draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03.txt   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-04.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov
Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs
Expires: December 30, 2018 R. Bush Expires: July 4, 2019 R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc. Arrcus, Inc.
K. Sriram K. Sriram
US NIST US NIST
June 28, 2018 December 31, 2018
Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-03 draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-04
Abstract Abstract
Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider, learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
marking routes according to operator configuration options without marking routes according to operator configuration options without
any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP
neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the neighbor, or enforcement that the two BGP speakers agree on the
relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement relationship. This document enhances BGP Open to establish agreement
of the (peer, customer, provider, internal) relationship of two of the (peer, customer, provider, rs, rs-client, internal)
neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate configuration on both relationship of two neighboring BGP speakers to enforce appropriate
sides. Propagated routes are then marked with an iOTC attribute configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked with
according to agreed relationship allowing prevention of route leaks. an iOTC attribute according to agreed relationship allowing
prevention of route leaks.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without normative meaning. case as English words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 4, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Role Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Role capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Role correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Strict mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Attribute or Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Attribute or Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Compatibility with BGPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Preamble 1. Introduction
1.1. Peering Relationships
Despite uses of words such as "Customer," "Peer." etc. the intent is
not business relationships, who pays whom, etc. These are common
terms to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes
known as Gao-Rexford model. E.g. if A is a "peer" of B and C, A does
not propagate B's prefixes to C. If D is a "customer" of E and F, D
does not propagate prefixes learned from E to F.
As the whole point of route leak detection and prevention is to
prevent vioation of these relationships, they are inescapable.
2. Introduction
This document specifies a new BGP Capability Code, [RFC5492] Sec 4, This document specifies a new BGP Capability Code, [RFC5492] Sec 4,
which two BGP speakers MAY use to ensure that they MUST agree on which two BGP speakers MAY use to ensure that they MUST agree on
their relationship; i.e. customer and provider or peers. Either or their relationship; i.e. customer and provider or peers. Either or
both may optionally be configured to require that this option be both may optionally be configured to require that this option be
exchanged for the BGP Open to succeed. exchanged for the BGP Open to succeed.
Also this document specifies a way to mark routes according to BGP Also this document specifies a way to mark routes according to BGP
Roles established in OPEN message and a way to create double-boundary Roles established in OPEN message and a way to create double-boundary
filters for prevention of route leaks via new BGP Path Attribute. filters for prevention of route leaks via new BGP Path Attribute.
For the purpose of this document, BGP route leaks are when a BGP For the purpose of this document, BGP route leaks are when a BGP
route was learned from transit provider or peer and is announced to route was learned from transit provider or peer and is announced to
another provider or peer. See another provider or peer.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]. These are usually the See[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]. These are usually
result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of
coordination between two BGP speakers. coordination between two BGP speakers.
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] The mechanism proposed [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] The mechanism proposed
in that draft provides the opportunity to detect route leaks made by in that draft provides the opportunity to detect route leaks made by
third parties but provides no support to strongly prevent route leak third parties but provides no support to strongly prevent route leak
creation. creation.
Also, route tagging which relies on operator maintained policy Also, route tagging which relies on operator maintained policy
configuration is too easily and too often misconfigured. configuration is too easily and too often misconfigured.
3. Role Definitions 2. Peering Relationships
As many of these terms are used differently in various contexts, it Despite uses of words such as "Customer," "Peer." etc. described
is worth being explicit. above are not business relationships, who pays whom, etc. These are
common terms to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation,
sometimes known as Gao-Rexford model.
A Provider: sends their own routes and (possibly) a subset of routes A Provider: MAY send to customer all available prefixes.
learned from their other customers, peers, and transit providers
to their customer.
A Customer: accepts 'transit routes' from its provider(s) and A Customer: MAY send to provider own prefixes and prefixes learned
announces their own routes and the routes they have learned from from its customers. A customer MUST NOT send to a provider
the transitive closure of their customers (AKA their 'customer prefixes learned from peers, other providers or RS.
cone') to their provider(s).
A Peer: announces their routes and the routes from their customer A Route Server (rs) MAY send to a rs client all available prefixes.
cone to other Peers.
An Internal: announces all routes, accepts all routes. A Route Server Client (rs-client) MAY send to a RS own prefixes and
prefixes learned from its customers. A rs-client MUST NOT send to
a RS prefixes learned from peers, providers or other RS.
A Peer: MAY send to a peer own prefixes and prefixes learned from
its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes learned
from other peers, providers or RS.
An Internal: MAY send all available prefixes through internal link.
Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is
announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of
routes they accept. routes they accept. But violation of listed MUST NOT rules may
result in route leaks. While these peering relations cover 99% of
possible scenarios, their configuration isn't part of the BGP itself,
thus requiring configuration of communities and corresponding egress
prefix filters. The automation of this process may significantly
decrease number of configuration mistakes.
4. BGP Role 3. BGP Role
BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured at BGP Role is new configuration option that SHOULD be configured at
each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two each BGP session. It reflects the real-world agreement between two
BGP speakers about their peering relationship. BGP speakers about their peering relationship.
Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are: Allowed Role values for eBGP sessions are:
o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor; o Provider - sender is a transit provider to neighbor;
o Customer - sender is customer of neighbor; o Customer - sender is customer of neighbor;
o RS - sender is route server at internet exchange point (IX)
o RS-client - sender is client of RS at internet exchange point (IX)
o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers; o Peer - sender and neighbor are peers;
o Internal - sender and neighbor is part of same organization. o Internal - sender and neighbor is part of same organization.
For iBGP sessions only Internal role MAY be configured. For iBGP sessions only Internal role MAY be configured.
Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it Since BGP Role reflects the relationship between two BGP speakers, it
could also be used for more than route leak mitigation. could also be used for more than route leak mitigation.
5. Role capability 4. Role capability
The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are: The TLV (type, length, value) of the BGP Role capability are:
o Type - <TBD1>; o Type - <TBD1>;
o Length - 1 (octet); o Length - 1 (octet);
o Value - integer corresponding to speaker' BGP Role. o Value - integer corresponding to speaker' BGP Role.
+--------+----------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| Value | Role name | | Value | Role name |
+--------+----------------------+ +-------+---------------------+
| 0 | Sender is Peer | | 0 | Sender is Internal |
| 1 | Sender is Provider | | 1 | Sender is Provider |
| 2 | Sender is Customer | | 2 | Sender is RS |
| 3 | Sender is Internal | | 3 | Sender is RS-Client |
+--------+----------------------+ | 4 | Sender is Customer |
| 5 | Sender is Peer |
+-------+---------------------+
Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
6. Role correctness 5. Role correctness
Section 4 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship Section 3 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship
between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't
automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers. automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.
To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is used with a set of To enforce correctness, the BGP Role check is used with a set of
constrains on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST corresponded. Of course, constrains on how speakers' BGP Roles MUST corresponded. Of course,
each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the each speaker MUST announce and accept the BGP Role capability in the
BGP OPEN message exchange. BGP OPEN message exchange.
If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check value of If a speaker receives a BGP Role capability, it MUST check value of
the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The the received capability with its own BGP Role (if it is set). The
allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's allowed pairings are (first a sender's Role, second the receiver's
Role): Role):
+--------------+----------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Sender Role | Receiver Role | | Sender Role | Receiver Role |
+--------------+----------------+ +-------------+---------------+
| Peer | Peer | | Internal | Internal |
| Provider | Customer | | Provider | Customer |
| Customer | Provider | | Customer | Provider |
| Internal | Internal | | RS | RS-Client |
+--------------+----------------+ | RS-Client | RS |
| Peer | Peer |
+-------------+---------------+
Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities
In case of any other pair of roles, speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch In case of any other pair of roles, speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch
Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>). Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>).
6.1. Strict mode 5.1. Strict mode
A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values
of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to
establish a BGP session with peers which do not announce the BGP Role establish a BGP session with neighbors which do not announce the BGP
capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a connection, Role capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a
it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486] connection, it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]
(Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default strict mode (Notfication with error code 6, subcode 5). By default strict mode
SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers, SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers,
that do not yet support this mechanism. that do not yet support this mechanism.
7. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute 6. BGP Internal Only To Customer attribute
The Internal Only To Customer (iOTC) attribute is a new optional, The Internal Only To Customer (iOTC) attribute is a new optional,
non-transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. This non-transitive BGP Path attribute with the Type Code <TBD3>. This
attribute has zero length as it is used only as a flag. attribute has zero length as it is used only as a flag.
There are three rules of iOTC attribute usage: There are four rules of iOTC attribute usage:
1. The iOTC attribute MUST be added to all incoming routes if the 1. The iOTC attribute MUST be added to all incoming routes if the
receiver's Role is Customer or Peer; receiver's Role is Customer, Peer or RS-client;
2. Routes with the iOTC attribute set MUST NOT be announced by a 2. Routes with the iOTC attribute set MUST NOT be announced by a
sender whose Role is Customer or Peer; sender whose Role is Customer, Peer or RS-client;
3. A sender MUST NOT include this attribute in UPDATE messages if 3. A sender MUST NOT include iOTC in UPDATE messages advertised to
its Role is Customer, Provider or Peer. If it is contained in an eBGP neighbor if its Role isn't Internal.
UPDATE message from eBGP speaker and receiver's Role is Customer,
Provider, Peer or unspecified, then this attribute MUST be 4. If iOTC is contained in an UPDATE message from eBGP speaker and
receiver's Role isn't Internal then this attribute MUST be
removed. removed.
These three rules provide mechanism that strongly prevents route leak These rules provide mechanism that strongly prevents route leak
creation by an AS. creation by an AS.
8. Attribute or Community 7. Attribute or Community
Having the relationship hard set by agreement between the two peers Having the relationship hard set by agreement between the two peers
in BGP OPEN is critical; the routers enforce the relationship in BGP OPEN is critical; the routers enforce the relationship
irrespective of operator configuration errors. irrespective of operator configuration errors.
Similarly, it is critical that the application of that relationship Similarly, it is critical that the application of that relationship
on prefix propagation using iOTC is enforced by the router(s), and on prefix propagation using iOTC is enforced by the router(s), and
minimally exposed to user misconfiguration. There is a question minimally exposed to user misconfiguration. There is a question
whether the iOTC marking should be an attribute or a well-known whether the iOTC marking should be an attribute or a well-known
community. community.
skipping to change at page 7, line 5 skipping to change at page 7, line 15
There is a long and sordid history of mis-configurations inserting There is a long and sordid history of mis-configurations inserting
incorrect communities, deleting communities, ignoring well-known incorrect communities, deleting communities, ignoring well-known
community markings etc. In this mechanism's case, an operator could, community markings etc. In this mechanism's case, an operator could,
for example, accidentally strip the well-known community on receipt. for example, accidentally strip the well-known community on receipt.
As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally As opposed to communities, BGP attributes may not be generally
modified or filtered by the operator. The router(s) enforce them. modified or filtered by the operator. The router(s) enforce them.
This is the desired property for the iOTC marking. Hence, this This is the desired property for the iOTC marking. Hence, this
document specifies iOTC as an attribute. document specifies iOTC as an attribute.
9. Compatibility with BGPsec 8. Compatibility with BGPsec
As the iOTC field is non-transitive, it is not seen by or signed by As the iOTC field is non-transitive, it is not seen by or signed by
BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. BGPsec [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
10. Additional Considerations 9. Additional Considerations
As the BGP Role reflects the relationship between neighbors, it can As the BGP Role reflects the peerin relationship between neighbors,
also have other uses. As an example, BGP Role might affect route it can also have other uses. As an example, BGP Role might affect
priority, or be used to distinguish borders of a network if a network route priority, or be used to distinguish borders of a network if a
consists of multiple AS. network consists of multiple AS.
Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of this Though such uses may be worthwhile, they are not the goal of this
document. Note that such uses would require local policy control. document. Note that such uses would require local policy control.
As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/ As BGP role configuration results in automatic creation of inbound/
outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence outbound filters, existence of roles should be treated as existence
of Import and Export policy. [I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject] of Import and Export policy. [I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject]
This document doesn't provide any security measures to check This document doesn't provide any security measures to check
correctness of iOTC usage if role isn't configured. correctness of iOTC usage if role isn't configured.
11. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed
upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/ upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/
capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role", assigned value capability-codes.xhtml] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role", assigned value
<TBD1> . The length of this capability is 1. <TBD1> . The length of this capability is 1.
The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name. Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name.
Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1. Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1.
Future assignments may be made by a standard action procedure Future assignments may be made by a standard action
[RFC5226]. procedure[RFC5226].
This document defines new subcode, "Role Mismatch", assigned value This document defines new subcode, "Role Mismatch", assigned value
<TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be removed <TBD2> in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be removed
upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp- upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271]. parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271].
This document defines a new optional, non-transitive BGP Path This document defines a new optional, non-transitive BGP Path
Attributes option, named "Internal Only To Customer", assigned value Attributes option, named "Internal Only To Customer", assigned value
<TBD3> [To be removed upon publication: <TBD3> [To be removed upon publication:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp- http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The length of this parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The length of this
attribute is 0. attribute is 0.
12. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that This document proposes a mechanism for prevention of route leaks that
are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration. are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration.
Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to Deliberate sending of a known conflicting BGP Role could be used to
sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable. sabotage a BGP connection. This is easily detectable.
BGP Role is disclosed only to an immediate BGP neighbor, so it will BGP Role is disclosed only to an immediate BGP neighbor, so it will
not itself reveal any sensitive information to third parties. not itself reveal any sensitive information to third parties.
13. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei
Robachevsky and Daniel Ginsburg for their contributions to a variant Robachevsky and Daniel Ginsburg for their contributions to a variant
of this work. of this work.
14. References 13. References
14.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease [RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease
Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486, Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486,
April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>. April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>. 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
14.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject] [I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject]
Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default EBGP Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default EBGP
Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies", draft-ietf- Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies", draft-ietf-
grow-bgp-reject-08 (work in progress), May 2017. grow-bgp-reject-08 (work in progress), May 2017.
[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition] [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem- BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-
skipping to change at page 9, line 24 skipping to change at page 9, line 31
Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection- Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-
mitigation-03 (work in progress), May 2016. mitigation-03 (work in progress), May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-15 (work Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-15 (work
in progress), March 2016. in progress), March 2016.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
editor.org/info/rfc5226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov Alexander Azimov
Qrator Labs Qrator Labs
Email: aa@qrator.net Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs Qrator Labs
Email: eb@qrator.net Email: eb@qrator.net
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
 End of changes. 48 change blocks. 
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