--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-04.txt 2019-07-07 15:13:20.128276825 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-05.txt 2019-07-07 15:13:20.316283121 -0700 @@ -1,182 +1,189 @@ I2NSF R. Marin-Lopez Internet-Draft G. Lopez-Millan Intended status: Standards Track University of Murcia -Expires: September 12, 2019 F. Pereniguez-Garcia +Expires: January 8, 2020 F. Pereniguez-Garcia University Defense Center - March 11, 2019 + July 7, 2019 Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-04 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-05 Abstract This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow protection by means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka. Security Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service. It considers two main well-known scenarios in IPsec: (i) gateway-to- gateway and (ii) host-to-host. The SDN-based service described in this document allows the distribution and monitoring of IPsec information from a Security Controller to one or several flow-based Network Security Function (NSF). The NSFs implement IPsec to protect - data traffic between network resources with IPsec. + data traffic between network resources. - The document focuses in the NSF Facing Interface by providing models - for Configuration and State data model required to allow the Security + The document focuses on the NSF Facing Interface by providing models + for configuration and state data required to allow the Security Controller to configure the IPsec databases (SPD, SAD, PAD) and IKEv2 - to establish security associations with a reduced intervention of the + to establish Security Associations with a reduced intervention of the network administrator. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. SDN-based IPsec management description . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. IKE case: IKE/IPsec in the NSF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.1. Interface Requirements for IKE case . . . . . . . . . 7 - 5.2. IKE-less case: IPsec (no IKEv2) in the NSF . . . . . . . 8 + 5.2. IKE-less case: IPsec (no IKEv2) in the NSF. . . . . . . . 7 5.2.1. Interface Requirements for IKE-less case . . . . . . 8 5.3. IKE case vs IKE-less case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5.3.1. Rekeying process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 5.3.2. NSF state loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.3.1. Rekeying process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5.3.2. NSF state loss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3.3. NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 6. YANG configuration data models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3.4. NSF Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6. YANG configuration data models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. IKE case model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2. IKE-less case model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 7. Use cases examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 7. Use cases examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under the same - controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + Security Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.2. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under different - security controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 - 8.1. IKE case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - 8.2. IKE-less case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 - Appendix A. Appendix A: Common YANG model for IKE and IKEless - cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - Appendix B. Appendix B: YANG model for IKE case . . . . . . . . 37 - Appendix C. Appendix C: YANG model for IKE-less case . . . . . . 43 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + Security Controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 9.1. IKE case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 9.2. IKE-less case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + Appendix A. Appendix A: Common YANG model for IKE and IKE-less + cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + Appendix B. Appendix B: YANG model for IKE case . . . . . . . . 43 + Appendix C. Appendix C: YANG model for IKE-less case . . . . . . 62 + Appendix D. Example of IKE case, tunnel mode (gateway-to- + gateway) with X.509 certificate authentication. . . 72 + Appendix E. Example of IKE-less case, transport mode (host-to- + host). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 + Appendix F. Examples of notifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 1. Introduction Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an architecture that enables users to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network - resources through software. SDN paradigm relocates the control of - network resources to a dedicated network element, namely SDN - controller. The SDN controller manages and configures the - distributed network resources and provides an abstracted view of the - network resources to the SDN applications. The SDN application can - customize and automate the operations (including management) of the - abstracted network resources in a programmable manner via this - interface [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300] - [ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow]. + resources through software. The SDN paradigm relocates the control + of network resources to a dedicated network element, namely SDN + Controller. The SDN controller (or Security Controller in the + context of this document) manages and configures the distributed + network resources and provides an abstracted view of the network + resources to the SDN applications. The SDN application can customize + and automate the operations (including management) of the abstracted + network resources in a programmable manner via this interface + [RFC7149] [ITU-T.Y.3300] [ONF-SDN-Architecture] [ONF-OpenFlow]. Recently, several network scenarios are considering a centralized way of managing different security aspects. For example, Software- - Defined WANs (SD-WAN) advocates to manage IPsec SAs from a - centralized point. Therefore, with the growth of SDN-based scenarios - where network resources are deployed in an autonomous manner, a - mechanism to manage IPsec SAs according to the SDN architecture - becomes more relevant. Thus, the SDN-based service described in this - document will autonomously deal with IPsec SAs management following a - SDN paradigm. + Defined WANs (SD-WAN), an SDN extension providing a software + abstraction to create secure network overlays over traditional WAN + and branch networks. SD-WAN is based on IPsec as underlying security + protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, fast deployment and + on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from + a centralized point. - An example of usage can be the notion of Software Defined WAN (SD- - WAN), SDN extension providing a software abstraction to create secure - network overlays over traditional WAN and branch networks. SD-WAN is - based on IPsec as underlying security protocol and aims to provide - flexible, automated, fast deployment and on-demand security network - services. + Therefore, with the growth of SDN-based scenarios where network + resources are deployed in an autonomous manner, a mechanism to manage + IPsec SAs according to the SDN architecture becomes more relevant. + Thus, the SDN-based service described in this document will + autonomously deal with IPsec SAs management following the SDN + paradigm. - IPsec architecture [RFC4301] defines a clear separation between the + IPsec architecture [RFC4301] defines clear separation between the processing to provide security services to IP packets and the key - management procedures to establish the IPsec security associations. + management procedures to establish the IPsec Security Associations. In this document, we define a service where the key management - procedures can be carried by an external entity: the Security - Controller. + procedures can be carried by an external and centralized entity: the + Security Controller. First, this document exposes the requirements to support the protection of data flows using IPsec [RFC4301]. We have considered two general cases: 1) IKE case. The Network Security Function (NSF) implements the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol and the IPsec databases: the Security Policy Database (SPD), the Security Association Database (SAD) and the Peer Authorization Database (PAD). The Security Controller is in charge of provisioning the NSF with the required information to IKE, the SPD and the PAD. 2) IKE-less case. The NSF only implements the IPsec databases (no IKE implementation). The Security Controller will provide the required parameters to create valid entries in the SPD and the SAD into the NSF. Therefore, the NSF will have only support for IPsec while automated key management functionality is moved to - the controller. + the Security Controller. In both cases, an interface/protocol is required to carry out this provisioning in a secure manner between the Security Controller and the NSF. In particular, IKE case requires the provision of SPD and - PAD entries and the IKE credential and information related with the - IKE negotiation (e.g. IKE_SA_INIT), and IKE-less case requires the + PAD entries, the IKE credential and information related with the IKE + negotiation (e.g. IKE_SA_INIT). IKE-less case requires the management of SPD and SAD entries. Based on YANG models in [netconf-vpn] and [I-D.tran-ipsecme-yang], RFC 4301 [RFC4301] and RFC - 7296 [RFC7296] this document defines the required interfaces with a + 7296 [RFC7296], this document defines the required interfaces with a YANG model for configuration and state data for IKE, PAD, SPD and SAD - (see Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C). + (see Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C). Examples of the usage + of these models can found in Appendix D, Appendix E and Appendix F. This document considers two typical scenarios to manage autonomously - IPsec SAs: gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host [RFC6071]. The - analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of - scope of this document. In these cases, host or gateways or both may - act as NSFs. Finally, it also discusses the situation where two NSFs - are under the control of two different Security Controllers. + IPsec SAs: gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host [RFC6071]. In these + cases, hosts, gateways or both may act as NSFs. Finally, it also + discusses the situation where two NSFs are under the control of two + different Security Controllers. The analysis of the host-to-gateway + (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope of this document. - NOTE: This work pays attention to the challenge "Lack of Mechanism + Finally, this work pays attention to the challenge "Lack of Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to NSFs" defined in [RFC8192] in the particular case of the establishment and management of IPsec SAs. In fact, this I-D could be considered as a proper use case for this particular challenge in [RFC8192]. 2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. @@ -192,86 +199,90 @@ addition, the following terms are defined below: o Software-Defined Networking. A set of techniques enabling to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300]. o Flow/Data Flow. Set of network packets sharing a set of characteristics, for example IP dst/src values or QoS parameters. - o Security Controller. A Controller is a management component that - contains control plane functions to manage and facilitate - information sharing, as well as execute security functions. In - the context of this document, it provides IPsec management - information. + o Security Controller. An entity that contains control plane + functions to manage and facilitate information sharing, as well as + execute security functions. In the context of this document, it + provides IPsec management information. o Network Security Function (NSF). Software that provides a set of security-related services. o Flow-based NSF. A NSF that inspects network flows according to a set of policies intended for enforcing security properties. The - NSFs considered in this document falls into this classification. + NSFs considered in this document fall into this classification. o Flow-based Protection Policy. The set of rules defining the conditions under which a data flow MUST be protected with IPsec, and the rules that MUST be applied to the specific flow. - o Internet Key Exchange (IKE) v2 Protocol to establish IPsec + o Internet Key Exchange (IKE) v2. Protocol to establish IPsec Security Associations (SAs). It requires information about the required authentication method (i.e. raw RSA/ECDSA keys or X.509 - certificates), DH groups, modes and algorithms for IKE SA - negotiation, etc. + certificates), Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups, IPsec SAs parameters + and algorithms for IKE SA negotiation, etc. o Security Policy Database (SPD). It includes information about - IPsec policies direction (in, out), local and remote addresses, - inbound and outboud SAs, etc. + IPsec policies direction (in, out), local and remote addresses + (traffic selectors information), inbound and outboud IPsec SAs, + etc. o Security Associations Database (SAD). It includes information about IPsec SAs, such as SPI, destination addresses, authentication and encryption algorithms and keys to protect IP flows. o Peer Authorization Database (PAD). It provides the link between - the SPD and a security association management protocol such as IKE - or the SDN-based solution described in this document. + the SPD and a security association management protocol. It is + used when the NSF deploys IKE implementation (IKE case). 4. Objectives o To describe the architecture for the SDN-based IPsec management, which implements a security service to allow the establishment and management of IPsec security associations from a central point, in order to protect specific data flows. o To define the interfaces required to manage and monitor the IPsec - Security Associations in the NSF from a Security Controller. YANG - models are defined for configuration and state data for IPsec + Security Associations (SA) in the NSF from a Security Controller. + YANG models are defined for configuration and state data for IPsec management. 5. SDN-based IPsec management description - As mentioned in Section 1, two cases are considered: + As mentioned in Section 1, two cases are considered, depending on + whether the NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation or not: IKE case and + IKE-less case. 5.1. IKE case: IKE/IPsec in the NSF In this case the NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation besides the IPsec support. The Security Controller is in charge of managing and - applying SPD and PAD entries (deriving and delivering IKE Credentials - such as a pre-shared key, certificates, etc.), and applying other IKE - configuration parameters (e.g. IKE_SA_INIT algorithms) to the NSF - for the IKE negotiation. + applying IPsec connection information (determining which nodes need + to start an IKE/IPsec session, deriving and delivering IKE + Credentials such as a pre-shared key, certificates, etc.), and + applying other IKE configuration parameters (e.g. cryptographic + algorithms for establishing an IKE SA) to the NSF for the IKE + negotiation. With these entries, the IKEv2 implementation can operate to establish the IPsec SAs. The application (administrator) establishes the IPsec requirements and information about the end points information (through the Client Facing Interface, [RFC8192]), and the Security - Controller translates those requirements into IKE, SPD and PAD + Controller translates these requirements into IKE, SPD and PAD entries that will be installed into the NSF (through the NSF Facing Interface). With that information, the NSF can just run IKEv2 to establish the required IPsec SA (when the data flow needs protection). Figure 1 shows the different layers and corresponding functionality. +-------------------------------------------+ |IPsec Management/Orchestration Application | Client or | I2NSF Client | App Gateway +-------------------------------------------+ @@ -288,42 +299,40 @@ | IKE | IPsec(SPD,PAD) | Security |-------------------------------------------| Function | Data Protection and Forwarding | +-------------------------------------------+ Figure 1: IKE case: IKE/IPsec in the NSF 5.1.1. Interface Requirements for IKE case SDN-based IPsec flow protection services provide dynamic and flexible - management of IPsec SAs in flow-based NSF. In order to support this - capability in case IKE case, the following interface requirements are - to be met: - - o A YANG data model for configuration data for IKEv2, SPD and PAD. + management of IPsec SAs in flow-based NSFs. In order to support this + capability in IKE case, the following interface requirements need to + be met: - o A YANG data model for state data for IKE, PAD, SPD and SAD (NOTE: - the SAD entries are created in runtime by IKEv2.) + o A YANG data model for IKEv2, SPD and PAD configuration data, and + for IKE state data. - o In scenarios where multiple controllers are implicated, SDN-based - IPsec management services may require a mechanism to discover - which Security Controller is managing a specific NSF. Moreover, - an east-west interface [RFC7426] is required to exchange IPsec- - related information. For example, if two gateways need to + o In scenarios where multiple Security Controllers are implicated, + SDN-based IPsec management services may require a mechanism to + discover which Security Controller is managing a specific NSF. + Moreover, an east-west interface [RFC7426] is required to exchange + IPsec-related information. For example, if two gateways need to establish an IPsec SA and both are under the control of two - different controllers then both Security Controllers need to - exchange information to properly configure their own gateways. - That is, the may need to agree on whether IKEv2 authentication - will be based on raw public keys or pre-shared keys. In case of - using pre-shared keys they will have to agree in the PSK. + different controllers, then both Security Controllers need to + exchange information to properly configure their own NSFs. That + is, the may need to agree on whether IKEv2 authentication will be + based on raw public keys, pre-shared keys, etc. In case of using + pre-shared keys they will have to agree in the PSK. -5.2. IKE-less case: IPsec (no IKEv2) in the NSF +5.2. IKE-less case: IPsec (no IKEv2) in the NSF. In this case, the NSF does not deploy IKEv2 and, therefore, the Security Controller has to perform the IKE security functions and management of IPsec SAs by populating and managing the SPD and the SAD. +-----------------------------------------+ | IPsec Management Application | Client or | I2NSF Client | App Gateway +-----------------------------------------+ @@ -340,651 +349,610 @@ | IPsec (SPD,SAD) | Function (NSF) |-----------------------------------------| | Data Protection and Forwarding | +-----------------------------------------+ Figure 2: IKE-less case: IPsec (no IKE) in the NSF As shown in Figure 2, applications for flow protection run on the top of the Security Controller. When an administrator enforces flow- based protection policies through the Client Facing Interface, the - Security Controller translates those requirements into SPD and SAD + Security Controller translates these requirements into SPD and SAD entries, which are installed in the NSF. PAD entries are not required since there is no IKEv2 in the NSF. 5.2.1. Interface Requirements for IKE-less case - In order to support the IKE-less case, the following requirements are - to be met: - - o A YANG data model for configuration data for SPD and SAD. + In order to support the IKE-less case, the following requirements + need to be met: - o A YANG data model for state data for SPD and SAD. + o A YANG data model for configuration data for SPD and SAD and for + state data for SAD. o In scenarios where multiple controllers are implicated, SDN-based IPsec management services may require a mechanism to discover which Security Controller is managing a specific NSF. Moreover, an east-west interface [RFC7426] is required to exchange IPsec- related information. NOTE: A possible east-west protocol for this IKE-less case could be IKEv2. However, this needs to be explore since the IKEv2 peers would be the Security Controllers. Specifically, the IKE-less case assumes that the SDN controller has to perform some security functions that IKEv2 typically does, namely (non-exhaustive): o IV generation. - o prevent counter resets for same key. + o Prevent counter resets for the same key. o Generation of pseudo-random cryptographic keys for the IPsec SAs. - o Rekey of the IPsec SAs based on notification from the NSF (i.e. + o Rekey of the IPsec SAs based on notifications from the NSF (i.e. expire). o Generation of the IPsec SAs when required based on notifications - (i.e. sadb_acquire). + (i.e. sadb-acquire) from the NSF. o NAT Traversal discovery and management. Additionally to these functions, another set of tasks must be - performed by the Controller (non-exhaustive list): + performed by the Security Controller (non-exhaustive list): - o SPI random generation. + o IPsec SA's SPI random generation. o Cryptographic algorithm/s selection. o Usage of extended sequence numbers. o Establishment of proper traffic selectors. 5.3. IKE case vs IKE-less case - IKE case MAY be easier to deploy than IKE-less case because current - gateways typically have an IKEv2/IPsec implementation. Moreover - hosts can install easily an IKE implementation. As downside, the NSF - needs more resources to hold IKEv2. Moreover, the IKEv2 - implementation needs to implement an interface so that the I2NSF - Agent can interact with them. + In principle, IKE case is easier to deploy than IKE-less case because + current gateways typically have an IKEv2/IPsec implementation. + Moreover hosts can install easily an IKE implementation. As + downside, the NSF needs more resources to hold IKEv2. Moreover, the + IKEv2 implementation needs to implement an internal interface so that + the IKE configuration sent by the Security Controller can be enforced + in runtime. Alternatively, IKE-less case allows lighter NSFs (no IKEv2 implementation), which benefits the deployment in constrained NSFs. Moreover, IKEv2 does not need to be performed in gateway-to-gateway and host-to-host scenarios under the same Security Controller (see Section 7.1). On the contrary, the overload of creating fresh IPsec SAs is shifted to the Security Controller since IKEv2 is not in the NSF. As a consequence, this may result in a more complex implementation in the controller side. This overload may create some scalability issues when the number of NSFs is high. In general, literature around SDN-based network management using a - centralized SDN controller is aware about scalability issues and - solutions have been already provided (e.g. hierarchical SDN - controllers; having multiple replicated SDN controllers, etc). In - the context of IPsec management, one straight way to reduce the - overhead and the potential scalability issue in the Security - Controller is to apply IKE case, described in this document, since - the IPsec SAs are managed between NSFs without the involvement of the - Security Controller at all, except by the initial IKE configuration - provided by the Security Controller. Other option with IKE-less is - to use techniques already seen in SDN world such as, for example, - hierarchical SDN controllers. Other solutions, such as Controller- - IKE [I-D.carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike], have proposed that NSFs - provide their DH public keys to the Security Controller, so that the - Security Controller distributes all public keys to all peers. All - peers can calculate a unique pairwise secret for each other peer and - there is no inter-NSF messages. A re-key mechanism is further - described in [I-D.carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike]. + centralized Security Controller is aware about scalability issues and + solutions have been already provided (e.g. hierarchical Security + Controllers; having multiple replicated Security Controllers, etc). + In the context of SDN-based IPsec management, one straight way to + reduce the overhead and the potential scalability issue in the + Security Controller is to apply the IKE case described in this + document, since the IPsec SAs are managed between NSFs without the + involvement of the Security Controller at all, except by the initial + IKE configuration provided by the Security Controller. Other + solutions, such as Controller-IKE + [I-D.carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike], have proposed that NSFs provide + their DH public keys to the Security Controller, so that the Security + Controller distributes all public keys to all peers. All peers can + calculate a unique pairwise secret for each other peer and there is + no inter-NSF messages. A rekey mechanism is further described in + [I-D.carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike]. In terms of security, IKE case provides better security properties - than IKE-less case, as we discuss in section Section 8. The main - reason is that the Security Controller is not able to observe any - session keys generated for the IPsec SAs because IKEv2 is in charge - of negotiating the IPsec SAs. + than IKE-less case, as we discuss in section Section 9. The main + reason is that the NSFs are generating the session keys and not the + Security Controller. -5.3.1. Rekeying process +5.3.1. Rekeying process. For IKE case, the rekeying process is carried out by IKEv2, following - the information defined in the SPD and SAD. + the information defined in the SPD and SAD. Therefore, connections + will live unless something different is required by the administrator + or the Security Controller detects something wrong. - For IKE-less case, the Security Controller needs to take care of the - rekeying process. When the IPsec SA is going to expire (e.g. IPsec - SA soft lifetime), it has to create a new IPsec SA and remove the old - one. This rekeying process starts when the Security Controller - receives a sadb_expire notification or it decides so, based on - lifetime state data obtained from the NSF. + Traditionally, during a rekey process of the IPSec SA using IKE, a + bundle of inbound and outbound IPsec SAs is taken into account from + the perspective of one of the NSFs. For example, if the inbound + IPsec SA expires both the inbound and outbound IPsec SA are rekeyed + at the same time in that NSF. However, when IKE is not used, we have + followed a different approach to avoid any packet loss during rekey: + the Security Controller installs first the new inbound SAs in both + NSFs and then, the outbound IPsec SAs. + + In other words, for the IKE-less case, the Security Controller needs + to take care of the rekeying process. When the IPsec SA is going to + expire (e.g. IPsec SA soft lifetime), it has to create a new IPsec + SA and remove the old one. This rekeying process starts when the + Security Controller receives a sadb-expire notification or it decides + so, based on lifetime state data obtained from the NSF. To explain the rekeying process between two IPsec peers A and B, let - assume that SPIa1 identifies the inbound SA in A and SPIb1 the - inbound SA in B. + assume that SPIa1 identifies the inbound IPsec SA in A, and SPIb1 the + inbound IPsec SA in B. 1. The Security Controller chooses two random values as SPI for the - new inbound SAs: for example, SPIa2 for A and SPIb2 for B. These - numbers MUST not be in conflict with any IPsec SA in A or B. - - Then, the Security Controller creates an inbound SA with SPIa2 in - A and another inbound SA in B with SPIb2. It can send this - information simultaneously to A and B. + new inbound IPsec SAs: for example, SPIa2 for A and SPIb2 for B. + These numbers MUST not be in conflict with any IPsec SA in A or + B. Then, the Security Controller creates an inbound IPsec SA + with SPIa2 in A and another inbound IPsec SA in B with SPIb2. It + can send this information simultaneously to A and B. 2. Once the Security Controller receives confirmation from A and B, - inbound SA are correctly installed. Then it proceeds to send in - parallel to A and B the outbound SAs: it sends the outbound SA to - A with SPIb2 and the outbound SA to B with SPIa2. At this point - the new IPsec SA is ready. + the controller knows that the inbound IPsec A are correctly + installed. Then it proceeds to send in parallel to A and B, the + outbound IPsec SAs: it sends the outbound IPsec SA to A with + SPIb2 and the outbound IPsec SA to B with SPIa2. At this point + the new IPsec SAs are ready. - 3. Once the Security Controller receives confirmation from A and B, - that the outbound SAs have been installed, the Security - Controller deletes the old IPsec SAs from A (inbound SPIa1 and - outbound SPIb1) and B (outbound SPIa1 and inbound SPIb1) in - parallel. It is worth noting that if the IPsec implementation - can itself detect traffic on the new IPsec SA, and it can delete - the old IPsec SA itself without instruction from the Security - Controller, then this step 3 is not required. + 3. Once the Security Controller receives confirmation from A and B + that the outbound IPsec SAs have been installed, the Security + Controller, in parallel, deletes the old IPsec SAs from A + (inbound SPIa1 and outbound SPIb1) and B (outbound SPIa1 and + inbound SPIb1). -5.3.2. NSF state loss +5.3.2. NSF state loss. If one of the NSF restarts, it will lose the IPsec state (affected NSF). By default, the Security Controller can assume that all the state has been lost and therefore it will have to send IKEv2, SPD and - PAD information to the NSF in IKE case, and SPD and SAD information - in IKE-less case. + PAD information to the NSF in the IKE case, and SPD and SAD + information in IKE-less case. In both cases, the Security Controller is aware of the affected NSF (e.g. the NETCONF/TCP connection is broken with the affected NSF, the - Security Controller is receiving sadb_bad-spi notification from a + Security Controller is receiving sadb-bad-spi notification from a particular NSF, etc.). Moreover, the Security Controller has a register about all the NSFs that have IPsec SAs with the affected NSF. Therefore, it knows the affected IPsec SAs. In IKE case, the Security Controller will configure the affected NSF with the new IKEv2, SPD and PAD information. It has also to send new parameters (e.g. a new fresh PSK for authentication) to the NSFs - which have IKEv2 SAs and IPsec SAs with the affected NSF. It can - also instruct the affected NSF to send IKEv2 INITIAL_CONTACT. - Finally, the Security Controller will instruct the affected NSF to - start the IKEv2 negotiation with the new configuration. + which have IKEv2 SAs and IPsec SAs with the affected NSF. Finally, + the Security Controller will instruct the affected NSF to start the + IKEv2 negotiation with the new configuration. In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller detects that a NSF has - lost the IPsec SAs (e.g. it reboots) it will delete the old IPsec SAs - of the non-failed nodes established with the failed node (step 1). - This prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext. If the - failed node comes to live, the Security Controller will configure the - new inbound IPsec SAs between the failed node and all the nodes the - failed was talking to (step 2). After these inbound IPsec SAs have - been established, the Security Controller can configure the outbound - IPsec SAs (step 3). + lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec SAs on the non-failed + nodes, established with the failed node (step 1). This prevents the + non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext. If the affected node comes + to live, the Security Controller will configure the new inbound IPsec + SAs between the affected node and all the nodes it was talking to + (step 2). After these inbound IPsec SAs have been established, the + Security Controller can configure the outbound IPsec SAs in parallel + (step 3). Nevertheless other more optimized options can be considered (e.g. - making IKEv2 configuration permanent between reboots). + making the IKEv2 configuration permanent between reboots). 5.3.3. NAT Traversal - In IKE case, IKEv2 already owns a mechanism to detect whether some of - the peers or both are located behind a NAT. If there is a NAT - network configured between two peers, it is required to activate the - usage of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation of ESP packets ([RFC3948], - [RFC8229]). Note that the usage of TRANSPORT mode when NAT is - required is forbidden in this specification. + In the IKE case, IKEv2 already provides a mechanism to detect whether + some of the peers or both are located behind a NAT. If there is a + NAT network configured between two peers, it is required to activate + the usage of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation for ESP packets ([RFC3948], + [RFC8229]). Note that the usage of IPsec transport mode when NAT is + required MUST NOT be used in this specification. - On the contrary, IKE-less case does not have any protocol in the NSFs - to detect whether they are located behind a NAT or not. However, the - SDN paradigm generally assumes the Security Controller has a view of - the network it controls. This view is built either requesting - information to the NSFs under its control, or because these NSFs - inform to the Security Controller. Based on this information, the - Security Controller can guess if there is a NAT configured between - two hosts, and apply the required policies to both NSFs besides - activating the usage of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation of ESP packets - ([RFC3948], [RFC8229]). + On the contrary, the IKE-less case does not have any protocol in the + NSFs to detect whether they are located behind a NAT or not. + However, the SDN paradigm generally assumes the Security Controller + has a view of the network under its control. This view is built + either requesting information to the NSFs under its control, or + because these NSFs inform the Security Controller. Based on this + information, the Security Controller can guess if there is a NAT + configured between two hosts, and apply the required policies to both + NSFs besides activating the usage of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation of + ESP packets ([RFC3948], [RFC8229]). For example, the Security Controller could directly request the NSF for specific data such as networking configuration, NAT support, etc. Protocols such as NETCONF or SNMP can be used here. For example, RFC 7317 [RFC7317] provides a YANG data model for system management or [I-D.ietf-opsawg-nat-yang] a data model for NAT management. The - Security Controller can use this NETCONF module with a gateway to - collect NAT information or even configure a NAT. In any case, if - this NETCONF module is not available and the Security Controller - cannot know if a host is behind a NAT or not, then IKE case should be - the right choice and not the IKE-less. + Security Controller can use this NETCONF module with a NSF to collect + NAT information or even configure a NAT network. In any case, if + this NETCONF module is not available in the NSF and the Security + Controller does not have a mechanism to know whether a host is behind + a NAT or not, then the IKE case should be the right choice and not + the IKE-less case. + +5.3.4. NSF Discovery + + The assumption in this document is that, for both cases, before a NSF + can operate in this system, it MUST be registered in the Security + Controller. In this way, when the NSF comes to live and establishes + a connection to the Security Controller, it knows that the NSF is + valid for joining the system. + + Either during this registration process or when the NSF connects with + the Security Controller, the Security Controller MUST discover + certain capabilities of this NSF, such as what is the cryptographic + suite supported, authentication method, the support of the IKE case + or the IKE-less case, etc. This discovery process is out of the + scope of this document. 6. YANG configuration data models - In order to support IKE case and IKE-less case we have modelled the + In order to support the IKE and IKE-less cases we have modeled the different parameters and values that must be configured to manage - IPsec SAs. Specifically, IKE requires modeling IKEv2, SPD and PAD + IPsec SAs. Specifically, IKE requires modeling IKEv2, SPD and PAD, while IKE-less case requires configuration models for the SPD and SAD. We have defined three models: ietf-ipsec-common (Appendix A), ietf-ipsec-ike (Appendix B, IKE case), ietf-ipsec-ikeless (Appendix C, IKE-less case). Since the model ietf-ipsec-common has - only typedef and groupings common to the other modules, in the - following we only show a simplified view of the ietf-ipsec-ike and - ietf-ipsec-ikeless models. + only typedef and groupings common to the other modules, we only show + a simplified view of the ietf-ipsec-ike and ietf-ipsec-ikeless + models. 6.1. IKE case model The model related to IKEv2 has been extracted from reading IKEv2 standard in [RFC7296], and observing some open source - implementations, such as Strongswan or Libreswan. + implementations, such as Strongswan [strongswan] or Libreswan + [libreswan]. The definition of the PAD model has been extracted from the specification in section 4.4.3 in [RFC4301] (NOTE: We have observed that many implementations integrate PAD configuration as part of the - IKEv2 configuration.) + IKEv2 configuration). module: ietf-ipsec-ike - +--rw ikev2 + +--rw ipsec-ike +--rw pad - | +--rw pad-entry* [pad-entry-id] - | +--rw pad-entry-id uint64 - | +--rw (identity)? + | +--rw pad-entry* [name] + | +--rw name string + | +--rw (identity) | | +--:(ipv4-address) | | | +--rw ipv4-address? inet:ipv4-address | | +--:(ipv6-address) | | | +--rw ipv6-address? inet:ipv6-address | | +--:(fqdn-string) | | | +--rw fqdn-string? inet:domain-name | | +--:(rfc822-address-string) | | | +--rw rfc822-address-string? string - | | +--:(dnX509) - | | | +--rw dnX509? string - | | +--:(id_key) - | | | +--rw id_key? string - | | +--:(id_null) - | | | +--rw id_null? empty - | | +--:(user_fqdn) - | | +--rw user_fqdn? string - | +--rw my-identifier string - | +--rw pad-auth-protocol? auth-protocol-type - | +--rw auth-method - | +--rw auth-m? auth-method-type + | | +--:(dnx509) + | | | +--rw dnx509? string + | | +--:(gnx509) + | | | +--rw gnx509? string + | | +--:(id-key) + | | | +--rw id-key? string + | | +--:(id-null) + | | +--rw id-null? empty + | +--rw auth-protocol? auth-protocol-type + | +--rw peer-authentication + | +--rw auth-method? auth-method-type | +--rw eap-method - | | +--rw eap-type? uint8 + | | +--rw eap-type uint8 | +--rw pre-shared | | +--rw secret? yang:hex-string | +--rw digital-signature - | +--rw ds-algorithm? signature-algorithm-t - | +--rw raw-public-key? yang:hex-string - | +--rw key-data? string - | +--rw key-file? string - | +--rw ca-data* string - | +--rw ca-file? string - | +--rw cert-data? string - | +--rw cert-file? string - | +--rw crl-data? string - | +--rw crl-file? string + | +--rw ds-algorithm? uint8 + | +--rw (public-key) + | | +--:(raw-public-key) + | | | +--rw raw-public-key? binary + | | +--:(cert-data) + | | +--rw cert-data? ct:x509 + | +--rw private-key? binary + | +--rw ca-data* ct:x509 + | +--rw crl-data? ct:crl + | +--rw crl-uri? inet:uri | +--rw oscp-uri? inet:uri - +--rw ike-conn-entry* [conn-name] - | +--rw conn-name string - | +--rw autostartup type-autostartup + +--rw conn-entry* [name] + | +--rw name string + | +--rw autostartup? autostartup-type | +--rw initial-contact? boolean - | +--rw version? enumeration - | +--rw ike-fragmentation? boolean - | +--rw ike-sa-lifetime-hard - | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw bytes? uint32 - | | +--rw packets? uint32 + | +--rw version? auth-protocol-type + | +--rw fragmentation? boolean | +--rw ike-sa-lifetime-soft - | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw bytes? uint32 - | | +--rw packets? uint32 - | | +--rw action? ic:lifetime-action - | +--rw ike-sa-authalg* ic:integrity-algorithm-t - | +--rw ike-sa-encalg* ic:encryption-algorithm-t - | +--rw dh_group uint32 + | | +--rw rekey-time? uint32 + | | +--rw reauth-time? uint32 + | +--rw ike-sa-lifetime-hard + | | +--rw over-time? uint32 + | +--rw authalg* ic:integrity-algorithm-type + | +--rw encalg* ic:encryption-algorithm-type + | +--rw dh-group? pfs-group | +--rw half-open-ike-sa-timer? uint32 | +--rw half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold? uint32 | +--rw local - | | +--rw local-pad-id? uint64 + | | +--rw local-pad-entry-name? string | +--rw remote - | | +--rw remote-pad-id? uint64 - | +--rw espencap? esp-encap - | +--rw sport? inet:port-number - | +--rw dport? inet:port-number - | +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address + | | +--rw remote-pad-entry-name? string + | +--rw encapsulation-type + | | +--rw espencap? esp-encap + | | +--rw sport? inet:port-number + | | +--rw dport? inet:port-number + | | +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address | +--rw spd - | | +--rw spd-entry* [spd-entry-id] - | | +--rw spd-entry-id uint64 - | | +--rw priority? uint32 - | | +--rw anti-replay-window? uint16 - | | +--rw names* [name] - | | | +--rw name-type? ipsec-spd-name - | | | +--rw name string - | | +--rw condition - | | | +--rw traffic-selector-list* [ts-number] - | | | +--rw ts-number uint32 - | | | +--rw direction? ipsec-traffic-direction - | | | +--rw local-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | | | +--rw remote-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | | | +--rw upper-layer-protocol* ipsec-upper-layer-proto + | | +--rw spd-entry* [name] + | | +--rw name string + | | +--rw ipsec-policy-config + | | +--rw anti-replay-window? uint64 + | | +--rw traffic-selector + | | | +--rw local-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | | +--rw remote-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol | | | +--rw local-ports* [start end] | | | | +--rw start inet:port-number | | | | +--rw end inet:port-number | | | +--rw remote-ports* [start end] | | | +--rw start inet:port-number | | | +--rw end inet:port-number | | +--rw processing-info - | | | +--rw action ipsec-spd-operation + | | | +--rw action? ipsec-spd-action | | | +--rw ipsec-sa-cfg | | | +--rw pfp-flag? boolean - | | | +--rw extSeqNum? boolean - | | | +--rw seqOverflow? boolean - | | | +--rw statefulfragCheck? boolean - | | | +--rw security-protocol? ipsec-protocol + | | | +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean + | | | +--rw seq-overflow? boolean + | | | +--rw stateful-frag-check? boolean | | | +--rw mode? ipsec-mode - | | | +--rw ah-algorithms - | | | | +--rw ah-algorithm* integrity-algorithm-t - | | | | +--rw trunc-length? uint32 + | | | +--rw protocol-parameters? ipsec-protocol-parameters | | | +--rw esp-algorithms - | | | | +--rw authentication* integrity-algorithm-t - | | | | +--rw encryption* encryption-algorithm-t - | | | | +--rw tfc_pad? uint32 + | | | | +--rw integrity* integrity-algorithm-type + | | | | +--rw encryption* encryption-algorithm-type + | | | | +--rw tfc-pad? boolean | | | +--rw tunnel - | | | +--rw local? inet:ip-address - | | | +--rw remote? inet:ip-address - | | | +--rw bypass-df? boolean + | | | +--rw local inet:ip-address + | | | +--rw remote inet:ip-address + | | | +--rw df-bit? enumeration | | | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean | | | +--rw dscp-mapping? yang:hex-string | | | +--rw ecn? boolean - | | +--rw spd-lifetime-soft - | | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp - | | | +--rw bytes? uint32 - | | | +--rw packets? uint32 - | | | +--rw action? lifetime-action - | | +--rw spd-lifetime-hard - | | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp + | | +--rw spd-mark + | | +--rw mark? uint32 + | | +--rw mask? yang:hex-string + | +--rw child-sa-info + | | +--rw pfs-groups* pfs-group + | | +--rw child-sa-lifetime-soft + | | | +--rw time? uint32 | | | +--rw bytes? uint32 | | | +--rw packets? uint32 - | | +--ro spd-lifetime-current - | | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro bytes? uint32 - | | +--ro packets? uint32 - | +--ro ike-sa-state - | +--ro uptime - | | +--ro running? yang:date-and-time - | | +--ro since? yang:date-and-time + | | | +--rw idle? uint32 + | | | +--rw action? ic:lifetime-action + | | +--rw child-sa-lifetime-hard + | | +--rw time? uint32 + | | +--rw bytes? uint32 + | | +--rw packets? uint32 + | | +--rw idle? uint32 + | +--ro state | +--ro initiator? boolean - | +--ro initiator-ikesa-spi? uint64 - | +--ro responder-ikesa-spi? uint64 + | +--ro initiator-ikesa-spi? ike-spi + | +--ro responder-ikesa-spi? ike-spi | +--ro nat-local? boolean | +--ro nat-remote? boolean - | +--ro nat-any? boolean - | +--ro espencap? esp-encap - | +--ro sport? inet:port-number - | +--ro dport? inet:port-number - | +--ro oaddr* inet:ip-address + | +--ro encapsulation-type + | | +--ro espencap? esp-encap + | | +--ro sport? inet:port-number + | | +--ro dport? inet:port-number + | | +--ro oaddr* inet:ip-address | +--ro established? uint64 - | +--ro rekey-time? uint64 - | +--ro reauth-time? uint64 - | +--ro child-sas* [] - | +--ro spis - | +--ro spi-in? ic:ipsec-spi - | +--ro spi-out? ic:ipsec-spi + | +--ro current-rekey-time? uint64 + | +--ro current-reauth-time? uint64 +--ro number-ike-sas - +--ro total? uint32 - +--ro half-open? uint32 - +--ro half-open-cookies? uint32 + +--ro total? uint64 + +--ro half-open? uint64 + +--ro half-open-cookies? uint64 + + Appendix D shows an example of IKE case configuration for a NSF, in + tunnel mode (gateway-to-gateway), with NSFs authentication based on + X.509 certificates. 6.2. IKE-less case model - The definition of the SPD model has been mainly extracted from the - specification in section 4.4.1 and Appendix D in [RFC4301]. Unlike - existing implementations (e.g. XFRM), it is worth mentioning that - this model follows [RFC4301] and, consequently, each policy (spd- - entry) consists of one or more traffic selectors. + For this case, the definition of the SPD model has been mainly + extracted from the specification in section 4.4.1 and Appendix D in + [RFC4301], though with some simplications. For example, each IPsec + policy (spd-entry) contains one traffic selector, instead a list of + them. The reason is that we have observed real kernel + implementations only admit a traffic selector per IPsec policy. The definition of the SAD model has been extracted from the specification in section 4.4.2 in [RFC4301]. Note that this model - not only associates an IPsec SA with its corresponding policy (spd- - entry-id) but also indicates the specific traffic selector that - caused its establishment. In other words, each traffic selector of a - policy (spd-entry) generates a different IPsec SA (sad-entry). + not only allows to associate an IPsec SA with its corresponding + policy through the specific traffic selector but also an identifier + (reqid). The notifications model has been defined using as reference the PF_KEYv2 standard in [RFC2367]. module: ietf-ipsec-ikeless - +--rw ietf-ipsec + +--rw ipsec-ikeless +--rw spd - | +--rw spd-entry* [spd-entry-id] - | +--rw spd-entry-id uint64 - | +--rw priority? uint32 - | +--rw anti-replay-window? uint16 - | +--rw names* [name] - | | +--rw name-type? ipsec-spd-name - | | +--rw name string - | +--rw condition - | | +--rw traffic-selector-list* [ts-number] - | | +--rw ts-number uint32 - | | +--rw direction? ipsec-traffic-direction - | | +--rw local-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | | +--rw remote-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | | +--rw upper-layer-protocol* ipsec-upper-layer-proto + | +--rw spd-entry* [name] + | +--rw name string + | +--rw direction? ic:ipsec-traffic-direction + | +--rw reqid? uint64 + | +--rw ipsec-policy-config + | +--rw anti-replay-window? uint64 + | +--rw traffic-selector + | | +--rw local-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | +--rw remote-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol | | +--rw local-ports* [start end] | | | +--rw start inet:port-number | | | +--rw end inet:port-number | | +--rw remote-ports* [start end] | | +--rw start inet:port-number | | +--rw end inet:port-number | +--rw processing-info - | | +--rw action ipsec-spd-operation + | | +--rw action? ipsec-spd-action | | +--rw ipsec-sa-cfg | | +--rw pfp-flag? boolean - | | +--rw extSeqNum? boolean - | | +--rw seqOverflow? boolean - | | +--rw statefulfragCheck? boolean - | | +--rw security-protocol? ipsec-protocol + | | +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean + | | +--rw seq-overflow? boolean + | | +--rw stateful-frag-check? boolean | | +--rw mode? ipsec-mode - | | +--rw ah-algorithms - | | | +--rw ah-algorithm* integrity-algorithm-t - | | | +--rw trunc-length? uint32 + | | +--rw protocol-parameters? | | +--rw esp-algorithms - | | | +--rw authentication* integrity-algorithm-t - | | | +--rw encryption* encryption-algorithm-t - | | | +--rw tfc_pad? uint32 + | | | +--rw integrity* integrity-algorithm-type + | | | +--rw encryption* encryption-algorithm-type + | | | +--rw tfc-pad? boolean | | +--rw tunnel - | | +--rw local? inet:ip-address - | | +--rw remote? inet:ip-address - | | +--rw bypass-df? boolean + | | +--rw local inet:ip-address + | | +--rw remote inet:ip-address + | | +--rw df-bit? enumeration | | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean | | +--rw dscp-mapping? yang:hex-string | | +--rw ecn? boolean - | +--rw spd-lifetime-soft - | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp + | +--rw spd-mark + | +--rw mark? uint32 + | +--rw mask? yang:hex-string + +--rw sad + +--rw sad-entry* [name] + +--rw name string + +--rw reqid? uint64 + +--rw ipsec-sa-config + | +--rw spi uint32 + | +--rw ext-seq-num? boolean + | +--rw seq-number-counter? uint64 + | +--rw seq-overflow? boolean + | +--rw anti-replay-window? uint32 + | +--rw traffic-selector + | | +--rw local-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | +--rw remote-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | | +--rw inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol + | | +--rw local-ports* [start end] + | | | +--rw start inet:port-number + | | | +--rw end inet:port-number + | | +--rw remote-ports* [start end] + | | +--rw start inet:port-number + | | +--rw end inet:port-number + | +--rw protocol-parameters? ic:ipsec-protocol-parameters + | +--rw mode? ic:ipsec-mode + | +--rw esp-sa + | | +--rw encryption + | | | +--rw encryption-algorithm? ic:encryption-algorithm-type + | | | +--rw key? yang:hex-string + | | | +--rw iv? yang:hex-string + | | +--rw integrity + | | +--rw integrity-algorithm? ic:integrity-algorithm-type + | | +--rw key? yang:hex-string + | +--rw sa-lifetime-hard + | | +--rw time? uint32 | | +--rw bytes? uint32 | | +--rw packets? uint32 - | | +--rw action? lifetime-action - | +--rw spd-lifetime-hard - | | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp + | | +--rw idle? uint32 + | +--rw sa-lifetime-soft + | | +--rw time? uint32 | | +--rw bytes? uint32 | | +--rw packets? uint32 - | +--ro spd-lifetime-current - | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp - | +--ro bytes? uint32 - | +--ro packets? uint32 - +--rw sad - +--rw sad-entry* [sad-entry-id] - +--rw sad-entry-id uint64 - +--rw spi? ic:ipsec-spi - +--rw seq-number? uint64 - +--rw seq-number-overflow-flag? boolean - +--rw anti-replay-window? uint16 - +--rw spd-entry-id? uint64 - +--rw local-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - +--rw remote-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - +--rw upper-layer-protocol* ipsec-upper-layer-proto - +--rw local-ports* [start end] - | +--rw start inet:port-number - | +--rw end inet:port-number - +--rw remote-ports* [start end] - | +--rw start inet:port-number - | +--rw end inet:port-number - +--rw security-protocol? ic:ipsec-protocol - +--rw sad-lifetime-hard - | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp - | +--rw bytes? uint32 - | +--rw packets? uint32 - +--rw sad-lifetime-soft - | +--rw time? yang:timestamp - | +--rw idle? yang:timestamp - | +--rw bytes? uint32 - | +--rw packets? uint32 - | +--rw action? ic:lifetime-action - +--rw mode? ic:ipsec-mode - +--rw statefulfragCheck? boolean - +--rw dscp? yang:hex-string - +--rw path-mtu? uint16 - +--rw tunnel - | +--rw local? inet:ip-address - | +--rw remote? inet:ip-address - | +--rw bypass-df? boolean - | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean - | +--rw dscp-mapping? yang:hex-string - | +--rw ecn? boolean - +--rw espencap? esp-encap - +--rw sport? inet:port-number - +--rw dport? inet:port-number - +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address - +--ro sad-lifetime-current - | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp + | | +--rw idle? uint32 + | | +--rw action? ic:lifetime-action + | +--rw tunnel + | | +--rw local inet:ip-address + | | +--rw remote inet:ip-address + | | +--rw df-bit? enumeration + | | +--rw bypass-dscp? boolean + | | +--rw dscp-mapping? yang:hex-string + | | +--rw ecn? boolean + | +--rw encapsulation-type + | +--rw espencap? esp-encap + | +--rw sport? inet:port-number + | +--rw dport? inet:port-number + | +--rw oaddr* inet:ip-address + +--ro ipsec-sa-state + +--ro sa-lifetime-current + | +--ro time? uint32 | +--ro bytes? uint32 | +--ro packets? uint32 - +--ro stats - | +--ro replay-window? uint32 - | +--ro replay? uint32 - | +--ro failed? uint32 - +--ro replay_state - | +--ro seq? uint32 - | +--ro oseq? uint32 - | +--ro bitmap? uint32 - +--ro replay_state_esn - | +--ro bmp-len? uint32 - | +--ro oseq? uint32 - | +--ro oseq-hi? uint32 - | +--ro seq-hi? uint32 - | +--ro replay-window? uint32 - | +--ro bmp* uint32 - +--rw ah-sa - | +--rw integrity - | +--rw integrity-algorithm? ic:integrity-algorithm-t - | +--rw key? string - +--rw esp-sa - +--rw encryption - | +--rw encryption-algorithm? ic:encryption-algorithm-t - | +--rw key? yang:hex-string - | +--rw iv? yang:hex-string - +--rw integrity - | +--rw integrity-algorithm? ic:integrity-algorithm-t - | +--rw key? yang:hex-string - +--rw combined-enc-intr? boolean + | +--ro idle? uint32 + +--ro replay-stats + +--ro replay-window? uint64 + +--ro packet-dropped? uint64 + +--ro failed? uint32 + +--ro seq-number-counter? uint64 notifications: - +---n spdb_expire - | +--ro index? uint64 - +---n sadb_acquire - | +--ro base-list* [version] - | | +--ro version string - | | +--ro msg_type? sadb-msg-type - | | +--ro msg_satype? sadb-msg-satype - | | +--ro msg_seq? uint32 - | +--ro local-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | +--ro remote-subnet? inet:ip-prefix - | +--ro upper-layer-protocol* ipsec-upper-layer-proto + +---n sadb-acquire + | +--ro ipsec-policy-name string + | +--ro traffic-selector + | +--ro local-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | +--ro remote-subnet inet:ip-prefix + | +--ro inner-protocol? ipsec-inner-protocol | +--ro local-ports* [start end] | | +--ro start inet:port-number | | +--ro end inet:port-number | +--ro remote-ports* [start end] | +--ro start inet:port-number | +--ro end inet:port-number - +---n sadb_expire - | +--ro base-list* [version] - | | +--ro version string - | | +--ro msg_type? sadb-msg-type - | | +--ro msg_satype? sadb-msg-satype - | | +--ro msg_seq? uint32 - | +--ro spi? ic:ipsec-spi - | +--ro anti-replay-window? uint16 - | +--ro encryption-algorithm? ic:encryption-algorithm-t - | +--ro authentication-algorithm? ic:integrity-algorithm-t - | +--ro sad-lifetime-hard - | | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro bytes? uint32 - | | +--ro packets? uint32 - | +--ro sad-lifetime-soft - | | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp - | | +--ro bytes? uint32 - | | +--ro packets? uint32 - | +--ro sad-lifetime-current - | +--ro time? yang:timestamp - | +--ro idle? yang:timestamp + +---n sadb-expire + | +--ro ipsec-sa-name string + | +--ro soft-lifetime-expire? boolean + | +--ro lifetime-current + | +--ro time? uint32 | +--ro bytes? uint32 | +--ro packets? uint32 - +---n sadb_bad-spi - +--ro state ic:ipsec-spi + | +--ro idle? uint32 + +---n sadb-seq-overflow + | +--ro ipsec-sa-name string + +---n sadb-bad-spi + +--ro spi uint32 + + Appendix E shows an example of IKE-less case configuration for a NSF, + in transport mode (host-to-host), with NSFs authentication based on + shared secrets. For the IKE-less case, Appendix F shows examples of + IPsec SA expire, acquire, sequence number overflow and bad SPI + notifications. 7. Use cases examples This section explains how different traditional configurations, that - is, host-to-host and gateway-to-gateway are deployed using this SDN- + is, host-to-host and gateway-to-gateway, are deployed using this SDN- based IPsec management service. In turn, these configurations will be typical in modern networks where, for example, virtualization will be key. -7.1. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under the same controller +7.1. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under the same Security + Controller +----------------------------------------+ | Security Controller | | | (1)| +--------------+ (2)+--------------+ | Flow-based ------> |Translate into|--->| South. Prot. | | Security. Pol. | |IPsec Policies| | | | | +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | | | | | | +--------------------------|-----|-------+ | | | (3) | |-------------------------+ +---| V V +----------------------+ +----------------------+ | NSF1 |<=======>| NSF2 | |IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) | |IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) | +----------------------+ (4) +----------------------+ - Figure 3: Host-to-host / gateway-to-gateway single controller flow - for the IKE case. + Figure 3: Host-to-host / gateway-to-gateway single Security + Controller for the IKE case. - Figure 3 describes the case IKE case: + Figure 3 describes the IKE case: 1. The administrator defines general flow-based security policies. The Security Controller looks for the NSFs involved (NSF1 and NSF2). 2. The Security Controller generates IKEv2 credentials for them and translates the policies into SPD and PAD entries. - 3. The Security Controller inserts the SPD and PAD entries in both - NSF1 and NSF2. + 3. The Security Controller inserts an IKEv2 configuration that + include the SPD and PAD entries in both NSF1 and NSF2. - 4. The flow is protected with the IPsec SA established with IKEv2. + 4. The flow is protected by means of the IPsec SA established with + IKEv2. +----------------------------------------+ | (1) Security Controller | Flow-based | | Security -----------| | Policy | V | | +---------------+ (2)+-------------+ | | |Translate into |--->| South. Prot.| | | |IPsec policies | | | | | +---------------+ +-------------+ | @@ -993,364 +961,353 @@ +-------------------------| --- |--------+ | | | (3) | |----------------------+ +--| V V +------------------+ +------------------+ | NSF1 |<=====>| NSF2 | |IPsec(SPD/SAD) | 4) |IPsec(SPD/SAD) | +------------------+ +------------------+ - Figure 4: Host-to-host / gateway-to-gateway single controller flow - for IKE-less case. + Figure 4: Host-to-host / gateway-to-gateway single Security + Controller for IKE-less case. - In IKE-less case, flow-based security policies defined by the + In the IKE-less case, flow-based security policies defined by the administrator are translated into IPsec SPD entries and inserted into the corresponding NSFs. Besides, fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the Security Controller and enforced in the NSFs. In - this case, the controller does not run any IKEv2 implementation, and - it provides the cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs. These keys - will be also distributed securely through the southbound interface. - Note that this is possible because both NSFs are managed by the same - controller. + this case, the Security Controller does not run any IKEv2 + implementation (neither the NSFs), and it provides the cryptographic + material for the IPsec SAs. These keys will be also distributed + securely through the southbound interface. Note that this is + possible because both NSFs are managed by the same Security + Controller. - Figure 4 describes the IKE-less, when a data packet needs to be + Figure 4 describes the IKE-less case, when a data packet needs to be protected in the path between the NSF1 and NSF2: - 1. The administrator establishes the flow-based security policies. - The Security Controller looks for the involved NSFs. + 1. The administrator establishes the flow-based security policies, + and the Security Controller looks for the involved NSFs. 2. The Security Controller translates the flow-based security policies into IPsec SPD and SAD entries. - 3. The Security Controller inserts the these entries in both NSF1 - and NSF2 IPsec databases. It associates a lifetime to the IPsec - SAs. When this lifetime expires, the NSF will send a sadb_expire + 3. The Security Controller inserts these entries in both NSF1 and + NSF2 IPsec databases. It associates a lifetime to the IPsec SAs. + When this lifetime expires, the NSF will send a sadb-expire notification to the Security Controller in order to start the rekeying process. 4. The flow is protected with the IPsec SA established by the Security Controller. + It is also possible that the Security Controller only installs the + SPD entries in step 2. In such a case, when a data packet requires + to be protected with IPsec, the NSF that saw first the data packet + will send a sadb-acquire notification that informs the Security + Controller that SAD entries with the IPsec SAs required to process + the data packet needs to be installed in the NSFs. + Both NSFs could be two hosts that exchange traffic and require to establish an end-to-end security association to protect their communications (host-to-host) or two gateways (gateway-to-gateway), for example, within an enterprise that needs to protect the traffic - between, for example, the networks of two branch offices. + between the networks of two branch offices. Applicability of these configurations appear in current and new networking scenarios. For example, SD-WAN technologies are providing dynamic and on-demand VPN connections between branch offices, or between branches and SaaS cloud services. Beside, IaaS services providing virtualization environments are deployments solutions based on IPsec to provide secure channels between virtual instances (host- to-host) and providing VPN solutions for virtualized networks (gateway-to-gateway). - In general (for IKE and IKE-less case), this system has various + In general (for IKE and IKE-less cases), this system has various advantages: - 1. It allows to create IPsec SAs among two NSFs, with only the - application of more general flow-based security policies at the + 1. It allows to create IPsec SAs among two NSFs, based only on the + application of general Flow-based Security Policies at the application layer. Thus, administrators can manage all security associations in a centralized point with an abstracted view of the network. - 2. All NSFs deployed after the application of the new policies are - NOT manually configured, therefore allowing its deployment in an - automated manner. + 2. Any NSF deployed in the system does not need manual + configuration, therefore allowing its deployment in an automated + manner. -7.2. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under different security - controllers +7.2. Host-to-host or gateway-to-gateway under different Security + Controllers It is also possible that two NSFs (i.e. NSF1 and NSF2) are under the control of two different Security Controllers. This may happen, for example, when two organizations, namely Enterprise A and Enterprise B, have their headquarters interconnected through a WAN connection and they both have deployed a SDN-based architecture to provide connectivity to all their clients. +-------------+ +-------------+ | | | | - Flow-based| Security |<===============>| Security <--Flow-based + Flow-based| Security |<=========>| Security <--Flow-based Sec. Pol.--> Controller | (3) | Controller | Sec. Pol. (1) | A | | B | (2) +-------------+ +-------------+ | | | (4) (4) | V V - +----------------------+ +----------------------+ + +--------------------+ +--------------------+ | NSF1 |<========>| NSF2 | |IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) | |IKEv2/IPsec(SPD/PAD) | - +----------------------+ (5) +----------------------+ + +--------------------+ (5) +--------------------+ - Figure 5: Different security controllers in IKE case + Figure 5: Different Security Controllers in the IKE case. - Figure 5 describes IKE case when two security controllers are + Figure 5 describes IKE case when two Security Controllers are involved in the process. 1. The A's administrator establishes general Flow-based Security Policies in Security Controller A. 2. The B's administrator establishes general Flow-based Security Policies in Security Controller B. 3. The Security Controller A realizes that protection is required between the NSF1 and NSF2, but the NSF2 is under the control of another Security Controller (Security Controller B), so it starts negotiations with the other controller to agree on the IPsec SPD policies and IKEv2 credentials for their respective NSFs. NOTE: This may require extensions in the East/West interface. - 4. Then, both Security Controllers enforce the IKEv2 credentials and + 4. Then, both Security Controllers enforce the IKEv2 credentials, related parameters and the SPD and PAD entries in their respective NSFs. 5. The flow is protected with the IPsec SAs established with IKEv2 between both NSFs. +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | | - Flow-based. ---> | <--- Flow-based - Prot. | Security |<=================>| Security |Sec. + Flow-based. ---> | | <---Flow-based + Prot. | Security |<===========>| Security |Sec. Pol.(1)| Controller | (3) | Controller |Pol. (2) | A | | B | +--------------+ +--------------+ | | | (4) (4) | V V - +------------------+ (5) +------------------+ + +--------------+ (5) +--------------+ | NSF1 |<==============>| NSF2 | |IPsec(SPD/SAD) | | IPsec(SPD/SAD) | - +------------------+ +------------------+ + +--------------+ +--------------+ - Figure 6: Different security controllers in IKE-less case + Figure 6: Different Security Controllers in the IKE-less case. - Figure 5 describes IKE-less case when two security controllers are + Figure 6 describes IKE-less case when two Security Controllers are involved in the process. 1. The A's administrator establishes general Flow Protection Policies in Security Controller A. 2. The B's administrator establishes general Flow Protection Policies in Security Controller B. 3. The Security Controller A realizes that the flow between NSF1 and - NSF2 MUST be protected. Nevertheless, the controller notices - that NSF2 is under the control of another Security Controller, so - it starts negotiations with the other controller to agree on the - IPsec SPD and SAD entries that define the IPsec SAs. NOTE: It - would worth evaluating IKEv2 as the protocol for the East/West - interface in this case. + NSF2 MUST be protected. Nevertheless, it notices that NSF2 is + under the control of another Security Controller B, so it starts + negotiations with the other controller to agree on the IPsec SPD + and SAD entries that define the IPsec SAs. NOTE: It would worth + evaluating IKEv2 as the protocol for the East/West interface in + this case. - 4. Once the Security Controllers have agreed on key material and the - details of the IPsec SAs, they both enforce this information into - their respective NSFs. + 4. Once the Security Controllers have agreed on the key material and + the details of the IPsec SAs, they both enforce this information + into their respective NSFs. 5. The flow is protected with the IPsec SAs established by both Security Controllers in their respective NSFs. -8. Security Considerations +8. IANA Considerations + + TBD + +9. Security Considerations First of all, this document shares all the security issues of SDN that are specified in the "Security Considerations" section of - [ITU-T.Y.3300] and [RFC8192]. On the one hand, it is important to - note that there MUST exit a security association between the Security - Controller and the NSFs to protect of the critical information - (cryptographic keys, configuration parameter, etc...) exchanged - between these entities. For example, if NETCONF is used as - southbound protocol between the Security Controller and the NSFs, it - is defined that TLS or SSH security association MUST be established - between both entities. On the other hand, we have divided this - section in two parts to analyze different security considerations for - both cases: NSF with IKEv2 (IKE case) and NSF without IKEv2 (IKE-less - case). In general, the Security Controller, as typically in the SDN - paradigm, is a target for different type of attacks. As a - consequence, the Security Controller is a key entity in the - infrastructure and MUST be protected accordingly. In particular, - according to this document, the Security Controller will handle + [ITU-T.Y.3300] and [RFC8192]. + + On the one hand, it is important to note that there MUST exit a + security association between the Security Controller and the NSFs to + protect of the critical information (cryptographic keys, + configuration parameter, etc...) exchanged between these entities. + For example, when NETCONF is used as southbound protocol between the + Security Controller and the NSFs, it is defined that TLS or SSH + security association MUST be established between both entities. + + On the other hand, if encryption is mandatory for all traffic of a + NSF, its default policy MUST be to drop (DISCARD) packets to prevent + cleartext packet leaks. This default policy MUST be in the startup + configuration datastore in the NSF before the NSF contacts with the + Security Controller. Moreover, the startup configuration datastore + MUST be pre-configured with the required ALLOW policies that allow to + communicate the NSF with the Security Controller once the NSF is + deployed. This pre-configuration step is not carried out by the + Security Controller but by some other entity before the NSF + deployment. In this manner, when the NSF starts/reboots, it will + always apply first the configuration in the startup configuration + before contacting the Security Controller. + + Finally, we have divided this section in two parts in order to + analyze different security considerations for both cases: NSF with + IKEv2 (IKE case) and NSF without IKEv2 (IKE-less case). In general, + the Security Controller, as typically in the SDN paradigm, is a + target for different type of attacks. Thus, the Security Controller + is a key entity in the infrastructure and MUST be protected + accordingly. In particular, the Security Controller will handle cryptographic material so that the attacker may try to access this - information. Although, we can assume this attack will not likely to + information. Although we can assume this attack will not likely to happen due to the assumed security measurements to protect the Security Controller, it deserves some analysis in the hypothetical - the attack occurs. The impact is different depending on the IKE case - or IKE-less case. + case the attack occurs. The impact is different depending on the IKE + case or IKE-less case. -8.1. IKE case +9.1. IKE case In IKE case, the Security Controller sends IKE credentials (PSK, - public/private keys, certificates, etc...) to the NSFs using the + public/private keys, certificates, etc.) to the NSFs using the security association between Security Controller and NSFs. The - general recommendation is that the Security Controller SHOULD NEVER - store the IKE credentials after distributing them. Moreover the NSFs - MUST NOT allow the reading of these values once they have been - applied by the Security Controller (i.e. write only operations). One - option is return always the same value (all 0s). If the attacker has - access to the Security Controller during the period of time that key - material is generated, it may access to these values. Since these - values are used during NSF authentication in IKEv2, it may - impersonate the affected NSFs. Several recommendations are - important. If PSK authentication is used in IKEv2, the Security - Controller SHOULD remove the PSK immediately after generating and - distributing it. Moreover, the PSK MUST have a proper length (e.g. - minimu, 128 bit length) and strength. If raw public keys are used, - the Security Controller SHOULD remove the associated private key - immediately after generating and distributing them to the NSFs. If - certificates are used, the NSF may generate the private key and - exports the public key for certification to the Security Controller. + general recommendation is that the Security Controller MUST NOT store + the IKE credentials after distributing them. Moreover, the NSFs MUST + NOT allow the reading of these values once they have been applied by + the Security Controller (i.e. write only operations). One option is + to return always the same value (i.e. all 0s) if a read operation is + carried out. If the attacker has access to the Security Controller + during the period of time that key material is generated, it might + have access to the key material. Since these values are used during + NSF authentication in IKEv2, it may impersonate the affected NSFs. + Several recommendations are important. If PSK authentication is used + in IKEv2, the Security Controller MUST remove the PSK immediately + after generating and distributing it. Moreover, the PSK MUST have a + proper length (e.g. minimum 128 bit length) and strength. When + public/private keys are used, the Security Controller MAY generate + both public key and private key. In such a case, the Security + Controller MUST remove the associated private key immediately after + distributing them to the NSFs. Alternatively, the NSF could generate + the private key and export only the public key to the Security + Controller. If certificates are used, the NSF MAY generate the + private key and exports the public key for certification to the + Security Controller. How the NSF generates these cryptographic + material (public key/private keys) and export the public key, or it + is instructed to do so, it is out of the scope of this document. -8.2. IKE-less case +9.2. IKE-less case - In the IKE-less case, the controller sends the IPsec SA information - to the SAD that includes the keys for integrity and encryption (when - ESP is used). That key material are symmetric keys to protect data - traffic. The general recommendation is that the Security Controller - SHOULD NEVER stores the keys after distributing them. Moreover, the - NSFs MUST NOT allow the reading of these values once they have been - applied by the Security Controller (i.e. write only operations). - Nevertheless, if the attacker has access to the Security Controller - during the period of time that key material is generated, it may - access to these values. In other words, it may have access to the - key material used in the distributed IPsec SAs and observe the - traffic between peers. In any case, some escenarios with special - secure environments (e.g. physically isolated data centers) make this - type of attack difficult. Moreover, some scenarios such as IoT - networks with constrained devices, where reducing implementation and - computation overhead is important, can apply IKE-less case as a - tradeoff between security and low overhead at the constrained device, - at the cost of assuming the security impact described above. + In the IKE-less case, the Security Controller sends the IPsec SA + information to the NSF's SAD that includes the private session keys + required for integrity and encryption. The general recommendation is + that it MUST NOT store the keys after distributing them. Moreover, + the NSFs receiving private key material MUST NOT allow the reading of + these values by any other entity (including the Security Controller + itself) once they have been applied (i.e. write only operations) into + the NSFs. Nevertheless, if the attacker has access to the Security + Controller during the period of time that key material is generated, + it may obtain these values. In other words, the attacker might be + able to observe the IPsec traffic and decrypt, or even modify and re- + encrypt the traffic between peers. -9. Acknowledgements +10. Acknowledgements Authors want to thank Paul Wouters, Sowmini Varadhan, David Carrel, Yoav Nir, Tero Kivinen, Graham Bartlett, Sandeep Kampati, Linda Dunbar, Carlos J. Bernardos, Alejandro Perez-Mendez, Alejandro Abad- Carrascosa, Ignacio Martinez and Ruben Ricart for their valuable comments. -10. References +11. References -10.1. Normative References +11.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301, December 2005, . - [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an - IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, - DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, - . - [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, . [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017, . - [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. - Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018, - . - -10.2. Informative References +11.2. Informative References [I-D.carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike] Carrel, D. and B. Weiss, "IPsec Key Exchange using a Controller", draft-carrel-ipsecme-controller-ike-01 (work in progress), March 2019. - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-framework] - Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. - Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security - Functions", draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-10 (work in - progress), November 2017. - - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases] - Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., - and J. Jeong, "I2NSF Problem Statement and Use cases", - draft-ietf-i2nsf-problem-and-use-cases-16 (work in - progress), May 2017. - [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) - Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-07 (work in - progress), January 2019. + Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08 (work in + progress), July 2019. [I-D.ietf-opsawg-nat-yang] Boucadair, M., Sivakumar, S., Jacquenet, C., Vinapamula, S., and Q. Wu, "A YANG Module for Network Address Translation (NAT) and Network Prefix Translation (NPT)", draft-ietf-opsawg-nat-yang-17 (work in progress), September 2018. - [I-D.jeong-i2nsf-sdn-security-services-05] - Jeong, J., Kim, H., Park, J., Ahn, T., and S. Lee, - "Software-Defined Networking Based Security Services using - Interface to Network Security Functions", draft-jeong- - i2nsf-sdn-security-services-05 (work in progress), July - 2016. - - [I-D.pfkey-spd] - Sakane, S., "PF_KEY Extensions for IPsec Policy Management - in KAME Stack", October 2002. - [I-D.tran-ipsecme-yang] Tran, K., Wang, H., Nagaraj, V., and X. Chen, "Yang Data Model for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)", draft-tran- ipsecme-yang-01 (work in progress), June 2015. [ITU-T.X.1252] "Baseline Identity Management Terms and Definitions", April 2010. [ITU-T.X.800] "Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applications", March 1991. [ITU-T.Y.3300] "Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300", June 2014. + [libreswan] + The Libreswan Project, "Libreswan VPN software", July + 2019. + [netconf-vpn] Stefan Wallin, "Tutorial: NETCONF and YANG", January 2014. - [netopeer] - CESNET, CESNET., "NETCONF toolset Netopeer", November - 2016. - [ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)", October 2013. [ONF-SDN-Architecture] "SDN Architecture", June 2014. [RFC2367] McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2", RFC 2367, DOI 10.17487/RFC2367, July 1998, . - [RFC3549] Salim, J., Khosravi, H., Kleen, A., and A. Kuznetsov, - "Linux Netlink as an IP Services Protocol", RFC 3549, - DOI 10.17487/RFC3549, July 2003, - . - [RFC3948] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M. Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets", RFC 3948, DOI 10.17487/RFC3948, January 2005, . [RFC6071] Frankel, S. and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", RFC 6071, DOI 10.17487/RFC6071, February 2011, . @@ -1367,881 +1324,2445 @@ Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software- Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January 2015, . [RFC8229] Pauly, T., Touati, S., and R. Mantha, "TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec Packets", RFC 8229, DOI 10.17487/RFC8229, August 2017, . [strongswan] - CESNET, CESNET., "StrongSwan: the OpenSource IPsec-based - VPN Solution", April 2017. + CESNET, "StrongSwan: the OpenSource IPsec-based VPN + Solution", July 2019. -Appendix A. Appendix A: Common YANG model for IKE and IKEless cases +Appendix A. Appendix A: Common YANG model for IKE and IKE-less cases - file "ietf-ipsec-common@2019-03-11.yang" + file "ietf-ipsec-common@2019-07-07.yang" module ietf-ipsec-common{ yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ipsec-common"; prefix "ipsec-common"; import ietf-inet-types { prefix inet; } import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } - import ietf-crypto-types { - prefix ct; - reference "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-01: Common YANG Dta Types for Cryptography"; - } - - organization "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) Working Group"; + organization "IETF I2NSF Working Group"; contact - " Rafael Marin Lopez - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Telf: +34868888501 - e-mail: rafa@um.es + "WG Web: + WG List: - Gabriel Lopez Millan - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Tel: +34 868888504 - email: gabilm@um.es + Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez + - Fernando Pereniguez Garcia - Department of Sciences and Informatics - University Defense Center (CUD), Spanish Air Force Academy, MDE-UPCT - 30720 San Javier - Spain - Tel: +34 968189946 - email: fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es + Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan + + + Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia + "; - description "Common Data model for SDN-based IPSec configuration."; + description + "Common Data model for the IKE and IKE-less cases + defined by the SDN-based IPsec flow protection service. - revision "2019-03-11" { - description "Revision"; - reference ""; + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons + identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with + or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and + subject to the license terms contained in, the + Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the + IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). + + This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;; + see the RFC itself for full legal notices. + + The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', + 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', + 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 + (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear + in all capitals, as shown here."; + + revision "2019-07-07" { + description "Revision 05"; + reference "RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings and typedef + for IKE and IKE-less case"; } - typedef encryption-algorithm-t { - type ct:encryption-algorithm-ref; - description "typedef"; + typedef encryption-algorithm-type { + type uint32; + description + "The encryption algorithm is specified with a 32-bit + number extracted from IANA Registry. The acceptable + values MUST follow the requirement levels for + encryption algorithms for ESP and IKEv2."; + reference + "IANA Registry- Transform Type 1 - Encryption + Algorithm Transform IDs. RFC 8221 - Cryptographic + Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage + Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) + and Authentication Header (AH) and RFC 8247 - + Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage + Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol + Version 2 (IKEv2)."; } - typedef integrity-algorithm-t { - type ct:mac-algorithm-ref; + typedef integrity-algorithm-type { + type uint32; description - "This typedef enables importing modules to easily define an - identityref to the 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' - base identity."; + "The integrity algorithm is specified with a 32-bit + number extracted from IANA Registry. + The acceptable values MUST follow the requirement + levels for encryption algorithms for ESP and IKEv2."; + reference + "IANA Registry- Transform Type 3 - Integrity + Algorithm Transform IDs. RFC 8221 - Cryptographic + Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage + Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) + and Authentication Header (AH) and RFC 8247 - + Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage + Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol + Version 2 (IKEv2)."; } typedef ipsec-mode { type enumeration { - enum TRANSPORT { description "Transport mode. No NAT support."; } - enum TUNNEL { description "Tunnel mode"; } + enum transport { + description + "IPsec transport mode. No Network Address + Translation (NAT) support."; } - description "Type definition of IPsec mode"; + enum tunnel { + description "IPsec tunnel mode."; + } + } + description + "Type definition of IPsec mode: transport or + tunnel."; + reference + "Section 3.2 in RFC 4301."; } typedef esp-encap { type enumeration { - enum ESPINTCP { description "ESP in TCP encapulation.";} - enum ESPINTLS { description "ESP in TCP encapsulation using TLS.";} - enum ESPINUDP { description "ESP in UDP encapsulation. RFC 3948 ";} - enum NONE { description "NOT ESP encapsulation" ; } + enum espintcp { + description + "ESP in TCP encapsulation."; + reference + "RFC 8229 - TCP Encapsulation of IKE and + IPsec Packets."; } - description "type defining types of ESP encapsulation"; + enum espintls { + description + "ESP in TCP encapsulation using TLS."; + reference + "RFC 8229 - TCP Encapsulation of IKE and + IPsec Packets."; } - - grouping encap { /* This is defined by XFRM */ - description "Encapsulation container"; - leaf espencap { type esp-encap; description "ESP in TCP, ESP in UDP or ESP in TLS";} - leaf sport {type inet:port-number; description "Encapsulation source port";} - leaf dport {type inet:port-number; description "Encapsulation destination port"; } - leaf-list oaddr {type inet:ip-address; description "Encapsulation Original Address ";} + enum espinudp { + description + "ESP in UDP encapsulation."; + reference + "RFC 3948 - UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP + Packets."; } + enum none { + description + "NOT ESP encapsulation."; + } + } + description + "Types of ESP encapsulation when Network Address + Translation (NAT) is present between two NSFs."; - typedef ipsec-protocol { - type enumeration { - enum ah { description "AH Protocol"; } - enum esp { description "ESP Protocol"; } + reference + "RFC 8229 - TCP Encapsulation of IKE and IPsec + Packets and RFC 3948 - UDP Encapsulation of IPsec + ESP Packets."; } - description "type define of ipsec security protocol"; + typedef ipsec-protocol-parameters { + type enumeration { + enum esp { description "IPsec ESP protocol."; } } + description + "Only the Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) is + supported but it could be extended in the future."; + reference + "RFC 4303- IP Encapsulating Security Payload + (ESP)."; - typedef ipsec-spi { - type uint32 { range "0..max"; } - description "SPI"; } typedef lifetime-action { type enumeration { - enum terminate-clear {description "Terminate the IPsec SA and allow the packets through";} - enum terminate-hold {description "Terminate the IPsec SA and drop the packets";} - enum replace {description "Replace the IPsec SA with a new one";} + enum terminate-clear { + description + "Terminates the IPsec SA and allows the + packets through."; } - description "Action when lifetime expiration"; + enum terminate-hold { + description + "Terminates the IPsec SA and drops the + packets."; + } + enum replace { + description + "Replaces the IPsec SA with a new one: + rekey. "; + } + } + description + "When the lifetime of an IPsec SA expires an action + needs to be performed over the IPsec SA that + reached the lifetime. There are three posible + options: terminate-clear, terminate-hold and + replace."; + reference + "Section 4.5 in RFC 4301."; } - - /*################## SPD basic groupings ####################*/ typedef ipsec-traffic-direction { type enumeration { - enum INBOUND { description "Inbound traffic"; } - enum OUTBOUND { description "Outbound traffic"; } + enum inbound { + description "Inbound traffic."; + } + enum outbound { + description "Outbound traffic."; } - description "IPsec traffic direction"; + } + description + "IPsec traffic direction is defined in two + directions: inbound and outbound. From a NSF + perspective inbound means the traffic that enters + the NSF and outbound is the traffic that is sent + from the NSF."; + reference + "Section 5 in RFC 4301."; } - typedef ipsec-spd-operation { + typedef ipsec-spd-action { type enumeration { - enum PROTECT { description "PROTECT the traffic with IPsec"; } - enum BYPASS { description "BYPASS the traffic"; } - enum DISCARD { description "DISCARD the traffic"; } + enum protect { + description + "PROTECT the traffic with IPsec."; } - description "The operation when traffic matches IPsec security policy"; + enum bypass { + description + "BYPASS the traffic. The packet is forwarded + without IPsec protection."; + } + enum discard { + description + "DISCARD the traffic. The IP packet is + discarded."; + } + } + description + "The action when traffic matches an IPsec security + policy. According to RFC 4301 there are three + possible values: BYPASS, PROTECT AND DISCARD"; + reference + "Section 4.4.1 in RFC 4301."; } - typedef ipsec-upper-layer-proto { + typedef ipsec-inner-protocol { + type union { + type uint8; type enumeration { - enum TCP { description "TCP traffic"; } - enum UDP { description "UDP traffic"; } - enum SCTP { description "SCTP traffic";} - enum DCCP { description "DCCP traffic";} - enum ICMP { description "ICMP traffic";} - enum IPv6-ICMP { description "IPv6-ICMP traffic";} - enum GRE {description "GRE traffic";} + enum any { + value 256; + description + "Any IP protocol number value."; } - description "Next layer proto on top of IP"; } - typedef ipsec-spd-name { - type enumeration { - enum id_rfc_822_addr { description "Fully qualified user name string."; } - enum id_fqdn { description "Fully qualified DNS name."; } - enum id_der_asn1_dn { description "X.500 distinguished name."; } - enum id_key { description "IKEv2 Key ID."; } } - description "IPsec SPD name type"; + default any; + description + "IPsec protection can be applied to specific IP + traffic and layer 4 traffic (TCP, UDP, SCTP, etc.) + or ANY protocol in the IP packet payload. We + specify the IP protocol number with an uint8 or + ANY defining an enumerate with value 256 to + indicate the protocol number."; + reference + "Section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 4301. + IANA Registry - Protocol Numbers."; + } + + grouping encap { + description + "This group of nodes allows to define the type of + encapsulation in case NAT traversal is + required and port information."; + leaf espencap { + type esp-encap; + description + "ESP in TCP, ESP in UDP or ESP in TLS."; + } + leaf sport { + type inet:port-number; + default 4500; + description + "Encapsulation source port."; + } + leaf dport { + type inet:port-number; + default 4500; + description + "Encapsulation destination port."; + } + + leaf-list oaddr { + type inet:ip-address; + description + "If required, this is the original address that + was used before NAT was applied over the Packet. + "; + + } + reference + "RFC 3947 and RFC 8229."; } grouping lifetime { - description "lifetime current state data"; - leaf time {type yang:timestamp; default 0; description "Time since the element is added";} - leaf idle {type yang:timestamp; default 0; description "Time the element is in idle state";} - leaf bytes { type uint32; default 0; description "Lifetime in bytes number";} - leaf packets {type uint32; default 0; description "Lifetime in packets number";} + description + "Different lifetime values limited to an IPsec SA."; + leaf time { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "Time in seconds since the IPsec SA was added. + For example, if this value is 180 seconds it + means the IPsec SA expires in 180 seconds since + it was added. The value 0 implies infinite."; + } + leaf bytes { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "If the IPsec SA processes the number of bytes + expressed in this leaf, the IPsec SA expires and + should be rekeyed. The value 0 implies + infinite."; } + leaf packets { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "If the IPsec SA processes the number of packets + expressed in this leaf, the IPsec SA expires and + should be rekeyed. The value 0 implies + infinite."; + } + leaf idle { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "When a NSF stores an IPsec SA, it + consumes system resources. In an idle NSF this + is a waste of resources. If the IPsec SA is idle + during this number of seconds the IPsec SA + should be removed. The value 0 implies + infinite."; + } + reference + "Section 4.4.2.1 in RFC 4301."; - /*################## SAD and SPD common basic groupings ####################*/ + } grouping port-range { - description "Port range grouping"; - leaf start { type inet:port-number; description "Start Port Number"; } - leaf end { type inet:port-number; description "End Port Number"; } + description + "This grouping defines a port range, such as + expressed in RFC 4301. For example: 1500 (Start + Port Number)-1600 (End Port Number). A port range + is used in the Traffic Selector."; + + leaf start { + type inet:port-number; + description + "Start port number."; + } + leaf end { + type inet:port-number; + description + "End port number."; + } + reference "Section 4.4.1.2 in RFC 4301."; } grouping tunnel-grouping { - description "Tunnel mode grouping"; - leaf local{ type inet:ip-address; description "Local tunnel endpoint"; } - leaf remote{ type inet:ip-address; description "Remote tunnel enpoint"; } - leaf bypass-df { type boolean; description "Bypass DF bit"; } - leaf bypass-dscp { type boolean; description "Bypass DSCP"; } - leaf dscp-mapping { type yang:hex-string; description "DSCP mapping"; } - leaf ecn { type boolean; description "Bit ECN"; } /* RFC 4301 ASN1 notation. Annex C*/ + description + "The parameters required to define the IP tunnel + endpoints when IPsec SA requires tunnel mode. The + tunnel is defined by two endpoints: the local IP + address and the remote IP address."; + + leaf local { + type inet:ip-address; + mandatory true; + description + "Local IP address' tunnel endpoint."; } + leaf remote { + type inet:ip-address; + mandatory true; + description + "Remote IP address' tunnel endpoint."; + } + leaf df-bit { + type enumeration { + enum clear { + description + "Disable the DF (Don't Fragment) bit + from the outer header. This is the + default value."; - grouping selector-grouping { - description "Traffic selector grouping"; + } + enum set { + description + "Enable the DF bit in the outer header."; + } + enum copy { + description + "Copy the DF bit to the outer header."; + } + } + default clear; + description + "Allow configuring the DF bit when encapsulating + tunnel mode IPsec traffic. RFC 4301 describes + three options to handle the DF bit during + tunnel encapsulation: clear, set and copy from + the inner IP header."; + reference + "Section 8.1 in RFC 4301."; + } + leaf bypass-dscp { + type boolean; + default true; + description + "If DSCP (Differentiated Services Code Point) + values in the inner header have to be used to + select one IPsec SA among several that match + the traffic selectors for an outbound packet"; + reference + "Section 4.4.2.1. in RFC 4301."; + } + leaf dscp-mapping { + type yang:hex-string; + description + "DSCP values allowed for packets carried over + this IPsec SA."; + reference + "Section 4.4.2.1. in RFC 4301."; + } + leaf ecn { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN). If true + copy CE bits to inner header."; + reference + "Section 5.2.1 and Annex C in RFC 4301."; + } - leaf local-subnet { type inet:ip-prefix; description "Local IP address subnet"; } - leaf remote-subnet { type inet:ip-prefix; description "Remote IP address subnet"; } + } - leaf-list upper-layer-protocol { type ipsec-upper-layer-proto; description "List of Upper Layer Protocol";} + grouping selector-grouping { + description + "This grouping contains the definition of a Traffic + Selector, which is used in the IPsec policies and + IPsec SAs."; + leaf local-subnet { + type inet:ip-prefix; + mandatory true; + description + "Local IP address subnet."; + } + leaf remote-subnet { + type inet:ip-prefix; + mandatory true; + description + "Remote IP address subnet."; + } + leaf inner-protocol { + type ipsec-inner-protocol; + default any; + description + "Inner Protocol that is going to be + protected with IPsec."; + } list local-ports { key "start end"; uses port-range; - description "List of local ports. When the upper-layer-protocol is ICMP this 16 bit value respresents code and type as mentioned in RFC 4301"; - + description + "List of local ports. When the inner + protocol is ICMP this 16 bit value represents + code and type."; } - list remote-ports { key "start end"; uses port-range; - description "List of remote ports. When the upper-layer-protocol is ICMP this 16 bit value respresents code and type as mentioned in RFC 4301"; + description + "List of remote ports. When the upper layer + protocol is ICMP this 16 bit value represents + code and type."; } + reference + "Section 4.4.1.2 in RFC 4301."; } - /*################## SPD ipsec-policy-grouping ####################*/ - grouping ipsec-policy-grouping { + description + "Holds configuration information for an IPsec SPD + entry."; - description "Holds configuration information for an IPSec SPD entry."; - - leaf spd-entry-id { type uint64; description "SPD entry id "; } - leaf priority {type uint32; default 0; description "Policy priority";} - leaf anti-replay-window { type uint16 { range "0 | 32..1024"; } description "Anti replay window size"; } - - list names { - key "name"; - leaf name-type { type ipsec-spd-name; description "SPD name type."; } - leaf name { type string; description "Policy name"; } - description "List of policy names"; + leaf anti-replay-window { + type uint64; + default 32; + description + "A 64-bit counter used to determine whether an + inbound ESP packet is a replay."; + reference + "Section 4.4.2.1 in RFC 4301."; } - - container condition { - description "SPD condition - RFC4301"; - list traffic-selector-list { - key "ts-number"; - leaf ts-number { type uint32; description "Traffic selector number"; } - leaf direction { type ipsec-traffic-direction; description "in/out"; } + container traffic-selector { + description + "Packets are selected for + processing actions based on the IP and inner + protocol header information, selectors, + matched against entries in the SPD."; uses selector-grouping; - ordered-by user; - description "List of traffic selectors"; - } + reference + "Section 4.4.4.1 in RFC 4301."; } - container processing-info { - description "SPD processing - RFC4301"; - leaf action{ type ipsec-spd-operation; mandatory true; description "Bypass or discard, container ipsec-sa-cfg is empty";} - + description + "SPD processing. If the required processing + action is protect, it contains the required + information to process the packet."; + leaf action { + type ipsec-spd-action; + default discard; + description + "If bypass or discard, container + ipsec-sa-cfg is empty."; + } container ipsec-sa-cfg { - when "../action = 'PROTECT'"; - - leaf pfp-flag { type boolean; description "Each selector has with a pfp flag."; } - leaf extSeqNum { type boolean; description "TRUE 64 bit counter, FALSE 32 bit"; } - leaf seqOverflow { type boolean; description "TRUE rekey, FALSE terminare & audit"; } - leaf statefulfragCheck { type boolean; description "Indicates whether (TRUE) or not (FALSE) stateful fragment checking (RFC 4301) applies to the SA to be created."; } - leaf security-protocol { type ipsec-protocol; description "Security protocol of IPsec SA: Either AH or ESP."; } - leaf mode { type ipsec-mode; description "transport/tunnel"; } - - container ah-algorithms { - when "../security-protocol = 'ah'"; - leaf-list ah-algorithm { type integrity-algorithm-t; description "Configure Authentication Header (AH)."; } - leaf trunc-length { type uint32; description "Truncation value for AH algorithm"; } - description "AH algoritms "; + when "../action = 'protect'"; + description + "IPSec SA configuration included in the SPD + entry."; + leaf pfp-flag { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "Each selector has a Populate From + Packet (PFP) flag. If asserted for a + given selector X, the flag indicates + that the IPSec SA to be created should + take its value (local IP address, + remote IP address, Next Layer + Protocol, etc.) for X from the value + in the packet. Otherwise, the IPsec SA + should take its value(s) for X from + the value(s) in the SPD entry."; + } + leaf ext-seq-num { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "True if this IPsec SA is using extended + sequence numbers. True 64 bit counter, + False 32 bit."; + } + leaf seq-overflow { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "The flag indicating whether + overflow of the sequence number + counter should prevent transmission + of additional packets on the IPsec + SA (false) and, therefore needs to + be rekeyed, or whether rollover is + permitted (true). If Authenticated + Encryption with Associated Data + (AEAD) is used this flag MUST BE + false."; + } + leaf stateful-frag-check { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "Indicates whether (true) or not (false) + stateful fragment checking applies to + the IPsec SA to be created."; + } + leaf mode { + type ipsec-mode; + default transport; + description + "IPsec SA has to be processed in + transport or tunnel mode."; + } + leaf protocol-parameters { + type ipsec-protocol-parameters; + default esp; + description + "Security protocol of the IPsec SA: + Only ESP is supported but it could be + extended in the future."; } - container esp-algorithms { - when "../security-protocol = 'esp'"; - description "Configure Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)."; - leaf-list authentication { type integrity-algorithm-t; description "Configure ESP authentication"; } - /* With AEAD algorithms, the authentication node is not used */ - leaf-list encryption { type encryption-algorithm-t; description "Configure ESP encryption"; } - leaf tfc_pad { type uint32; default 0; description "TFC padding for ESP encryption"; } + when "../protocol-parameters = 'esp'"; + description + "Configuration of Encapsulating + Security Payload (ESP) parameters and + algorithms."; + leaf-list integrity { + type integrity-algorithm-type; + default 0; + ordered-by user; + description + "Configuration of ESP authentication + based on the specified integrity + algorithm. With AEAD algorithms, + the integrity node is not + used."; + reference + "Section 3.2 in RFC 4303."; + } + leaf-list encryption { + type encryption-algorithm-type; + default 20; + ordered-by user; + description + "Configuration of ESP encryption + algorithms. The default value is + 20 (ENCR_AES_GCM_16)."; + reference + "Section 3.2 in RFC 4303."; + } + leaf tfc-pad { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "If Traffic Flow Confidentiality + (TFC) padding for ESP encryption + can be used (true) or not (false)"; + reference + "Section 2.7 in RFC 4303."; + } + reference + "RFC 4303."; } - container tunnel { - when "../mode = 'TUNNEL'"; + when "../mode = 'tunnel'"; uses tunnel-grouping; - description "tunnel grouping container"; + description + "IPsec tunnel endpoints definition."; } - - description " IPSec SA configuration container"; } + reference + "Section 4.4.1.2 in RFC 4301."; } - - container spd-lifetime-soft { - description "SPD lifetime hard state data"; - uses lifetime; - leaf action {type lifetime-action; description "Action lifetime";} + container spd-mark { + description + "The Mark to set for the IPsec SA of this + connection. This option is only available + on linux NETKEY/XFRM kernels. It can be + used with iptables to create custom + iptables rules using CONNMARK. It can also + be used with Virtual Tunnel Interfaces + (VTI) to direct marked traffic to + specific vtiXX devices."; + leaf mark { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "Mark used to match XFRM policies and + states."; + } + leaf mask { + type yang:hex-string; + default 00:00:00:00; + description + "Mask used to match XFRM policies and + states."; } - - container spd-lifetime-hard { - description "SPD lifetime hard state data. The action after the lifetime is to remove the SPD entry."; - uses lifetime; } - - // State data for an IPsec SPD entry - container spd-lifetime-current { - uses lifetime; - config false; - description "SPD lifetime current state data"; } - } /* grouping ipsec-policy-grouping */ - } + Appendix B. Appendix B: YANG model for IKE case - file "ietf-ipsec-ike@2019-03-11.yang" - + file "ietf-ipsec-ike@2019-07-07.yang" module ietf-ipsec-ike { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ipsec-ike"; - prefix "ipsec-ike"; + prefix "ike"; import ietf-inet-types { prefix inet; } import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } import ietf-crypto-types { prefix ct; - reference "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-01: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"; + reference + "draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-09: + Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography."; } import ietf-ipsec-common { prefix ic; - reference "Common Data model for SDN-based IPSec configuration"; + reference + "RFC XXXX: module ietf-ipsec-common, revision + 2019-07-07."; } - organization "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) Working Group"; + import ietf-netconf-acm { + prefix nacm; + reference + "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control + Model."; + } + + organization "IETF I2NSF Working Group"; contact - " Rafael Marin Lopez - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Telf: +34868888501 - e-mail: rafa@um.es + "WG Web: + WG List: - Gabriel Lopez Millan - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Tel: +34 868888504 - email: gabilm@um.es + Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez + - Fernando Pereniguez Garcia - Department of Sciences and Informatics - University Defense Center (CUD), Spanish Air Force Academy, MDE-UPCT - 30720 San Javier - Spain - Tel: +34 968189946 - email: fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es + Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan + + + Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia + "; - description "Data model for IKE case."; + description - revision "2019-03-11" { - description "Revision 1.1"; - reference ""; - } + "This module contains IPSec IKE case model for the SDN-based + IPsec flow protection service. An NSF will implement this + module. - typedef type-autostartup { - type enumeration { - enum ADD {description "IPsec configuration is only loaded but not started.";} - enum ON-DEMAND {description "IPsec configuration is loaded and transferred to the NSF's kernel";} - enum START { description "IPsec configuration is loaded and transferred to the NSF's kernel, and the IKEv2 based IPsec SAs are established";} + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as + authors of the code. All rights reserved. + + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or + without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject + to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License + set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions + Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). + + This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see + the RFC itself for full legal notices. + + The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', + 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', + 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 + (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear + in all capitals, as shown here."; + + revision "2019-07-07" { + description "Revision 5"; + reference + "RFC XXXX: YANG model for IKE case."; } - description "Different policies of when to start an IKEv2 based IPsec SA"; + + typedef ike-spi { + type uint64 { range "0..max"; } + description + "Security Parameter Index (SPI)'s IKE SA."; + reference + "Section 2.6 in RFC 7296."; } - typedef auth-protocol-type { + typedef autostartup-type { type enumeration { - enum IKEv2 { description "Authentication protocol based on IKEv2"; } + enum add { + description + "IKE/IPsec configuration is only loaded into + IKE implementation but IKE/IPsec SA is not + started."; + } + enum on-demand { + description + "IKE/IPsec configuration is loaded + into IKE implementation. The IPsec policies + are transferred to the NSF's kernel but the + IPsec SAs are not established immediately. + The IKE implementation will negotiate the + IPsec SAs when the NSF's kernel requests it + (i.e. through an ACQUIRE notification)."; + } + enum start { + description "IKE/IPsec configuration is loaded + and transferred to the NSF's kernel, and the + IKEv2 based IPsec SAs are established + immediately without waiting any packet."; } - description "IKE authentication protocol version"; + } + description + "Different policies to set IPsec SA configuration + into NSF's kernel when IKEv2 implementation has + started."; } typedef pfs-group { + type uint32; + description + "DH groups for IKE and IPsec SA rekey."; + reference + "Section 3.3.2 in RFC 7296. Transform Type 4 - + Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs in IANA Registry + - Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) + Parameters."; + } + + typedef auth-protocol-type { type enumeration { - enum NONE {description "NONE";} - enum 768-bit-MODP {description "768-bit MODP Group";} - enum 1024-bit-MODP {description "1024-bit MODP Group";} - enum 1536-bit-MODP {description "1536-bit MODP Group";} - enum 2048-bit-MODP {description "2048-bit MODP Group";} - enum 3072-bit-MODP {description "3072-bit MODP Group";} - enum 4096-bit-MODP {description "4096-bit MODP Group";} - enum 6144-bit-MODP {description "6144-bit MODP Group";} - enum 8192-bit-MODP {description "8192-bit MODP Group";} + enum ikev2 { + value 2; + description + "IKEv2 authentication protocol. It is the + only defined right now. An enum is used for + further extensibility."; } - description "PFS group for IPsec rekey"; } - - /*################## PAD ####################*/ + description + "IKE authentication protocol version specified in the + Peer Authorization Database (PAD). It is defined as + enumerate to allow new IKE versions in the + future."; + reference + "RFC 7296."; + } typedef auth-method-type { - /* Most implementations also provide XAUTH protocol, others used are: BLISS, P12, NTLM, PIN */ type enumeration { - enum pre-shared { description "Select pre-shared key message as the authentication method"; } - enum eap { description "Select EAP as the authentication method"; } - enum digital-signature { description "Select digital signature method";} - enum null {description "null authentication";} + enum pre-shared { + description + "Select pre-shared key as the + authentication method."; + reference + "RFC 7296."; } - description "Peer authentication method"; + enum eap { + description + "Select EAP as the authentication method."; + reference + "RFC 7296."; } - - typedef signature-algorithm-t { - type ct:signature-algorithm-ref; // We must reference to "signature-algorithm-ref" but we temporary use hash-algorithm-ref - description "This typedef enables referencing to any digital signature algorithm"; + enum digital-signature { + description + "Select digital signature method."; + reference + "RFC 7296 and RFC 7427."; + } + enum null { + description + "Null authentication."; + reference + "RFC 7619."; } - grouping auth-method-grouping { - description "Peer authentication method data"; - - container auth-method { - description "Peer authentication method container"; + } + description + "Peer authentication method specified in the Peer + Authorization Database (PAD)."; + } - leaf auth-m { type auth-method-type; description "Type of authentication method (pre-shared, eap, digital signature, null)"; } + container ipsec-ike { + description + "IKE configuration for a NSF. It includes PAD + parameters, IKE connections information and state + data."; + container pad { + description + "Configuration of Peer Authorization Database + (PAD). The PAD contains information about IKE + peer (local and remote). Therefore, the Security + Controller also stores authentication + information for this NSF and can include + several entries for the local NSF not only + remote peers. Storing local and remote + information makes possible to specify that this + NSF with identity A will use some particular + authentication with remote NSF with identity B + and what are the authentication mechanisms + allowed to B."; + list pad-entry { + key "name"; + ordered-by user; + description + "Peer Authorization Database (PAD) entry. It + is a list of PAD entries ordered by the + Security Controller."; + leaf name { + type string; + description + "PAD unique name to identify this + entry."; + } + choice identity { + mandatory true; + description + "A particular IKE peer will be + identified by one of these identities. + This peer can be a remote peer or local + peer (this NSF)."; + reference + "Section 4.4.3.1 in RFC 4301."; + case ipv4-address{ + leaf ipv4-address { + type inet:ipv4-address; + description + "Specifies the identity as a + single four (4) octet IPv4 + addressExample: 10.10.10.10."; + } + } + case ipv6-address{ + leaf ipv6-address { + type inet:ipv6-address; + description + "Specifies the identity as a + single sixteen (16) octet IPv6 + address. An example is + 2001:DB8:0:0:8:800:200C:417A."; + } + } + case fqdn-string { + leaf fqdn-string { + type inet:domain-name; + description + "Specifies the identity as a + Fully-QualifiedDomain Name + (FQDN) string. An example is: + example.com. The string MUST + not contain any terminators + (e.g., NULL, CR, etc.)."; + } + } + case rfc822-address-string { + leaf rfc822-address-string { + type string; + description + "Specifies the identity as a + fully-qualified RFC822 email + address string. An example is, + jsmith@example.com. The string + MUST not contain any + terminators e.g., NULL, CR, + etc.)."; + reference + "RFC 822."; + } + } + case dnx509 { + leaf dnx509 { + type string; + description + "Specifies the identity as a + ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished + Name. An example is + C=US,O=Example + Organisation,CN=John Smith."; + reference + "RFC 2247."; + } + } + case gnx509 { + leaf gnx509 { + type string; + description + "ASN.1 X.509 GeneralName. RFC + 3280."; + } + } + case id-key { + leaf id-key { + type string; + description + "Opaque octet stream that may be + used to pass vendor-specific + information for proprietary + types of identification."; + reference + "Section 3.5 in RFC 7296."; + } + } + case id-null { + leaf id-null { + type empty; + description + "ID_NULL identification used + when IKE identification payload + is not used." ; + reference + "RFC 7619."; + } + } + } + leaf auth-protocol { + type auth-protocol-type; + default ikev2; + description + "Only IKEv2 is supported right now but + other authentication protocols may be + supported in the future."; + } + container peer-authentication { + description + "This container allows the Security + Controller to configure the + authentication method (pre-shared key, + eap, digitial-signature, null) that + will use a particular peer and the + credentials, which will depend on the + selected authentication method."; + leaf auth-method { + type auth-method-type; + default pre-shared; + description + "Type of authentication method + (pre-shared, eap, digital signature, + null)."; + reference + "Section 2.15 in RFC 7296."; + } container eap-method { - when "../auth-m = 'eap'"; - leaf eap-type { type uint8; description "EAP method type"; } - description "EAP method description used when auth method is eap"; + when "../auth-method = 'eap'"; + leaf eap-type { + type uint8; + mandatory true; + description + "EAP method type. This + information provides the + particular EAP method to be + used. Depending on the EAP + method, pre-shared keys or + certificates may be used."; + } + description + "EAP method description used when + authentication method is 'eap'."; + reference + "Section 2.16 in RFC 7296."; } - container pre-shared { - when "../auth-m[.='pre-shared' or .='eap']"; - leaf secret { type yang:hex-string; description "Pre-shared secret value";} - description "Shared secret value"; + when + "../auth-method[.='pre-shared' or + .='eap']"; + leaf secret { + nacm:default-deny-all; + type yang:hex-string; + description + "Pre-shared secret value. The + NSF has to prevent read access + to this value for security + reasons."; + } + description + "Shared secret value for PSK or + EAP method authentication based on + PSK."; } - container digital-signature { - when "../auth-m[.='digital-signature' or .='eap']"; - leaf ds-algorithm {type signature-algorithm-t; description "Name of the digital signature algorithm";} - leaf raw-public-key {type yang:hex-string; description "RSA raw public key" ;} - leaf key-data { type string; description "RSA private key data - PEM"; } - leaf key-file { type string; description "RSA private key file name "; } - leaf-list ca-data { type string; description "List of trusted CA certs - PEM"; } - leaf ca-file { type string; description "List of trusted CA certs file"; } - leaf cert-data { type string; description "X.509 certificate data - PEM4"; } - leaf cert-file { type string; description "X.509 certificate file"; } - leaf crl-data { type string; description "X.509 CRL certificate data in base64"; } - leaf crl-file { type string; description " X.509 CRL certificate file"; } - leaf oscp-uri { type inet:uri; description "OCSP URI";} - description "RSA signature container"; + when + "../auth-method[.='digital-signature' + or .='eap']"; + leaf ds-algorithm { + type uint8; + description + "The digital signature + algorithm is specified with a + value extracted from the IANA + Registry. Depending on the + algorithm, the following leafs + must contain information. For + example if digital signature + involves a certificate then leaf + 'cert-data' and 'private-key' + will contain this information."; + reference + "IKEv2 Authentication Method - + IANA Registry - Internet Key + Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) + Parameters."; } + + choice public-key { + mandatory true; + leaf raw-public-key { + type binary; + description + "A binary that contains the + value of the public key. The + interpretation of the content + is defined by the digital + signature algorithm. For + example, an RSA key is + represented as RSAPublicKey as + defined in RFC 8017, and an + Elliptic Curve Cryptography + (ECC) key is represented + using the 'publicKey' + described in RFC 5915."; + reference + "RFC XXX: Common YANG Data + Types for Cryptography."; } + leaf cert-data { + type ct:x509; + description + "X.509 certificate data - + PEM4."; + reference + "RFC XXX: Common YANG Data + Types for Cryptography."; } - - grouping identity-grouping { - description "Identification type. It is an union identity"; - choice identity { - description "Choice of identity."; - leaf ipv4-address { type inet:ipv4-address; description "Specifies the identity as a single four (4) octet IPv4 address. An example is, 10.10.10.10. "; } - leaf ipv6-address { type inet:ipv6-address; description "Specifies the identity as a single sixteen (16) octet IPv6 address. An example is FF01::101, 2001:DB8:0:0:8:800:200C:417A ."; } - leaf fqdn-string { type inet:domain-name; description "Specifies the identity as a Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) string. An example is: example.com. The string MUST not contain any terminators (e.g., NULL, CR, etc.)."; } - leaf rfc822-address-string { type string; description "Specifies the identity as a fully-qualified RFC822 email address string. An example is, jsmith@example.com. The string MUST not contain any terminators (e.g., NULL, CR, etc.)."; } - leaf dnX509 { type string; description "Specifies the identity as a distinguished name in the X.509 tradition."; } - leaf id_key { type string; description "Key id"; } - leaf id_null { type empty; description "RFC 7619" ; } - leaf user_fqdn { type string; description "User FQDN"; } + description + "If the Security Controller + knows that the NSF + already owns a private key + associated to this public key + (the NSF generated the pair + public key/private key out of + band), it will only configure + one of the leaf of this + choice. The NSF, based on + the public key value can know + the private key to be used."; } - leaf my-identifier { type string; mandatory true; description "id used for authentication"; } + leaf private-key { + nacm:default-deny-all; + type binary; + description + "A binary that contains the + value of the private key. The + interpretation of the content + is defined by the digital + signature algorithm. For + example, an RSA key is + represented as RSAPrivateKey as + defined in RFC 8017, and an + Elliptic Curve Cryptography + (ECC) key is represented as + ECPrivateKey as defined in RFC + 5915."; + reference + "RFC XXX: Common YANG Data + Types for Cryptography."; } + leaf-list ca-data { + type ct:x509; + description + "List of trusted Certification + Authorities (CA) certificates + encoded using ASN.1 + distinguished encoding rules + (DER)."; + reference + "RFC XXX: Common YANG Data + Types for Cryptography."; + } + leaf crl-data { + type ct:crl; + description + "A CertificateList structure, as + specified in RFC 5280, + encoded using ASN.1 + distinguished encoding rules + (DER),as specified in ITU-T + X.690."; + reference + "RFC XXX: Common YANG Data Types + for Cryptography."; + } + leaf crl-uri { + type inet:uri; + description + "X.509 CRL certificate URI."; + } + leaf oscp-uri { + type inet:uri; + description + "OCSP URI."; + } + description + "Digital Signature container."; - /*################ end PAD ##################*/ - - /*################## IKEv2-grouping ##################*/ - grouping ike-proposal { - description "IKEv2 proposal grouping"; - - container ike-sa-lifetime-hard { - description "IKE SA lifetime hard"; - uses ic:lifetime; + } /*container digital-signature*/ + } /*container peer-authentication*/ + } } + list conn-entry { + key "name"; + description + "IKE peer connection information. This list + contains the IKE connection for this peer + with other peers. This will be translated in + real time by IKE Security Associations + established with these nodes."; + leaf name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "Identifier for this connection + entry."; + } + leaf autostartup { + type autostartup-type; + default add; + description + "By-default: Only add configuration + without starting the security + association."; + } + leaf initial-contact { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "The goal of this value is to deactivate the + usage of INITIAL_CONTACT notification + (true). If this flag remains to false it + means the usage of the INITIAL_CONTACT + notification will depend on the IKEv2 + implementation."; + } + leaf version { + type auth-protocol-type; + default ikev2; + description + "IKE version. Only version 2 is supported + so far."; + } + leaf fragmentation { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "Whether or not to enable IKE + fragmentation as per RFC 7383 (true or + false)."; + reference + "RFC 7383."; + } container ike-sa-lifetime-soft { - description "IPsec SA lifetime soft"; - uses ic:lifetime; - leaf action {type ic:lifetime-action; description "Action lifetime";} + description + "IKE SA lifetime soft. Two lifetime values + can be configured: either rekey time of the + IKE SA or reauth time of the IKE SA. When + the rekey lifetime expires a rekey of the + IKE SA starts. When reauth lifetime + expires a IKE SA reauthentication starts."; + leaf rekey-time { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "Time in seconds between each IKE SA + rekey.The value 0 means infinite."; } - - leaf-list ike-sa-authalg { type ic:integrity-algorithm-t; description "Auth algorigthm for IKE SA";} - leaf-list ike-sa-encalg { type ic:encryption-algorithm-t; description "Auth algorigthm for IKE SAs";} - leaf dh_group { type uint32; mandatory true; description "Group number for Diffie Hellman Exponentiation";} - leaf half-open-ike-sa-timer { type uint32; description "Set the half-open IKE SA timeout duration" ; } - leaf half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold { type uint32; description "Number of half-open IKE SAs that activate the cookie mechanism." ; } + leaf reauth-time { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "Time in seconds between each IKE SA + reauthentication. The value 0 means + infinite."; } - - grouping ike-child-sa-info { - description "IPsec SA Information"; - leaf-list pfs_groups { type pfs-group; description "If non-zero, require perfect forward secrecy when requesting new SA. The non-zero value is the required group number"; } - - container child-sa-lifetime-soft { - description "IPsec SA lifetime soft"; - uses ic:lifetime; - leaf action {type ic:lifetime-action; description "action lifetime";} + reference + "Section 2.8 in RFC 7296."; } - - container child-sa-lifetime-hard { - description "IPsec SA lifetime hard. The action will be to terminate the IPsec SA."; - uses ic:lifetime; + container ike-sa-lifetime-hard { + description + "Hard IKE SA lifetime. When this + time is reached the IKE SA is removed."; + leaf over-time { + type uint32; + default 0; + description + "Time in seconds before the IKE SA is + removed. The value 0 means infinite."; } + reference + "RFC 7296."; } - - /*################## End IKEv2-grouping ##################*/ - - container ikev2 { - - description "Configure the IKEv2 software"; - - container pad { - description "Configure Peer Authorization Database (PAD)"; - list pad-entry { - key "pad-entry-id"; + leaf-list authalg { + type ic:integrity-algorithm-type; + default 12; ordered-by user; - description "Peer Authorization Database (PAD)"; - leaf pad-entry-id { type uint64; description "SAD index. ";} - uses identity-grouping; - leaf pad-auth-protocol { type auth-protocol-type; description "IKEv2, etc. ";} - uses auth-method-grouping; + description + "Authentication algorithm for establishing + the IKE SA. This list is ordered following + from the higher priority to lower priority. + First node of the list will be the algorithm + with higher priority. If this list is empty + the default integrity algorithm value assumed + is NONE."; } + leaf-list encalg { + type ic:encryption-algorithm-type; + default 12; + ordered-by user; + description + "Encryption or AEAD algorithm for the IKE + SAs. This list is ordered following + from the higher priority to lower priority. + First node of the list will be the algorithm + with higher priority. If this list is empty + the default encryption value assumed is + NULL."; } - - list ike-conn-entry { - key "conn-name"; - description "IKE peer connection information"; - leaf conn-name { type string; mandatory true; description "Name of IKE connection";} - leaf autostartup { type type-autostartup; mandatory true; description "if True: automatically start tunnel at startup; else we do lazy tunnel setup based on trigger from datapath";} - leaf initial-contact {type boolean; default false; description "This IKE SA is the only currently active between the authenticated identities";} - leaf version { - type enumeration { - enum ikev2 {value 2; description "IKE version 2";} + leaf dh-group { + type pfs-group; + default 14; + description + "Group number for Diffie-Hellman + Exponentiation used during IKE_SA_INIT + for the IKE SA key exchange."; } - description "IKE version"; + leaf half-open-ike-sa-timer { + type uint32; + description + "Set the half-open IKE SA timeout + duration."; + reference + "Section 2 in RFC 7296."; } - leaf ike-fragmentation { type boolean; description "Whether to use IKEv2 fragmentation as per RFC 7383 (TRUE or FALSE)"; } - uses ike-proposal; - + leaf half-open-ike-sa-cookie-threshold { + type uint32; + description + "Number of half-open IKE SAs that activate + the cookie mechanism." ; + reference + "Section 2.6 in RFC 7296."; + } container local { - description "Local peer connection information"; - leaf local-pad-id { type uint64; description " ";} + leaf local-pad-entry-name { + type string; + description + "Local peer authentication information. + This node points to a specific entry in + the PAD where the authorization + information about this particular local + peer is stored. It MUST match a + pad-entry-name."; + } + description + "Local peer authentication information."; } - container remote { - description "Remote peer connection information"; - leaf remote-pad-id { type uint64; description " ";} + leaf remote-pad-entry-name { + type string; + description + "Remote peer authentication information. + This node points to a specific entry in + the PAD where the authorization + information about this particular + remote peer is stored. It MUST match a + pad-entry-name."; } - + description + "Remote peer authentication information."; + } + container encapsulation-type + { uses ic:encap; - + description + "This container carries configuration + information about the source and destination + ports of encapsulation that IKE should use + and the type of encapsulation that + should use when NAT traversal is required. + However, this is just a best effort since + the IKE implementation may need to use a + different encapsulation as + described in RFC 8229."; + reference + "RFC 8229."; + } container spd { - description "Configure the Security Policy Database (SPD)"; + description + "Configuration of the Security Policy + Database (SPD). This main information is + placed in the grouping + ipsec-policy-grouping."; list spd-entry { - key "spd-entry-id"; + key "name"; + ordered-by user; + leaf name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "SPD entry unique name to identify + the IPsec policy."; + } + container ipsec-policy-config { + description + "This container carries the + configuration of a IPsec policy."; uses ic:ipsec-policy-grouping; + } + description + "List of entries which will constitute + the representation of the SPD. Since we + have IKE in this case, it is only + required to send a IPsec policy from + this NSF where 'local' is this NSF and + remote the other NSF. The IKE + implementation will install IPsec + policies in the NSF's kernel in both + directions (inbound and outbound) and + their corresponding IPsec SAs based on + the information in this SPD entry."; + } + reference + "Section 2.9 in RFC 7296."; + } + container child-sa-info { + leaf-list pfs-groups { + type pfs-group; + default 0; ordered-by user; - description "List of SPD entries"; + description + "If non-zero, it is required perfect + forward secrecy when requesting new + IPsec SA. The non-zero value is + the required group number. This list is + ordered following from the higher + priority to lower priority. First node + of the list will be the algorithm + with higher priority."; + } + container child-sa-lifetime-soft { + description + "Soft IPsec SA lifetime soft. + After the lifetime the action is + defined in this container + in the leaf action."; + uses ic:lifetime; + leaf action { + type ic:lifetime-action; + default replace; + description + "When the lifetime of an IPsec SA + expires an action needs to be + performed over the IPsec SA that + reached the lifetime. There are + three possible options: + terminate-clear, terminate-hold and + replace."; + reference + "Section 4.5 in RFC 4301 and Section 2.8 + in RFC 7296."; } } - - container ike-sa-state { - container uptime { - description "IKE service uptime"; - leaf running { type yang:date-and-time; description "Relative uptime";} - leaf since { type yang:date-and-time; description "Absolute uptime";} + container child-sa-lifetime-hard { + description + "IPsec SA lifetime hard. The action will + be to terminate the IPsec SA."; + uses ic:lifetime; + reference + "Section 2.8 in RFC 7296."; } + description + "Specific information for IPsec SAs + SAs. It includes PFS group and IPsec SAs + rekey lifetimes."; + } + container state { + config false; - leaf initiator { type boolean; description "It is acting as initiator in this connection";} - leaf initiator-ikesa-spi {type uint64; description "Initiator's IKE SA SPI";} - leaf responder-ikesa-spi {type uint64; description "Responsder's IKE SA SPI";} - leaf nat-local {type boolean; description "YES, if local endpoint is behind a NAT";} - leaf nat-remote {type boolean; description "YES, if remote endpoint is behind a NAT";} - leaf nat-any {type boolean; description "YES, if both local and remote endpoints are behind a NAT";} - + leaf initiator { + type boolean; + description + "It is acting as initiator for this + connection."; + } + leaf initiator-ikesa-spi { + type ike-spi; + description + "Initiator's IKE SA SPI."; + } + leaf responder-ikesa-spi { + type ike-spi; + description + "Responder's IKE SA SPI."; + } + leaf nat-local { + type boolean; + description + "True, if local endpoint is behind a + NAT."; + } + leaf nat-remote { + type boolean; + description + "True, if remote endpoint is behind + a NAT."; + } + container encapsulation-type + { uses ic:encap; - - leaf established {type uint64; description "Seconds the IKE SA has been established";} - leaf rekey-time {type uint64; description "Seconds before IKE SA gets rekeyed";} - leaf reauth-time {type uint64; description "Seconds before IKE SA gets re-authenticated";} - list child-sas { - container spis{ - description "IPsec SA's SPI '"; - leaf spi-in {type ic:ipsec-spi; description "Security Parameter Index for inbound IPsec SA";} - leaf spi-out {type ic:ipsec-spi; description "Security Parameter Index for the corresponding outbound IPsec SA";} - + description + "This container provides information + about the source and destination + ports of encapsulation that IKE is + using, and the type of encapsulation + when NAT traversal is required."; + reference + "RFC 8229."; } - description "State data about IKE CHILD SAs"; + leaf established { + type uint64; + description + "Seconds since this IKE SA has been + established."; } - config false; - description "IKE state data"; + leaf current-rekey-time { + type uint64; + description + "Seconds before IKE SA must be rekeyed."; + } + leaf current-reauth-time { + type uint64; + description + "Seconds before IKE SA must be + re-authenticated."; + } + description + "IKE state data for a particular + connection."; } /* ike-sa-state */ } /* ike-conn-entries */ container number-ike-sas{ - leaf total {type uint32; description "Total number of IKEv2 SAs";} - leaf half-open {type uint32; description "Number of half-open IKEv2 SAs";} - leaf half-open-cookies {type uint32; description "Number of half open IKE SAs with cookie activated" ;} config false; - description "Number of IKE SAs"; + leaf total { + type uint64; + description + "Total number of active IKE SAs."; } - } /* container ikev2 */ + leaf half-open { + type uint64; + description + "Number of half-open active IKE SAs."; + } + leaf half-open-cookies { + type uint64; + description + "Number of half open active IKE SAs with + cookie activated."; + } + description + "General information about the IKE SAs. In + particular, it provides the current number of + IKE SAs."; + } + } /* container ipsec-ike */ } Appendix C. Appendix C: YANG model for IKE-less case - file "ietf-ipsec-ikeless@2019-03-11.yang" + file "ietf-ipsec-ikeless@2019-07-07.yang" module ietf-ipsec-ikeless { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ipsec-ikeless"; - prefix "ipsec-ikeless"; + prefix "ikeless"; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } import ietf-ipsec-common { prefix ic; - reference "Common Data model for SDN-based IPSec configuration"; + reference + "Common Data model for SDN-based IPSec + configuration."; } - organization "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions) Working Group"; + import ietf-netconf-acm { + prefix nacm; + reference + "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control + Model."; + } + organization "IETF I2NSF Working Group"; contact - " Rafael Marin Lopez - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Telf: +34868888501 - e-mail: rafa@um.es + "WG Web: + WG List: - Gabriel Lopez Millan - Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC) - Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia - 30100 Murcia - Spain - Tel: +34 868888504 - email: gabilm@um.es + Author: Rafael Marin-Lopez + - Fernando Pereniguez Garcia - Department of Sciences and Informatics - University Defense Center (CUD), Spanish Air Force Academy, MDE-UPCT - 30720 San Javier - Spain - Tel: +34 968189946 - email: fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es + Author: Gabriel Lopez-Millan + + + Author: Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia + "; - description "Data model for IKE-less case"; + description + "Data model for IKE-less case in the SDN-base IPsec flow + protection service. - revision "2019-03-11" { - description "Revision"; - reference ""; - } + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons + identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. + Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with + or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and + subject to the license terms contained in, the + Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the + IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). - /*################## SAD grouping ####################*/ - grouping ipsec-sa-grouping { - description "Configure Security Association (SA). Section 4.4.2.1 in RFC 4301"; + This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;; + see the RFC itself for full legal notices. - leaf sad-entry-id {type uint64; description "This value identifies a specific entry in the SAD";} - leaf spi { type ic:ipsec-spi; description "Security Parameter Index. This may not be unique for a particular SA";} - leaf seq-number { type uint64; description "Current sequence number of IPsec packet."; } - leaf seq-number-overflow-flag { type boolean; description "The flag indicating whether overflow of the sequence number counter should prevent transmission of additional packets on the SA, or whether rollover is permitted."; } - leaf anti-replay-window { type uint16 { range "0 | 32..1024"; } description "Anti replay window size"; } - leaf spd-entry-id {type uint64; description "This value links the SA with the SPD entry";} + The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', + 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', + 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 + (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear + in all capitals, as shown here."; - uses ic:selector-grouping; + revision "2019-07-07" { + description "Revision 05"; + reference "RFC XXXX: YANG model for IKE case."; + } - leaf security-protocol { type ic:ipsec-protocol; description "Security protocol of IPsec SA: Either AH or ESP."; } + container ipsec-ikeless { + description + "Container for configuration of the IKE-less + case. The container contains two additional + containers: 'spd' and 'sad'. The first allows the + Security Controller to configure IPsec policies in + the Security Policy Database SPD, and the second + allows to configure IPsec Security Associations + (IPsec SAs) in the Security Association Database + (SAD)."; + reference "RFC 4301."; + container spd { + description + "Configuration of the Security Policy Database + (SPD.)"; + reference "Section 4.4.1.2 in RFC 4301."; - container sad-lifetime-hard { - description "SAD lifetime hard state data. The action associated is terminate."; - uses ic:lifetime; + list spd-entry { + key "name"; + ordered-by user; + leaf name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "SPD entry unique name to identify this + entry."; } - container sad-lifetime-soft { - description "SAD lifetime hard state data"; - uses ic:lifetime; - leaf action {type ic:lifetime-action; description "action lifetime";} + leaf direction { + type ic:ipsec-traffic-direction; + description + "Inbound traffic or outbound + traffic. In the IKE-less case the + Security Controller needs to + specify the policy direction to be + applied in the NSF. In the IKE case + this direction does not need to be + specified since IKE + will determine the direction that + IPsec policy will require."; } + leaf reqid { + type uint64; + default 0; + description + "This value allows to link this + IPsec policy with IPsec SAs with the + same reqid. It is only required in + the IKE-less model since, in the IKE + case this link is handled internally + by IKE."; - leaf mode { type ic:ipsec-mode; description "SA Mode"; } - leaf statefulfragCheck { type boolean; description "Indicates whether (TRUE) or not (FALSE) stateful fragment checking (RFC 4301) applies to this SA."; } + } - leaf dscp { type yang:hex-string; description "DSCP value"; } - leaf path-mtu { type uint16; description "Maximum size of an IPsec packet that can be transmitted without fragmentation"; } + container ipsec-policy-config { + description + "This container carries the + configuration of a IPsec policy."; + uses ic:ipsec-policy-grouping; + } + description + "The SPD is represented as a list of SPD + entries, where each SPD entry represents an + IPsec policy."; + } /*list spd-entry*/ + } /*container spd*/ - container tunnel { - when "../mode = 'TUNNEL'"; - uses ic:tunnel-grouping; - description "Container for tunnel grouping"; + container sad { + description + "Configuration of the IPSec Security Association + Database (SAD)"; + reference "Section 4.4.2.1 in RFC 4301."; + list sad-entry { + key "name"; + ordered-by user; + leaf name { + type string; + description + "SAD entry unique name to identify this + entry."; + } + leaf reqid { + type uint64; + default 0; + description + "This value allows to link this + IPsec SA with an IPsec policy with + the same reqid."; } - uses ic:encap; + container ipsec-sa-config { + description + "This container allows configuring + details of an IPsec SA."; + leaf spi { + type uint32 { range "0..max"; } + mandatory true; + description + "Security Parameter Index (SPI)'s + IPsec SA."; - // STATE DATA for SA - container sad-lifetime-current { - uses ic:lifetime; - config false; - description "SAD lifetime current state data"; } - - container stats { // xfrm.h - leaf replay-window {type uint32; default 0; description " "; } - leaf replay {type uint32; default 0; description "packets detected out of the replay window and dropped because they are replay packets";} - leaf failed {type uint32; default 0; description "packets detected out of the replay window ";} - config false; - description "SAD statistics"; + leaf ext-seq-num { + type boolean; + default true; + description + "True if this IPsec SA is using + extended sequence numbers. True 64 + bit counter, FALSE 32 bit."; } - - container replay_state { // xfrm.h - leaf seq {type uint32; default 0; description "input traffic sequence number when anti-replay-window != 0";} - leaf oseq {type uint32; default 0; description "output traffic sequence number";} - leaf bitmap {type uint32; default 0; description "";} - config false; - description "Anti-replay Sequence Number state"; + leaf seq-number-counter { + type uint64; + default 0; + description + "A 64-bit counter when this IPsec + SA is using Extended Sequence + Number or 32-bit counter when it + is not. It used to generate the + initial Sequence Number field + in ESP headers."; } - - container replay_state_esn { // xfrm.h - leaf bmp-len {type uint32; default 0; description "bitmap length for ESN"; } - leaf oseq { type uint32; default 0; description "output traffic sequence number"; } - leaf oseq-hi { type uint32; default 0; description ""; } - leaf seq-hi { type uint32; default 0; description ""; } - leaf replay-window {type uint32; default 0; description ""; } - leaf-list bmp { type uint32; description "bitmaps for ESN (depends on bmp-len) "; } - config false; - description "Anti-replay Extended Sequence Number (ESN) state"; + leaf seq-overflow { + type boolean; + default false; + description + "The flag indicating whether + overflow of the sequence number + counter should prevent transmission + of additional packets on the IPsec + SA (false) and, therefore needs to + be rekeyed, or whether rollover is + permitted (true). If Authenticated + Encryption with Associated Data + (AEAD) is used this flag MUST BE + false."; + } + leaf anti-replay-window { + type uint32; + default 32; + description + "A 32-bit counter and a bit-map (or + equivalent) used to determine + whether an inbound ESP packet is a + replay. If set to 0 no anti-replay + mechanism is performed."; + } + container traffic-selector { + uses ic:selector-grouping; + description + "The IPsec SA traffic selector."; + } + leaf protocol-parameters { + type ic:ipsec-protocol-parameters; + default esp; + description + "Security protocol of IPsec SA: Only + ESP so far."; + } + leaf mode { + type ic:ipsec-mode; + description + "Tunnel or transport mode."; } + container esp-sa { + when "../protocol-parameters = + 'esp'"; + description + "In case the IPsec SA is + Encapsulation Security Payload + (ESP), it is required to specify + encryption and integrity + algorithms, and key material."; + + container encryption { + description + "Configuration of encryption or + AEAD algorithm for IPSec + Encapsulation Security Payload + (ESP)."; + leaf encryption-algorithm { + type ic:encryption-algorithm-type; + description + "Configuration of ESP + encryption. With AEAD + algorithms, the integrity + node is not used."; } - /*################## end SAD grouping ##################*/ - /*################# Register grouping #################*/ - typedef sadb-msg-type { - type enumeration { - enum sadb_acquire { description "SADB_ACQUIRE"; } - enum sadb_expire { description "SADB_EXPIRE"; } + leaf key { + nacm:default-deny-all; + type yang:hex-string; + description + "ESP encryption key value."; } - description "Notifications (PF_KEY message types) that must be forwarded by the NSF to the controller in IKE-less case"; + leaf iv { + nacm:default-deny-all; + type yang:hex-string; + description + "ESP encryption IV value."; } - - typedef sadb-msg-satype { - type enumeration { - enum sadb_satype_unspec { description "SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC"; } - enum sadb_satype_ah { description "SADB_SATYPE_AH"; } - enum sadb_satype_esp { description "SADB_SATYPE_ESP"; } - enum sadb_satype_rsvp { description "SADB_SATYPE_RSVP"; } - enum sadb_satype_ospfv2 { description "SADB_SATYPE_OSPFv2"; } - enum sadb_satype_ripv2 { description "SADB_SATYPE_RIPv2"; } - enum sadb_satype_mip { description "SADB_SATYPE_MIP"; } - enum sadb_satype_max { description "SADB_SATYPE_MAX"; } } - description "PF_KEY Security Association types"; + container integrity { + description + "Configuration of integrity for + IPSec Encapsulation Security + Payload (ESP). This container + allows to configure integrity + algorithm when no AEAD + algorithms are used, and + integrity is required."; + leaf integrity-algorithm { + type ic:integrity-algorithm-type; + description + "Message Authentication Code + (MAC) algorithm to provide + integrity in ESP."; } - - grouping base-grouping { - description "Configuration for the message header format"; - list base-list { - key "version"; - leaf version { type string; description "Version of PF_KEY (MUST be PF_KEY_V2)"; } - leaf msg_type { type sadb-msg-type; description "Identifies the type of message"; } - leaf msg_satype { type sadb-msg-satype; description "Defines the type of Security Association"; } - leaf msg_seq { type uint32; description "Sequence number of this message."; } - description "Configuration for a specific message header format"; + leaf key { + nacm:default-deny-all; + type yang:hex-string; + description + "ESP integrity key value."; } } - /*################# End Register grouping #################*/ - - /*################## IPsec configuration ##################*/ - container ietf-ipsec { - description "IPsec configuration"; + } /*container esp-sa*/ - container spd { - description "Configure the Security Policy Database (SPD)"; - list spd-entry { - key "spd-entry-id"; - uses ic:ipsec-policy-grouping; - ordered-by user; - description "List of SPD entries"; + container sa-lifetime-hard { + description + "IPsec SA hard lifetime. The action + associated is terminate and + hold."; + uses ic:lifetime; } + container sa-lifetime-soft { + description + "IPSec SA soft lifetime."; + uses ic:lifetime; + leaf action { + type ic:lifetime-action; + description + "Action lifetime: + terminate-clear, + terminate-hold or replace."; } - container sad { - description "Configure the IPSec Security Association Database (SAD)"; - - list sad-entry { - key "sad-entry-id"; + } + container tunnel { + when "../mode = 'tunnel'"; + uses ic:tunnel-grouping; + description + "Endpoints of the IPsec tunnel."; + } + container encapsulation-type + { + uses ic:encap; + description + "This container carries + configuration information about + the source and destination ports + which will be used for ESP + encapsulation that ESP packets the + type of encapsulation when NAT + traversal is in place."; + } + } /*ipsec-sa-config*/ - uses ipsec-sa-grouping; + container ipsec-sa-state { + config false; + description + "Container describing IPsec SA state + data."; + container sa-lifetime-current { + uses ic:lifetime; + description + "SAD lifetime current."; + } + container replay-stats { + description + "State data about the anti-replay + window."; + leaf replay-window { + type uint64; + description + "Current state of the replay + window."; + } + leaf packet-dropped { + type uint64; + description + "Packets detected out of the + replay window and dropped + because they are replay + packets."; - container ah-sa { - when "../security-protocol = 'ah'"; - description "Configure Authentication Header (AH) for SA"; - container integrity { - description "Configure integrity for IPSec Authentication Header (AH)"; - leaf integrity-algorithm { type ic:integrity-algorithm-t; description "Configure Authentication Header (AH)."; } - leaf key { type string; description "AH key value";} } + leaf failed { + type uint32; + description + "Number of packets detected out + of the replay window."; + } + leaf seq-number-counter { + type uint64; + description + "A 64-bit counter when this + IPsec SA is using Extended + Sequence Number or 32-bit + counter when it is not. + Current value of sequence + number."; } + } /* container replay-stats*/ + } /*ipsec-sa-state*/ - container esp-sa { - when "../security-protocol = 'esp'"; - description "Set IPSec Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP)"; + description + "List of SAD entries that conforms the SAD."; + } /*list sad-entry*/ + } /*container sad*/ + }/*container ipsec-ikeless*/ - container encryption { - description "Configure encryption for IPSec Encapsulation Secutiry Payload (ESP)"; - leaf encryption-algorithm { type ic:encryption-algorithm-t; description "Configure ESP encryption"; } - leaf key { type yang:hex-string; description "ESP encryption key value";} - leaf iv {type yang:hex-string; description "ESP encryption IV value"; } + /* Notifications */ + notification sadb-acquire { + description + "An IPsec SA is required. The traffic-selector + container contains information about the IP packet + that triggers the acquire notification."; + leaf ipsec-policy-name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "It contains the SPD entry name (unique) of + the IPsec policy that hits the IP packet + required IPsec SA. It is assumed the + Security Controller will have a copy of the + information of this policy so it can + extract all the information with this + unique identifier. The type of IPsec SA is + defined in the policy so the Security + Controller can also know the type of IPsec + SA that must be generated."; + } + container traffic-selector { + description + "The IP packet that triggered the acquire + and requires an IPsec SA. Specifically it + will contain the IP source/mask and IP + destination/mask; protocol (udp, tcp, + etc...); and source and destination + ports."; + uses ic:selector-grouping; } - - container integrity { - description "Configure authentication for IPSec Encapsulation Secutiry Payload (ESP)"; - leaf integrity-algorithm { type ic:integrity-algorithm-t; description "Configure Authentication Header (AH)."; } - leaf key { type yang:hex-string; description "ESP integrity key value";} } - /* With AEAD algorithms, the integrity node is not used */ - leaf combined-enc-intr { type boolean; description "ESP combined mode algorithms. The algorithm is specified in encryption-algorithm";} + notification sadb-expire { + description "An IPsec SA expiration (soft or hard)."; + leaf ipsec-sa-name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "It contains the SAD entry name (unique) of + the IPsec SA that has expired. It is assumed + the Security Controller will have a copy of the + IPsec SA information (except the cryptographic + material and state data) indexed by this name + (unique identifier) so it can know all the + information (crypto algorithms, etc.) about + the IPsec SA that has expired in order to + perform a rekey (soft lifetime) or delete it + (hard lifetime) with this unique identifier."; } - description "List of SAD entries"; + leaf soft-lifetime-expire { + type boolean; + default true; + description + "If this value is true the lifetime expired is + soft. If it is false is hard."; } + container lifetime-current { + description + "IPsec SA current lifetime. If + soft-lifetime-expired is true this container is + set with the lifetime information about current + soft lifetime."; + uses ic:lifetime; } - } /* container ietf-ipsec */ + } + notification sadb-seq-overflow { + description "Sequence overflow notification."; + leaf ipsec-sa-name { + type string; + mandatory true; + description + "It contains the SAD entry name (unique) of + the IPsec SA that is about to have sequence + number overflow and rollover is not permitted. + It is assumed the Security Controller will have + a copy of the IPsec SA information (except the + cryptographic material and state data) indexed + by this name (unique identifier) so the it can + know all the information (crypto algorithms, + etc.) about the IPsec SA that has expired in + order to perform a rekey of the IPsec SA."; + } + } + notification sadb-bad-spi { + description + "Notify when the NSF receives a packet with an + incorrect SPI (i.e. not present in the SAD)."; + leaf spi { + type uint32 { range "0..max"; } + mandatory true; + description + "SPI number contained in the erroneous IPsec + packet."; + } + } + }/*module ietf-ipsec*/ - /*################## RPC and Notifications ##################*/ + - // These RPCs are needed by a Security Controller in IKEless case +Appendix D. Example of IKE case, tunnel mode (gateway-to-gateway) with + X.509 certificate authentication. - notification spdb_expire { - description "A SPD entry has expired"; - leaf index { type uint64; description "SPD index. RFC4301 does not mention an index however real implementations (e.g. XFRM or PFKEY_v2 with KAME extensions provide a policy index to refer a policy. "; } - } + This example shows a XML configuration file sent by the Security + Controller to establish a IPsec Security Association between two NSFs + in tunnel mode (gateway-to-gateway) with ESP, and authentication + based on X.509 certificates using IKEv2. - notification sadb_acquire { - description "A IPsec SA is required "; - uses base-grouping; - uses ic:selector-grouping; // To indicate the concrete traffic selector of the policy that triggered this acquire. - } + Security Controller + | + /---- Southbound interface -----\ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + nsf_h1 nsf_h2 + h1---- (:1/:100)===== IPsec_ESP_Tunnel_mode =====(:200/:1)-------h2 + 2001:DB8:1:/64 (2001:DB8:123:/64) 2001:DB8:2:/64 - notification sadb_expire { - description "A IPsec SA expiration (soft or hard)"; + Figure 7: IKE case, tunnel mode , X.509 certicate authentication. - uses base-grouping; - leaf spi { type ic:ipsec-spi; description "Security Parameter Index";} - leaf anti-replay-window { type uint16 { range "0 | 32..1024"; } description "Anti replay window"; } + + + + nsf_h1_pad + 2001:DB8:123::100 + + digital-signature + + base64encodedvalue== + base64encodedvalue== + base64encodedvalue== + + + + + nsf_h2_pad + 2001:DB8:123::200 + ikev2 + + digital-signature + + + 1 + base64encodedvalue== + base64encodedvalue== + + + + + + nsf_h1-nsf_h2 + start + ikev2 + false + true + + 60 + 120 + + + 3600 + + 7 + + 3 + + 18 + + 30 + 15 + + nsf_h1_pad + + + nsf_h2_pad + + + + nsf_h1-nsf_h2 + + 32 + + 2001:DB8:1::0/64 + 2001:DB8:2::0/64 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + + protect + + false + true + false + false + tunnel + esp + + + 2 + + 12 + false + + + 2001:DB8:123::100 + 2001:DB8:123::200 + clear + true + false + + + + + + + + + 18 + + 1000000 + 1000 + + 60 + replace + + + 2000000 + 2000 + + 120 + + + + - leaf encryption-algorithm { type ic:encryption-algorithm-t; description "encryption algorithm of the expired SA"; } - leaf authentication-algorithm { type ic:integrity-algorithm-t; description "authentication algorithm of the expired SA"; } +Appendix E. Example of IKE-less case, transport mode (host-to-host). - container sad-lifetime-hard { - description "SAD lifetime hard state data"; - uses ic:lifetime; - } - container sad-lifetime-soft { - description "SAD lifetime soft state data"; - uses ic:lifetime; - } + This example shows a XML configuration file sent by the Security + Controller to establish a IPsec Security association between two NSFs + in transport mode (host-to-host) with ESP. - container sad-lifetime-current { - description "SAD lifetime current state data"; - uses ic:lifetime; - } + Security Controller + | + /---- Southbound interface -----\ + / \ + / \ + / \ + / \ + nsf_h1 nsf_h2 + (:100)===== IPsec_ESP_Transport_mode =====(:200) + (2001:DB8:123:/64) - } + Figure 8: IKE-less case, transport mode. - notification sadb_bad-spi { - description "Notifiy when the NSF receives a packet with an incorrect SPI (i.e. not present in the SAD)"; - leaf state { type ic:ipsec-spi; mandatory "true"; description "SPI number contained in the erroneous IPsec packet"; } - } + + + + + in/trans/2001:DB8:123::200/2001:DB8:123::100 + + inbound + 1 + + + 2001:DB8:123::200/128 + 2001:DB8:123::100/128 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + + protect + + true + true + transport + esp + + + 2 + + 12 + + + + + + + out/trans/2001:DB8:123::100/2001:DB8:123::200 + outbound + 1 + + + 2001:DB8:123::100/128 + 2001:DB8:123::200/128 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + + protect + + true + true + transport + esp + + + 2 + + 12 + + + + + + + + + out/trans/2001:DB8:123::100/2001:DB8:123::200 + 1 + + 34501 + true + 100 + true + 32 + + 2001:DB8:123::100/128 + 2001:DB8:123::200/128 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + esp + transport + + + + 12 + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + + + + 2 + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + + + + + + in/trans/2001:DB8:123::200/2001:DB8:123::100 + 1 + + 34502 + true + 100 + true + 32 + + 2001:DB8:123::200/128 + 2001:DB8:123::100/128 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + esp + transport + + + + 12 + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + + + + 2 + 01:23:45:67:89:AB:CE:DF + + + + 2000000 + 2000 + + 120 + + + 1000000 + 1000 + + 60 + replace + + + + + - }/*module ietf-ipsec*/ +Appendix F. Examples of notifications. - + Below we show several XML files that represent different types of + notifications defined in the IKE-less YANG model, which are sent by + the NSF to the Security Controller. The notifications happen in the + IKE-less case. + + +in/trans/2001:DB8:123::200/2001:DB8:123::100 + true + + 1000000 + 1000 + + 60 + + + + Figure 9: Example of sadb-expire notification. + + + in/trans/2001:DB8:123::200/2001:DB8:123::100 + + 2001:DB8:123::200/128 + 2001:DB8:123::100/128 + any + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + 0 + + + + + Figure 10: Example of sadb-acquire notification. + + + in/trans/2001:DB8:123::200/2001:DB8:123::100 + + + Figure 11: Example of sadb-seq-overflow notification. + + + 666 + + + Figure 12: Example of sadb-bad-spi notification. Authors' Addresses Rafa Marin-Lopez University of Murcia Campus de Espinardo S/N, Faculty of Computer Science Murcia 30100 Spain Phone: +34 868 88 85 01