--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-03.txt 2017-07-03 16:13:58.033518718 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-04.txt 2017-07-03 16:13:58.073519682 -0700 @@ -1,23 +1,23 @@ I2NSF S. Hares Internet-Draft J. Strassner Intended status: Informational Huawei -Expires: September 07, 2017 D. Lopez +Expires: January 07, 2018 D. Lopez Telefonica I+D L. Xia Huawei H. Birkholz Fraunhofer SIT - March 07, 2017 + July 03, 2017 Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) Terminology - draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-03.txt + draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-04.txt Abstract This document defines a set of terms that are used for the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) effort. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. @@ -26,47 +26,47 @@ Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 07, 2017. + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 07, 2018. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 6.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Introduction This document defines the terminology for the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) effort. This section provides some background on I2NSF; a detailed problem statement can be found in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases]. Motivation and comparison to previous work can be found in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis]. Enterprises are now considering using network security functions @@ -112,44 +112,44 @@ Abstraction: The definition of the salient characteristics and behavior of an object that distinguish it from all other types of objects. It manages complexity by exposing common properties between objects and processes while hiding detail that is not relevant. Access Control: Protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy, and is permitted by only - authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) - according to that policy [RFC4949]. + authorized entities (e.g., users, programs, processes, or other + systems) according to that policy [RFC4949]. Access Control List (ACL): This is a mechanism that implements access control for a system resource by enumerating the system entities that are permitted to access the resource and stating, either implicitly or explicitly, the access modes granted to each entity [RFC4949]. A YANG description is defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. Accounting: The act of collecting information on resource usage for the purpose of trend analysis, auditing, billing, or cost allocation ([RFC2975] [RFC3539]). Assertion: Defined by the ITU in [X.1252] as "a statement made by an entity without accompanying evidence of its validity". In the - context of I2NSF, an assertion MAY include metadata about all or + context of I2NSF, an assertion may include metadata about all or part of the assertion (e.g., context of the assertion, or about timestamp indicating the point in time the assertion was created). The validity of an assertion cannot be verified. (from [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]). Attestation: The process of validating the integrity of a computing - device. See also Direct Anonymous Attestation. + device. See also Direct Anonymous Attestation, Remote Attestation. Authentication: Defined in [RFC4949] as "the process of verifying a claim that a system entity or system resource has a certain attribute value." (from [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]). Authorization: Defined in [RFC4949] as "an approval that is granted to a system entity to access a system resource." (from [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology]). Business-to-Business (B2B). A type of transaction in which one @@ -162,27 +162,22 @@ company. Bespoke security management: Security management systems that are made to fit a particular customer. Boolean Clause: A logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. Also called Boolean Expression. Capability: A set of features that are available from an I2NSF Component. These functions may, but do not have to, be used. All - Capabilities are announced through the I2NSF Registration - Interface. Examples are Capabilities that are available from an - NSF Server. - - Client: See I2NSF Consumer. - - Client-Facing Interface: See I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. + Capabilities are announced using the I2NSF Registration + Interface. Component: An encapsulation of software that communicates using Interfaces. A Component may be implemented by hardware and/or software, and be represented using a set of classes. In general, a Component encapsulates a set of data structures and a set of algorithms that implement the function(s) that it provides. Constraint: A Constraint is a limitation or restriction. Constraints may be associated with any type of object (e.g., Events, Conditions, and Actions in Policy Rules). @@ -227,41 +222,46 @@ Data Integrity: Defined in [RFC4949] as "the property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner." Data Model: A representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is dependent on data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol (typically one or more of these ). Note the difference between a data **model** and a data **structure**. - [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]. + [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-data-model]. Data Plane: In the context of I2NSF, the Data Plane is an architectural Component that provides operational functions to enable an I2NSF Component to provide and consume packets and flows. See also: Control Plane, Management Plane. Data Provenance: A historical record of the sources, origins and evolution of data that is influenced by inputs, entities, functions and processes. Data Structure: A low-level building block that is used in - programming to implement an algorithm. A data model typically - contains multiple types of data structures; however, a data - structure does not contain a data model. Note the difference - between a data **model** and a data **structure**. + programming to implement an algorithm. It defines how data is + organized. A data model typically contains multiple types of + data structures; however, a data structure does not contain a + data model. Note the difference between a data **model** and a + data **structure**. + + Domain: A collection of Entities that share a common purpose. In + addition, each constituent Entity in a Domain is both uniquely + addressable and uniquely identifiable within that Domain. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA): A cryptographic primitive that enables remote authentication of a trusted computer without compromising the privacy of that computer's user(s). See also - attestation. + attestation, remote attestation. Firewall (FW): A function that restricts data communication traffic to and from one of the connected networks (the one said to be 'inside' the firewall), and thus protects that network's system resources against threats from the other network (the one that is said to be 'outside' the firewall) [RFC4949]. [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls] Flow: A set of information (e.g., packets) that are related in a fundamental manner (e.g., sent from the same source and sent to @@ -319,23 +319,23 @@ I2NSF Consumer: A Consumer is a Role that is assigned to an I2NSF Component that contains functions to provide information to other I2NSF Components. Examples include providing I2NSF Policy Rules to other I2NSF Components. See also: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, I2NSF Producer, I2NSF Producer-Facing Interface, Role. I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface: An Interface dedicated to requesting information from I2NSF Producers. This is typically defined per I2NSF administrative domain. For example, this Interface could be used to request a set of I2NSF Flow Security - Policy Rules from an I2NSF Controller, or from one or more - individual NSFs. See also: I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF - NSF-Facing Interface, Interface. + Policy Rules from a Controller, or from one or more + individual NSFs. See also: I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, + I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface, Interface. I2NSF Directly Consummable Policy Rule: An I2NSF Policy Rule is said to be directly consummable if a network device can execute it without translating its content or structure. See also I2NSF Indirectly Consummable Policy Rule, I2NSF Policy Rule. I2NSF Indirectly Consummable Policy Rule: An I2NSF Policy Rule is said to be indirectly consummable if a network device can NOT execute it without first translating its content or structure. See also I2NSF Directly Consummable Policy Rule, I2NSF Policy Rule. @@ -348,47 +348,50 @@ be evaluated or not. Examples of an I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g. logon, logoff, and actions that violate an ACL). (based on [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]). See also I2NSF Action, I2NSF Condition, I2NSF Policy Rule. I2NSF Management System: I2NSF Consumers and Producers operate within the scope of a network management system, which serves as a collection and distribution point for I2NSF security provisioning, monitoring, and other operations. + I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface: An Interface dedicated to providing I2NSF + Services. For example, this could provide Anti-Virus, (D)DoS, or + IPS Services. This is also called the "NSF-Facing Interface". + See also: Interface, I2NSF Consumer Interface. + I2NSF Policy Rule: An I2NSF Policy Rule is an imperative statement that is used as a means to monitor and control the changing and/or maintaining of the state of one or more managed objects. It consists of three Boolean clauses (Event, Condition, and Action). In this context, "manage" means that one or more of the following six fundamental operations are supported: create, read, write, delete, start, and stop). Note that for this release of I2NSF, only imperative policy rules are in scope. An example of an I2NSF Policy Rule is, in pseudo-code: IF is TRUE IF is TRUE THEN execute END-IF END-IF - This is based on [I-D.draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]. + This is based on [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]. I2NSF Producer: A Producer is a Role that is assigned to an I2NSF Component that contains functions to send information and/or commands to another I2NSF Component (e.g., for describing, communicating, and/or executing policies, or for transmitting data). See also: I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, I2NSF Producer, I2NSF Producer-Facing Interface, Role. - I2NSF Producer-Facing Interface: See NSF-Facing Interface. - I2NSF Registry: A repository where I2NSF data and metadata information are stored and maintained. I2NSF Components can connect to the I2NSF Registry using the I2NSF Registration Interface; the actions that an I2NSF Component can performing SHOULD be defined using an Access Control mechanism. Examples of information that SHOULD be registered include Capability data, as well as consistent defintions of data and I2NSF Components. See also: Access Control, I2NSF Component, I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF Registration Interface. @@ -397,24 +400,20 @@ I2NSF Components. See also: I2NSF Component, I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF Registry. I2NSF Service: A set of functions, provided by an I2NSF Component, which provides data communication, processing, storage, presentation, maniuplation, or other functions that can be consumed by I2NSF Components. Exemplary I2NSF Services include Anti-Virus, Authentication, Authorization, Firewall, and IPS Services. See also: I2NSF Component, Interface. - IDS: Intrusion Detection System (see below). - - IPS: Intrusion Protection System (see below). - Information Model: A representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is independent of data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol. See also: Data Model. (from [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]). Interface: A set of operations one object knows it can invoke on, and expose to, another object. It is a subset of all operations that a given object implements. The same object may have multiple types of interfaces to serve different purposes. @@ -426,27 +425,41 @@ See also: Interface. Intrusion Detection System (IDS): A system that detects network intrusions via a variety of filters, monitors, and/or probes. An IDS may be stateful or stateless. See also: IPS. Intrusion Protection System (IPS): A system that protects against network intrusions. An IPS may be stateful or stateless. See also: IDS. + Management Domain: A collection Entities that share a common + purpose, which has the following three behavioral features: + 1) a set of administrators are assigned to govern the Entities + that are contained in a Management Domain + 2) a set of application are defined that are responsible for + executing one or more governance operations + 3) a set of management mechanisms, such as Policy Rules, are + defined to govern the behavior of the Entities contained + in the Mangement Domain. + Management Plane: In the context of I2NSF, the Management Plane is an architectural Component that provides common functions to define the behavior of I2NSF Components. The primary use of the - Management Plane is to transport behavioral commands, and supply - OAM data, for making decisions that affect behavior. Examples - include modifying the configuration of an I2NSF Component and - transporting OAM data. See also: Control Plane, Data Plane. + Management Plane is to formulate behavioral commands and forward + them to the Control Plane. The Control Plane then translates them + into a form that can be consumed by I2NSF components. The + Management Plane may also instantiate and manage I2NSF Policy + Rules. The Management Plane is also responsible for handling and + acting on OAM data, which may influence the decision-making + processes in the I2NSF Control Plane and other I2NSF Components. + See also: Control Plane, Data Plane. Metadata: Data that provides information about other data. Examples include IETF network management protocols (e.g. NETCONF, RESTCONF, IPFIX) or IETF routing interfaces (I2RS). The I2NSF security interface may utilize Metadata to describe and/or prescribe characteristics and behavior of the YANG data models. Middlebox: Any intermediary device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and destination host @@ -468,20 +481,26 @@ Object Constraint Language (OCL): A constraint programming language that is used to specify restrictions on functionality. (from http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/i2nsf/current/msg00762.html) Profile: A structured representation of information that uses a pre-defined set of capabilities of an object, typically in a specific context. Zero or more Capabilities may be changed at runtime. This may be used to simplify how this object interacts with other objects in its environment. +Remote Attestation: A functoin that enables changes to an Entity to + be detected by authorized parties (e.g., applications or users). + Direct Anonymous Attestation preserves the privacy of the user, + whereas remote attestation may not. See also: Attestation, + Direct Anonymous Attestation. + Role: An abstraction of a Component that models context-specific views and responsibilities of an object as separate Role objects. Role objects can optionally be attached to, and removed from, the object that the Role object describes at runtime. This provides three important benefits. First, it enables different behavior to be supported by the same Component for different contexts. Second, it enables the behavior of a Component to be adjusted dynamically (i.e., at runtime, in response to changes in context) by using one or more Roles to define the behavior desired for each context. Third, it decouples the Roles of a Component from @@ -497,24 +516,24 @@ 4. Security Considerations This is a terminology document with no security considerations. 5. Contributors The following people contributed to creating this document, and are listed in alphabetical order: - Adrian Farrel, Linda Dunbar + Adrian Farrel, Christian Jacquenet, Linda Dunbar, + Mohammed Boucadair 6. References - 6.1. Informative References [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis] Hares, S., Moskowitz, R., and Zhang, D., "Analysis of Existing work for I2NSF", draft-ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis-03 (work in progress), March 2017. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases] Hares, S., Dunbar, L., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., and C. Jacquenet, "I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases", draft- @@ -511,45 +530,51 @@ 6.1. Informative References [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis] Hares, S., Moskowitz, R., and Zhang, D., "Analysis of Existing work for I2NSF", draft-ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis-03 (work in progress), March 2017. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases] Hares, S., Dunbar, L., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., and C. Jacquenet, "I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases", draft- - ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-09 (work in progress), - February 2017. + ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-16 (work in progress), + May 2017. [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] Bogdanovic, D., Sreenivasa, K., Huang, L., Blair, D., "Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model", - draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-09 (work in progress), - February 2017. + draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model-11 (work in progress), + June 2017. [I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls] Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in progress), October 2012. [I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology] Birkholz, H., Lu, J., Strassner, J., Cam-Wignet, N., "Secure Automation and Continuous Monitoring (SACM) - Terminology", draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-11, - September 2016 + Terminology", draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-12, + March 2017 + + [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-data-model] + Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and S. van der Meer, "Generic + Policy Data Model for Simplified Use of Policy + Abstractions (SUPA)", draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy- + data-model-04 (work in progress), June 2017. [I-D.ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model] - Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and J. Coleman, "Generic + Strassner, J., Halpern, J., and S. van der Meer, "Generic Policy Information Model for Simplified Use of Policy Abstractions (SUPA)", draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy- - info-model-02 (work in progress), January 2017. + info-model-03 (work in progress), May 2017. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2975] Aboba, B., Arkko, J., and D. Harrington, "Introduction to Accounting Management", RFC 2975, DOI 10.17487/RFC2975, October 2000, . [RFC3234] Carpenter, B. and S. Brim, "Middleboxes: Taxonomy and Issues", RFC 3234, DOI 10.17487/RFC3234, February 2002,