<KeyProvServerFinished> for a description
of how K_TOKEN is generated). of how K_TOKEN is generated).
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
<--- KC, MAC <--- KP, MAC
If Authentication Data (AD) was received in the <KeyProvClientNonce> If Authentication Data (AD) was received in the <KeyProvClientNonce>
message, then the DSKPP server MUST authenticate the user in message, then the DSKPP server MUST authenticate the user in
accordance with Section 3.3.2. If authentication fails, then DSKPP accordance with Section 3.4.1. If authentication fails, then DSKPP
server MUST abort. Otherwise, the DSKPP server decrypts R_C, server MUST abort. Otherwise, the DSKPP server decrypts R_C,
calculates K_TOKEN from the combination of the two random nonces R_S calculates K_TOKEN from the combination of the two random nonces R_S
and R_C, the encryption key K, and possibly some other data, using and R_C, the encryption key K, and possibly some other data (refer to
the DSKPP-PRF function defined in Section 3.4. The server then Section 3.1.2.2 for a description of how K_TOKEN is generated). The
associates K_TOKEN with the cryptographic module in a server-side server then associates K_TOKEN with the cryptographic module in a
data store. The intent is that the data store later on will be used server-side data store. The intent is that the data store later on
by some service that needs to verify or decrypt data produced by the will be used by some service that needs to verify or decrypt data
cryptographic module and the key. produced by the cryptographic module and the key.
Once the association has been made, the DSKPP server sends a Once the association has been made, the DSKPP server sends a
confirmation message to the DSKPP client called confirmation message to the DSKPP client called
<KeyProvServerFinished>. The confirmation message MUST include a Key <KeyProvServerFinished>. The confirmation message MUST include a Key
Container (KC) that holds an identifier for the generated key (but Package (KP) that holds an identifier for the generated key (but not
not the key itself) and additional configuration information, e.g., the key itself) and additional configuration information, e.g., the
the identity of the DSKPP server. The default symmetric key identity of the DSKPP server. The default symmetric key package
container format is based on the Portable Symmetric Key Container format is based on the Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)
(PSKC) defined in [PSKC]. Alternative formats MAY include PKCS#12 defined in [PSKC]. Alternative formats MAY include [SKPC-ASN.1],
[PKCS-12] or PKCS#5 XML [PKCS-5-XML] format. In addition to a Key PKCS#12 [PKCS-12], or PKCS#5 XML [PKCS-5-XML] format. In addition to
Container, <KeyProvServerFinished> MUST also include a MAC that the a Key Package, <KeyProvServerFinished> MUST also include a MAC that
DSKPP client will use to authenticate the message before commiting the DSKPP client will use to authenticate the message before
K_TOKEN. committing K_TOKEN.
After receiving a <KeyProvServerFinished> message with Status = After receiving a <KeyProvServerFinished> message with Status =
"Success", the DSKPP client MUST verify the MAC. The DSKPP client "Success", the DSKPP client MUST verify the MAC. The DSKPP client
MUST terminate the DSKPP session if the MAC does not verify, and MUST terminate the DSKPP session if the MAC does not verify, and
MUST, in this case, also delete any nonces, keys, and/or secrets MUST, in this case, also delete any nonces, keys, and/or secrets
associated with the failed run of the protocol. If associated with the failed run of the protocol. If
<KeyProvServerFinished> has Status = "Success" and the MAC was <KeyProvServerFinished> has Status = "Success" and the MAC was
verified, then the DSKPP client MUST associate the provided key verified, then the DSKPP client MUST associate the provided key
container with the generated key K_TOKEN, and store this data package with the generated key K_TOKEN, and store this data
permanently. After this operation, it MUST NOT be possible to permanently. After this operation, it MUST NOT be possible to
overwrite the key unless knowledge of an authorizing key is proven overwrite the key unless knowledge of an authorizing key is proven
through a MAC on a later <KeyProvServerHello> (and through a MAC on a later <KeyProvServerHello> (and
<KeyProvServerFinished>) message. <KeyProvServerFinished>) message.
3.1.2. Generation of Symmetric Keys for Cryptographic Modules 3.1.2. Generation of Symmetric Keys for Cryptographic Modules
With 4-pass DSKPP, the symmetric key that is the target of With 4-pass DSKPP, the symmetric key that is the target of
provisioning, is generated on-the-fly without being transferred provisioning, is generated on-the-fly without being transferred
between the DSKPP client and DSKPP server. A sample data flow between the DSKPP client and DSKPP server. A sample data flow
skipping to change at page 22, line 22 skipping to change at page 23, line 22
persuade the legitimate server to derive the same value for K_TOKEN, persuade the legitimate server to derive the same value for K_TOKEN,
since K_TOKEN is a function of the public key involved, and the since K_TOKEN is a function of the public key involved, and the
attacker's public key must be different than the correct server's (or attacker's public key must be different than the correct server's (or
else the attacker would not be able to decrypt the information else the attacker would not be able to decrypt the information
received from the client). Therefore, once the attacker is no longer received from the client). Therefore, once the attacker is no longer
"in the middle," the client and server will detect that they are "out "in the middle," the client and server will detect that they are "out
of sync" when they try to use their keys. In the case of encrypting of sync" when they try to use their keys. In the case of encrypting
R_C with K_SERVER, it is therefore important to verify that K_SERVER R_C with K_SERVER, it is therefore important to verify that K_SERVER
really is the legitimate server's key. One way to do this is to really is the legitimate server's key. One way to do this is to
independently validate a newly generated K_TOKEN against some independently validate a newly generated K_TOKEN against some
validation service at the server (e.g. by using a connection validation service at the server (e.g. using a connection independent
independent from the one used for the key generation). from the one used for the key generation).
3.1.2.2. Computing the Symmetric Key 3.1.2.2. Computing the Symmetric Key
In DSKPP, keys are generated using the DSKPP-PRF function defined in In DSKPP, K_TOKEN and K_MAC are generated using the DSKPP-PRF
Section 3.4, a secret random value R_C chosen by the DSKPP client, a function defined in Section 3.5, a secret random value R_C chosen by
random value R_S chosen by the DSKPP server, and the key K used to the DSKPP client, a random value R_S chosen by the DSKPP server, and
encrypt R_C. The input parameter s of DSKPP-PRF is set to the the key K used to encrypt R_C. The input parameter s of DSKPP-PRF is
concatenation of the (ASCII) string "Key generation", K, and R_S, and set to the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "Key generation", K,
the input parameter dsLen is set to the desired length of the key, and R_S. The input parameter dsLen is set to the desired length of
K_TOKEN (the length of K_TOKEN is given by the key's type): the key, K_PROV, whose first half constitutes K_MAC and second half
constitutes K_TOKEN. The combined length is determined by the type
of K_TOKEN and K_MAC:
dsLen = (desired length of K_TOKEN) dsLen = (desired length of K_PROV, i.e., the combined length of
K_TOKEN and K_MAC)
K_TOKEN = DSKPP-PRF (R_C, "Key generation" || K || R_S, dsLen) K_PROV = DSKPP-PRF (R_C, "Key generation" || K || R_S, dsLen)
When computing K_TOKEN above, the output of DSKPP-PRF MAY be subject Then K_TOKEN and K_MAC derived from K_PROV, where
to an algorithm-dependent transform before being adopted as a key of
the selected type. One example of this is the need for parity in DES
keys.
3.1.3. MAC Calculations K_PROV = K_MAC || K_TOKEN
3.1.3.1. Server Authorization in the Case of Key Renewal When computing K_PROV, the derived keys, K_MAC and K_TOKEN, MAY be
subject to an algorithm-dependent transform before being adopted as a
key of the selected type. One example of this is the need for parity
in DES keys.
3.1.3. Encryption of Pseudorandom Nonces Sent from the DSKPP Client
DSKPP client random nonce(s) are either encrypted with the public key
provided by the DSKPP server or by a shared secret key. For example,
in the case of a public RSA key, an RSA encryption scheme from PKCS
#1 [PKCS-1] MAY be used.
In the case of a shared secret key, to avoid dependence on other
algorithms, the DSKPP client MAY use the DSKPP-PRF function described
herein with the shared secret key K_SHARED as input parameter K (in
this case, K_SHARED SHOULD be used solely for this purpose), the
concatenation of the (ASCII) string "Encryption" and the server's
nonce R_S as input parameter s, and dsLen set to the length of R_C:
dsLen = len(R_C)
DS = DSKPP-PRF(K_SHARED, "Encryption" || R_S, dsLen)
This will produce a pseudorandom string DS of length equal to R_C.
Encryption of R_C MAY then be achieved by XOR-ing DS with R_C:
E(DS, R_C) = DS ^ R_C
The DSKPP server will then perform the reverse operation to extract
R_C from E(DS, R_C).
3.1.4. MAC Calculations
3.1.4.1. Server Authentication in the Case of Key Renewal
A MAC MUST be present in the <KeyProvServerHello> message if the A MAC MUST be present in the <KeyProvServerHello> message if the
DSKPP run will result in the replacement of an existing key with a DSKPP run will result in the replacement of an existing key with a
new one as proof that the DSKPP server is authorized to perform the new one, as proof that the DSKPP server is authenticated to perform
action. When the MAC value is used for server authentication, the the action. When the MAC value is used for server authentication,
value MAY be computed by using the DSKPP-PRF function of Section 3.4, the value MAY be computed by using the DSKPP-PRF function of
in which case the input parameter s MUST be set to the concatenation Section 3.5, in which case the input parameter s MUST be set to the
of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation", R (if sent by the client), concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation", R (if sent
and R_S, and K MUST be set to the existing MAC key K_MAC' . The by the client), and R_S, and K MUST be set to the existing MAC key
input parameter dsLen MUST be set to the length of R_S: K_MAC' (i.e., the value of the MAC key that existed before this
protocol run). Note that the implementation may specify K_MAC' to be
the value of the K_TOKEN that is being replaced, or a version of
K_MAC from the previous protocol run.
The input parameter dsLen MUST be set to the length of R_S:
dsLen = len(R_S) dsLen = len(R_S)
MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC', "MAC 1 computation" || [R ||] R_S, dsLen) MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC', "MAC 1 computation" || [R ||] R_S, dsLen)
The MAC algorithm MUST be the same as the algorithm used for key
confirmation purposes.
3.1.3.2. Key Confirmation 3.1.4.2. Key Confirmation
To avoid a false "Commit" message causing the cryptographic module to To avoid a false "Commit" message causing the cryptographic module to
end up in an initialized state in which the server does not recognize end up in an initialized state in which the server does not recognize
the stored key, <ServerFinished> messages MUST be authenticated with the stored key, <ServerFinished> messages MUST be authenticated with
a MAC. The MAC MUST be calculated using the already established MAC a MAC. The MAC MUST be calculated using the already established MAC
algorithm and MUST be computed on the (ASCII) string "MAC 2 algorithm and MUST be computed on the (ASCII) string "MAC 2
computation" and R_C using the existing the MAC key K_MAC' (i.e., the computation" and R_C using the existing the MAC key K_MAC (i.e., the
MAC key that existed before this protocol run). If DSKPP-PRFof one derived from K_PROV, as described in Section 3.1.2.2. If DSKPP-
Section 3.4 is used as the MAC algorithm, then the input parameter s PRF (defined in Section 3.5) is used as the MAC algorithm, then the
MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 2 input parameter s MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII)
computation", R_C, and dsLen as follows: string "MAC 2 computation", R_C, and dsLen as follows:
dsLen = len(R_C) dsLen = len(R_C)
MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC, "MAC 2 computation" || R_C, dsLen) MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC, "MAC 2 computation" || R_C, dsLen)
3.2. Two-Pass Protocol Usage 3.2. Two-Pass Protocol Usage
Two-pass DSKPP is essentially a transport of key material from the This section describes the message flow and methods that comprise the
DSKPP server to the DSKPP client. Two-pass DSKPP supports multiple two-pass protocol variant. Two-pass DSKPP is essentially a transport
key protection methods that ensure K_TOKEN is not exposed to any of keying material from the DSKPP server to the DSKPP client. The
other entity than the DSKPP server and the cryptographic module keying material is contained in a package that is formatted in such a
itself. Currently, three such key protection methods are defined way that ensures that the symmetric key that is being established,
(refer to Section 3.2.2), each supporting a different usage of 2-pass K_TOKEN, is not exposed to any other entity than the DSKPP server and
DSKPP: the cryptographic module itself. To ensure the keying material is
adequately protected for all two-pass usage scenarios, the key
package format MUST support the following key protection methods, as
defined in Section 3.2.2:
Key Transport This profile is intended for PKI-capable Key Transport This profile is intended for PKI-capable
devices. Key transport is carried out devices. Key transport is carried out
using a public key, K_CLIENT, whose using the public key of the DSKPP client,
private key part resides in the whose private key part resides in the
cryptographic module as the transport cryptographic module as the key transport
key. key.
Key Wrap This profile is ideal for pre-keyed Key Wrap This profile is ideal for pre-keyed
devices, e.g., SIM cards. Key wrap is devices, e.g., SIM cards. Key wrap is
carried out using a symmetric key- carried out using a key wrapping key,
wrapping key, K_SHARED, which is known in which is known in advance by both the
advance by both the cryptographic module cryptographic module and the DSKPP
and the DSKPP server. server.
Passphrase-Based Key Wrap This profile is a variation of the Key Passphrase-Based Key Wrap This profile is a variation of the Key
Wrap Profile. It is applicable to Wrap Profile. It is applicable to
constrained devices with keypads, e.g., constrained devices with keypads, e.g.,
mobile phones. Key wrap is carried out mobile phones. Key wrap is carried out
using a passphrase-derived key-wrapping using a passphrase-derived key wrapping
key, K_DERIVED, which is known in advance key, known in advance by both the
by both the cryptographic module and cryptographic module and DSKPP server.
DSKPP server.
This section describes the message flow and methods that comprise the Key package formats that satisfy this criteria are [PSKC] and
two-pass protocol variant. [SKPC-ASN.1].
3.2.1. Message Flow 3.2.1. Message Flow
The two-pass protocol flow consists of one exchange: The two-pass protocol flow consists of one exchange:
1: Pass 1 = <KeyProvClientHello>, Pass 2 = <KeyProvServerFinished> 1: Pass 1 = <KeyProvClientHello>, Pass 2 = <KeyProvServerFinished>
The client's initial <KeyProvClientHello> message is directly The client's initial <KeyProvClientHello> message is directly
followed by a <KeyProvServerFinished> message (unlike the four-pass followed by a <KeyProvServerFinished> message (unlike the four-pass
variant, there is no exchange of the <KeyProvServerHello> and variant, there is no exchange of the <KeyProvServerHello> and
<KeyProvClientNonce> messages). However, as the two-pass variation <KeyProvClientNonce> messages). However, as the two-pass variation
of DSKPP consists of one round trip to the server, the client is of DSKPP consists of one round trip to the server, the client is
still able to include its random nonce, R_C, algorithm preferences still able to include its random nonce, R_C, algorithm preferences
and supported key types in the <KeyProvClientHello> message. Note and supported key types in the <KeyProvClientHello> message. Note
that by including R_C in <KeyProvClientHello>, the DSKPP client is that by including R_C in <KeyProvClientHello>, the DSKPP client is
able to ensure the server is alive before "committing" the key. able to ensure the server is alive before "committing" the key.
To ensure that a generated key K_TOKEN ends up associated with the The DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with
the correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct
user. To ensure that the key K_TOKEN ends up associated with the
correct cryptographic module and user, the DSKPP server MAY couple an correct cryptographic module and user, the DSKPP server MAY couple an
initial user authentication to the DSKPP execution using one of the initial user authentication to the DSKPP execution as described in
mechanisms described in Section 3.3. Whatever the mechanism, the Section 3.4.
DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with the
correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct user.
The purpose and content of each message are described below, The purpose and content of each message are described below,
including the optional <KeyProvTrigger>. including the optional <KeyProvTrigger>.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
[<---] R_TRIGGER, [DeviceID], [<---] R_TRIGGER, [DeviceID],
[KeyID], [URL_S] [KeyID], [URL_S]
The DSKPP server optionally sends a <KeyProvTrigger> message to the The DSKPP server optionally sends a <KeyProvTrigger> message to the
DSKPP client. The trigger message MUST contain a nonce, R_TRIGGER, DSKPP client. The trigger message MUST contain a nonce, R_TRIGGER,
to allow the server to couple the trigger with a later to allow the server to couple the trigger with a later
<KeyProvClientHello> request. <KeyProvTrigger> MAY include DeviceID <KeyProvClientHello> request. <KeyProvTrigger> MAY include a DeviceID
to allow the client to select the device with which it will to allow the client to select the device with which it will
communicate. In the case of key renewal, <KeyProvTrigger> SHOULD communicate (for more information about device identification, refer
to Section 3.3). In the case of key renewal, <KeyProvTrigger> SHOULD
include the identifier for the key, KeyID, that is being replaced. include the identifier for the key, KeyID, that is being replaced.
Finally, the trigger MAY contain a URL for the DSKP client to use Finally, the trigger MAY contain a URL for the DSKPP client to use
when contacting the DSKPP server. when contacting the DSKPP server.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
R_C, SAL, KPML, [AD], R_C, SAL, KPML, [AD],
[R_TRIGGER], [R_TRIGGER],
[DeviceID], [KeyID] ---> [DeviceID], [KeyID] --->
The DSKPP client sends a <KeyProvClientHello> message to the DSKPP The DSKPP client sends a <KeyProvClientHello> message to the DSKPP
server. <KeyProvClientHello> MUST include client nonce, R_C, and a server. <KeyProvClientHello> MUST include client nonce, R_C, and a
Security Attribute List (SAL), identifying which DSKPP versions, Security Attribute List (SAL), identifying which DSKPP versions,
protocol variations (in this case "two-pass"), key container formats, protocol variations (in this case "two-pass"), key package formats,
key types, encryption and MAC algorithms that the client supports. key types, encryption and MAC algorithms that the client supports.
Unlike 4-pass DSKPP, the 2-pass DSKPP client uses the Unlike 4-pass DSKPP, the 2-pass DSKPP client uses the
<KeyProvClientHello> message to declare the list of Key Protection <KeyProvClientHello> message to declare the list of Key Protection
Methods (KPML) it supports, providing required payload information in Methods (KPML) it supports, providing required payload information in
accordance with Section 3.2.2. Optionally, the message MAY include accordance with Section 3.2.2. Optionally, the message MAY include
client Authentication Data (AD), such as a MAC derived from an client Authentication Data (AD), such as a MAC derived from an
authentication code and R_C (refer to Section 3.3.2). In addition, authentication code and R_C (refer to Section 3.4.1). In addition,
if a trigger message preceded <KeyProvClientHello>, then it passes if a trigger message preceded <KeyProvClientHello>, then it passes
the parameters received in <KeyProvTrigger> back to the DSKPP Server. the parameters received in <KeyProvTrigger> back to the DSKPP Server.
In particular, it MUST include R_TRIGGER so that the DSKPP server can In particular, it MUST include R_TRIGGER so that the DSKPP server can
associate the client with the trigger message, and SHOULD include associate the client with the trigger message, and SHOULD include
DeviceID and KeyID. DeviceID and KeyID.
DSKPP Client DSKPP Server DSKPP Client DSKPP Server
------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
<--- KCH, KC, E(K,K_PROV), <--- KPH, KP, E(K,K_PROV),
MAC, AD MAC, AD
If Authentication Data (AD) was received, then the DSKPP server MUST If Authentication Data (AD) was received, then the DSKPP server MUST
authenticate the user in accordance with Section 3.3.2. If authenticate the user in accordance with Section 3.4.1. If
authentication fails, then DSKPP server MUST abort. Otherwise, the authentication fails, then DSKPP server MUST abort. Otherwise, the
DSKPP server generates a key K_PROV from which two keys, K_TOKEN and DSKPP server generates a key K_PROV from which two keys, K_TOKEN and
K_MAC, are derived. (Alternatively, the key K_PROV may have been K_MAC, are derived. (Alternatively, the key K_PROV may have been
pre-generated as described in Section 1.1.1. The DSKPP server pre-generated as described in Section 1.1.1. The DSKPP server
selects a Key Protection Method (KPM) and applies it to K_PROV in selects a Key Protection Method (KPM) and applies it to K_PROV in
accordance with Section 3.2.2. The server then associates K_TOKEN accordance with Section 3.2.2. The server then associates K_TOKEN
with the cryptographic module in a server-side data store. The with the cryptographic module in a server-side data store. The
intent is that the data store later will be used by some service that intent is that the data store later will be used by some service that
needs to verify or decrypt data produced by the cryptographic module needs to verify or decrypt data produced by the cryptographic module
and the key. and the key.
Once the association has been made, the DSKPP server sends a Once the association has been made, the DSKPP server sends a
confirmation message to the DSKPP client called confirmation message to the DSKPP client called
<KeyProvServerFinished>. For two-pass DSKPP, the confirmation <KeyProvServerFinished>. For two-pass DSKPP, the confirmation
message MUST include a Key Container Header (KCH) that contains the message MUST include a Key Package Header (KPH) that contains the
DSKPP Server's ID and KPM. The ServerID is used for authentication DSKPP Server's ID and KPM. The ServerID is used for authentication
purposes, and the KPM informs the DSKPP client of the security purposes, and the KPM informs the DSKPP client of the security
context in which it will operate. In addition to the KCH, the context in which it will operate. In addition to the KPH, the
confirmation message MUST include the Key Container (KC) that holds confirmation message MUST include the Key Package (KP) that holds the
the KeyID, K_PROV from which K_TOKEN and K_MAC are derived, and KeyID, K_PROV from which K_TOKEN and K_MAC are derived, and
additional configuration information. The default symmetric key additional configuration information. The default symmetric key
container format is based on the Portable Symmetric Key Container package format is based on the Portable Symmetric Key Container
(PSKC) defined in [PSKC]. Alternative formats MAY include PKCS#12 (PSKC) defined in [PSKC]. Alternative formats MAY include
[PKCS-12] or PKCS#5 XML [PKCS-5-XML]. Finally, <ServerFinished> MUST [SKPC-ASN.1], PKCS#12 [PKCS-12], or PKCS#5 XML [PKCS-5-XML].
include two MACs (MAC and AD) whose values are calculated with Finally, <ServerFinished> MUST include two MACs (MAC and AD) whose
contribution from the client nonce, R_C, provided in the values are calculated with contribution from the client nonce, R_C,
<ClientHello> message. The MAC values will allow the cryptographic provided in the <ClientHello> message. The MAC values will allow the
module to perform key confirmation and server authentication before cryptographic module to perform key confirmation and server
"commiting" the key (see Section 3.2.3 for more information). authentication before "committing" the key (see Section 3.2.3 for
more information).
After receiving a <KeyProvServerFinished> message with Status = After receiving a <KeyProvServerFinished> message with Status =
"Success", the DSKPP client MUST verify both MAC values (MAC and AD). "Success", the DSKPP client MUST verify both MAC values (MAC and AD).
The DSKPP client MUST terminate the DSKPP session if either MAC does The DSKPP client MUST terminate the DSKPP session if either MAC does
not verify, and MUST, in this case, also delete any nonces, keys, not verify, and MUST, in this case, also delete any nonces, keys,
and/or secrets associated with the failed run of the protocol. If and/or secrets associated with the failed run of the protocol. If
<KeyProvServerFinished> has Status = "Success" and the MACs were <KeyProvServerFinished> has Status = "Success" and the MACs were
verified, then the DSKPP client MUST extract the key data from the verified, then the DSKPP client MUST extract the key data from the
provided key container, and store data locally. After this provided key package, and store data locally. After this operation,
operation, it MUST NOT be possible to overwrite the key unless it MUST NOT be possible to overwrite the key unless knowledge of an
knowledge of an authorizing key is proven through a MAC on a later authorizing key is proven through a MAC on a later
<KeyProvServerFinished> message. <KeyProvServerFinished> message.
3.2.2. Key Protection Profiles 3.2.2. Key Protection Profiles
This section introduces three profiles of two-pass DSKPP for key This section introduces three profiles of two-pass DSKPP for key
protection. Further profiles MAY be defined by external entities or protection. Further profiles MAY be defined by external entities or
through the IETF process. through the IETF process.
3.2.2.1. Key Transport Profile 3.2.2.1. Key Transport Profile
This profile initializes the cryptographic module with a symmetric This profile establishes a symmetric key, K_TOKEN, in the
key, K_TOKEN, through key transport and key derivation. The key cryptographic module using key transport and key derivation. Key
transport is carried out using a public key, K_CLIENT, whose private transport is carried out using a public key whose private key part
key part resides in the cryptographic module as the transport key. A resides in the cryptographic module as the key transport key. A
key K_PROV from which two keys, K_TOKEN and K_MAC are derived MUST be provisioning master key, K_PROV, MUST be transported from the DSKPP
transported. server to the client. From K_PROV, two keys are derived: the
symmetric key to be established, K_TOKEN, and a key used to compute
MACs, K_MAC.
This profile MUST be identified with the following URN: This profile MUST be identified with the following URN:
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport
In the two-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload In the two-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload
associated with this key protection method. The payload MUST be of associated with this key protection method. This payload MUST be of
type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]), and only those choices of the ds: type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]), and only those choices of ds:
KeyInfoType that identify a public key are allowed. The ds: KeyInfoType that identify a public key are allowed. The <ds:
X509Certificate option of the ds:X509Data alternative is RECOMMENDED X509Certificate> option of the <ds:X509Data> alternative is
when the public key corresponding to the private key on the RECOMMENDED when the public key corresponding to the private key on
cryptographic module has been certified. the cryptographic module has been certified.
The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be
of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption
methods utilizing a public key that are supported by the DSKPP client methods utilizing a public key that are supported by the DSKPP client
(as indicated in the <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element of the (as indicated in the <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element of the
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are allowed <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are allowed
as values for the <xenc:EncryptionMethod> element. Further, in the as values for the <xenc:EncryptionMethod>. Further, in the case of
case of 2-pass DSKPP, the <ds:KeyInfo> element MUST contain the same 2-pass DSKPP, <ds:KeyInfo> MUST contain the same value (i.e. identify
value (i.e. identify the same public key) as the <Payload> of the the same public key) as the <Payload> of the corresponding supported
corresponding supported key protection method in the key protection method in the <KeyProvClientHello> message that
<KeyProvClientHello> message that triggered the response. The triggered the response. <xenc:CarriedKeyName> MAY be present, but
<CarriedKeyName> element MAY be present, but MUST, when present, MUST, when present, contain the same value as the <KeyID> element of
contain the same value as the <KeyID> element of the the <KeyProvServerFinished> message. The Type attribute of the xenc:
<KeyProvServerFinished> message. The Type attribute of the xenc:
EncryptedKeyType MUST be present and MUST identify the type of the EncryptedKeyType MUST be present and MUST identify the type of the
wrapped key. The type MUST be one of the types supported by the wrapped key. The type MUST be one of the types supported by the
DSKPP client (as reported in the <SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding DSKPP client (as reported in the <SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The
transported key MUST consist of two parts of equal length. The first transported key, K_PROV, MUST consist of two parts of equal length.
half constitutes K_MAC and the second half constitutes K_TOKEN. The The first half constitutes K_MAC and the second half constitutes
length of K_TOKEN (and hence also the length of K_MAC) is determined K_TOKEN. The length of K_TOKEN (and hence also the length of K_MAC)
by the type of K_TOKEN. is determined by the type of K_TOKEN.
DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST
support the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 key-wrapping support the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 key wrapping
mechanism defined in [XMLENC]. mechanism defined in [XMLENC].
When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac> When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac>
element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and
MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm
MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as
indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC
MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2 for Two-Pass DSKPP. MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2.3 for two-pass DSKPP.
In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType
element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a
successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being
replaced. replaced.
3.2.2.2. Key Wrap Profile 3.2.2.2. Key Wrap Profile
This profile initializes the cryptographic module with a symmetric This profile establishes a symmetric key, K_TOKEN, in the
key, K_TOKEN, through key wrap and key derivation. The key wrap MUST cryptographic module through key wrap and key derivation. Key wrap
be carried out using a (symmetric) key-wrapping key, K_SHARED, known is carried out using a symmetric key wrapping key, known in advance
in advance by both the cryptographic module and the DSKPP server. A by both the cryptographic module and the DSKPP server. A
key K_PROV from which two keys, K_TOKEN and K_MAC are derived MUST be provisioning master key, K_PROV, MUST be transported from the DSKPP
wrapped. server to the client. From K_PROV, two keys are derived: the
symmetric key to be established, K_TOKEN, and a key used to compute
MACs, K_MAC.
This profile MUST be identified with the following URI: This profile MUST be identified with the following URI:
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap
In the 2-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload In the 2-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload
associated with this key protection method. The payload MUST be of associated with this key protection method. This payload MUST be of
type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]), and only those choices of the ds: type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]), and only those choices of the ds:
KeyInfoType that identify a symmetric key are allowed. The ds: KeyInfoType that identify a symmetric key are allowed. The <ds:
KeyName alternative is RECOMMENDED. KeyName> alternative is RECOMMENDED.
The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be
of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption
methods utilizing a symmetric key that are supported by the DSKPP methods utilizing a symmetric key that are supported by the DSKPP
client (as indicated in the <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element client (as indicated in the <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element
of the <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are of the <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are
allowed as values for the <xenc:EncryptionMethod> element. Further, allowed as values for the <xenc:EncryptionMethod>. Further, in the
in the case of 2-pass DSKPP, the <ds:KeyInfo> element MUST contain case of 2-pass DSKPP, <ds:KeyInfo> MUST contain the same value (i.e.
the same value (i.e. identify the same symmetric key) as the identify the same symmetric key) as the <Payload> of the
<Payload> of the corresponding supported key protection method in the corresponding supported key protection method in the
<KeyProvClientHello> message that triggered the response. The <KeyProvClientHello> message that triggered the response. <xenc:
<CarriedKeyName> element MAY be present, and MUST, when present, CarriedKeyName> MAY be present, and MUST, when present, contain the
contain the same value as the <KeyID> element of the same value as the <KeyID> element of the <KeyProvServerFinished>
<KeyProvServerFinished> message. The Type attribute of the xenc: message. The Type attribute of the xenc:EncryptedKeyType MUST be
EncryptedKeyType MUST be present and MUST identify the type of the present and MUST identify the type of the wrapped key. The type MUST
wrapped key. The type MUST be one of the types supported by the be one of the types supported by the DSKPP client (as reported in the
DSKPP client (as reported in the <SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding <SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding <KeyProvClientHello> message in
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The wrapped key, K_PROV, MUST consist of
wrapped key MUST consist of two parts of equal length. The first two parts of equal length. The first half constitutes K_MAC and the
half constitutes K_MAC and the second half constitutes K_TOKEN. The second half constitutes K_TOKEN. The length of K_TOKEN (and hence
length of K_TOKEN (and hence also the length of K_MAC) is determined also the length of K_MAC) is determined by the type of K_TOKEN.
by the type of K_TOKEN.
DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST
support the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 key-wrapping support the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 key wrapping
mechanism defined in [XMLENC]. mechanism defined in [XMLENC].
When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac> When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac>
element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and
MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm
MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as
indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC
MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2. MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2.3.
In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType
element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a
successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being
replaced. replaced.
3.2.2.3. Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile 3.2.2.3. Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile
This profile is a variation of the key wrap profile. It initializes This profile is a variation of the key wrap profile. It establishes
the cryptographic module with a symmetric key, K_TOKEN, through key a symmetric key, K_TOKEN, in the cryptographic module through key
wrap and key derivation, using a passphrase-derived key-wrapping key, wrap and key derivation. Key wrap is carried out using a passphrase-
K_DERIVED. The passphrase is known in advance by both the device derived key wrapping key. The passphrase is known in advance by both
user and the DSKPP server. To preserve the property of not exposing the user of the device and the DSKPP server. To preserve the
K_TOKEN to any other entity than the DSKPP server and the property of not exposing K_TOKEN to any other entity than the DSKPP
cryptographic module itself, the method SHOULD be employed only when server and the cryptographic module itself, the method SHOULD be
the device contains facilities (e.g. a keypad) for direct entry of employed only when the device contains facilities (e.g. a keypad) for
the passphrase. A key K_PROV from which two keys, K_TOKEN and K_MAC direct entry of the passphrase. A provisioning master key, K_PROV,
are derived MUST be wrapped. MUST be transported from the DSKPP server to the client. From
K_PROV, two keys are derived: the symmetric key to be established,
K_TOKEN, and a key used to compute MACs, K_MAC.
This profile MUST be identified with the following URI: This profile MUST be identified with the following URI:
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap
In the 2-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload In the 2-pass version of DSKPP, the client MUST send a payload
associated with this key protection method. The payload MUST be of associated with this key protection method. This payload MUST be of
type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]). The ds:KeyName option MUST be used type ds:KeyInfoType ([XMLDSIG]). The <ds:KeyName option> MUST be
and the key name MUST identify the passphrase that will be used by used and the key name MUST identify the passphrase that will be used
the server to generate the key-wrapping key. As an example, the by the server to generate the key wrapping key. As an example, the
identifier could be a user identifier or a registration identifier identifier could be a user identifier or a registration identifier
issued by the server to the user during a session preceding the DSKPP issued by the server to the user during a session preceding the DSKPP
protocol run. protocol run.
The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be The server payload associated with this key protection method MUST be
of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption of type xenc:EncryptedKeyType ([XMLENC]), and only those encryption
methods utilizing a passphrase to derive the key-wrapping key that methods utilizing a passphrase to derive the key wrapping key that
are supported by the DSKPP client (as indicated in the are supported by the DSKPP client (as indicated in the
<SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element of the <KeyProvClientHello> <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> element of the <KeyProvClientHello>
message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are allowed as values for the message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP) are allowed as values for the
<xenc:EncryptionMethod> element. Further, in the case of 2-pass <xenc:EncryptionMethod>. Further, in the case of 2-pass DSKPP, <ds:
DSKPP, the <ds:KeyInfo> element MUST contain the same value (i.e. KeyInfo> MUST contain the same value (i.e. identify the same
identify the same passphrase) as the <Payload> of the corresponding passphrase) as the <Payload> of the corresponding supported key
supported key protection method in the <KeyProvClientHello> message protection method in the <KeyProvClientHello> message that triggered
that triggered the response. The <CarriedKeyName> element MAY be the response. <xenc:CarriedKeyName> MAY be present, and MUST, when
present, and MUST, when present, contain the same value as the present, contain the same value as the <KeyID> element of the
<KeyID> element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message. The Type <KeyProvServerFinished> message. The Type attribute of the xenc:
attribute of the xenc:EncryptedKeyType MUST be present and MUST EncryptedKeyType MUST be present and MUST identify the type of the
identify the type of the wrapped key. The type MUST be one of the wrapped key. The type MUST be one of the types supported by the
types supported by the DSKPP client (as reported in the DSKPP client (as reported in the <SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding
<SupportedKeyTypes> of the preceding <KeyProvClientHello> message in <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The
the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The wrapped key MUST consist of two parts wrapped key, K_PROV, MUST consist of two parts of equal length. The
of equal length. The first half constitutes K_MAC and the second first half constitutes K_MAC and the second half constitutes K_TOKEN.
half constitutes K_TOKEN. The length of K_TOKEN (and hence also the The length of K_TOKEN (and hence also the length of K_MAC) is
length of K_MAC) is determined by the type of K_TOKEN. determined by the type of K_TOKEN.
DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST DSKPP servers and cryptographic modules supporting this profile MUST
support the PBES2 password based encryption scheme defined in support the PBES2 password based encryption scheme defined in
[PKCS-5] (and identified as [PKCS-5] (and identified as
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2 in http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2 in
[PKCS-5-XML]), the PBKDF2 passphrase-based key derivation function [PKCS-5-XML]), the PBKDF2 passphrase-based key derivation function
also defined in [PKCS-5] (and identified as also defined in [PKCS-5] (and identified as
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2 in http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2 in
[PKCS-5-XML]), and the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 [PKCS-5-XML]), and the http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 key
key-wrapping mechanism defined in [XMLENC]. wrapping mechanism defined in [XMLENC].
When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac> When this profile is used, the MacAlgorithm attribute of the <Mac>
element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and element of the <KeyProvServerFinished> message MUST be present and
MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm MUST identify the selected MAC algorithm. The selected MAC algorithm
MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as MUST be one of the MAC algorithms supported by the DSKPP client (as
indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the indicated in the <SupportedMacAlgorithms> element of the
<KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC <KeyProvClientHello> message in the case of 2-pass DSKPP). The MAC
MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2. MUST be calculated as described in Section 3.2.3.
In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType In addition, DSKPP servers MUST include the AuthenticationDataType
element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a element in their <KeyProvServerFinished> messages whenever a
successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being successful protocol run will result in an existing K_TOKEN being
replaced. replaced.
3.2.3. MAC Calculations 3.2.3. MAC Calculations
3.2.3.1. Key Confirmation 3.2.3.1. Key Confirmation
In two-pass DSKPP, the client MUST include a nonce R in the In two-pass DSKPP, the client MUST include a nonce R in the
<KeyProvClientHello> message. Further, the DSKPP server MUST include <KeyProvClientHello> message. Further, the DSKPP server MUST include
its identifier, ServerID, in the <KeyProvServerFinished> message (via its identifier, ServerID, in the <KeyProvServerFinished> message (via
the Key Container). The MAC value in the <KeyProvServerFinished> the Key Package). The MAC value in the <KeyProvServerFinished>
message MUST be computed on the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation", message MUST be computed on the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation",
the server identifier ServerID, and R using a MAC key K_MAC. This the server identifier ServerID, and R using a MAC key K_MAC. This
key MUST be provided together with K_TOKEN to the cryptographic key, along with K_TOKEN, are derived from K_PROV which MUST be
module. provided to the cryptographic module.
If DSKPP-PRF is used as the MAC algorithm, then the input parameter s If DSKPP-PRF is used as the MAC algorithm, then the input parameter s
MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1
computation" and R, and the parameter dsLen MUST be set to the length computation" and R, and the parameter dsLen MUST be set to the length
of R: of R:
dsLen = len(R) dsLen = len(R)
MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC, "MAC 1 computation" || ServerID || R, dsLen) MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC, "MAC 1 computation" || ServerID || R, dsLen)
3.2.3.2. Server Authorization 3.2.3.2. Server Authentication
A MAC MUST be present in the <KeyProvServerFinished> message as proof A second MAC MUST be present in the <KeyProvServerFinished> message
that the DSKPP server is authorized to provide a new key to the as proof that the DSKPP server is authorized to replace a key on the
cryptographic module. In 2-pass DSKPP, servers include this MAC cryptographic module. In 2-pass DSKPP, servers provide the second
value in the AuthenticationDataType element of MAC in the AuthenticationDataType element of <KeyProvServerFinished>.
<KeyProvServerFinished>. The MAC value in the AuthenticationDataType The MAC value in the AuthenticationDataType element MUST be computed
element MUST be computed on the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation", on the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 computation", the server identifier
the server identifier ServerID, and R, using the existing MAC key ServerID, and R, using a pre-existing MAC key K_MAC' (the MAC key
K_MAC' (the MAC key that existed before this protocol run). The MAC that existed before this protocol run). Note that the implementation
algorithm MUST be the same as the algorithm used for key confirmation may specify K_MAC' to be the value of the K_TOKEN that is being
purposes. replaced, or a version of K_MAC from the previous protocol run.
If DSKPP-PRF is used as the MAC algorithm, then the input parameter s If DSKPP-PRF is used as the MAC algorithm, then the input parameter s
MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1 MUST consist of the concatenation of the (ASCII) string "MAC 1
computation" ServerID, and R. The parameter dsLen MUST be set to at computation" ServerID, and R. The parameter dsLen MUST be set to at
least 16 (i.e. the length of the MAC MUST be at least 16 octets): least 16 (i.e. the length of the MAC MUST be at least 16 octets):
dsLen >= 16 dsLen >= 16
MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC', "MAC 1 computation" || ServerID || R, dsLen) MAC = DSKPP-PRF (K_MAC', "MAC 1 computation" || ServerID || R, dsLen)
3.3. User Authentication The MAC algorithm MUST be the same as the algorithm used for key
confirmation purposes.
The DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with
the correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct
user. If the user has not been authenticated by some out-of-band
means, then the user SHOULD be authenticated within the DSKPP. For a
further discussion of this, and threats related to man-in-the-middle
attacks in this context, see Section 9.
When relying on DSKPP for user authentication, the DSKPP server
SHOULD explicitly:
o Bind the user to the device (see Section 3.3.1, below)
o Rely on client-provided Authentication Data (AD) to verify that a
legitimate user is behind the wheel (see Section 3.3.2, below)
NOTE: Device authentication can be handled implicitly by either
relying on the device certificate for wrapping the key in the two-
pass DSKPP Key Wrap Profile (seeSection 3.2.2), or by coupling the
device certificate with the Authentication Code (see below).
3.3.1. Device Identifier 3.3. Device Identification
The DSKPP server MAY be pre-configured with a unique device The DSKPP server MAY be pre-configured with a unique device
identifier corresponding to a particular cryptographic module. The identifier corresponding to a particular cryptographic module. The
DSKPP server MAY then include this identifier in the DSKPP DSKPP server MAY then include this identifier in the DSKPP
initialization trigger, in which case the DSKPP client MUST include initialization trigger, in which case the DSKPP client MUST include
it in its message(s) to the DSKPP server for authentication. Note it in its message(s) to the DSKPP server for authentication. Note
that it is also legitimate for a DSKPP client to initiate the DSKPP that it is also legitimate for a DSKPP client to initiate the DSKPP
protocol run without having received an initialization message from a protocol run without having received an initialization message from a
server, but in this case any provided device identifier MUST NOT be server, but in this case any provided device identifier MUST NOT be
accepted by the DSKPP server unless the server has access to a unique accepted by the DSKPP server unless the server has access to a unique
key for the identified device and that key will be used in the key for the identified device and that key will be used in the
protocol. protocol.
3.3.2. Authentication Data 3.4. User Authentication
The DSKPP server MUST ensure that a generated key is associated with
the correct cryptographic module, and if applicable, the correct
user. If the user has not been authenticated by some out-of-band
means, then the user SHOULD be authenticated within the DSKPP. When
relying on DSKPP for user authentication, the DSKPP server SHOULD
explicitly rely on client-provided Authentication Data (AD) to verify
that a legitimate user is behind the wheel. For a further discussion
of this, and threats related to man-in-the-middle attacks in this
context, see Section 9.
3.4.1. Authentication Data
As described in the message flows above (see Section 3.1.1 and As described in the message flows above (see Section 3.1.1 and
Section 3.2.1), the DSKPP client MAY include Authentication Data (AD) Section 3.2.1), the DSKPP client MAY include Authentication Data (AD)
in its request(s). Note that AD MAY be omitted if client certificate in its request(s). Note that AD MAY be omitted if client certificate
authentication has been provided by the transport channel such as authentication has been provided by the transport channel such as
TLS. Nonetheless, when AD is provided, the DSKPP server MUST verify TLS. Nonetheless, when AD is provided, the DSKPP server MUST verify
the data before continuing with the protocol run. The DSKPP client the data before continuing with the protocol run. The DSKPP client
generates AD through derivation of an Authentication Code (AC) as generates AD through derivation of an Authentication Code (AC) as
follows (see Section 3.3.2.2 for details): described in Section 3.4.3.
AD = HMAC(AC, K)
AC is a one-time use value that is a special form of a shared secret AC is a one-time use value that is a (potentially low entropy) shared
between a user and the DSKPP server. This secret MUST be made secret between a user and the DSKPP server. This secret is made
available to the client before or during DSKPP initiation. Two ways available to the client before the DSKPP message exchange. Below are
in which this MAY be done are: two examples of how the user may obtain the AC:
a. A key issuer may deliver an AC to the user or device in response a. A key issuer may deliver an AC to the user or device in response
to a key request, which the user enters into an application to a key request, which the user enters into an application
hosted on their device. For example, a user runs an application hosted on their device. For example, a user runs an application
that is resident on their device, e.g., a mobile phone. The that is resident on their device, e.g., a mobile phone. The
application cannot proceed without a new symmetric key. The user application cannot proceed without a new symmetric key. The user
is redirected to an issuer's Web site from where the user is redirected to an issuer's Web site from where the user
requests a key. The issuer's Web application processes the requests a key. The issuer's Web application processes the
request, and returns an AC, which then appears on the user's request, and returns an AC, which then appears on the user's
display. The user then invokes a symmetric key-based application display. The user then invokes a symmetric key-based application
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hosted on their device. For example, a user runs an application hosted on their device. For example, a user runs an application
that is resident on their device, e.g., a mobile phone. The that is resident on their device, e.g., a mobile phone. The
application cannot proceed without a new symmetric key. The user application cannot proceed without a new symmetric key. The user
is redirected to an issuer's Web site from where the user is redirected to an issuer's Web site from where the user
requests a key. The issuer's Web application processes the requests a key. The issuer's Web application processes the
request, and returns an AC, which then appears on the user's request, and returns an AC, which then appears on the user's
display. The user then invokes a symmetric key-based application display. The user then invokes a symmetric key-based application
hosted on the device, which asks the user to input the AC using a hosted on the device, which asks the user to input the AC using a
keypad. The application invokes the DSKPP client, providing it keypad. The application invokes the DSKPP client, providing it
with the AC. with the AC.
b. The provisioning server may send a trigger message, b. The provisioning server may send a trigger message,
<KeyProvTrigger>, to the DSKPP client, which and set the value of <KeyProvTrigger>, to the DSKPP client, which sets the value of
the trigger nonce, R_TRIGGER, to AC. When this method is used, a the trigger nonce, R_TRIGGER, to AC. When this method is used, a
transport providing privacy and integrity MUST be used to deliver transport providing privacy and integrity MUST be used to deliver
the DSKPP initialization trigger from the DSKPP server to the the DSKPP initialization trigger from the DSKPP server to the
DSKPP client, e.g. HTTPS. DSKPP client, e.g., HTTPS.
Note that when an issuer delegates symmetric key provisioning to a
third party provisioning service provider, both client authentication
and issuer authentication are required by the provisioning server.
Client authentication to the issuer MAY be in-band or out-of-band as
described above. The issuer acts as a proxy for the provisioning
server. The issuer authenticates to the provisioning service
provider either using a certificate or a pre-established secret key.
A description of the AC and how it is used to derive AD is contained A description of the AC and how it is used to derive AD is contained
in the sub-sections below. in the sub-sections below.
3.3.2.1. Authentication Code Format 3.4.2. Authentication Code Format
At a minimum, the AC MUST contain the following parameters:
identifier: A globally unique identifier that represents the user's
key request. The MAY be generated as a sequence number.
password: A unique value that SHOULD be generated by the system as a
random number to make AC more difficult to guess.
checksum: The checksum SHOULD be calculated from the remaining
digits in the AC.
The Issuer MUST rely on a Tag-Length-Value (TLV) format to represent
the AC, such as:
Tag = 0x01 = password The AC MUST contain a client identifier and a password. A checksum
Tag = 0x02 = identifier element MAY be included, which is generated by the issuing server and
Tag = 0x03 = checksum sent to the user as part of the AC. If included the checksum MUST be
computed using the CRC16 algorithm [ISO3309]. When the user enters
the AC, the typed password is verified with the checksum to ensure it
is correctly entered by the user.
where one (or two) byte(s) MAY be used to indicate the L(ength) of <<OPEN: Format for AC>>
the V(alue) field.
3.3.2.2. MAC Calculation 3.4.3. Authentication Data Calculation
The Authentication Data is a MAC that is derived from AC as follows The Authentication Data is a MAC that is derived from AC as follows
(refer to Section 3.4 for a description of DSKPP-PRF in general and (refer to Section 3.5 for a description of DSKPP-PRF in general and
Appendix C for a description of DSKPP-PRF-AES): Appendix C for a description of DSKPP-PRF-AES):
MAC = DSKPP-PRF-AES(K_AC, AC->Identifier||URL_S||R_C||[R_S], 16) MAC = DSKPP-PRF(K_AC, AC->Identifier||URL_S||R_C||[R_S], 16)
In four-pass DSKPP, the cryptographic module uses R_C, R_S, and In four-pass DSKPP, the cryptographic module uses R_C, R_S, and
URL_S, to calculate the MAC. In two-pass DSKPP, the cryptographic URL_S, to calculate the MAC. In two-pass DSKPP, the cryptographic
module does not have access to R_S, therefore only R_C is used in module does not have access to R_S, therefore only R_C is used in
combination with URL_S to produce the MAC. In either case, K_AC MAY combination with URL_S to produce the MAC. In either case, K_AC MUST
be derived from AC>password as follows [PKCS-5]: be derived from AC>password as follows [PKCS-5]:
K_AC = PBKDF2(AC->password, R_C || [K], c, 16) K_AC = PBKDF2(AC->password, R_C || [K], iter_count, 16)
K MAY be one of the following:
K_CLIENT: The device public key when a device certificate is
available and used for key transport in 2-pass
K_SHARED: The shared key between the client and the server when it K is OPTIONAL only in four-pass where no K_SHARED is used. In all
is used for key wrap in two-pass or for R_C protection in four- other cases one of the following values for K MUST be used:
pass
K_DERIVED: When a passphrase-derived key is used for key wrap in a. The public key of the DSKPP client, or the public key of the
two-pass DSKPP. device when a device certificate is available
b. The pre-shared key between the client and the server
c. A passphrase-derived key
Finally, c is iteration count between 10 and 1000. The iteration count, iter_count, MUST be set to 1 except when K is
the device public key, in which case it MUST be at least 100,000.
3.4. The DSKPP One-Way Pseudorandom Function, DSKPP-PRF 3.5. The DSKPP One-Way Pseudorandom Function, DSKPP-PRF
3.4.1. Introduction 3.5.1. Introduction
All of the protocol variations depend on DSKPP-PRF. The general All of the protocol variations depend on DSKPP-PRF. The general
requirements on DSKPP-PRF are the same as on keyed hash functions: It requirements on DSKPP-PRF are the same as on keyed hash functions: It
MUST take an arbitrary length input, and be one-way and collision- MUST take an arbitrary length input, and be one-way and collision-
free (for a definition of these terms, see, e.g., [FAQ]). Further, free (for a definition of these terms, see, e.g., [FAQ]). Further,
the DSKPP-PRF function MUST be capable of generating a variable- the DSKPP-PRF function MUST be capable of generating a variable-
length output, and its output MUST be unpredictable even if other length output, and its output MUST be unpredictable even if other
outputs for the same key are known. outputs for the same key are known.
It is assumed that any realization of DSKPP-PRF takes three input It is assumed that any realization of DSKPP-PRF takes three input
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(see PKCS#5 Version 2.0 [PKCS-5], Section 4), and this (see PKCS#5 Version 2.0 [PKCS-5], Section 4), and this
characterization of DSKPP-PRF SHOULD fit all actual PRF algorithms characterization of DSKPP-PRF SHOULD fit all actual PRF algorithms
implemented by cryptographic modules. From the point of view of this implemented by cryptographic modules. From the point of view of this
specification, DSKPP-PRF is a "black-box" function that, given the specification, DSKPP-PRF is a "black-box" function that, given the
inputs, generates a pseudorandom value. inputs, generates a pseudorandom value.
Separate specifications MAY define the implementation of DSKPP-PRF Separate specifications MAY define the implementation of DSKPP-PRF
for various types of cryptographic modules. Appendix C contains two for various types of cryptographic modules. Appendix C contains two
example realizations of DSKPP-PRF. example realizations of DSKPP-PRF.
3.4.2. Declaration 3.5.2. Declaration
DSKPP-PRF (k, s, dsLen) DSKPP-PRF (k, s, dsLen)
Input: Input:
k secret key in octet string format k secret key in octet string format
s octet string of varying length consisting of variable data s octet string of varying length consisting of variable data
distinguishing the particular string being derived distinguishing the particular string being derived
dsLen desired length of the output dsLen desired length of the output
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Input: Input:
k secret key in octet string format k secret key in octet string format
s octet string of varying length consisting of variable data s octet string of varying length consisting of variable data
distinguishing the particular string being derived distinguishing the particular string being derived
dsLen desired length of the output dsLen desired length of the output
Output: Output:
DS pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long DS pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long
For the purposes of this document, the secret key k MUST be at least For the purposes of this document, the secret key k MUST be at least
16 octets long. 16 octets long.
3.5. Encryption of Pseudorandom Nonces Sent from the DSKPP Client
DSKPP client random nonce(s) are either encrypted with the public key
provided by the DSKPP server or by a shared secret key. For example,
in the case of a public RSA key, an RSA encryption scheme from PKCS
#1 [PKCS-1] MAY be used.
In the case of a shared secret key, to avoid dependence on other
algorithms, the DSKPP client MAY use the DSKPP-PRF function described
herein with the shared secret key K_SHARED as input parameter K (in
this case, K_SHARED SHOULD be used solely for this purpose), the
concatenation of the (ASCII) string "Encryption" and the server's
nonce R_S as input parameter s, and dsLen set to the length of R_C:
dsLen = len(R_C)
DS = DSKPP-PRF(K_SHARED, "Encryption" || R_S, dsLen)
This will produce a pseudorandom string DS of length equal to R_C.
Encryption of R_C MAY then be achieved by XOR-ing DS with R_C:
E(DS, R_C) = DS ^ R_C
The DSKPP server will then perform the reverse operation to extract
R_C from E(DS, R_C).
4. DSKPP Message Formats 4. DSKPP Message Formats
The message formats from the DSKPP XML schema, found in Section 7, The message formats from the DSKPP XML schema, found in Section 7,
are explained in this section. Examples can be found in Appendix A. are explained in this section. Examples can be found in Appendix A.
The XML format for DSKPP messages have been designed to be The XML format for DSKPP messages has been designed to be extensible.
extensible. However, it is possible that the use of extensions will However, it is possible that the use of extensions will harm
harm interoperability; therefore, any use of extensions SHOULD be interoperability; therefore, any use of extensions SHOULD be
carefully considered. For example, if a particular implementation carefully considered. For example, if a particular implementation
relies on the presence of a proprietary extension, then it may not be relies on the presence of a proprietary extension, then it may not be
able to interoperate with independent implementations that have no able to interoperate with independent implementations that have no
knowledge of this extension. knowledge of this extension.
4.1. General XML Schema Requirements 4.1. General XML Schema Requirements
Some DSKPP elements rely on the parties being able to compare Some DSKPP elements rely on the parties being able to compare
received values with stored values. Unless otherwise noted, all received values with stored values. Unless otherwise noted, all
elements in this document that have the XML Schema "xs:string" type, elements in this document that have the XML Schema "xs:string" type,
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MUST be used by the DSKPP client in the subsequent MUST be used by the DSKPP client in the subsequent
<KeyProvClientHello> request. The OPTIONAL <TokenPlatformInfo> <KeyProvClientHello> request. The OPTIONAL <TokenPlatformInfo>
element informs the DSKPP client about the characteristics of the element informs the DSKPP client about the characteristics of the
intended cryptographic module platform, and applies in the public-key intended cryptographic module platform, and applies in the public-key
variant of DSKPP in situations when the client potentially needs to variant of DSKPP in situations when the client potentially needs to
decide which one of several modules to initialize. decide which one of several modules to initialize.
4.3. Components of the <KeyProvClientHello> Request 4.3. Components of the <KeyProvClientHello> Request
This message is the initial message sent from the DSKPP client to the This message is the initial message sent from the DSKPP client to the
DSKPP server in both variants of the DSKPP. DSKPP server in both variations of the DSKPP.
<xs:element name="KeyProvClientHello" <xs:element name="KeyProvClientHello"
type="dskpp:KeyProvClientHelloPDU"> type="dskpp:KeyProvClientHelloPDU">
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProvClientHelloPDU"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProvClientHelloPDU">
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractRequestType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractRequestType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="DeviceIdentifierData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="DeviceIdentifierData"
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<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TriggerNonce" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TriggerNonce"
type="dskpp:NonceType" /> type="dskpp:NonceType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedKeyTypes" <xs:element name="SupportedKeyTypes"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" <xs:element name="SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedMacAlgorithms" <xs:element name="SupportedMacAlgorithms"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedProtocolVariants" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedProtocolVariants"
type="dskpp:ProtocolVariantsType" /> type="dskpp:ProtocolVariantsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedKeyContainers" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedKeyPackages"
type="dskpp:KeyContainersFormatType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackagesFormatType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The components of this message have the following meaning: The components of this message have the following meaning:
o Version: (attribute inherited from the AbstractRequestType type) o Version: (attribute inherited from the AbstractRequestType type)
The highest version of this protocol the client supports. Only The highest version of this protocol the client supports. Only
version one ("1.0") is currently specified. version one ("1.0") is currently specified.
o <DeviceIdentifierData>: An identifier for the cryptographic module o <DeviceIdentifierData>: An identifier for the cryptographic module
as defined in Section 3.3 above. The identifier MUST only be as defined in Section 3.4 above. The identifier MUST only be
present if such shared secrets exist or if the identifier was present if such shared secrets exist or if the identifier was
provided by the server in a <KeyProvTrigger> element (see provided by the server in a <KeyProvTrigger> element (see
Section 6.2.7). In the latter case, it MUST have the same value Section 6.2.7). In the latter case, it MUST have the same value
as the identifier provided in that element. as the identifier provided in that element.
o <KeyID>: An identifier for the key that will be overwritten if the o <KeyID>: An identifier for the key that will be overwritten if the
protocol run is successful. The identifier MUST only be present protocol run is successful. The identifier MUST only be present
if the key exists or if the identifier was provided by the server if the key exists or if the identifier was provided by the server
in a <KeyProvTrigger> element, in which case, it MUST have the in a <KeyProvTrigger> element, in which case, it MUST have the
same value as the identifier provided in that element (see a same value as the identifier provided in that element (see a
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RECOMMENDED that clients include this element whenever the <KeyID> RECOMMENDED that clients include this element whenever the <KeyID>
element is present. element is present.
o <TriggerNonce>: This OPTIONAL element MUST be present if and only o <TriggerNonce>: This OPTIONAL element MUST be present if and only
if the DSKPP run was initialized with a <KeyProvTrigger> message if the DSKPP run was initialized with a <KeyProvTrigger> message
(see Section 6.2.7), and MUST, in that case, have the same value (see Section 6.2.7), and MUST, in that case, have the same value
as the <TriggerNonce> child of that message. A server using as the <TriggerNonce> child of that message. A server using
nonces in this way MUST verify that the nonce is valid and that nonces in this way MUST verify that the nonce is valid and that
any device or key identifier values provided in the any device or key identifier values provided in the
<KeyProvTrigger> message match the corresponding identifier values <KeyProvTrigger> message match the corresponding identifier values
in the <KeyProvClientHello> message. in the <KeyProvClientHello> message.
o <SupportedKeyTypes>: A sequence of URLs indicating the key types o <SupportedKeyTypes>: A sequence of container elements that in turn
for which the cryptographic module is willing to generate keys contain URLs indicating the key types for which the cryptographic
through DSKPP. module is willing to generate keys through DSKPP.
o <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>: A sequence of URLs indicating the o <SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>: A sequence of container elements
encryption algorithms supported by the cryptographic module for that in turn contain URLs indicating the encryption algorithms
the purposes of DSKPP. The DSKPP client MAY indicate the same supported by the cryptographic module for the purposes of DSKPP.
algorithm both as a supported key type and as an encryption The DSKPP client MAY indicate the same algorithm both as a
algorithm. supported key type and as an encryption algorithm.
o <SupportedMacAlgorithms>: A sequence of URLs indicating the MAC o <SupportedMacAlgorithms>: A sequence of container elements that in
algorithms supported by the cryptographic module for the purposes turn contain URLs indicating the MAC algorithms supported by the
of DSKPP. The DSKPP client MAY indicate the same algorithm both cryptographic module for the purposes of DSKPP. The DSKPP client
as an encryption algorithm and as a MAC algorithm (e.g., MAY indicate the same algorithm both as an encryption algorithm
and as a MAC algorithm (e.g.,
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes, which is defined http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes, which is defined
in Appendix C). in Appendix C).
o <SupportedProtocolVariants>: This OPTIONAL element is used by the o <SupportedProtocolVariants>: This OPTIONAL element is used by the
DSKPP client to indicate support for four-pass or two-pass DSKPP. DSKPP client to indicate support for four-pass or two-pass DSKPP.
If two-pass support is specified, then <KeyProvClientNonce> MUST If two-pass support is specified, then <KeyProvClientNonce> MUST
be set to nonce R in the <KeyProvClientHello> message unless be set to nonce R in the <KeyProvClientHello> message unless
<TriggerNonce> is already present. <TriggerNonce> is already present.
o <SupportedKeyContainers>: This OPTIONAL element is a sequence of o <SupportedKeyPackages>: This OPTIONAL element is a sequence of
URLs indicating the key container formats supported by the DSKPP container elements that in turn contain URLs indicating the key
client. If this element is not provided, then the DSKPP server package formats supported by the DSKPP client. If this element is
MUST proceed with "http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer" not provided, then the DSKPP server MUST proceed with
(see [PSKC]). "http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer" (see [PSKC]).
o <AuthenticationData>: This OPTIONAL element contains data that the o <AuthenticationData>: This OPTIONAL element contains data that the
DSKPP client uses to authenticate the user or device to the DSKPP DSKPP client uses to authenticate the user or device to the DSKPP
server. The element is set as specified in Section 3.3. server. The element is set as specified in Section 3.4.
o <Extensions>: A sequence of extensions. One extension is defined o <Extensions>: A sequence of extensions. One extension is defined
for this mesolsage in this version of DSKPP: the ClientInfoType for this message in this version of DSKPP: the ClientInfoType (see
(see Section 5). Section 5).
Some of the core elements of the message are described below. Some of the core elements of the message are described below.
4.3.1. The DeviceIdentifierDataType Type 4.3.1. The DeviceIdentifierDataType Type
The DeviceIdentifierDataType type is used to uniquely identify the The DeviceIdentifierDataType type is used to uniquely identify the
device that houses the cryptographic module, e.g., a mobile phone. device that houses the cryptographic module, e.g., a mobile phone.
The device identifier allows the DSKPP server to find, e.g., a pre- The device identifier allows the DSKPP server to find, e.g., a pre-
shared transport key for 2-pass DSKPP and/or the correct shared shared key transport key for 2-pass DSKPP and/or the correct shared
secret for MAC'ing purposes. The default DeviceIdentifierDataType is secret for MAC'ing purposes. The default DeviceIdentifierDataType is
defined in [PSKC]. defined in [PSKC].
<xs:complexType name="DeviceIdentifierDataType"> <xs:complexType name="DeviceIdentifierDataType">
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="DeviceId" type="pskc:DeviceIdType" /> <xs:element name="DeviceId" type="pskc:DeviceIdType" />
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" /> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" />
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
4.3.2. The ProtocolVariantsType Type 4.3.2. The ProtocolVariantsType Type
The ProtocolVariantsType type is OPTIONAL for a DSKPP client, who MAY The ProtocolVariantsType is a complex type that is a sequence of
use it to indicate the number of passes of the DSKPP protocol that it elements, each describing a DSKPP protocol variant. The DSKPP client
supports. The ProtocolVariantsType MAY be used to indicate support MAY use the ProtocolVariantsType to identify which protocol variants
for 4-pass or 2-pass DSKPP. If the ProtocolVariantsType is not used, it supports, i.e., by providing <SupportProtocolVariants> within a
then the DSKPP server will proceed with ordinary 4-pass DSKPP. <KeyProvClientHello> message.
However, if it does not support 4-pass DSKPP, then the server MUST
find a suitable two-pass variation or else the protocol run will
fail.
Selecting the "TwoPass" element signals client support for the 2-pass Selecting the <FourPass> element signals client support for 4-pass
version of DSKPP, informs the server of supported two-pass key DSKPP as described in Section 3.1.1.
protection methods, and provides OPTIONAL payload data to the DSKPP
server. The payload is sent in an opportunistic fashion, and MAY be Selecting the <TwoPass> element signals client support for the 2-pass
discarded by the DSKPP server if the server does not support thekey version of DSKPP as described in Section 3.2.1. The <TwoPass>
protection method with which the payload is associated. element is of type KeyProtectionDataType, which carries information
that informs the server of supported two-pass key protection methods
as described in Section 3.2.2, and provides OPTIONAL payload data to
the DSKPP server. The payload is sent in an opportunistic fashion,
and MAY be discarded by the DSKPP server if the server does not
support the key protection method with which the payload is
associated.
If the DSKPP client does not include <SupportedProtocolVariants> in
the <KeyProvClientHello> message, then the DSKPP server MUST proceed
by using the 4-pass DSKPP variant. If the DSKPP server does not
support 4-pass DSKPP, then the server MUST use the two-pass protocol
variant. If it cannot support the two-pass protocol variant, then
the protocol run MUST fail.
<xs:complexType name="ProtocolVariantsType"> <xs:complexType name="ProtocolVariantsType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="FourPass" /> <xs:element name="FourPass" minOccurs="0" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TwoPass" <xs:element name="TwoPass" type="dskpp:KeyProtectionDataType"
type="dskpp:KeyProtectionDataType"/> minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProtectionDataType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProtectionDataType">
<xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="SupportedKeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="SupportedKeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" <xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The elements of this type have the following meaning: The elements of this type have the following meaning:
o <SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>: A two-pass key protection method o <SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>: A two-pass key protection method
supported by the DSKPP client. Multiple supported methods MAY be supported by the DSKPP client. Multiple supported methods MAY be
present, in which case they MUST be listed in order of precedence. present, in which case they MUST be listed in order of precedence.
o <Payload>: An OPTIONAL payload associated with each supported key o <Payload>: An OPTIONAL payload associated with each supported key
protection method. protection method.
A DSKPP client that indicates support for two-pass DSKPP MUST also A DSKPP client that indicates support for two-pass DSKPP MUST also
include the nonce R in its <KeyProvClientHello> message (this will include the nonce R in its <KeyProvClientHello> message (this will
enable the client to verify that the DSKPP server it is communicating enable the client to verify that the DSKPP server it is communicating
with is alive). with is alive).
4.3.3. The KeyContainersFormatType Type 4.3.3. The KeyPackagesFormatType Type
The OPTIONAL KeyContainersFormatType type is a list of type-value The OPTIONAL KeyPackagesFormatType type is a list of type-value pairs
pairs that a DSKPP client or server MAY use to define key container that a DSKPP client or server MAY use to define key package formats
formats it supports. Key container formats are identified through it supports. Key package formats are identified through URLs, e.g.,
URLs, e.g., the PSKC KeyContainer URL the PSKC KeyContainer URL
"http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer" (see [PSKC]). "http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer" (see [PSKC]).
<xs:complexType name="KeyContainersFormatType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyPackagesFormatType">
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="KeyContainerFormat" <xs:element name="KeyPackageFormat"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerFormatType"/> type="dskpp:KeyPackageFormatType"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="KeyContainerFormatType"> <xs:simpleType name="KeyPackageFormatType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" />
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
4.3.4. The AuthenticationDataType Type 4.3.4. The AuthenticationDataType Type
The OPTIONAL AuthenticationDataType type is used by DSKPP clients and The OPTIONAL AuthenticationDataType type is used by DSKPP clients and
server to carry authentication values in DSKPP messages. The element server to carry authentication values in DSKPP messages as described
MAY contain a MAC derived from an authentication code as follows: in Section 3.4.
a. A DSKPP client MAY include a one-time use AuthenticationCode that
was given by the issuer to the user for acquiring a symmetric
key. An AuthenticationCode MAY contain alphanumeric characters
in addition to numeric digits depending on the device type and
policy of the issuer. For example, if the device is a mobile
phone, a code that the user enters on the keypad would typically
be restricted to numeric digits for ease of use. An
authentication code MAY be sent to the DSKPP server as MAC data
calculated according to section Section 3.3.2.
b. A DSKPP server MAY use the AuthenticationDataType element
AuthenticationCodeMac to carry a MAC for authenticating itself to
the client. For example, when a successful 2-pass DSKPP protocol
run will result in an existing key being replaced, then the DSKPP
server MUST include a MAC proving to the DSKPP client that the
server knows the value of the key it is about to replace.
<xs:complexType name="AuthenticationDataType"> <xs:complexType name="AuthenticationDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ClientID" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ClientID"
type="dskpp:IdentifierType" /> type="dskpp:IdentifierType" />
<xs:element name="AuthenticationCodeMac" <xs:element name="AuthenticationCodeMac"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMacType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMacType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="AuthenticationCodeMacType"> <xs:complexType name="AuthenticationCodeMacType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="IterationCount" type="xs:int" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="IterationCount" type="xs:int" />
<xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The elements of the AuthenticationDataType type have the following The elements of the AuthenticationDataType type have the following
meaning: meaning:
skipping to change at page 43, line 24 skipping to change at page 43, line 42
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="IterationCount" type="xs:int" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="IterationCount" type="xs:int" />
<xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The elements of the AuthenticationDataType type have the following The elements of the AuthenticationDataType type have the following
meaning: meaning:
o <ClientID>: A requester's identifier. The value MAY be a user ID, o <ClientID>: A requester's identifier of maximum length 128. The
a device ID, or a keyID associated with the requester's value MAY be a user ID, a device ID, or a keyID associated with
authentication value. Ifa <KeyProvTrigger> message was provided the requester's authentication value. The <ClientID> MAY be
by the server to initiate the DSKPP protocol run, <ClientID> can omitted if the requester can be identified by another means. For
be omitted, as the DeviceID, KeyID, and/or nonce provided in the example, the <ClientID> is not needed if a <KeyProvTrigger>
<InitializationTriggerType> element ought to be sufficient to message includes a DeviceID, KeyID, and/or nonce.
identify the requester.
o <AuthenticationCodeMac>: An authentication MAC and additional o <AuthenticationCodeMac>: An authentication MAC and additional
information (e.g., MAC algorithm). This MAC MAY be derived as information (e.g., MAC algorithm), derived as described in
follows: Section 3.4.3.
* User Authentication: A DSKPP client MAY include a one-time use
AuthenticationCode that was given by the issuer to the user for
acquiring a symmetric key. An AuthenticationCode MAY contain
alphanumeric characters in addition to numeric digits depending
on the device type and policy of the issuer. For example, if
the device is a mobile phone, a code that the user enters on
the keypad would typically be restricted to numeric digits for
ease of use. An authentication code MAY be sent to the DSKPP
server as MAC data calculated as described in section
Section 3.3.2.
* Server Authorization (two-pass DSKPP only): A DSKPP server MUST
include a MAC in its <KeyProvServerFinished> message as proof
that the DSKPP server is authorized to provide a new key to the
cryptographic module. For example, when a successful 2-pass
DSKPP protocol run will result in an existing key being
replaced, then the DSKPP server MUST include the
AuthenticationDataType element's AuthenticationCodeMac in its
<KeyProvServerFinished> message. For more information, refer
to Section 3.2.3.2.
4.4. Components of the <KeyProvServerHello> Response (Used Only in 4.4. Components of the <KeyProvServerHello> Response (Used Only in
Four-Pass DSKPP) Four-Pass DSKPP)
In a four-pass exchange, this message is the first message sent from In a four-pass exchange, this message is the first message sent from
the DSKPP server to the DSKPP client (assuming a trigger message has the DSKPP server to the DSKPP client (assuming a trigger message has
not been sent to initiate the protocol, in which case, this message not been sent to initiate the protocol, in which case, this message
is the second message sent from the DSKPP server to the DSKPP is the second message sent from the DSKPP server to the DSKPP
client). It is sent upon reception of a <KeyProvClientHello> client). It is sent upon reception of a <KeyProvClientHello>
message. message.
skipping to change at page 44, line 27 skipping to change at page 44, line 27
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerHelloPDU"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerHelloPDU">
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType">
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0"> <xs:sequence minOccurs="0">
<xs:element name="KeyType" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> <xs:element name="KeyType" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="EncryptionAlgorithm" <xs:element name="EncryptionAlgorithm"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="MacAlgorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> <xs:element name="MacAlgorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType" /> <xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType" />
<xs:element name="KeyContainerFormat" <xs:element name="KeyPackageFormat"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerFormatType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackageFormatType" />
<xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" /> <xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The components of this message have the following meaning: The components of this message have the following meaning:
o Version: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) o Version: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType type)
The version selected by the DSKPP server. MAY be lower than the The version selected by the DSKPP server. MAY be lower than the
version indicated by the DSKPP client, in which case, local policy version indicated by the DSKPP client, in which case, local policy
at the client MUST determine whether or not to continue the at the client MUST determine whether or not to continue the
session. session.
o SessionID: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType o SessionID: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType
type) An identifier for this session. type) An identifier for this session. The SessionID has a maximum
length of 128.
o Status: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) o Status: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType type)
Return code for the <KeyProvClientHello>. If Status is not Return code for the <KeyProvClientHello>. If Status is not
"Continue", only the Status and Version attributes will be "Continue", only the Status and Version attributes will be
present; otherwise, all the other element MUST be present as well. present; otherwise, all the other element MUST be present as well.
o <KeyType>: The type of the key to be generated. o <KeyType>: The type of the key to be generated.
o <EncryptionAlgorithm>: The encryption algorithm to use when o <EncryptionAlgorithm>: The encryption algorithm to use when
protecting R_C. protecting R_C.
o <MacAlgorithm>: The MAC algorithm to be used by the DSKPP server. o <MacAlgorithm>: The MAC algorithm to be used by the DSKPP server.
o <EncryptionKey>: Information about the key to use when encrypting o <EncryptionKey>: Information about the key to use when encrypting
R_C. It will either be the server's public key (the <ds:KeyValue> R_C. It will either be the server's public key (the <ds:KeyValue>
alternative of ds:KeyInfoType) or an identifier for a shared alternative of ds:KeyInfoType) or an identifier for a shared
secret key (the <ds:KeyName> alternative of ds:KeyInfoType). secret key (the <ds:KeyName> alternative of ds:KeyInfoType).
o <KeyContainerFormat>: The key container format type to be used by o <KeyPackageFormat>: The key package format type to be used by the
the DSKPP server. The default setting relies on the DSKPP server. The default setting relies on the KeyPackageType
KeyContainerType element defined in element defined in "urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:container"
"urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:container" [PSKC]. [PSKC].
o <Payload>: The actual payload. For this version of the protocol, o <Payload>: The actual payload. For this version of the protocol,
only one payload is defined: the pseudorandom string R_S. only one payload is defined: the pseudorandom string R_S.
o <Extensions>: A list of server extensions. Two extensions are o <Extensions>: A list of server extensions. Two extensions are
defined for this message in this version of DSKPP: the defined for this message in this version of DSKPP: the
ClientInfoType and the ServerInfoType (see Section 5). ClientInfoType and the ServerInfoType (see Section 5).
o <Mac>: The MAC MUST be present if the DSKPP run will result in the o <Mac>: The MAC MUST be present if the DSKPP run will result in the
replacement of an existing symmetric key with a new one (i.e., if replacement of an existing symmetric key with a new one (i.e., if
the <KeyID> element was present in the <ClientHello message). In the <KeyID> element was present in the <ClientHello message). In
this case, the DSKPP server MUST prove to the cryptographic module this case, the DSKPP server MUST prove to the cryptographic module
that it is authorized to replace it. that it is authorized to replace it.
4.5. Components of a <KeyProvClientNonce> Request (Used Only in Four- 4.5. Components of a <KeyProvClientNonce> Request (Used Only in Four-
Pass DSKPP) Pass DSKPP)
In a four-pass DSKPP exchange, this message contains the nonce R_C In a four-pass DSKPP exchange, this message contains the nonce R_C
that was chosen by the cryptographic module, and encrypted by the that was chosen by the cryptographic module, and encrypted by the
negotiated encryption key and encryption algorith negotiated encryption key and encryption algorithm
<xs:element name="KeyProvClientNonce" <xs:element name="KeyProvClientNonce"
type="dskpp:KeyProvClientNoncePDU"> type="dskpp:KeyProvClientNoncePDU">
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProvClientNoncePDU"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProvClientNoncePDU">
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractRequestType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractRequestType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="EncryptedNonce" type="xs:base64Binary" /> <xs:element name="EncryptedNonce" type="xs:base64Binary" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" />
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</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The components of this message have the following meaning: The components of this message have the following meaning:
o Version: (inherited from the AbstractRequestType type) MUST be the o Version: (inherited from the AbstractRequestType type) MUST be the
same version as in the <KeyProvServerHello> message. same version as in the <KeyProvServerHello> message.
o <SessionID>: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType o <SessionID>: (attribute inherited from the AbstractResponseType
type) MUST have the same value as the SessionID attribute in the type) MUST have the same value as the SessionID attribute in the
received <KeyProvServerHello> message. received <KeyProvServerHello> message. SessionID has maximum
length of 128.
o <EncryptedNonce>: The nonce generated and encrypted by the o <EncryptedNonce>: The nonce generated and encrypted by the
cryptographic module. The encryption MUST be made using the cryptographic module. The encryption MUST be made using the
selected encryption algorithm and identified key, and as specified selected encryption algorithm and identified key, and as specified
in Section 3.4. in Section 3.5.
o <AuthenticationData>: The authentication data value MUST be set as o <AuthenticationData>: The authentication data value MUST be set as
specified in Section 3.3 and Section 4.3.4. specified in Section 3.4 and Section 4.3.4.
o <Extensions>: A list of extensions. Two extensions are defined o <Extensions>: A list of extensions. Two extensions are defined
for this message in this version of DSKPP: the ClientInfoType and for this message in this version of DSKPP: the ClientInfoType and
the ServerInfoType (see Section 5) the ServerInfoType (see Section 5)
4.6. Components of a <KeyProvServerFinished> Response 4.6. Components of a <KeyProvServerFinished> Response
This message is the last message of the DSKPP protocol run. In a This message is the last message of the DSKPP protocol run. In a
4-pass exchange, the DSKPP server sends this message in response to a 4-pass exchange, the DSKPP server sends this message in response to a
<KeyProvClientNonce> message, whereas in a 2-pass exchange, the DSKPP <KeyProvClientNonce> message, whereas in a 2-pass exchange, the DSKPP
server sends this message in response to a <KeyProvClientHello> server sends this message in response to a <KeyProvClientHello>
message. message.
<xs:element name="KeyProvServerFinished" <xs:element name="KeyProvServerFinished"
type="dskpp:KeyProvServerFinishedPDU"> type="dskpp:KeyProvServerFinishedPDU">
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerFinishedPDU"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerFinishedPDU">
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType">
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0"> <xs:sequence minOccurs="0">
<xs:element name="KeyContainer" <xs:element name="KeyPackage"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackageType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
<xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
The components of this message have the following meaning: The components of this message have the following meaning:
o Version: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) The DSKPP o Version: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) The DSKPP
version used in this session. version used in this session.
o SessionID: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) The o SessionID: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) The
previously established identifier for this session. previously established identifier for this session. The SessionID
is of maximum length 128.
o Status: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) Return code o Status: (inherited from the AbstractResponseType type) Return code
for the <KeyProvServerFinished> message. If Status is not for the <KeyProvServerFinished> message. If Status is not
"Success", only the Status, SessionID, and Version attributes will "Success", only the Status, SessionID, and Version attributes will
be present (the presence of the SessionID attribute is dependent be present (the presence of the SessionID attribute is dependent
on the type of reported error); otherwise, all the other elements on the type of reported error); otherwise, all the other elements
MUST be present as well. In this latter case, the MUST be present as well. In this latter case, the
<KeyProvServerFinished> message can be seen as a "Commit" message, <KeyProvServerFinished> message can be seen as a "Commit" message,
instructing the cryptographic module to store the generated key instructing the cryptographic module to store the generated key
and associate the given key identifier with this key. and associate the given key identifier with this key.
o <KeyContainer>: The key container containing symmetric key values o <KeyPackage>: The key package containing keying material in
(in the case of a 2-pass exchange) and configuration data. The accordance with four- and two-pass DSKPP usage (see Section 3.1
default container format is based on the KeyContainerType type and Section 3.2). The default package format is based on the
from PSKC, as defined in [PSKC]. KeyContainerType type from PSKC, as defined in [PSKC].
o <Extensions>: A list of extensions chosen by the DSKPP server. o <Extensions>: A list of extensions chosen by the DSKPP server.
For this message, this version of DSKPP defines one extension, the For this message, this version of DSKPP defines one extension, the
ClientInfoType (see Section 5). ClientInfoType (see Section 5).
o <Mac>: To avoid a false "Commit" message causing the cryptographic o <Mac>: To avoid a false "Commit" message causing the cryptographic
module to end up in an initialized state for which the server does module to end up in an initialized state for which the server does
not know the stored key, <KeyProvServerFinished> messages MUST not know the stored key, <KeyProvServerFinished> messages MUST
always be authenticated with a MAC. The MAC MUST be made using always be authenticated with a MAC. The MAC MUST be made using
the already established MAC algorithm. the already established MAC algorithm.
4.7. The StatusCode Type 4.7. The StatusCode Type
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<xs:enumeration value="Abort" /> <xs:enumeration value="Abort" />
<xs:enumeration value="AccessDenied" /> <xs:enumeration value="AccessDenied" />
<xs:enumeration value="MalformedRequest" /> <xs:enumeration value="MalformedRequest" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnknownRequest" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnknownRequest" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnknownCriticalExtension" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnknownCriticalExtension" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnsupportedVersion" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnsupportedVersion" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyTypes" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyTypes" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoProtocolVariants" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoProtocolVariants" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyContainers" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyPackages" />
<xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataMissing" /> <xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataMissing" />
<xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataInvalid" /> <xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataInvalid" />
<xs:enumeration value="InitializationFailed" /> <xs:enumeration value="InitializationFailed" />
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
Upon transmission or receipt of a message for which the Status Upon transmission or receipt of a message for which the Status
attribute's value is not "Success" or "Continue", the default attribute's value is not "Success" or "Continue", the default
behavior, unless explicitly stated otherwise below, is that both the behavior, unless explicitly stated otherwise below, is that both the
DSKPP server and the DSKPP client MUST immediately terminate the DSKPP server and the DSKPP client MUST immediately terminate the
skipping to change at page 49, line 35 skipping to change at page 49, line 35
DSKPP server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's DSKPP server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's
first response message. first response message.
o "NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" indicates that the DSKPP client only o "NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" indicates that the DSKPP client only
suggested MAC algorithms that are not supported by the DSKPP suggested MAC algorithms that are not supported by the DSKPP
server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's first server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's first
response message. response message.
o "NoProtocolVariants" indicates that the DSKPP client only o "NoProtocolVariants" indicates that the DSKPP client only
suggested a protocol variation (either 2-pass or 4-pass) that is suggested a protocol variation (either 2-pass or 4-pass) that is
not supported by the DSKPP server. This error is only valid in not supported by the DSKPP server. This error is only valid in
the DSKPP server's first response message. the DSKPP server's first response message.
o "NoSupportedKeyContainers" indicates that the DSKPP client only o "NoSupportedKeyPackages" indicates that the DSKPP client only
suggested key container formats that are not supported by the suggested key package formats that are not supported by the DSKPP
DSKPP server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's server. This error is only valid in the DSKPP server's first
first response message. response message.
o "AuthenticationDataMissing" indicates that the DSKPP client didn't o "AuthenticationDataMissing" indicates that the DSKPP client didn't
provide authentication data that the DSKPP server required. provide authentication data that the DSKPP server required.
o "AuthenticationDataInvalid" indicates that the DSKPP client o "AuthenticationDataInvalid" indicates that the DSKPP client
supplied user authentication data that the DSKPP server failed to supplied user authentication data that the DSKPP server failed to
validate. validate.
o "InitializationFailed" indicates that the DSKPP server could not o "InitializationFailed" indicates that the DSKPP server could not
generate a valid key given the provided data. When this status generate a valid key given the provided data. When this status
code is received, the DSKPP client SHOULD try to restart DSKPP, as code is received, the DSKPP client SHOULD try to restart DSKPP, as
it is possible that a new run will succeed. it is possible that a new run will succeed.
o "ProvisioningPeriodExpired" indicates that the provisioning period o "ProvisioningPeriodExpired" indicates that the provisioning period
set by the DSKPP server has expired. When the status code is set by the DSKPP server has expired. When the status code is
received, the DSKPP client SHOULD report the reason for key received, the DSKPP client SHOULD report the reason for key
initialization failure to the user and the user MUST register with initialization failure to the user and the user MUST register with
the DSKPP server to initialize a new key. the DSKPP server to initialize a new key.
5. Extensibility 5. Protocol Extensions
5.1. The ClientInfoType Type 5.1. The ClientInfoType Type
Present in a <KeyProvClientHello> or a <KeyProvClientNonce> message, Present in a <KeyProvClientHello> or a <KeyProvClientNonce> message,
the OPTIONAL ClientInfoType extension contains DSKPP client-specific the OPTIONAL ClientInfoType extension contains DSKPP client-specific
information. DSKPP servers MUST support this extension. DSKPP information that is custom to an implementation. DSKPP servers MUST
servers MUST NOT attempt to interpret the data it carries and, if support this extension. DSKPP servers MUST NOT attempt to interpret
received, MUST include it unmodified in the current protocol run's the data it carries and, if received, MUST include it unmodified in
next server response. Servers need not retain the ClientInfoType's the current protocol run's next server response. Servers need not
data after that response has been generated. retain the ClientInfoType's data after that response has been
generated.
5.2. The ServerInfoType Type 5.2. The ServerInfoType Type
When present, the OPTIONAL ServerInfoType extension contains DSKPP When present, the OPTIONAL ServerInfoType extension contains DSKPP
server-specific information. This extension is only valid in server-specific information that is custom to an implementation.
<KeyProvServerHello> messages for which Status = "Continue". DSKPP This extension is only valid in <KeyProvServerHello> messages for
clients MUST support this extension. DSKPP clients MUST NOT attempt which Status = "Continue". DSKPP clients MUST support this
to interpret the data it carries and, if received, MUST include it extension. DSKPP clients MUST NOT attempt to interpret the data it
unmodified in the current protocol run's next client request (i.e., carries and, if received, MUST include it unmodified in the current
the <KeyProvClientNonce> message). DSKPP clients need not retain the protocol run's next client request (i.e., the <KeyProvClientNonce>
ServerInfoType's data after that request has been generated. This message). DSKPP clients need not retain the ServerInfoType's data
extension MAY be used, e.g., for state management in the DSKPP after that request has been generated. This extension MAY be used,
server. e.g., for state management in the DSKPP server.
6. Protocol Bindings 6. Protocol Bindings
6.1. General Requirements 6.1. General Requirements
DSKPP assumes a reliable transport. DSKPP assumes a reliable transport.
6.2. HTTP/1.1 Binding for DSKPP 6.2. HTTP/1.1 Binding for DSKPP
6.2.1. Introduction 6.2.1. Introduction
This section presents a binding of the previous messages to HTTP/1.1 This section presents a binding of the previous messages to HTTP/1.1
[RFC2616]. Note that the HTTP client normally will be different from [RFC2616]. Note that the HTTP client normally will be different from
the DSKPP client, i.e., the HTTP client will only exist to "proxy" the DSKPP client, i.e., the HTTP client will only exist to "proxy"
DSKPP messages from the DSKPP client to the DSKPP server. Likewise, DSKPP messages from the DSKPP client to the DSKPP server. Likewise,
on the HTTP server side, the DSKPP server MAY receive DSKPP PDUs from on the HTTP server side, the DSKPP server MAY receive DSKPP PDUs from
a "front-end" HTTP server. a "front-end" HTTP server. The DSKPP server will be identified by a
specific URL, which may be pre-configured, or provided to the client
during initialization.
6.2.2. Identification of DSKPP Messages 6.2.2. Identification of DSKPP Messages
The MIME-type for all DSKPP messages MUST be The MIME-type for all DSKPP messages MUST be
application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml
6.2.3. HTTP Headers 6.2.3. HTTP Headers
HTTP proxies MUST NOT cache responses carrying DSKPP messages. For In order to avoid caching of responses carrying DSKPP messages by
this reason, the following holds: proxies, the following holds:
o When using HTTP/1.1, requesters SHOULD: o When using HTTP/1.1, requesters SHOULD:
* Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no- * Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-
store". store".
* Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache". * Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
o When using HTTP/1.1, responders SHOULD: o When using HTTP/1.1, responders SHOULD:
* Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-must- * Include a Cache-Control header field set to "no-cache, no-must-
revalidate, private". revalidate, private".
* Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache". * Include a Pragma header field set to "no-cache".
* NOT include a Validator, such as a Last-Modified or ETag * NOT include a Validator, such as a Last-Modified or ETag
header. header.
To handle content negotiation, HTTP requests MAY include an HTTP
Accept header field. This header field SHOULD have the value
application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml as defined in Section 6.2.2.
The Accept header MAY include additional content types defined by
future versions of this protocol.
There are no other restrictions on HTTP headers, besides the There are no other restrictions on HTTP headers, besides the
requirement to set the Content-Type header value according to requirement to set the Content-Type header value according to
Section 6.2.2. Section 6.2.2.
6.2.4. HTTP Operations 6.2.4. HTTP Operations
Persistent connections as defined in HTTP/1.1 are assumed but not Persistent connections as defined in HTTP/1.1 are OPTIONAL. DSKPP
required. DSKPP requests are mapped to HTTP POST operations. DSKPP requests are mapped to HTTP requests with the POST method. DSKPP
responses are mapped to HTTP responses. responses are mapped to HTTP responses.
For the 4-pass DSKPP, messages within the protocol run are bound
together. In particular, <KeyProvServerHello> is bound to the
preceding <KeyProvClientHello> by being transmitted in the
corresponding HTTP response. <KeyProvServerHello> MUST have a
SessionID attribute, and the SessionID attribute of the subsequent
<KeyProvClientNonce> message MUST be identical.
<KeyProvServerFinished> is then once again bound to the rest through
HTTP (and possibly through a SessionID).
6.2.5. HTTP Status Codes 6.2.5. HTTP Status Codes
A DSKPP HTTP responder that refuses to perform a message exchange A DSKPP HTTP responder that refuses to perform a message exchange
with a DSKPP HTTP requester SHOULD return a 403 (Forbidden) response. with a DSKPP HTTP requester SHOULD return a 403 (Forbidden) response.
In this case, the content of the HTTP body is not significant. In In this case, the content of the HTTP body is not significant. In
the case of an HTTP error while processing a DSKPP request, the HTTP the case of an HTTP error while processing a DSKPP request, the HTTP
server MUST return a 500 (Internal Server Error) response. This type server MUST return a 500 (Internal Server Error) response. This type
of error SHOULD be returned for HTTP-related errors detected before of error SHOULD be returned for HTTP-related errors detected before
control is passed to the DSKPP processor, or when the DSKPP processor control is passed to the DSKPP processor, or when the DSKPP processor
reports an internal error (for example, the DSKPP XML namespace is reports an internal error (for example, the DSKPP XML namespace is
incorrect, or the DSKPP schema cannot be located). If the type of a incorrect, or the DSKPP schema cannot be located). If a request is
DSKPP request cannot be determined, the DSKPP responder MUST return a received that is not a DSKPP client message, the DSKPP responder MUST
400 (Bad request) response. return a 400 (Bad request) response.
In these cases (i.e., when the HTTP response code is 4xx or 5xx), the In these cases (i.e., when the HTTP response code is 4xx or 5xx), the
content of the HTTP body is not significant. content of the HTTP body is not significant.
Redirection status codes (3xx) apply as usual. Redirection status codes (3xx) apply as usual.
Whenever the HTTP POST is successfully invoked, the DSKPP HTTP Whenever the HTTP POST is successfully invoked, the DSKPP HTTP
responder MUST use the 200 status code and provide a suitable DSKPP responder MUST use the 200 status code and provide a suitable DSKPP
message (possibly with DSKPP error information included) in the HTTP message (possibly with DSKPP error information included) in the HTTP
body. body.
6.2.6. HTTP Authentication 6.2.6. HTTP Authentication
No support for HTTP/1.1 authentication is assumed. No support for HTTP/1.1 authentication is assumed.
6.2.7. Initialization of DSKPP 6.2.7. Initialization of DSKPP
The DSKPP server MAY initialize the DSKPP protocol by sending an HTTP If a user requests key initialization in a browsing session, and if
response with Content-Type set according to Section 6.2.2 and that request has an appropriate Accept header (e.g., to a specific
response code set to 200 (OK). This message MAY, e.g., be sent in DSKPP server URL), the DSKPP server MAY respond by sending a DSKPP
response to a user requesting key initialization in a browsing initialization message in an HTTP response with Content-Type set
session. The initialization message MAY carry data in its body. If according to Section 6.2.2 and response code set to 200 (OK). The
this is the case, the data MUST be a valid instance of a initialization message MAY carry data in its body, such as the URL
for the DSKPP client to use when contacting the DSKPP server. If the
message does carry data, the data MUST be a valid instance of a
<KeyProvTrigger> element. <KeyProvTrigger> element.
Note that if the user's request was directed to some other resource,
the DSKPP server MUST NOT respond by combining the DSKPP content type
with response code 200. In that case, the DSKPP server SHOULD
respond by sending a DSKPP initialization message in an HTTP response
with Content-Type set according to Section 6.2.2 and response code
set to 406 (Not Acceptable).
6.2.8. Example Messages 6.2.8. Example Messages
a. Initialization from DSKPP server: a. Initialization from DSKPP server:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml
Content-Length: <some value> Content-Length: <some value>
DSKPP initialization data in XML form... DSKPP initialization data in XML form...
b. Initial request from DSKPP client: b. Initial request from DSKPP client:
POST http://example.com/cgi-bin/DSKPP-server HTTP/1.1 POST http://example.com/cgi-bin/DSKPP-server HTTP/1.1
Cache-Control: no-store
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store
Pragma: no-cache Pragma: no-cache
Host: example.com Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml
Content-Length: <some value> Content-Length: <some value>
DSKPP data in XML form (supported version, supported DSKPP data in XML form (supported version, supported
algorithms...) algorithms...)
c. Initial response from DSKPP server: c. Initial response from DSKPP server:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-store Cache-Control: no-cache, no-must-revalidate, private
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml Content-Type: application/vnd.ietf.keyprov.dskpp+xml
Content-Length: <some value> Content-Length: <some value>
DSKPP data in XML form (server random nonce, server public key, DSKPP data in XML form (server random nonce, server public key,
...) ...)
7. DSKPP Schema 7. DSKPP Schema
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<xs:schema <xs:schema
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified"
version="1.0"> version="1.0">
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/ schemaLocation="www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
<xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" <xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
schemaLocation="keyprov-pskc-1.0.xsd"/> schemaLocation="keyprov-pskc-1.0.xsd"/>
<xs:complexType name="AbstractRequestType" abstract="true"> <xs:complexType name="AbstractRequestType" abstract="true">
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation> Basic types </xs:documentation> <xs:documentation> Basic types </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
<xs:attribute name="Version" type="dskpp:VersionType" <xs:attribute name="Version" type="dskpp:VersionType"
use="required"/> use="required"/>
skipping to change at page 54, line 17 skipping to change at page 55, line 6
<xs:enumeration value="Abort" /> <xs:enumeration value="Abort" />
<xs:enumeration value="AccessDenied" /> <xs:enumeration value="AccessDenied" />
<xs:enumeration value="MalformedRequest" /> <xs:enumeration value="MalformedRequest" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnknownRequest" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnknownRequest" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnknownCriticalExtension" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnknownCriticalExtension" />
<xs:enumeration value="UnsupportedVersion" /> <xs:enumeration value="UnsupportedVersion" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyTypes" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyTypes" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedMacAlgorithms" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoProtocolVariants" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoProtocolVariants" />
<xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyContainers" /> <xs:enumeration value="NoSupportedKeyPackages" />
<xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataMissing" /> <xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataMissing" />
<xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataInvalid" /> <xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationDataInvalid" />
<xs:enumeration value="InitializationFailed" /> <xs:enumeration value="InitializationFailed" />
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="DeviceIdentifierDataType"> <xs:complexType name="DeviceIdentifierDataType">
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="DeviceId" type="pskc:DeviceIdType" /> <xs:element name="DeviceId" type="pskc:DeviceIdType" />
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" /> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" />
skipping to change at page 55, line 14 skipping to change at page 55, line 51
<xs:element name="Algorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> <xs:element name="Algorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="AlgorithmType"> <xs:simpleType name="AlgorithmType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" />
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="ProtocolVariantsType"> <xs:complexType name="ProtocolVariantsType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="FourPass" /> <xs:element name="FourPass" minOccurs="0" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TwoPass" <xs:element name="TwoPass" type="dskpp:KeyProtectionDataType"
type="dskpp:KeyProtectionDataType"/> minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProtectionDataType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProtectionDataType">
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation xml:lang="en"> <xs:documentation xml:lang="en">
This element is only valid for two-pass DSKPP. This element is only valid for two-pass DSKPP.
</xs:documentation> </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
<xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="SupportedKeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:element name="SupportedKeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" /> <xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="PayloadType"> <xs:complexType name="PayloadType">
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" /> <xs:element name="Nonce" type="dskpp:NonceType" />
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" /> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" />
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyContainersFormatType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyPackagesFormatType">
<xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded"> <xs:sequence maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="KeyContainerFormat" <xs:element name="KeyPackageFormat"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerFormatType"/> type="dskpp:KeyPackageFormatType"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="KeyContainerFormatType"> <xs:simpleType name="KeyPackageFormatType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI" />
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="AuthenticationDataType"> <xs:complexType name="AuthenticationDataType">
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation xml:lang="en"> <xs:documentation xml:lang="en">
Authentication data contains a MAC. Authentication data contains a MAC.
</xs:documentation> </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ClientID" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ClientID"
skipping to change at page 56, line 40 skipping to change at page 57, line 27
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="MacType"> <xs:complexType name="MacType">
<xs:simpleContent> <xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:base64Binary"> <xs:extension base="xs:base64Binary">
<xs:attribute name="MacAlgorithm" type="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:attribute name="MacAlgorithm" type="xs:anyURI" />
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent> </xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyContainerType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyPackageType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ServerID" type="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="ServerID" type="xs:anyURI" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="KeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="KeyProtectionMethod" type="xs:anyURI" />
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="KeyContainer" type="pskc:KeyContainerType" /> <xs:element name="KeyPackage" type="pskc:KeyContainerType" />
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" /> <xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="strict" />
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="InitializationTriggerType"> <xs:complexType name="InitializationTriggerType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="DeviceIdentifierData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="DeviceIdentifierData"
type="dskpp:DeviceIdentifierDataType" /> type="dskpp:DeviceIdentifierDataType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="KeyID" type="xs:base64Binary" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="KeyID" type="xs:base64Binary" />
skipping to change at page 59, line 7 skipping to change at page 59, line 42
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TriggerNonce" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="TriggerNonce"
type="dskpp:NonceType" /> type="dskpp:NonceType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedKeyTypes" <xs:element name="SupportedKeyTypes"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms" <xs:element name="SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element name="SupportedMacAlgorithms" <xs:element name="SupportedMacAlgorithms"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedProtocolVariants" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedProtocolVariants"
type="dskpp:ProtocolVariantsType" /> type="dskpp:ProtocolVariantsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedKeyContainers" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="SupportedKeyPackages"
type="dskpp:KeyContainersFormatType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackagesFormatType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="KeyProvServerHello" <xs:element name="KeyProvServerHello"
type="dskpp:KeyProvServerHelloPDU"> type="dskpp:KeyProvServerHelloPDU">
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation> KeyProvServerHello PDU </xs:documentation> <xs:documentation> KeyProvServerHello PDU </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerHelloPDU"> <xs:complexType name="KeyProvServerHelloPDU">
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation xml:lang="en"> <xs:documentation xml:lang="en">
Response message sent from DSKPP server to DSKPP client Response message sent from DSKPP server to DSKPP client
skipping to change at page 59, line 39 skipping to change at page 60, line 25
</xs:documentation> </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType">
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0"> <xs:sequence minOccurs="0">
<xs:element name="KeyType" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> <xs:element name="KeyType" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="EncryptionAlgorithm" <xs:element name="EncryptionAlgorithm"
type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="MacAlgorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" /> <xs:element name="MacAlgorithm" type="dskpp:AlgorithmType" />
<xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType" /> <xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType" />
<xs:element name="KeyContainerFormat" <xs:element name="KeyPackageFormat"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerFormatType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackageFormatType" />
<xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" /> <xs:element name="Payload" type="dskpp:PayloadType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="KeyProvClientNonce" <xs:element name="KeyProvClientNonce"
skipping to change at page 60, line 47 skipping to change at page 61, line 33
<xs:annotation> <xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation xml:lang="en"> <xs:documentation xml:lang="en">
Final message sent from DSKPP server to DSKPP client in a DSKPP Final message sent from DSKPP server to DSKPP client in a DSKPP
session. A MAC value serves for key confirmation, and optional session. A MAC value serves for key confirmation, and optional
AuthenticationData serves for server authentication. AuthenticationData serves for server authentication.
</xs:documentation> </xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation> </xs:annotation>
<xs:complexContent mixed="false"> <xs:complexContent mixed="false">
<xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType"> <xs:extension base="dskpp:AbstractResponseType">
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0"> <xs:sequence minOccurs="0">
<xs:element name="KeyContainer" <xs:element name="KeyPackage"
type="dskpp:KeyContainerType" /> type="dskpp:KeyPackageType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="Extensions"
type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" /> type="dskpp:ExtensionsType" />
<xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" /> <xs:element name="Mac" type="dskpp:MacType" />
<xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData" <xs:element minOccurs="0" name="AuthenticationData"
type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" /> type="dskpp:AuthenticationDataType" />
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:extension> </xs:extension>
</xs:complexContent> </xs:complexContent>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
</xs:schema> </xs:schema>
8. Conformance Requirements 8. Conformance Requirements
In order to assure that all implementations of DSKPP can In order to assure that all implementations of DSKPP can
interoperate, there are the following "MUST support" requirements" interoperate, the DSKPP server:
The conformance requirements for the DSKPP server consist of the
following:
a. MUST implement the four-pass variant of the protocol a. MUST implement the four-pass variation of the protocol
(Section 3.1) (Section 3.1)
b. MUST implement the two-pass variant of the protocol (Section 3.2)
c. MUST support user authentication (Section 3.3)
d. MUST support the Key Transport, Key Wrap, and Passphrase-Based
Key Wrap Protection Profiles (Section 3.2.2)
e. MUST support the DSKPP-PRF-AES DSKPP-PRF realization (Appendix C)
f. MUST support the DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 DSKPP-PRF realization
(Appendix C)
g. MAY support the RSA Encryption Scheme ([PKCS-1])
h. MAY support DSKPP-PRF with XOR (Section 3.5)
i. SHOULD support integration with PKCS #11 in four-pass DSKPP
(Appendix B)
The conformance requirements for the DSKPP client consist of the b. MUST implement the two-pass variation of the protocol
following: (Section 3.2)
a. MUST implement the four-pass variant of the protocol c. MUST support user authentication (Section 3.4)
(Section 3.1)
b. MUST implement the two-pass variant of the protocol (Section 3.2) d. MUST support the following Key Derivation Functions:
c. MUST support user authentication (Section 3.3) * DSKPP-PRF-AES DSKPP-PRF realization (Appendix C)
d. MUST support the Key Transport, Key Wrap, and Passphrase-Based * DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 DSKPP-PRF realization (Appendix C)
Key Wrap Protection Profiles (Section 3.2.2)
e. MUST support the DSKPP-PRF-AES DSKPP-PRF realization (Appendix C) e. MUST support the following Encryption mechanisms for protection
f. MUST support the DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 DSKPP-PRF realization of the client nonce in the four-pass protocol:
(Appendix C) * Mechanism described in Section 3.1.3
g. MAY support the RSA Encryption Scheme ([PKCS-1])
h. MAY support DSKPP-PRF with XOR (Section 3.5) f. MUST support the following Encryption algorithms for symmetric
i. SHOULD support integration with PKCS #11 in four-pass DSKPP key operations, e.g., key wrap:
(Appendix B) * AES-CBC-128 [FIPS197-AES]
g. MUST support the following Encryption algorithms for asymmetric
key operations, e.g., key transport:
* RSA Encryption Scheme [PKCS-1]
h. MUST support the following Integrity/KDF MAC functions:
* HMAC-SHA256 [FIPS180-SHA]
* AES-CMAC-128 [FIPS197-AES]
i. MUST support the PSKC key package [PSKC]; all three PSKC key
protection profiles (Key Transport, Key Wrap, and Passphrase-
Based Key Wrap) MUST be implemented
j. MAY support the ASN.1 key package as defined in [SKPC-ASN.1]
DSKPP clients need to support either the two-pass or the four-pass
variant of the protocol. DSKPP clients MUST fulfill all requirements
listed in item (c) - (j).
Of course, DSKPP is a security protocol, and one of its major Of course, DSKPP is a security protocol, and one of its major
functions is to allow only authorized parties to successfully functions is to allow only authorized parties to successfully
initialize a cryptographic module with a new symmetric key. initialize a cryptographic module with a new symmetric key.
Therefore, a particular implementation may be configured with any of Therefore, a particular implementation may be configured with any of
a number of restrictions concerning algorithms and trusted a number of restrictions concerning algorithms and trusted
authorities that will prevent universal interoperability. authorities that will prevent universal interoperability.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
9.1. General 9.1. General
DSKPP is designed to protect generated key material from exposure. DSKPP is designed to protect generated keying material from exposure.
No other entities than the DSKPP server and the cryptographic module No other entities than the DSKPP server and the cryptographic module
will have access to a generated K_TOKEN if the cryptographic will have access to a generated K_TOKEN if the cryptographic
algorithms used are of sufficient strength and, on the DSKPP client algorithms used are of sufficient strength and, on the DSKPP client
side, generation and encryption of R_C and generation of K_TOKEN take side, generation and encryption of R_C and generation of K_TOKEN take
place as specified in the cryptographic module. This applies even if place as specified in the cryptographic module. This applies even if
malicious software is present in the DSKPP client. However, as malicious software is present in the DSKPP client. However, as
discussed in the following, DSKPP does not protect against certain discussed in the following sub-sections, DSKPP does not protect
other threats resulting from man-in-the-middle attacks and other against certain other threats resulting from man-in-the-middle
forms of attacks. DSKPP SHOULD, therefore, be run over a transport attacks and other forms of attacks. DSKPP SHOULD, therefore, be run
providing privacy and integrity, such as HTTP over Transport Layer over a transport providing privacy and integrity, such as HTTP over
Security (TLS) with a suitable ciphersuite, when such threats are a Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a suitable ciphersuite, when such
concern. Note that TLS ciphersuites with anonymous key exchanges are threats are a concern. Note that TLS ciphersuites with anonymous key
not suitable in those situations. exchanges are not suitable in those situations.
9.2. Active Attacks 9.2. Active Attacks
9.2.1. Introduction 9.2.1. Introduction
An active attacker MAY attempt to modify, delete, insert, replay, or An active attacker MAY attempt to modify, delete, insert, replay, or
reorder messages for a variety of purposes including service denial reorder messages for a variety of purposes including service denial
and compromise of generated key material. Section 9.2.2 through and compromise of generated keying material. Section 9.2.2 through
Section 9.2.7. Section 9.2.7.
9.2.2. Message Modifications 9.2.2. Message Modifications
Modifications to a <DSKPPTrigger> message will either cause denial- Modifications to a <DSKPPTrigger> message will either cause denial-
of-service (modifications of any of the identifiers or the nonce) or of-service (modifications of any of the identifiers or the nonce) or
will cause the DSKPP client to contact the wrong DSKPP server. The will cause the DSKPP client to contact the wrong DSKPP server. The
latter is in effect a man-in-the-middle attack and is discussed latter is in effect a man-in-the-middle attack and is discussed
further in Section 9.2.7. further in Section 9.2.7.
skipping to change at page 64, line 13 skipping to change at page 64, line 49
<EncryptedNonce> element, e.g., replacing it with a value for which <EncryptedNonce> element, e.g., replacing it with a value for which
the attacker knows an underlying R'C, will not result in the client the attacker knows an underlying R'C, will not result in the client
changing its pre-DSKPP state, since the server will be unable to changing its pre-DSKPP state, since the server will be unable to
provide a valid MAC in its final message to the client. The server provide a valid MAC in its final message to the client. The server
MAY, however, end up storing K'TOKEN rather than K_TOKEN. If the MAY, however, end up storing K'TOKEN rather than K_TOKEN. If the
cryptographic module has been associated with a particular user, then cryptographic module has been associated with a particular user, then
this could constitute a security problem. For a further discussion this could constitute a security problem. For a further discussion
about this threat, and a possible countermeasure, see Section 9.5 about this threat, and a possible countermeasure, see Section 9.5
below. Note that use of TLS does not protect against this attack if below. Note that use of TLS does not protect against this attack if
the attacker has access to the DSKPP client (e.g., through malicious the attacker has access to the DSKPP client (e.g., through malicious
software, "trojans"). software, "Trojans").
Finally, attackers may also modify the <KeyProvServerFinished> Finally, attackers may also modify the <KeyProvServerFinished>
message. Replacing the <Mac> element will only result in denial-of- message. Replacing the <Mac> element will only result in denial-of-
service. Replacement of any other element may cause the DSKPP client service. Replacement of any other element may cause the DSKPP client
to associate, e.g., the wrong service with the generated key. DSKPP to associate, e.g., the wrong service with the generated key. DSKPP
SHOULD be run over a transport providing privacy and integrity when SHOULD be run over a transport providing privacy and integrity when
this is a concern. this is a concern.
9.2.3. Message Deletion 9.2.3. Message Deletion
skipping to change at page 65, line 47 skipping to change at page 66, line 35
etc. etc.
If DSKPP is not run over a transport providing privacy, a passive If DSKPP is not run over a transport providing privacy, a passive
attacker may learn: attacker may learn:
o What cryptographic modules a particular user is in possession of; o What cryptographic modules a particular user is in possession of;
o The identifiers of keys on those cryptographic modules and other o The identifiers of keys on those cryptographic modules and other
attributes pertaining to those keys, e.g., the lifetime of the attributes pertaining to those keys, e.g., the lifetime of the
keys; and keys; and
o DSKPP versions and cryptographic algorithms supported by a o DSKPP versions and cryptographic algorithms supported by a
particular DSKPP client or server. particular DSKPP client or server.
Whenever the above is a concern, DSKPP SHOULD be run over a transport Whenever the above is a concern, DSKPP SHOULD be run over a transport
providing privacy. If man-in-the-middle attacks for the purposes providing privacy. If man-in-the-middle attacks for the purposes
described above are a concern, the transport SHOULD also offer described above are a concern, the transport SHOULD also offer
server-side authentication. server-side authentication.
9.4. Cryptographic Attacks 9.4. Cryptographic Attacks
An attacker with unlimited access to an initialized cryptographic An attacker with unlimited access to an initialized cryptographic
module may use the module as an "oracle" to pre-compute values that module may use the module as an "oracle" to pre-compute values that
later on may be used to impersonate the DSKPP server. Section 3.5 later on may be used to impersonate the DSKPP server. Section 3.1.3
and Section 3 contain discussions of this threat and steps and Section 3 contain discussions of this threat and steps
RECOMMENDED to protect against it. RECOMMENDED to protect against it.
9.5. Attacks on the Interaction between DSKPP and User Authentication 9.5. Attacks on the Interaction between DSKPP and User Authentication
If keys generated in DSKPP will be associated with a particular user If keys generated in DSKPP will be associated with a particular user
at the DSKPP server (or a server trusted by, and communicating with at the DSKPP server (or a server trusted by, and communicating with
the DSKPP server), then in order to protect against threats where an the DSKPP server), then in order to protect against threats where an
attacker replaces a client-provided encrypted R_C with his own R'C attacker replaces a client-provided encrypted R_C with his own R'C
(regardless of whether the public-key variation or the shared-secret (regardless of whether the public-key variation or the shared-secret
skipping to change at page 67, line 5 skipping to change at page 67, line 38
Another threat arises when an attacker is able to trick a user to Another threat arises when an attacker is able to trick a user to
authenticate to the attacker rather than to the legitimate service authenticate to the attacker rather than to the legitimate service
before the DSKPP protocol run. If successful, the attacker will then before the DSKPP protocol run. If successful, the attacker will then
be able to impersonate the user towards the legitimate service, and be able to impersonate the user towards the legitimate service, and
subsequently receive a valid DSKPP trigger. If the public-key subsequently receive a valid DSKPP trigger. If the public-key
variant of DSKPP is used, this may result in the attacker being able variant of DSKPP is used, this may result in the attacker being able
to (after a successful DSKPP protocol run) impersonate the user. to (after a successful DSKPP protocol run) impersonate the user.
Ordinary precautions MUST, therefore, be in place to ensure that Ordinary precautions MUST, therefore, be in place to ensure that
users authenticate only to legitimate services. users authenticate only to legitimate services.
9.6. Additional Considerations 9.6. Miscellaneous Considerations
9.6.1. Client Contributions to K_TOKEN Entropy 9.6.1. Client Contributions to K_TOKEN Entropy
In 4-pass DSKPP, both the client and the server provide randomizing In 4-pass DSKPP, both the client and the server provide randomizing
material to K_TOKEN , in a manner that allows both parties to verify material to K_TOKEN , in a manner that allows both parties to verify
that they did contribute to the resulting key. In the 2-pass DSKPP that they did contribute to the resulting key. In the 2-pass DSKPP
version defined herein, only the server contributes to the entropy of version defined herein, only the server contributes to the entropy of
K_TOKEN. This means that a broken or compromised (pseudo-)random K_TOKEN. This means that a broken or compromised (pseudo-)random
number generator in the server may cause more damage than it would in number generator in the server may cause more damage than it would in
the 4-pass variation. Server implementations SHOULD therefore take the 4-pass variation. Server implementations SHOULD therefore take
skipping to change at page 67, line 33 skipping to change at page 68, line 20
including R, using K_MAC. including R, using K_MAC.
9.6.3. Server Authentication 9.6.3. Server Authentication
DSKPP servers MUST authenticate themselves whenever a successful DSKPP servers MUST authenticate themselves whenever a successful
DSKPP 2-pass protocol run would result in an existing K_TOKEN being DSKPP 2-pass protocol run would result in an existing K_TOKEN being
replaced by a K_TOKEN', or else a denial-of-service attack where an replaced by a K_TOKEN', or else a denial-of-service attack where an
unauthorized DSKPP server replaces a K_TOKEN with another key would unauthorized DSKPP server replaces a K_TOKEN with another key would
be possible. In 2-pass DSKPP, servers authenticate by including the be possible. In 2-pass DSKPP, servers authenticate by including the
AuthenticationDataType extension containing a MAC as described in AuthenticationDataType extension containing a MAC as described in
Section 3.2 for Two-Pass DSKPP. Section 3.2 for two-pass DSKPP.
9.6.4. User Authentication 9.6.4. User Authentication
A DSKPP server MUST authenticate a client to ensure that K_TOKEN is A DSKPP server MUST authenticate a client to ensure that K_TOKEN is
delivered to the intended device. The following measures SHOULD be delivered to the intended device. The following measures SHOULD be
considered: considered:
o When an Authentication Code is used for client authentication, a o When an Authentication Code is used for client authentication, a
password dictionary attack on the authentication data is possible. password dictionary attack on the authentication data is possible.
o The length of the Authentication Code when used over a non-secure o The length of the Authentication Code when used over a non-secure
channel SHOULD be longer than what is used over a secure channel. channel SHOULD be longer than what is used over a secure channel.
When a device, e.g., some mobile phones with small screens, cannot When a device, e.g., some mobile phones with small screens, cannot
handle a long Authentication Code in a user-friendly manner, DSKPP handle a long Authentication Code in a user-friendly manner, DSKPP
SHOULD rely on a secure channel for communication. SHOULD rely on a secure channel for communication.
o In the case that a non-secure channel has to be used, the o In the case that a non-secure channel has to be used, the
Authentication Code SHOULD be sent to the server MAC'd as Authentication Code SHOULD be sent to the server MAC'd as
specified in Section 3.3. The Authentication Code and nonce value specified in Section 3.4. The Authentication Code and nonce value
MUST be strong enough to prevent offline brute-force recovery of MUST be strong enough to prevent offline brute-force recovery of
the Authentication Code from the HMAC data. Given that the nonce the Authentication Code from the HMAC data. Given that the nonce
value is sent in plaintext format over a non-secure transport, the value is sent in plaintext format over a non-secure transport, the
cryptographic strength of the AuthenticationData depends more on cryptographic strength of the AuthenticationData depends more on
the quality of the AuthenticationCode. the quality of the AuthenticationCode.
o When the AuthenticationCode is sent from the DSKPP server to the o When the AuthenticationCode is sent from the DSKPP server to the
device in a DSKPP initialization trigger message, an eavesdropper device in a DSKPP initialization trigger message, an eavesdropper
may be able to capture this message and race the legitimate user may be able to capture this message and race the legitimate user
for a key initialization. To prevent this, the transport layer for a key initialization. To prevent this, the transport layer
used to send the DSKPP trigger MUST provide privacy and integrity used to send the DSKPP trigger MUST provide privacy and integrity
e.g. secure browser session. e.g. secure browser session.
9.6.5. Key Protection in the Two-Pass Passphrase Profile 9.6.5. Key Protection in Two-Pass DSKPP
The passphrase-based key wrap profile uses the PBKDF2 function from Three key protection profiles are defined for the different usages of
[PKCS-5] to generate an encryption key from a passphrase and salt 2-pass DSKPP, which MUST be supported by a key package format, such
string. The derived key, K_DERIVED is used by the server to encrypt as [PSKC] and [SKPC-ASN.1]. Therefore, key protection in the two-
K_TOKEN and by the cryptographic module to decrypt the newly pass DSKPP is dependent upon the security of the key package format
delivered K_TOKEN. It is important to note that passphrase-based selected for a protocol run. Some considerations for the Passphrase
encryption is generally limited in the security that it provides profile follow.
despite the use of salt and iteration count in PBKDF2 to increase the
complexity of attack. Implementations SHOULD therefore take The passphrase-based key wrap profile SHOULD depend upon the PBKDF2
additional measures to strengthen the security of the passphrase- function from [PKCS-5] to generate an encryption key from a
based key wrap profile. The following measures SHOULD be considered passphrase and salt string. It is important to note that passphrase-
where applicable: based encryption is generally limited in the security that it
provides despite the use of salt and iteration count in PBKDF2 to
increase the complexity of attack. Implementations SHOULD therefore
take additional measures to strengthen the security of the
passphrase-based key wrap profile. The following measures SHOULD be
considered where applicable:
o The passphrase SHOULD be selected well, and usage guidelines such o The passphrase SHOULD be selected well, and usage guidelines such
as the ones in [NIST-PWD] SHOULD be taken into account. as the ones in [NIST-PWD] SHOULD be taken into account.
o A different passphrase SHOULD be used for every key initialization o A different passphrase SHOULD be used for every key initialization
wherever possible (the use of a global passphrase for a batch of wherever possible (the use of a global passphrase for a batch of
cryptographic modules SHOULD be avoided, for example). One way to cryptographic modules SHOULD be avoided, for example). One way to
achieve this is to use randomly-generated passphrases. achieve this is to use randomly-generated passphrases.
o The passphrase SHOULD be protected well if stored on the server o The passphrase SHOULD be protected well if stored on the server
and/or on the cryptographic module and SHOULD be delivered to the and/or on the cryptographic module and SHOULD be delivered to the
device's user using secure methods. device's user using secure methods.
o User pre-authentication SHOULD be implemented to ensure that o User per-authentication SHOULD be implemented to ensure that
K_TOKEN is not delivered to a rogue recipient. K_TOKEN is not delivered to a rogue recipient.
o The iteration count in PBKDF2 SHOULD be high to impose more work o The iteration count in PBKDF2 SHOULD be high to impose more work
for an attacker using brute-force methods (see [PKCS-5] for for an attacker using brute-force methods (see [PKCS-5] for
recommendations). However, it MUST be noted that the higher the recommendations). However, it MUST be noted that the higher the
count, the more work is required on the legitimate cryptographic count, the more work is required on the legitimate cryptographic
module to decrypt the newly delivered K_TOKEN. Servers MAY use module to decrypt the newly delivered K_TOKEN. Servers MAY use
relatively low iteration counts to accommodate devices with relatively low iteration counts to accommodate devices with
limited processing power such as some PDA and cell phones when limited processing power such as some PDA and cell phones when
other security measures are implemented and the security of the other security measures are implemented and the security of the
passphrase-based key wrap method is not weakened. passphrase-based key wrap method is not weakened.
o Transport level security (e.g. TLS) SHOULD be used where possible o Transport level security (e.g. TLS) SHOULD be used where possible
to protect a 2-pass protocol run. Transport level security to protect a two-pass protocol run. Transport level security
provides a second layer of protection for the newly generated provides a second layer of protection for the newly generated
K_TOKEN. K_TOKEN.
10. Internationalization Considerations 10. Internationalization Considerations
The DSKPP protocol is mostly meant for machine-to-machine The DSKPP protocol is mostly meant for machine-to-machine
communications; as such, most of its elements are tokens not meant communications; as such, most of its elements are tokens not meant
for direct human consumption. If these tokens are presented to the for direct human consumption. If these tokens are presented to the
end user, some localization may need to occur. DSKPP exchanges end user, some localization may need to occur. DSKPP exchanges
information using XML. All XML processors are required to understand information using XML. All XML processors are required to understand
UTF-8 and UTF-16 encoding, and therefore all DSKPP clients and UTF-8 and UTF-16 encoding, and therefore all DSKPP clients and
servers MUST understand UTF-8 and UTF-16 encoded XML. Additionally, servers MUST understand UTF-8 and UTF-16 encoded XML. Additionally,
DSKPP servers and clients MUST NOT encode XML with encodings other DSKPP servers and clients MUST NOT encode XML with encodings other
than UTF-8 or UTF-16. than UTF-8 or UTF-16.
11. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
This document calls for registration of new URNs within the IETF sub- This document calls for registration of new URNs within the IETF sub-
namespace per RFC3553 [RFC3553]. The following URNs are RECOMMENDED: namespace per RFC3553 [RFC3553]. The following URNs are RECOMMENDED:
o DSKPP XML schema: "urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol"
o DSKPP XML namespace: "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol" o DSKPP XML schema:
"urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
o DSKPP XML namespace: "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
12. Intellectual Property Considerations 12. Intellectual Property Considerations
RSA and RSA Security are registered trademarks or trademarks of RSA RSA and RSA Security are registered trademarks or trademarks of RSA
Security Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. The names Security Inc. in the United States and/or other countries. The names
of other products and services mentioned may be the trademarks of of other products and services mentioned may be the trademarks of
their respective owners. their respective owners.
13. Contributors 13. Contributors
This work is based on information contained in [RFC4758], authored by This work is based on information contained in [RFC4758], authored by
Magnus Nystrom, with enhancements (esp. Client Authentication, and Magnus Nystrom, with enhancements (esp. Client Authentication, and
support for multiple key container formats) from an individual support for multiple key package formats) from an individual
Internet-Draft co-authored by Mingliang Pei and Salah Machani. Internet-Draft co-authored by Mingliang Pei and Salah Machani.
We would like to thank Shuh Chang for contributing the DSKPP object We would like to thank Shuh Chang for contributing the DSKPP object
model, and Philip Hoyer for his work in aligning DSKPP and PSKC model, and Philip Hoyer for his work in aligning DSKPP and PSKC
schemas. schemas.
We would also like to thank Hannes Tschofenig for his draft reviews, We would also like to thank Hannes Tschofenig for his draft reviews,
feedback, and text contributions. feedback, and text contributions.
14. Acknowledgements 14. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following for review of previous DSKPP We would like to thank the following for review of previous DSKPP
document versions: document versions:
o Lakshminath Dondeti (Review December 2007)
o Dr. Ulrike Meyer (Review June 2007) o Dr. Ulrike Meyer (Review June 2007)
o Niklas Neumann (Review June 2007) o Niklas Neumann (Review June 2007)
o Shuh Chang (Review June 2007) o Shuh Chang (Review June 2007)
o Hannes Tschofenig (Review June 2007 and again in August 2007) o Hannes Tschofenig (Review June 2007 and again in August 2007)
o Sean Turner (Review August 2007) o Sean Turner (Review August 2007)
o John Linn (Review August 2007) o John Linn (Review August 2007)
o Philip Hoyer (Review September 2007) o Philip Hoyer (Review September 2007)
o Thomas Roessler (Review November 2007)
o Lakshminath Dondeti (Comments December 2007)
o Pasi Eronen (Comments December 2007)
We would also like to thank the following for their input to selected We would also like to thank the following for their input to selected
design aspects of the DSKPP protocol: design aspects of the DSKPP protocol:
o Anders Rundgren (Key Container Format and Client Authentication o Anders Rundgren (Key Package Format and Client Authentication
Data) Data)
o Thomas Roessler (HTTP Binding)
o Hannes Tschofenig (HTTP Binding) o Hannes Tschofenig (HTTP Binding)
o Phillip Hallam-Baker (Registry for Algorithms) o Phillip Hallam-Baker (Registry for Algorithms)
Finally, we would like to thank Robert Griffin for opening Finally, we would like to thank Robert Griffin for opening
communication channels for us with the IEEE P1619.3 Key Management communication channels for us with the IEEE P1619.3 Key Management
Group, and facilitating our groups in staying informed of potential Group, and facilitating our groups in staying informed of potential
areas (esp. key provisioning and global key identifiers of areas (esp. key provisioning and global key identifiers of
collaboration) of collaboration. collaboration) of collaboration.
15. References 15. References
15.1. Normative references 15.1. Normative references
[PKCS-1] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Cryptography Standard", PKCS #1
Version 2.1, June 2002,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[PKCS-5] RSA Laboratories, "Password-Based Cryptography Standard",
PKCS #5 Version 2.0, March 1999,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[PKCS-5-XML]
RSA Laboratories, "XML Schema for PKCS #5 Version 2.0",
PKCS #5 Version 2.0 Amd.1 (FINAL DRAFT), October 2006,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[RFC2119] "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>.
[UNICODE] Davis, M. and M. Duerst, "Unicode Normalization Forms", [UNICODE] Davis, M. and M. Duerst, "Unicode Normalization Forms",
March 2001, March 2001,
<http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr15/ <http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr15/
tr15-21.html>. tr15-21.html>.
[XMLDSIG] W3C, "XML Signature Syntax and Processing", [XMLDSIG] W3C, "XML Signature Syntax and Processing",
W3C Recommendation, February 2002, W3C Recommendation, February 2002,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/>.
[XMLENC] W3C, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", [XMLENC] W3C, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing",
skipping to change at page 71, line 29 skipping to change at page 73, line 5
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, February 2004, <http:// Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, February 2004, <http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/ csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/
fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>. fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf>.
[FIPS197-AES] [FIPS197-AES]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/ (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>. publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.
[FSE2003] Iwata, T. and K. Kurosawa, "OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC. In Fast [ISO3309] "ISO Information Processing Systems - Data Communication -
Software Encryption", FSE 2003, Springer-Verlag , 2003, High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Structure",
<http://crypt.cis.ibaraki.ac.jp/omac/docs/omac.pdf>. IS 3309, 3rd Edition, October 1984.
[NIST-PWD] [NIST-PWD]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Password National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Password
Usage", FIPS 112, May 1985, Usage", FIPS 112, May 1985,
<http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip112.htm>. <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip112.htm>.
[PKCS-1] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Cryptography Standard", PKCS #1 [NIST-SP800-38B]
Version 2.1, June 2002, International Organization for Standardization,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>. "Recommendations for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication", NIST SP800-38B, May 2005, <
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/
SP_800-38B.pdf>.
[NIST-SP800-57]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Key Management - Part I: General
(Revised)", NIST 800-57, March 2007, <http://
csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/
sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf>.
[PKCS-11] RSA Laboratories, "Cryptographic Token Interface [PKCS-11] RSA Laboratories, "Cryptographic Token Interface
Standard", PKCS #11 Version 2.20, June 2004, Standard", PKCS #11 Version 2.20, June 2004,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>. <http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[PKCS-12] "Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard", PKCS #12 [PKCS-12] "Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard", PKCS #12
Version 1.0, 2005, Version 1.0, 2005,
<ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/ <ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/
pkcs-12v1.pdf>. pkcs-12v1.pdf>.
[PKCS-5] RSA Laboratories, "Password-Based Cryptography Standard", [PSKC] "Portable Symmetric Key Container", 2008, <http://
PKCS #5 Version 2.0, March 1999,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[PKCS-5-XML]
RSA Laboratories, "XML Schema for PKCS #5 Version 2.0",
PKCS #5 Version 2.0 Amd.1 (FINAL DRAFT), October 2006,
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/>.
[PSKC] "Portable Symmetric Key Container", 2005, <http://
www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-hoyer-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container- draft-hoyer-keyprov-portable-symmetric-key-container-
00.txt>. 03.txt>.
[RFC2104] Krawzcyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawzcyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999, Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999,
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>. <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002. April 2002.
[RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An [RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
Parameters", RFC 3553, BCP 73, June 2003. Parameters", RFC 3553, BCP 73, June 2003.
[RFC4758] RSA, The Security Division of EMC, "Cryptographic Token [RFC4758] RSA, The Security Division of EMC, "Cryptographic Token
Key Initialization Protocol (CT-KIP)", November 2006, Key Initialization Protocol (CT-KIP)", November 2006,
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4758.txt>. <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4758.txt>.
[SKPC-ASN.1]
"Symmetric Key Package Content Type", 2007, <http://
www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-keyprov-symmetrickeyformat-01.txt>.
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
This appendix contains example messages that illustrate parameters, This appendix contains example messages that illustrate parameters,
encoding, and semantics in four-and two- pass DSKPP exchanges. The encoding, and semantics in four-and two- pass DSKPP exchanges. The
examples are written using XML, and are syntactically correct. MAC examples are written using XML, and are syntactically correct. MAC
and cipher values are fictitious however. and cipher values are fictitious however.
A.1. Trigger Message A.1. Trigger Message
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvTrigger Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvTrigger Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:InitializationTrigger> <dskpp:InitializationTrigger>
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:KeyID>SE9UUDAwMDAwMDAx</dskpp:KeyID> <dskpp:KeyID>SE9UUDAwMDAwMDAx</dskpp:KeyID>
<dskpp:TokenPlatformInfo KeyLocation="Hardware" <dskpp:TokenPlatformInfo KeyLocation="Hardware"
skipping to change at page 74, line 4 skipping to change at page 76, line 6
AlgorithmLocation="Software"/> AlgorithmLocation="Software"/>
<dskpp:TriggerNonce>112dsdfwf312asder394jw==</dskpp:TriggerNonce> <dskpp:TriggerNonce>112dsdfwf312asder394jw==</dskpp:TriggerNonce>
<dskpp:ServerUrl>https://www.somekeyprovservice.com/ <dskpp:ServerUrl>https://www.somekeyprovservice.com/
</dskpp:ServerUrl> </dskpp:ServerUrl>
</dskpp:InitializationTrigger> </dskpp:InitializationTrigger>
</dskpp:KeyProvTrigger> </dskpp:KeyProvTrigger>
A.2. Four-Pass Protocol A.2. Four-Pass Protocol
A.2.1. <KeyProvClientHello> Without a Preceding Trigger A.2.1. <KeyProvClientHello> Without a Preceding Trigger
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes> <dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
skipping to change at page 74, line 37 skipping to change at page 76, line 38
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> <dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants><dskpp:FourPass/> <dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants><dskpp:FourPass/>
</dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> </dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> <dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
</dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> </dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
A.2.2. <KeyProvClientHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger A.2.2. <KeyProvClientHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:KeyID>SE9UUDAwMDAwMDAx</dskpp:KeyID> <dskpp:KeyID>SE9UUDAwMDAwMDAx</dskpp:KeyID>
<dskpp:TriggerNonce>112dsdfwf312asder394jw==</dskpp:TriggerNonce> <dskpp:TriggerNonce>112dsdfwf312asder394jw==</dskpp:TriggerNonce>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes> <dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes>
skipping to change at page 75, line 39 skipping to change at page 77, line 39
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> <dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants><dskpp:FourPass/> <dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants><dskpp:FourPass/>
</dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> </dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> <dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
</dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> </dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
A.2.3. <KeyProvServerHello> Without a Preceding Trigger A.2.3. <KeyProvServerHello> Without a Preceding Trigger
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerHello Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" Status="Success" <dskpp:KeyProvServerHello Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" Status="Continue"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:KeyType> <dskpp:KeyType>
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/otps/schemas/2005/09/otps-wst#SecurID-AES http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/otps/schemas/2005/09/otps-wst#SecurID-AES
</dskpp:KeyType> </dskpp:KeyType>
<dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm> <dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm> </dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm>
<dskpp:MacAlgorithm> <dskpp:MacAlgorithm>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:MacAlgorithm> </dskpp:MacAlgorithm>
<dskpp:EncryptionKey> <dskpp:EncryptionKey>
<ds:KeyName>KEY-1</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>KEY-1</ds:KeyName>
</dskpp:EncryptionKey> </dskpp:EncryptionKey>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
<dskpp:Payload> <dskpp:Payload>
<dskpp:Nonce>qw2ewasde312asder394jw==</dskpp:Nonce> <dskpp:Nonce>qw2ewasde312asder394jw==</dskpp:Nonce>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerHello> </dskpp:KeyProvServerHello>
A.2.4. <KeyProvServerHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger A.2.4. <KeyProvServerHello> Assuming a Preceding Trigger
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerHello Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" <dskpp:KeyProvServerHello Version="1.0" SessionID="4114"
Status="Success" Status="Continue"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:KeyType> <dskpp:KeyType>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:otpalg#SecurID-AES urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:otpalg#SecurID-AES
</dskpp:KeyType> </dskpp:KeyType>
<dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm> <dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm> </dskpp:EncryptionAlgorithm>
<dskpp:MacAlgorithm> <dskpp:MacAlgorithm>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:MacAlgorithm> </dskpp:MacAlgorithm>
<dskpp:EncryptionKey> <dskpp:EncryptionKey>
<ds:KeyName>KEY-1</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>KEY-1</ds:KeyName>
</dskpp:EncryptionKey> </dskpp:EncryptionKey>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
<dskpp:Payload> <dskpp:Payload>
<dskpp:Nonce>qw2ewasde312asder394jw==</dskpp:Nonce> <dskpp:Nonce>qw2ewasde312asder394jw==</dskpp:Nonce>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
<dskpp:Mac <dskpp:Mac
MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes"> MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes">
cXcycmFuZG9tMzEyYXNkZXIzOTRqdw== cXcycmFuZG9tMzEyYXNkZXIzOTRqdw==
</dskpp:Mac> </dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerHello> </dskpp:KeyProvServerHello>
A.2.5. <KeyProvClientNonce> Using Default Encryption A.2.5. <KeyProvClientNonce> Using Default Encryption
This message contains the nonce chosen by the cryptographic module, This message contains the nonce chosen by the cryptographic module,
R_C, encrypted by the specified encryption key and encryption R_C, encrypted by the specified encryption key and encryption
algorithm. algorithm.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientNonce Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" <dskpp:KeyProvClientNonce Version="1.0" SessionID="4114"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0">
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:EncryptedNonce>VXENc+Um/9/NvmYKiHDLaErK0gk= <dskpp:EncryptedNonce>VXENc+Um/9/NvmYKiHDLaErK0gk=
</dskpp:EncryptedNonce> </dskpp:EncryptedNonce>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID> <dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount> <dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientNonce> </dskpp:KeyProvClientNonce>
A.2.6. <KeyProvServerFinished> Using Default Encryption A.2.6. <KeyProvServerFinished> Using Default Encryption
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" Status="Success" <dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" Status="Success"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0">
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" <dskpp:KeyPackage>
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0 <dskpp:KeyPackage Version="1.0">
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd"> <pskc:MACAlgorithm>http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1
<dskpp:KeyContainer> </pskc:MACAlgorithm>
<dskpp:KeyContainer Version="1.0">
<pskc:DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/>
<pskc:Device> <pskc:Device>
<pskc:Key <pskc:Key
KeyAlgorithm="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/otps/schemas/2005/09/ KeyAlgorithm="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/otps/schemas/2005/09/
otps-wst#SecurID-AES" otps-wst#SecurID-AES"
KeyId="XL0000000001234"> KeyId="XL0000000001234">
<pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer> <pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer>
<pskc:Usage OTP="true"> <pskc:Usage OTP="true">
<pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/> <pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/>
</pskc:Usage> </pskc:Usage>
<pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName> <pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName>
<pskc:Data Name="TIME"> <pskc:Data Name="TIME">
<pskc:Value>AAAAADuaygA=</pskc:Value> <pskc:PlainValue>AAAAADuaygA=</pskc:PlainValue>
</pskc:Data> </pskc:Data>
<pskc:Expiry>10/30/2012</pskc:Expiry> <pskc:ExpiryDate>2012-12-31T00:00:00</pskc:ExpiryDate>
</pskc:Key> </pskc:Key>
</pskc:Device> </pskc:Device>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
<dskpp:Mac <dskpp:Mac
MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes"> MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes">
miidfasde312asder394jw== miidfasde312asder394jw==
</dskpp:Mac> </dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished> </dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished>
A.3. Two-Pass Protocol A.3. Two-Pass Protocol
A.3.1. Example Using the Key Transport Profile A.3.1. Example Using the Key Transport Profile
The client indicates support all the Key Transport, Key Wrap, and The client indicates support all the Key Transport, Key Wrap, and
Passphrase-Based Key Wrap profiles (see Section 3.2.2): Passphrase-Based Key Wrap profiles:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce> <dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes> <dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
skipping to change at page 80, line 39 skipping to change at page 82, line 35
</dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> <dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> <dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:TwoPass> <dskpp:TwoPass>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
<dskpp:Payload xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType"> <dskpp:Payload>
<ds:KeyInfo xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType">
<ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
<dskpp:Payload xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType"> <dskpp:Payload>
<ds:KeyInfo xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType">
<ds:X509Data> <ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate>miib</ds:X509Certificate> <ds:X509Certificate>miib</ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data> </ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
</dskpp:TwoPass> </dskpp:TwoPass>
</dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> </dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> <dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
</dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> </dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID> <dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount> <dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
In this example, the server responds to the previous request using In this example, the server responds to the previous request using
the key transport profile. the key transport profile.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" SessionID="4114" <dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" SessionID="4114"
Status="Success" Status="Success"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0 <dskpp:KeyPackage>
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:KeyContainer>
<dskpp:KeyContainer Version="1.0">
<dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID> <dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID>
<dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#transport
</dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
<pskc:EncryptionMethod <dskpp:KeyPackage Version="1.0">
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/05/xmlenc#rsa_1_5"> <pskc:EncryptionKey>
<pskc:KeyInfo>
<ds:X509Data> <ds:X509Data>
<ds:X509Certificate>miib</ds:X509Certificate> <ds:X509Certificate>miib</ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data> </ds:X509Data>
</pskc:KeyInfo> </pskc:EncryptionKey>
</pskc:EncryptionMethod>
<pskc:DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/>
<pskc:Device> <pskc:Device>
<pskc:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ACME</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>0755225266</pskc:SerialNo>
</pskc:DeviceId>
<pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp" <pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp"
KeyId="SDU312345678"> KeyId="0755225266">
<pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer> <pskc:Issuer>AnIssuer</pskc:Issuer>
<pskc:Usage OTP="true"> <pskc:Usage OTP="true">
<pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/> <pskc:ResponseFormat Length="8" Format="DECIMAL"/>
</pskc:Usage> </pskc:Usage>
<pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName>
<pskc:Data Name="SECRET">
<pskc:Value>
7JHUyp3azOkqJENSsh6b2vxXzwGBYypzJxEr+ikQAa229KV/BgZhGA==
</pskc:Value>
<pskc:ValueDigest>
i8j+kpbfKQsSlwmJYS99lQ==
</pskc:ValueDigest>
</pskc:Data>
<pskc:Data Name="COUNTER"> <pskc:Data Name="COUNTER">
<pskc:Value>AAAAAAAAAAA=</pskc:Value> <pskc:PlainValue>AprkuA==</pskc:PlainValue>
</pskc:Data>
<pskc:Data Name="SECRET">
<pskc:EncryptedValue Id="ED">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5"/>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=
</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</pskc:EncryptedValue>
</pskc:Data> </pskc:Data>
<pskc:Expiry>10/30/2012</pskc:Expiry>
</pskc:Key> </pskc:Key>
</pskc:Device> </pskc:Device>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
<dskpp:Mac <dskpp:Mac
MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes"> MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes">
miidfasde312asder394jw== miidfasde312asder394jw==
</dskpp:Mac> </dskpp:Mac>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished> </dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished>
A.3.2. Example Using the Key Wrap Profile A.3.2. Example Using the Key Wrap Profile
The client sends a request that specifies a shared key to protect the The client sends a request that specifies a shared key to protect the
K_TOKEN, and the server responds using the Key Wrap Profile. K_TOKEN, and the server responds using the Key Wrap Profile.
Authentication data in this example is basing on an authentication Authentication data in this example is based on an authentication
code rather than a device certificate. code rather than a device certificate.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:pkcs-5= xmlns:pkcs-5=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#" "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce> <dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes> <dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
skipping to change at page 83, line 41 skipping to change at page 85, line 34
</dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedEncryptionAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> <dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> <dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:TwoPass> <dskpp:TwoPass>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
<dskpp:Payload xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType"> <dskpp:Payload>
<ds:KeyInfo xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType">
<ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
</dskpp:TwoPass> </dskpp:TwoPass>
</dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> </dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> <dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
</dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> </dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID> <dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount> <dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
In this example, the server responds to the previous request using In this example, the server responds to the previous request using
skipping to change at page 84, line 16 skipping to change at page 86, line 11
<dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount> <dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
In this example, the server responds to the previous request using In this example, the server responds to the previous request using
the key wrap profile. the key wrap profile.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" Status="Success" <dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" Status="Success"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0 <dskpp:KeyPackage>
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:KeyContainer>
<dskpp:KeyContainer Version="1.0">
<dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID> <dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID>
<dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap
</dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
<pskc:EncryptionMethod <dskpp:KeyPackage Version="1.0">
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"> <pskc:EncryptionKey>
<pskc:KeyInfo> <ds:KeyName>PRE_SHARED_KEY</ds:KeyName>
<ds:KeyName>Key-001</ds:KeyName> </pskc:EncryptionKey>
</pskc:KeyInfo> <pskc:MACAlgorithm>http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1
</pskc:EncryptionMethod> </pskc:MACAlgorithm>
<pskc:DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/>
<pskc:Device> <pskc:Device>
<pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp" <pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp"
KeyId="SDU312345678"> KeyId="312345678">
<pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer> <pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer>
<pskc:Usage OTP="true"> <pskc:Usage OTP="true">
<pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/> <pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/>
</pskc:Usage> </pskc:Usage>
<pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName> <pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName>
<pskc:Data Name="SECRET"> <pskc:Data Name="SECRET">
<pskc:Value> <pskc:EncryptedValue>
JSPUyp3azOkqJENSsh6b2hdXz1WBYypzJxEr+ikQAa22M6V/BgZhRg== <xenc:EncryptionMethod
</pskc:Value> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc"/>
<pskc:ValueDigest> <xenc:CipherData>
i8j+kpbfKQsSlwmJYS99lQ== <xenc:CipherValue>
</pskc:ValueDigest> kyzrWTJuhJKQHhZtf2CWbKC5H3LdfAPvKzHHQ8SdxyE=
</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</pskc:EncryptedValue>
<pskc:ValueMAC>cwJI898rRpGBytTqCAsegaQqPZA=
</pskc:ValueMAC>
</pskc:Data> </pskc:Data>
<pskc:Data Name="COUNTER"> <pskc:Data Name="COUNTER">
<pskc:Value>AAAAAAAAAAA=</pskc:Value> <pskc:PlainValue>AAAAAAAAAAA=</pskc:PlainValue>
</pskc:Data> </pskc:Data>
<pskc:Expiry>10/30/2012</pskc:Expiry> <pskc:ExpiryDate>2012-12-31T00:00:00</pskc:ExpiryDate>
</pskc:Key> </pskc:Key>
</pskc:Device> </pskc:Device>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
<dskpp:Mac <dskpp:Mac
MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes"> MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes">
miidfasde312asder394jw== miidfasde312asder394jw==
</dskpp:Mac> </dskpp:Mac>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished> </dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished>
A.3.3. Example Using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile A.3.3. Example Using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile
The client sends a request similar to that in Appendix A.3.1 with The client sends a request similar to that in Appendix A.3.1 with
authentication data basing on an authentication code, and the server authentication data based on an authentication code, and the server
responds using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile. The responds using the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile. The
authentication data is set in clear text when it is sent over a authentication data is set in clear text when it is sent over a
secure transport channel such as TLS. secure transport channel such as TLS.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvClientHello Version="1.0"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:pkcs-5= xmlns:pkcs-5=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#" "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> <dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:DeviceId> <dskpp:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer> <pskc:Manufacturer>ManufacturerABC</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo> <pskc:SerialNo>XL0000000001234</pskc:SerialNo>
<pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model> <pskc:Model>U2</pskc:Model>
</dskpp:DeviceId> </dskpp:DeviceId>
</dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData> </dskpp:DeviceIdentifierData>
<dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce> <dskpp:ClientNonce>xwQzwEl0CjPAiQeDxwRJdQ==</dskpp:ClientNonce>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes> <dskpp:SupportedKeyTypes>
<dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp <dskpp:Algorithm>http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp
skipping to change at page 86, line 34 skipping to change at page 88, line 26
<dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> <dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:Algorithm> <dskpp:Algorithm>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes
</dskpp:Algorithm> </dskpp:Algorithm>
</dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms> </dskpp:SupportedMacAlgorithms>
<dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> <dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:TwoPass> <dskpp:TwoPass>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#wrap
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
<dskpp:Payload xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType"> <dskpp:Payload>
<ds:KeyInfo xsi:type="ds:KeyInfoType">
<ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>Key_001</ds:KeyName>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</dskpp:Payload> </dskpp:Payload>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap
</dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:SupportedKeyProtectionMethod>
</dskpp:TwoPass> </dskpp:TwoPass>
</dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants> </dskpp:SupportedProtocolVariants>
<dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> <dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> <dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#KeyContainer
</dskpp:KeyContainerFormat> </dskpp:KeyPackageFormat>
</dskpp:SupportedKeyContainers> </dskpp:SupportedKeyPackages>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID> <dskpp:ClientID>31300257</dskpp:ClientID>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount> <dskpp:IterationCount>512</dskpp:IterationCount>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvClientHello> </dskpp:KeyProvClientHello>
In this example, the server responds to the previous request using In this example, the server responds to the previous request using
the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile. the Passphrase-Based Key Wrap Profile.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0" <dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished Version="1.0"
SessionID="4114" Status="Success" SessionID="4114" Status="Success"
xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0" xmlns:dskpp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:container:1.0"
xmlns:pkcs-5="http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:protocol:1.0 <dskpp:KeyPackage>
keyprov-dskpp-1.0.xsd">
<dskpp:KeyContainer>
<dskpp:KeyContainer Version="1.0">
<dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID> <dskpp:ServerID>https://www.somedskppservice.com/</dskpp:ServerID>
<dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> <dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyprov:protocol#passphrase-wrap
</dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod> </dskpp:KeyProtectionMethod>
<pskc:EncryptionMethod <dskpp:KeyPackage Version="1.0">
Algorithm="http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/ <pskc:EncryptionKey>
pkcs-5#pbes2"> <pskc:DerivedKey Id="#Passphrase1">
<pskc:PBEEncryptionParam pskc:CarriedKeyName>Passphrase1</pskc:CarriedKeyName>
EncryptionAlgorithm= <pskc:KeyDerivationMethod
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128-cbc"> Algorithm=
<pskc:PBESalt>y6TzckeLRQw=</pskc:PBESalt> "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2">
<pskc:PBEIterationCount>1024</pskc:PBEIterationCount> <pkcs-5:Parameters xsi:type="pkcs-5:PBKDF2ParameterType">
</pskc:PBEEncryptionParam> <Salt>
<pskc:IV>c2FtcGxlaXY=</pskc:IV> <Specified>Df3dRAhjGh8=</Specified>
</pskc:EncryptionMethod> </Salt>
<pskc:DigestMethod <IterationCount>2000</IterationCount>
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/> <KeyLength>16</KeyLength>
<PRF/>
</pkcs-5:Parameters>
</pskc:KeyDerivationMethod>
<xenc:ReferenceList>
<xenc:DataReference URI="#ED"/>
</xenc:ReferenceList>
</pskc:DerivedKey>
</pskc:EncryptionKey>
<pskc:Device> <pskc:Device>
<pskc:DeviceId>
<pskc:Manufacturer>ACME</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>0755225266</pskc:SerialNo>
</pskc:DeviceId>
<pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp" <pskc:Key KeyAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/pskc#hotp"
KeyId="SDU312345678"> KeyId="0755225266">
<pskc:Issuer>CredentialIssuer</pskc:Issuer> <pskc:Issuer>AnIssuer</pskc:Issuer>
<pskc:Usage OTP="true"> <pskc:Usage OTP="true">
<pskc:ResponseFormat Format="DECIMAL" Length="6"/> <pskc:ResponseFormat Length="8" Format="DECIMAL"/>
</pskc:Usage> </pskc:Usage>
<pskc:FriendlyName>MyFirstToken</pskc:FriendlyName>
<pskc:Data Name="SECRET">
<pskc:Value>
JSPUyp3azOkqJENSsh6b2hdXz1WBYypzJxEr+ikQAa22M6V/BgZhRg==
</pskc:Value>
<pskc:ValueDigest>
i8j+kpbfKQsSlwmJYS99lQ==
</pskc:ValueDigest>
</pskc:Data>
<pskc:Data Name="COUNTER"> <pskc:Data Name="COUNTER">
<pskc:Value>AAAAAAAAAAA=</pskc:Value> <pskc:PlainValue>AprkuA==</pskc:PlainValue>
</pskc:Data>
<pskc:Data Name="SECRET">
<pskc:EncryptedValue Id="ED">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128"/>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>rf4dx3rvEPO0vKtKL14NbeVu8nk=
</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</pskc:EncryptedValue>
</pskc:Data> </pskc:Data>
<pskc:Expiry>10/30/2012</pskc:Expiry>
</pskc:Key> </pskc:Key>
</pskc:Device> </pskc:Device>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
</dskpp:KeyContainer> </dskpp:KeyPackage>
<dskpp:Mac <dskpp:Mac
MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes"> MacAlgorithm="http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes">
miidfasde312asder394jw== miidfasde312asder394jw==
</dskpp:Mac> </dskpp:Mac>
<dskpp:AuthenticationData> <dskpp:AuthenticationData>
<dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> <dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
<dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac> <dskpp:Mac>4bRJf9xXd3KchKoTenHJiw==</dskpp:Mac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac> </dskpp:AuthenticationCodeMac>
</dskpp:AuthenticationData> </dskpp:AuthenticationData>
</dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished> </dskpp:KeyProvServerFinished>
skipping to change at page 89, line 26 skipping to change at page 91, line 28
CKA_SENSITIVE MUST be set to CK_TRUE and CKA_EXTRACTABLE MUST CKA_SENSITIVE MUST be set to CK_TRUE and CKA_EXTRACTABLE MUST
also be set to CK_TRUE), and also to be used for further key also be set to CK_TRUE), and also to be used for further key
derivation. From K, a token key K_TOKEN of suitable type is derivation. From K, a token key K_TOKEN of suitable type is
derived by calling C_DeriveKey using the PKCS #11 mechanism derived by calling C_DeriveKey using the PKCS #11 mechanism
CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY and setting the CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS to CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY and setting the CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS to
the first bit of the generic secret key (i.e. set to 0). the first bit of the generic secret key (i.e. set to 0).
Likewise, a MAC key K_MAC is derived from K_PROV by calling Likewise, a MAC key K_MAC is derived from K_PROV by calling
C_DeriveKey using the CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism, C_DeriveKey using the CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism,
this time setting CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS to the length of K_PROV this time setting CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS to the length of K_PROV
(in bits) divided by two. (in bits) divided by two.
2. The server wraps K_PROV with either the token's public key 2. The server wraps K_PROV with either the public key of the
K_CLIENT, the shared secret key K_SHARED, or the derived DSKPP client or device, the pre-shared secret key, or the
shared secret key K_DERIVED by using C_WrapKey. If use of derived shared secret key by using C_WrapKey. If use of the
the DSKPP key wrap algorithm has been negotiated then the DSKPP key wrap algorithm has been negotiated then the
CKM_KIP_WRAP mechanism MUST be used to wrap K. When calling CKM_KIP_WRAP mechanism MUST be used to wrap K. When calling
C_WrapKey, the hKey handle in the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure C_WrapKey, the hKey handle in the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure
MUST be set to NULL_PTR. The pSeed parameter in the MUST be set to NULL_PTR. The pSeed parameter in the
CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST point to the nonce R provided by CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST point to the nonce R provided by
the DSKPP client, and the ulSeedLen parameter MUST indicate the DSKPP client, and the ulSeedLen parameter MUST indicate
the length of R. The hWrappingKey parameter in the call to the length of R. The hWrappingKey parameter in the call to
C_WrapKey MUST be set to refer to the wrapping key. C_WrapKey MUST be set to refer to the key wrapping key.
3. Next, the server needs to calculate a MAC using K_MAC. If 3. Next, the server needs to calculate a MAC using K_MAC. If
use of the DSKPP MAC algorithm has been negotiated, then the use of the DSKPP MAC algorithm has been negotiated, then the
MAC is calculated by calling C_SignInit with the CKM_KIP_MAC MAC is calculated by calling C_SignInit with the CKM_KIP_MAC
mechanism followed by a call to C_Sign. In the call to mechanism followed by a call to C_Sign. In the call to
C_SignInit, K_MAC MUST be the signature key, the hKey C_SignInit, K_MAC MUST be the signature key, the hKey
parameter in the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST be set to parameter in the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST be set to
NULL_PTR, the pSeed parameter of the CT_KIP_PARAMS structure NULL_PTR, the pSeed parameter of the CT_KIP_PARAMS structure
MUST be set to NULL_PTR, and the ulSeedLen parameter MUST be MUST be set to NULL_PTR, and the ulSeedLen parameter MUST be
set to zero. In the call to C_Sign, the pData parameter MUST set to zero. In the call to C_Sign, the pData parameter MUST
be set to the concatenation of the string ServerID and the be set to the concatenation of the string ServerID and the
nonce R, and the ulDataLen parameter MUST be set to the nonce R, and the ulDataLen parameter MUST be set to the
length of the concatenated string. The desired length of the length of the concatenated string. The desired length of the
MAC MUST be specified through the pulSignatureLen parameter MAC MUST be specified through the pulSignatureLen parameter
and MUST be set to the length of R. and MUST be set to the length of R.
4. If the server also needs to authenticate its message (due to 4. If the server also needs to authenticate its message (due to
an existing K_TOKEN being replaced), the server MUST an existing K_TOKEN being replaced), the server MUST
calculate a second MAC. Again, if use of the DSKPP MAC calculate a second MAC. Again, if use of the DSKPP MAC
algorithm has been negotiated, then the MAC is calculated by algorithm has been negotiated, then the MAC is calculated by
calling C_SignInit with the CKM_KIP_MAC mechanism followed by calling C_SignInit with the CKM_KIP_MAC mechanism followed by
a call to C_Sign. In this call to C_SignInit, the K_MAC a call to C_Sign. In this call to C_SignInit, the K_MAC'
existing before this DSKPP protocol run MUST be the signature existing before this DSKPP protocol run MUST be the signature
key, the hKey parameter in the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST key (the implementation may specify K_MAC' to be the value of
be set to NULL, the pSeed parameter of the CT_KIP_PARAMS the K_TOKEN that is being replaced, or a version of K_MAC
structure MUST be set to NULL_PTR, and the ulSeeidLen from the previous protocol run), the hKey parameter in the
parameter MUST be set to zero. In the call to C_Sign, the CK_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST be set to NULL, the pSeed
pData parameter MUST be set to the concatenation of the parameter of the CT_KIP_PARAMS structure MUST be set to
string ServerID and the nonce R, and the ulDataLen parameter NULL_PTR, and the ulSeedLen parameter MUST be set to zero.
MUST be set to the length of concatenated string. The In the call to C_Sign, the pData parameter MUST be set to the
desired length of the MAC MUST be specified through the concatenation of the string ServerID and the nonce R, and the
pulSignatureLen parameter and MUST be set to the length of R. ulDataLen parameter MUST be set to the length of concatenated
string. The desired length of the MAC MUST be specified
through the pulSignatureLen parameter and MUST be set to the
length of R.
5. The server sends its message to the client, including the 5. The server sends its message to the client, including the
wrapped key K, the MAC and possibly also the authenticating wrapped key K_TOKEN, the MAC and possibly also the
MAC. authenticating MAC.
c. On the client side, c. On the client side,
1. The client calls C_UnwrapKey to receive a handle to K. After 1. The client calls C_UnwrapKey to receive a handle to K. After
this, the client calls C_DeriveKey twice: Once to derive this, the client calls C_DeriveKey twice: Once to derive
K_TOKEN and once to derive K_MAC. The client MUST use the K_TOKEN and once to derive K_MAC. The client MUST use the
same mechanism (CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) and the same same mechanism (CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY) and the same
mechanism parameters as used by the server above. When mechanism parameters as used by the server above. When
calling C_UnwrapKey and C_DeriveKey, the pTemplate parameter calling C_UnwrapKey and C_DeriveKey, the pTemplate parameter
MUST be used to set additional key attributes in accordance MUST be used to set additional key attributes in accordance
with local policy and as negotiated and expressed in the with local policy and as negotiated and expressed in the
protocol. In particular, the value of the <KeyID> element in protocol. In particular, the value of the <KeyID> element in
skipping to change at page 91, line 4 skipping to change at page 93, line 6
ulSeedLen MUST be set to 0. The hKey parameter of ulSeedLen MUST be set to 0. The hKey parameter of
C_VerifyInit MUST refer to K_MAC. In the call to C_Verify, C_VerifyInit MUST refer to K_MAC. In the call to C_Verify,
pData MUST be set to the concatenation of the string ServerID pData MUST be set to the concatenation of the string ServerID
and the nonce R, and the ulDataLen parameter MUST be set to and the nonce R, and the ulDataLen parameter MUST be set to
the length of the concatenated string, pSignature to the MAC the length of the concatenated string, pSignature to the MAC
value received from the server, and ulSignatureLen to the value received from the server, and ulSignatureLen to the
length of the MAC. If the MAC does not verify the protocol length of the MAC. If the MAC does not verify the protocol
session ends with a failure. The token MUST be constructed session ends with a failure. The token MUST be constructed
to not "commit" to the new K_TOKEN or the new K_MAC unless to not "commit" to the new K_TOKEN or the new K_MAC unless
the MAC verifies. the MAC verifies.
3. If an authenticating MAC was received (REQUIRED if the new 3. If an authenticating MAC was received (REQUIRED if the new
K_TOKEN will replace an existing key on the token), then it K_TOKEN will replace an existing key on the token), then it
is verified in a similar vein but using the K_MAC associated is verified in a similar vein but using the K_MAC' associated
with this server and existing before the protocol run. with this server and existing before the protocol run (the
Again, if the MAC does not verify the protocol session ends implementation may specify K_MAC' to be the value of the
with a failure, and the token MUST be constructed no to K_TOKEN that is being replaced, or a version of K_MAC from
"commit" to the new K_TOKEN or the new K_MAC unless the MAC the previous protocol run). Again, if the MAC does not
verifies. verify the protocol session ends with a failure, and the
token MUST be constructed no to "commit" to the new K_TOKEN
or the new K_MAC unless the MAC verifies.
Appendix C. Example of DSKPP-PRF Realizations Appendix C. Example of DSKPP-PRF Realizations
C.1. Introduction C.1. Introduction
This example appendix defines DSKPP-PRF in terms of AES [FIPS197-AES] This example appendix defines DSKPP-PRF in terms of AES [FIPS197-AES]
and HMAC [RFC2104]. and HMAC [RFC2104].
C.2. DSKPP-PRF-AES C.2. DSKPP-PRF-AES
C.2.1. Identification C.2.1. Identification
For cryptographic modules supporting this realization of DSKPP-PRF, For cryptographic modules supporting this realization of DSKPP-PRF,
the following URL MAY be used to identify this algorithm in DSKPP: the following URL MAY be used to identify this algorithm in DSKPP:
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-aes-128
When this URL is used to identify the encryption algorithm to use, When this URL is used to identify the encryption algorithm to use,
the method for encryption of R_C values described in Section 3.5 MUST the method for encryption of R_C values described in Section 3.1.3
be used. MUST be used.
C.2.2. Definition C.2.2. Definition
DSKPP-PRF-AES (k, s, dsLen) DSKPP-PRF-AES (k, s, dsLen)
Input: Input:
k Encryption key to use k Encryption key to use
s Octet string consisting of randomizing material. The s Octet string consisting of randomizing material. The
length of the string s is sLen. length of the string s is sLen.
dsLen Desired length of the output dsLen Desired length of the output
Output: Output:
DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long
Steps: Steps:
skipping to change at page 92, line 9 skipping to change at page 94, line 13
Output: Output:
DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long
Steps: Steps:
1. Let bLen be the output block size of AES in octets: 1. Let bLen be the output block size of AES in octets:
bLen = (AES output block length in octets) bLen = (AES output block length in octets)
(normally, bLen = 16) (normally, bLen = 16)
2. If dsLen > (2**32 - 1) * bLen, output "derived data too long" and 2. If dsLen > (2**32 - 1) * bLen, output "derived data too long" and
stop stop
3. Let n be the number of bLen-octet blocks in the output data, 3. Let n be the number of bLen-octet blocks in the output data,
rounding up, and let j be the number of octets in the last block: rounding up, and let j be the number of octets in the last block:
n = ROUND( dsLen / bLen) n = CEILING( dsLen / bLen)
j = dsLen - (n - 1) * bLen j = dsLen - (n - 1) * bLen
4. For each block of the pseudorandom string DS, apply the function 4. For each block of the pseudorandom string DS, apply the function
F defined below to the key k, the string s and the block index to F defined below to the key k, the string s and the block index to
compute the block: compute the block:
B1 = F (k, s, 1) , B1 = F (k, s, 1) ,
B2 = F (k, s, 2) , B2 = F (k, s, 2) ,
... ...
Bn = F (k, s, n) Bn = F (k, s, n)
The function F is defined in terms of the OMAC1 construction from
[FSE2003], using AES as the block cipher:
F (k, s, i) = OMAC1-AES (k, INT (i) || s) The function F is defined in terms of the CMAC construction from
[NIST-SP800-38B], using AES as the block cipher:
F (k, s, i) = CMAC-AES (k, INT (i) || s)
where INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most where INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
significant octet first, and the output length of OMAC1 is set to significant octet first, and the output length of CMAC is set to
bLen. bLen.
Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dsLen octets to product Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dsLen octets to product
the desired data string DS: the desired data string DS:
DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1> DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1>
Output the derived data DS. Output the derived data DS.
C.2.3. Example C.2.3. Example
skipping to change at page 92, line 45 skipping to change at page 95, line 4
DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1> DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1>
Output the derived data DS. Output the derived data DS.
C.2.3. Example C.2.3. Example
If we assume that dsLen = 16, then: If we assume that dsLen = 16, then:
n = 16 / 16 = 1 n = 16 / 16 = 1
j = 16 - (1 - 1) * 16 = 16 j = 16 - (1 - 1) * 16 = 16
DS = B1 = F (k, s, 1) = OMAC1-AES (k, INT (1) || s) DS = B1 = F (k, s, 1) = CMAC-AES (k, INT (1) || s)
C.3. DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 C.3. DSKPP-PRF-SHA256
C.3.1. Identification C.3.1. Identification
For cryptographic modules supporting this realization of DSKPP-PRF, For cryptographic modules supporting this realization of DSKPP-PRF,
the following URL MAY be used to identify this algorithm in DSKPP: the following URL MAY be used to identify this algorithm in DSKPP:
http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-sha256 http://www.ietf.org/keyprov/dskpp#dskpp-prf-sha256
When this URL is used to identify the encryption algorithm to use, When this URL is used to identify the encryption algorithm to use,
the method for encryption of R_C values described in Section 3.5 MUST the method for encryption of R_C values described in Section 3.1.3
be used. MUST be used.
C.3.2. Definition C.3.2. Definition
DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 (k, s, dsLen) DSKPP-PRF-SHA256 (k, s, dsLen)
Input: Input:
k Encryption key to use k Encryption key to use
s Octet string consisting of randomizing material. The s Octet string consisting of randomizing material. The
length of the string s is sLen. length of the string s is sLen.
dsLen Desired length of the output dsLen Desired length of the output
Output: Output:
DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long
Steps: Steps:
skipping to change at page 93, line 39 skipping to change at page 95, line 43
DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long DS A pseudorandom string, dsLen-octets long
Steps: Steps:
1. Let bLen be the output size of SHA-256 in octets of [FIPS180-SHA] 1. Let bLen be the output size of SHA-256 in octets of [FIPS180-SHA]
(no truncation is done on the HMAC output): (no truncation is done on the HMAC output):
bLen = 32 bLen = 32
(normally, bLen = 16) (normally, bLen = 16)
2. If dsLen > (2**32 - 1) * bLen, output "derived data too long" and 2. If dsLen > (2**32 - 1) * bLen, output "derived data too long" and
stop stop
3. Let n be the number of bLen-octet blocks in the output data, 3. Let n be the number of bLen-octet blocks in the output data,
rounding up, and let j be the number of octets in the last block: rounding up, and let j be the number of octets in the last block:
n = ROUND( dsLen / bLen) n = CEILING( dsLen / bLen)
j = dsLen - (n - 1) * bLen j = dsLen - (n - 1) * bLen
4. For each block of the pseudorandom string DS, apply the function 4. For each block of the pseudorandom string DS, apply the function
F defined below to the key k, the string s and the block index to F defined below to the key k, the string s and the block index to
compute the block: compute the block:
B1 = F (k, s, 1) , B1 = F (k, s, 1) ,
B2 = F (k, s, 2) , B2 = F (k, s, 2) ,
... ...
Bn = F (k, s, n) Bn = F (k, s, n)
The function F is defined in terms of the HMAC construction from The function F is defined in terms of the HMAC construction from
[RFC2104], using SHA-256 as the digest algorithm: [RFC2104], using SHA-256 as the digest algorithm:
F (k, s, i) = HMAC-SHA256 (k, INT (i) || s) F (k, s, i) = HMAC-SHA256 (k, INT (i) || s)
where INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most where INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
significant octet first, and the output length of HMAC is set to significant octet first, and the output length of HMAC is set to
bLen. bLen.
Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dsLen octets to product Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dsLen octets to product
skipping to change at page 94, line 27 skipping to change at page 96, line 34
DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1> DS = B1 || B2 || ... || Bn<0..j-1>
Output the derived data DS. Output the derived data DS.
C.3.3. Example C.3.3. Example
If we assume that sLen = 256 (two 128-octet long values) and dsLen = If we assume that sLen = 256 (two 128-octet long values) and dsLen =
16, then: 16, then:
n = ROUND ( 16 / 32 ) = 1 n = CEILING( 16 / 32 ) = 1
j = 16 - (1 - 1) * 32 = 16 j = 16 - (1 - 1) * 32 = 16
B1 = F (k, s, 1) = HMAC-SHA256 (k, INT (1) || s) B1 = F (k, s, 1) = HMAC-SHA256 (k, INT (1) || s)
DS = B1<0 ... 15> DS = B1<0 ... 15>
That is, the result will be the first 16 octets of the HMAC output. That is, the result will be the first 16 octets of the HMAC output.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Andrea Doherty Andrea Doherty
RSA, The Security Division of EMC RSA, The Security Division of EMC
174 Middlesex Tpk. 174 Middlesex Tpk.
Bedford, MA 01730 Bedford, MA 01730
USA USA
Email: adoherty@rsa.com Email: andrea.doherty@rsa.com
Mingliang Pei Mingliang Pei
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
487 E. Middlefield Road 487 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043 Mountain View, CA 94043
USA USA
Email: mpei@verisign.com Email: mpei@verisign.com
Salah Machani Salah Machani
Diversinet Corp. Diversinet Corp.
skipping to change at page 95, line 26 skipping to change at page 97, line 37
Canada Canada
Email: smachani@diversinet.com Email: smachani@diversinet.com
Magnus Nystrom Magnus Nystrom
RSA, The Security Division of EMC RSA, The Security Division of EMC
Arenavagen 29 Arenavagen 29
Stockholm, Stockholm Ln 121 29 Stockholm, Stockholm Ln 121 29
SE SE
Email: mnystrom@rsa.com Email: magnus.nystrom@rsa.com
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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