draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-04.txt   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-05.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs
Expires: July 4, 2019 R. Bush Expires: August 19, 2019 R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc. Arrcus, Inc.
K. Sriram K. Sriram
US NIST US NIST
December 31, 2018 February 15, 2019
Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-04 draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-05
Abstract Abstract
Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
marking routes according to operator configuration options without marking routes according to operator configuration options, with no
any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP neighbor,
neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the relationship.
relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement of the (peer,
of the (peer, customer, provider, rs, rs-client, internal) customer, provider, RS, RS-client, internal) relationship of two
relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both
configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute
an iOTC attribute according to agreed relationship allowing according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks.
prevention of route leaks.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without normative meaning. case as English words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Attribute or Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Attribute or Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies a new BGP Capability Code, [RFC5492] Sec 4, This document specifies a new BGP Capability Code, [RFC5492] Sec 4,
which two BGP speakers MAY use to ensure that they MUST agree on which two BGP speakers MAY use to ensure that they MUST agree on
their relationship; i.e. customer and provider or peers. Either or their relationship; i.e. customer and provider or peers. Either or
both may optionally be configured to require that this option be both MAY optionally be configured to require that this option be
exchanged for the BGP Open to succeed. exchanged for the BGP Open to succeed.
Also this document specifies a way to mark routes according to BGP Also this document specifies a way to mark routes according to BGP
Roles established in OPEN message and a way to create double-boundary Roles established in OPEN message and a way to create double-boundary
filters for prevention of route leaks via new BGP Path Attribute. filters for prevention of route leaks using the new BGP Path
Attribute.
For the purpose of this document, BGP route leaks are when a BGP For the purpose of this document, BGP route leaks are when a BGP
route was learned from transit provider or peer and is announced to route was learned from transit provider or peer and is announced to
another provider or peer. another provider or peer. See[RFC7908]. These are usually the
See[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]. These are usually result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of
the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of
coordination between two BGP speakers. coordination between two BGP speakers.
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] The mechanism proposed [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] The mechanism proposed
in that draft provides the opportunity to detect route leaks made by in that draft provides the opportunity to detect route leaks made by
third parties but provides no support to strongly prevent route leak third parties but provides no mechanism to strongly prevent route
creation. leak creation.
Also, route tagging which relies on operator maintained policy Also, route tagging which relies on operator maintained policy
configuration is too easily and too often misconfigured. configuration is too easily, and too often, misconfigured.
2. Peering Relationships 2. Peering Relationships
Despite uses of words such as "Customer," "Peer." etc. described Despite uses of words such as "Customer," "Peer." etc. described
above are not business relationships, who pays whom, etc. These are above are not business relationships, who pays whom, etc. These are
common terms to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation, common terms to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation,
sometimes known as Gao-Rexford model. sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model.
A Provider: MAY send to customer all available prefixes. A Provider: MAY send to a customer all available prefixes.
A Customer: MAY send to provider own prefixes and prefixes learned A Customer: MAY send to a provider their own prefixes and prefixes
from its customers. A customer MUST NOT send to a provider learned from any of their customers. A customer MUST NOT send to
prefixes learned from peers, other providers or RS. a provider prefixes learned from peers, other providers, or RS.
A Route Server (rs) MAY send to a rs client all available prefixes. A Route Server (RS) MAY send to a RS client all available prefixes.
A Route Server Client (rs-client) MAY send to a RS own prefixes and A Route Server Client (RS-client) MAY send to an RS its own prefixes
prefixes learned from its customers. A rs-client MUST NOT send to and prefixes learned from its customers. A RS-client MUST NOT
a RS prefixes learned from peers, providers or other RS. send to an RS prefixes learned from peers, providers, or other RS.
A Peer: MAY send to a peer own prefixes and prefixes learned from A Peer: MAY send to a peer its own prefixes and prefixes learned
its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes
from other peers, providers or RS. learned from other peers, providers, or RS.
An Internal: MAY send all available prefixes through internal link. An Internal: MAY send all available prefixes through internal link.
Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is
announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of
routes they accept. But violation of listed MUST NOT rules may routes they accept. But violation of rules marked MUST NOT may
result in route leaks. While these peering relations cover 99% of result in route leaks. While these peering relations cover 99% of
possible scenarios, their configuration isn't part of the BGP itself, possible scenarios, their configuration isn't part of the BGP itself,
thus requiring configuration of communities and corresponding egress thus requiring configuration of communities and corresponding egress
prefix filters. The automation of this process may significantly prefix filters. The automation of this process may significantly
decrease number of configuration mistakes. decrease number of configuration mistakes.
3. BGP Role 3. BGP Role
BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured at BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured on
each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two
BGP speakers about their peering relationship. BGP speakers about their peering relationship.
Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are: Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are:
o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor; o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor;
o Customer - sender is customer of neighbor; o Customer - sender is customer of neighbor;
o RS - sender is route server at internet exchange point (IX) o RS - sender is route server at internet exchange point (IX)
o RS-client - sender is client of RS at internet exchange point (IX) o RS-client - sender is client of RS at internet exchange point (IX)
o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers; o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers;
o Internal - sender and neighbor is part of same organization. o Internal - sender and neighbor are part of the same organization.
For iBGP sessions only Internal role MAY be configured. For iBGP sessions, only the Internal role MAY be configured.
Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it
could also be used for more than route leak mitigation. could also be used for more than route leak mitigation.
4. Role capability 4. Role capability
The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are: The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are:
o Type - <TBD1>; o Type - <TBD1>;
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Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
5. Role correctness 5. Role correctness
Section 3 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship Section 3 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship
between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't
automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers. automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.
To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is used with a set of To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is used with a set of
constrains on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST corresponded. Of course, constrains on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST correspond. Of course,
each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the
BGP OPEN message exchange. BGP OPEN message exchange.
If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check value of If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check the value
the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The of the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The
allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's
Role): Role):
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Sender Role | Receiver Role | | Sender Role | Receiver Role |
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Internal | Internal | | Internal | Internal |
| Provider | Customer | | Provider | Customer |
| Customer | Provider | | Customer | Provider |
| RS | RS-Client | | RS | RS-Client |
| RS-Client | RS | | RS-Client | RS |
| Peer | Peer | | Peer | Peer |
+-------------+---------------+ +-------------+---------------+
Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities
In case of any other pair of roles, speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch In case of any other pairs of roles, a speaker MUST send a Role
Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>). Mismatch Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>).
5.1. Strict mode 5.1. Strict mode
A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values
of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to
establish a BGP session with neighbors which do not announce the BGP establish a BGP session with a neighbor which does not announce the
Role capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a BGP Role capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a
connection, it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486] connection, it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]
(Notfication with error code 6, subcode 5). By default strict mode (Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default, strict mode
SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers, SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers
that do not yet support this mechanism. that do not yet support this mechanism.
6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute 6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute
The Internal Only To Customer (iOTC) attribute is a new optional, The Internal Only To Customer (iOTC) attribute is a new optional,
non-transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. This non-transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. This
attribute has zero length as it is used only as a flag. attribute has zero length as it is used only as a flag.
There are four rules of iOTC attribute usage: There are four rules of iOTC attribute usage:
1. The iOTC attribute MUST be added to all incoming routes if the 1. The iOTC attribute MUST be added to all incoming routes if the
receiver's Role is Customer, Peer or RS-client; receiver's Role is Customer, Peer, or RS-client;
2. Routes with the iOTC attribute set MUST NOT be announced by a 2. Routes with the iOTC attribute set MUST NOT be announced by a
sender whose Role is Customer, Peer or RS-client; sender whose Role is Customer, Peer, or RS-client;
3. A sender MUST NOT include iOTC in UPDATE messages advertised to 3. A sender MUST NOT include iOTC in UPDATE messages advertised to
eBGP neighbor if its Role isn't Internal. eBGP neighbor if its Role isn't Internal.
4. If iOTC is contained in an UPDATE message from eBGP speaker and 4. If iOTC is contained in an UPDATE message from eBGP speaker and
receiver's Role isn't Internal then this attribute MUST be receiver's Role isn't Internal then this attribute MUST be
removed. removed.
These rules provide mechanism that strongly prevents route leak These rules provide mechanism to strongly prevent route leak creation
creation by an AS. by an AS.
7. Attribute or Community 7. Attribute or Community
Having the relationship hard set by agreement between the two peers Having the relationship hard set by agreement between the two peers
in BGP OPEN is critical; the routers enforce the relationship in BGP OPEN is critical; the routers enforce the relationship
irrespective of operator configuration errors. irrespective of operator policy configuration errors.
Similarly, it is critical that the application of that relationship Similarly, it is critical that the application of that relationship
on prefix propagation using iOTC is enforced by the router(s), and on prefix propagation using iOTC is enforced by the router(s), and
minimally exposed to user misconfiguration. There is a question minimally exposed to user mis-configuration. There is a question
whether the iOTC marking should be an attribute or a well-known whether the iOTC marking should be an attribute or a well-known
community. community.
There is a long and sordid history of mis-configurations inserting There is a long and sordid history of mis-configurations inserting
incorrect communities, deleting communities, ignoring well-known incorrect communities, deleting communities, ignoring well-known
community markings etc. In this mechanism's case, an operator could, community markings etc. In this mechanism's case, an operator could,
for example, accidentally strip the well-known community on receipt. for example, accidentally strip the well-known community on receipt.
As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally
modified or filtered by the operator. The router(s) enforce them. modified or filtered by the operator. The router(s) enforce them.
This is the desired property for the iOTC marking. Hence, this This is the desired property for the iOTC marking. Hence, this
document specifies iOTC as an attribute. document specifies iOTC as an attribute.
8. Compatibility with BGPsec 8. Compatibility with BGPsec
As the iOTC field is non-transitive, it is not seen by or signed by As the iOTC attribute is non-transitive, it is not seen by or signed
BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. by BGPsec [RFC8205].
9. Additional Considerations 9. Additional Considerations
As the BGP Role reflects the peerin relationship between neighbors, As the BGP Role reflects the peering relationship between neighbors,
it can also have other uses. As an example, BGP Role might affect it can also have other uses. As an example, BGP Role might affect
route priority, or be used to distinguish borders of a network if a route priority, or be used to distinguish borders of a network if a
network consists of multiple AS. network consists of multiple ASs.
Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of this Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of this
document. Note that such uses would require local policy control. document. Note that such uses would require local policy control.
As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/ As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/
outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence
of Import and Export policy. [I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject] of Import and Export policy. [RFC8212]
This document doesn't provide any security measures to check This document doesn't provide any security measures to check
correctness of iOTC usage if role isn't configured. correctness of iOTC usage if role isn't configured.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed
upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/ upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/
capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role", assigned value capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role", assigned value
<TBD1> . The length of this capability is 1. <TBD1> . The length of this capability is 1.
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This document defines a new optional, non-transitive BGP Path This document defines a new optional, non-transitive BGP Path
Attributes option, named "Internal Only To Customer", assigned value Attributes option, named "Internal Only To Customer", assigned value
<TBD3> [To be removed upon publication: <TBD3> [To be removed upon publication:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp- http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The length of this parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The length of this
attribute is 0. attribute is 0.
11. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that
are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration. are the result of BGP policy mis-configuration.
Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to
sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable. sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable.
BGP Role is disclosed only to an immediate BGP neighbor, so it will BGP Role is disclosed only to an immediate BGP neighbor, so it will
not itself reveal any sensitive information to third parties. not itself reveal any sensitive information to third parties.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei
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[RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease [RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease
Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486, Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486,
April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>. April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>. 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject]
Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default EBGP
Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies", draft-ietf-
grow-bgp-reject-08 (work in progress), May 2017.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-
definition-06 (work in progress), May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., and A. Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and
Robachevsky, "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-
Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection- detection-mitigation-10 (work in progress), October 2018.
mitigation-03 (work in progress), May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-15 (work
in progress), March 2016.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8212] Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default External
BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behavior without Policies",
RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8212>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov Alexander Azimov
Qrator Labs Qrator Labs
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs Qrator Labs
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