--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17.txt 2019-09-16 00:13:03.740026178 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18.txt 2019-09-16 00:13:03.800027695 -0700 @@ -1,26 +1,26 @@ I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University Intended status: Informational S. Hyun -Expires: February 9, 2020 Chosun University +Expires: March 18, 2020 Myongji University T. Ahn Korea Telecom S. Hares Huawei D. Lopez Telefonica I+D - August 8, 2019 + September 15, 2019 Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Based Security Services - draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18 Abstract This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. Status of This Memo @@ -30,59 +30,60 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on February 9, 2020. + This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 5. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 6. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-16 . . . 23 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 5. Intent-based Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 6. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 7. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 8. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 . . . 28 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1. Introduction Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions (NSFs). Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii) supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality @@ -107,95 +109,104 @@ Registration Interface for a security service [RFC8329]. Security Controller maintains the mapping between a capability and an NSF, so it can perform to translate a high-level security policy received from I2NSF User to a low-level security policy configured and enforced in an NSF [policy-translation]. Security Controller can monitor the states and security attacks in NSFs through NSF monitoring [nsf-monitoring-dm]. This document illustrates the applicability of the I2NSF framework - with four different scenarios: + with five different scenarios: 1. The enforcement of time-dependent web access control. - 2. The application of I2NSF to a Service Function Chaining (SFC) + 2. The support of intent-based security services through I2NSF and + Security Policy Translator [policy-translation]. + + 3. The application of I2NSF to a Service Function Chaining (SFC) environment [RFC7665]. - 3. The integration of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined + 4. The integration of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] to provide different security functionality such as firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack mitigation. - 4. The use of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV] as a + 5. The use of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV] as a supporting technology. The implementation of I2NSF in these scenarios has allowed us to verify the applicability and effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for a variety of use cases. 2. Terminology This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7149], [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.X.800], [NFV-Terminology], [RFC8329], and [i2nsf-terminology]. In addition, the following terms are defined below: - o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that - enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage - network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and - operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner - [ITU-T.Y.3300]. + o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator + that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into + network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. + + o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can + establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for + efficient firewall management. + + o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system + that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE + services. + + o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network + segments that inspects some suspicious packets that attempt to + cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not + satisfy certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers + or IP addresses. o Network Function: A functional block within a network infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well- defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology]. + o Network Functions Virtualization (NFV): A principle of separating + network functions (or network security functions) from the + hardware they run on by using virtual hardware abstraction + [NFV-Terminology]. + o Network Security Function (NSF): Software that provides a set of security-related services. Examples include detecting unwanted activity and blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfill service requirements. The NSF can also help in supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality [i2nsf-terminology]. - o Network Functions Virtualization (NFV): A principle of separating - network functions (or network security functions) from the - hardware they run on by using virtual hardware abstraction - [NFV-Terminology]. + o Security Policy Translator (SPT): Software that translates a high- + level security policy for the Consumer-Facing Interface into a + low-level security policy for the NSF-Facing Interface + [policy-translation]. The SPT is a core part of the Security + Controller in the I2NSF system. o Service Function Chaining (SFC): The execution of an ordered set of abstract service functions (i.e., network functions) according to ordering constraints that must be applied to packets, frames, and flows selected as a result of classification. The implied order may not be a linear progression as the architecture allows for SFCs that copy to more than one branch, and also allows for cases where there is flexibility in the order in which service functions need to be applied [RFC7665]. - o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network - segments that inspects some suspicious packets that attempt to - cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not - satisfy certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers - or IP addresses. - - o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can - establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for - efficient firewall management. - - o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system - that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE - services. - - o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator - that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into - network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. + o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that + enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage + network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and + operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner + [ITU-T.Y.3300]. +------------+ | I2NSF User | +------------+ ^ | Consumer-Facing Interface v +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ @@ -208,36 +219,36 @@ +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ Figure 1: I2NSF Framework 3. I2NSF Framework This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329]. As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by delivering high-level security policies, which specify security requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security - Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface + Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI) [consumer-facing-inf-dm]. The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies. The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies - to the NSFs via the NSF-Facing Interface [nsf-facing-inf-dm]. + to the NSFs via the NSF-Facing Interface (NFI) [nsf-facing-inf-dm]. As shown in Figure 1, with a Developer's Management System (called DMS), developers (or vendors) inform the Security Controller of the - capabilities of the NSFs through the Registration Interface + capabilities of the NSFs through the Registration Interface (RI) [registration-inf-dm] for registering (or deregistering) the corresponding NSFs. Note that the lifecycle management of NSF code from DMS (e.g., downloading of NSF modules and testing of NSF code) is out of scope for I2NSF. The Consumer-Facing Interface can be implemented with the Consumer- Facing Interface YANG data model [consumer-facing-inf-dm] using RESTCONF [RFC8040] which befits a web-based user interface for an I2NSF User to send a Security Controller a high-level security policy. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level @@ -270,155 +281,340 @@ data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Registration Interface. The I2NSF framework can chain multiple NSFs to implement low-level security policies with the SFC architecture [RFC7665]. The following sections describe different security service scenarios illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework. - + block_website block_website_during_working_hours 09:00 18:00 - Staff_Member's_PC + Staff_Members'_PCs - example.com + SNS_Websites drop - + - Figure 2: An XML Example for Time-based Web-filter + Figure 2: A High-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web + Filter + + + + + block_website + + block_website_during_working_hours + + + 09:00 + 18:00 + + + + + + + 2001:DB8:10:1::10 + 2001:DB8:10:1::20 + 2001:DB8:10:1::30 + + + + + example1.com + example2.com + example3.com + example4.com + + + + + drop + + + + + + + Figure 3: A Low-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web + Filter 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a - particular Internet service (e.g., example.com) during business - hours. The following is an example high-level security policy rule - for a web filter that the administrator requests: Block the staff - members' access to example.com from 9 AM (i.e., 09:00) to 6 PM (i.e., - 18:00) by dropping their packets. Figure 2 is an example XML code - for this web filter that is sent from the I2NSF User to the Security - Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface - [consumer-facing-inf-dm]. + particular Internet service (e.g., social networking service (SNS)) + during business hours. The following is an example high-level + security policy rule for a web filter that the administrator + requests: Block the staff members' access to SNS websites from 9 AM + (i.e., 09:00) to 6 PM (i.e., 18:00) by dropping their packets. + Figure 2 is a high-level security policy XML code for the web filter + that is sent from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller via the + Consumer-Facing Interface [consumer-facing-inf-dm]. The security policy name is "block_website" with the tag "policy- name", and the security policy rule name is "block_website_during_working_hours" with the tag "rule-name". The filtering event has the time span where the filtering begin time is the time "09:00" (i.e., 9:00AM) with the tag "begin-time", and the filtering end time is the time "18:00" (i.e., 6:00PM) with the tag "end-time". The filtering condition has the source target of - "Staff_Member's_PC" with the tag "src-target", and the destination - target of a website "example.com" with the tag "dest-target". Note - that the destination target can be translated to IP address(es) - corresponding to the website's URL, and then either the website's URL - or the corresponding IP address(es) can be used by both firewall and - web filter. The action is to "drop" the packets satisfying the above - event and condition with the tag "primary-action". + "Staff_Members'_PCs" with the tag "src-target", and the destination + target of "SNS_Websites" with the tag "dest-target". + + Assume that "Staff_Members'_PCs" are 2001:DB8:10:1::10, + 2001:DB8:10:1::20, and 2001:DB8:10:1::30, and that "SNS_Websites" are + example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com, as shown + in Figure 3. Note that Figure 3 is a low-level security policy XML + code for the web filter that is sent from the Security Controller to + an NSF via the NSF-Facing Interface [nsf-facing-inf-dm]. + + The source target can by translated by the Security Policy Translator + (SPT) in the Security Controller to the IP addresses of computers (or + mobile devices) used by the staff members. Refer to Section 5 for + the detailed description of the SPT. The destination target can also + be translated by the SPT to the actual websites corresponding to the + symbolic website name "SNS_Websites", and then either each website's + URL or the corresponding IP address(es) can be used by both firewall + and web filter. The action is to "drop" the packets satisfying the + above event and condition with the tag "primary-action". After receiving the high-level security policy, the Security Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a received packet is an HTTP-session packet from a staff member, which is part of an HTTP session generated by the staff member. The URL inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of - a received packet is in the example.com domain or not. + a received packet is one of the target websites (i.e., example1.com, + example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com) or not. The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each active NSF in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the Developer's Management System via the Registration interface. Based on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection - [policy-translation]. In this scenario, it is assumed that a - firewall NSF has the IP address and port number inspection - capabilities and a web filter NSF has URL inspection capability. + through the security policy translation in Section 5. In this + scenario, it is assumed that a firewall NSF has the IP address and + port number inspection capabilities and a web filter NSF has URL + inspection capability. - The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the + The Security Controller generates a low-level security policy for the NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL - inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller - may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise - network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in - use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is - currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the - Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check - whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one - being used by a staff member. + inspection, and time checking, which is shown in Figure 3. + Specifically, the Security Controller may interoperate with an access + control server in the enterprise network in order to retrieve the + information (e.g., IP address in use, company identifier (ID), and + role) of each employee that is currently using the network. Based on + the retrieved information, the Security Controller generates a low- + level security policy to check whether the source IP address of a + received packet matches any one being used by a staff member. - In addition, the low-level security rules should be able to determine - that a received packet uses either the HTTP protocol without - Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] or the HTTP protocol with - TLS as HTTPS. The low-level security rules for web filter check that - the target URL field of a received packet is equal to example.com, or - that the destination IP address of a received packet is an IP address - corresponding to example.com. Note that if HTTPS is used for an - HTTP-session packet, the HTTP protocol header is encrypted, so the - URL information may not be seen from the packet for the web + In addition, the low-level security policy's rule (shortly, low-level + security rule) should be able to determine that a received packet + uses either the HTTP protocol without Transport Layer Security (TLS) + [RFC8446] or the HTTP protocol with TLS as HTTPS. The low-level + security rule for web filter checks that the target URL field of a + received packet is equal to one of the target SNS websites (i.e., + example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com), or that + the destination IP address of a received packet is an IP address + corresponding to one of the SNS websites. Note that if HTTPS is used + for an HTTP-session packet, the HTTP protocol header is encrypted, so + the URL information may not be seen from the packet for the web filtering. Thus, the IP address(es) corresponding to the target URL needs to be obtained from the certificate in TLS versions prior to 1.3 [RFC8446] or the Server Name Indication (SNI) in a TCP-session packet in TLS versions without the encrypted SNI [tls-esni]. Also, to obtain IP address(es) corresponding to a target URL, the DNS name resolution process can be observed through a packet capturing tool because the DNS name resolution will translate the target URL into IP address(es). The IP addresses obtained through either TLS or DNS can be used by both firewall and web filter for whitelisting or blacklisting the TCP five-tuples of HTTP sessions. - Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules + Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security policy of the IP address and port number inspection to the firewall NSF and - the low-level rules for URL inspection to the web filter NSF. + the low-level security policy for URL inspection to the web filter + NSF. The following describes how the time-dependent web access control service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter. - 1. A staff member tries to access example.com during business hours, - e.g., 10 AM. + 1. A staff member tries to access one of the target SNS websites + (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and + example4.com) during business hours, e.g., 10 AM. 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an HTTP-session packet from the staff member. 3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web filter. The SFC architecture [RFC7665] can be utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework. 4. The web filter checks the received packet's target URL field or its destination IP address corresponding to the target URL, and detects that the packet is being sent to the server for - example.com. The web filter then checks that the current time is - within business hours. If so, the web filter drops the packet, - and consequently the staff member's access to example.com during - business hours is blocked. + example1.com. The web filter then checks that the current time + is within business hours. If so, the web filter drops the + packet, and consequently the staff member's access to one of the + SNS websites (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and + example4.com) during business hours is blocked. + + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + | | + | I2NSF User | + | | + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + | Consumer-Facing Interface + | + High-level Security Policy + Security | + Controller V + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + | Security Policy | | + | Translator | | + | +---------------------+----------------------+ | + | | | | | + | | +-------+--------+ | | + | | | Data Extractor | | | + | | +-------+--------+ | | + | | | Extracted Data from | | + | | V High-level Policy | | + | | +-------+--------+ +------+ | | + | | | Data Converter |<-->|NSF DB| | | + | | +-------+--------+ +------+ | | + | | | Required Data for | | + | | V Target NSFs | | + | | +-------+--------+ | | + | | |Policy Generator| | | + | | +-------+--------+ | | + | | | | | + | +---------------------+----------------------+ | + | | | + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + | NSF-Facing Interface + | + Low-level Security Policy + | + V + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + | | + | NSF(s) | + | | + +------------------------+-------------------------+ + + Figure 4: Security Policy Translation and Enforcement in I2NSF System + +5. Intent-based Security Services + + I2NSF aims at providing intent-based security services to configure + specific security policies into NSFs with customer-friendly secuirty + policies at a high level. For example, when an I2NSF User submits a + high-level security policy (e.g., web filtering as shown in Figure 2) + to the Security Controller, the Security Policy Tranlator (SPT) in + the Security Controller will translate it into the correspondong low- + level security policy as shown in Figure 3 [policy-translation]. A + security administrator using the I2NSF User can describe a security + policy without the knowledge of the detailed information about + subjects (e.g., source and destination) and objects (e.g., web + traffic) of the security policy's rule(s). + + Figure 4 shows the security policy translation and enforcement in the + I2NSF system [policy-translation]. As shown in Figure 4, an I2NSF + User delivers a high-level security policy to the Security Controller + using the Consumer-Facing Interface (denoted as CFI). The high-level + security policy is translated by the SPT in the Security Controller + into the corresponding low-level security policy which is + understandable by target NSF(s). The Security Controller delivers + the low-level security policy to the appropriate NSF(s) to enforce + the policy's rules. + + The SPT consists of three modules for security policy translations + such as Data Extractor, Data Converter, and Policy Generator, as + shown in Figure 4. The Data Extractor extracts data from a high- + level security policy delivered by the I2NSF User. The data + correspond to the leaf nodes in the YANG data model for the Consumer- + Facing Interface. In the high-level policy in Figure 2, the data are + the tag values of policy-name, rule-name, begin-time, end-time, src- + target, dest-target, and primary-action. That is, the tag values are + "block_website", "block_website_during_working_hours", "09:00", + "18:00", "Staff_Members'_PCs", "SNS_Websites", and "drop." + + The Data Converter converts the extracted high-level policy data + received from the Data Extractor into the corresponding low-level + policy data. The low-level policy data have the capability + information of NSFs to be selected as target NSFs for the required + security service enforcement specified by the high-level security + policy. The tag values in the extracted high-level policy data are + replaced with the tag values in the low-level policy data, which are + the leaf nodes of the YANG data model for the NSF-Facing Interface + (denoted as NFI). The value of each leaf node in CFI is translated + into the value of the corresponding leaf node in NFI. For example, + "block_website" of policy-name in CFI (in Figure 2) is translated + into "block_website" of system-policy-name in NFI (in Figure 3). The + tag values of rule-name, begin-time, end-time, and primary-action in + CFI are mapped into the same values of rule-name, begin-time, end- + time, and egress-action in NFI. However, the tag values of src- + target and dest-target in CFI are translated into IP addresses and + URLs, respectively, for the sake of NFI. That is, + "Staff_Members'_PCs" of CFI is translated into three IPv6 addresses + such as "2001:DB8:10:1::10", "2001:DB8:10:1::20", and + "2001:DB8:10:1::30" for the sake of NFI. Also, "SNS_Websites" of CFI + is translated into four URLs such as "example1.com", "example2.com", + "example3.com", and "example4.com" for the sake of NFI. In addition + to the data conversion, the Data Converter searches for appropriate + NSFs having capabilities corresponding to the leaf nodes of the YANG + data model for NFI. For the data conversion and NSF search, an NSF + database (denoted as NSF DB) can be consulted, as shown in Figure 4, + because the NSF DB has the capability information of NSFs that the + DMS(s) registered with the Security Controller using the Registration + Interface. + + The Policy Generator generates a low-level security policy + corresponding to the low-level policy data made by the Data Converter + per a target NSF. That is, the Policy Generator can build such a + low-level security policy XML file like Figure 3 with the NSF DB + because the NSF DB has the mapping information between the CFI YANG + data model and the NFI YANG data model. + + Therefore, by allowing the I2NSF User to express its security policy + without knowing the detailed information of entities for security + policies, the I2NSF can efficiently support the intent-based security + services with the help of the security policy translator along with + the NSF DB. +------------+ | I2NSF User | +------------+ ^ | Consumer-Facing Interface v +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ @@ -436,36 +632,36 @@ | +-----+ | | | (DPI) | +-----------------+ | +--------------+ | . | . | . | +-----------------------+ ------>| NSF-n | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| +-----------------------+ - Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SFC + Figure 5: An I2NSF Framework with SFC -5. I2NSF Framework with SFC +6. I2NSF Framework with SFC In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI. For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF. SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g., NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture to support the advanced security action. - Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown + Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown in the figure, SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions) a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with SFC, the Security Controller can take responsibilities of generating classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs. By analyzing high-level security @@ -520,51 +716,51 @@ | +----------------+ | | ^ | | | SDN Southbound Interface | | v | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | |Switch-1|-| Switch-2 |-|Switch-3|.......|Switch-m| | | | | |(Classifier)| | (SFF) | | | | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - Figure 4: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network + Figure 6: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network -6. I2NSF Framework with SDN +7. I2NSF Framework with SDN This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF system. For example, for efficient firewall services, simple packet filtering can be performed by SDN forwarding elements (e.g., switches), and complicated packet filtering based on packet payloads can be performed by a firewall NSF. This optimized firewall using both SDN forwarding elements and a firewall NSF is more efficient than a firewall where SDN forwarding elements forward all the packets to a firewall NSF for packet filtering. This is because packets to be filtered out can be early dropped by SDN forwarding elements without consuming further network bandwidth due to the forwarding of the packets to the firewall NSF. - Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to + Figure 6 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to support network-based security services. In this system, the enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN forwarding elements (e.g., a switch running as either a hardware middle box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., a firewall running in a form of a VNF [ETSI-NFV]). Note that NSFs are created or removed by the NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO) [ETSI-NFV-MANO], performing the lifecycle management of NSFs as VNFs. - Refer to Section 7 for the detailed discussion of the NSF lifecycle + Refer to Section 8 for the detailed discussion of the NSF lifecycle management in the NFV MANO for I2NSF. For security policy enforcement (e.g., packet filtering), the Security Controller instructs the SDN Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements can perform the required security services with flow tables under the supervision of the SDN Controller. As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules: Rule A is a simple packet filtering rule that checks only the IP address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time- consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached @@ -601,71 +797,71 @@ the capabilities each VNF can offer [ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This subsystem can determine whether a given software element (VNF instance) is an NSF or a virtualized SDN switch. For example, if a VNF instance has anti-malware capability according to the description of the VNF, it could be considered as an NSF. A VNF onboarding system [VNF-ONBOARDING] can be used as such a subsystem that maintains the descriptions of each VNF to tell whether a VNF instance is for an NSF or for a virtualized SDN switch. For the support of SFC in the I2NSF framework with SDN, as shown in - Figure 4, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the + Figure 6, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the role of either SFC Classifier or SFF, which are explained in - Section 5. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with + Section 6. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with Security Controller. This interface is used to update security service function chaining information for traffic flows. For example, when it needs to update an SFP for a traffic flow in an SDN - network, as shown in Figure 4, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks + network, as shown in Figure 6, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks Security Controller to update the SFP for the traffic flow (needing another security service as an NSF) via NSF-Facing Interface. This update lets Security Controller ask Classifier (denoted as Switch-2) to update the mapping between the traffic flow and SFP in Classifier via NSF-Facing Interface. The following subsections introduce three use cases from [RFC8192] for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. -6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System +7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and apply common rules to individual network elements (e.g., switch). The centralized network firewall controls each forwarding element, and firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically. A time-based firewall can be enforced with packet filtering rules and a time span (e.g., work hours). With this time-based firewall, a time-based security policy can be enforced, as explained in Section 4. For example, employees at a company are allowed to access social networking service websites during lunch time or after work hours. -6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System +7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules, according to the configuration of a VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). This centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically. The centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. Specifically, a network firewall performs the basic security check of an unknown flow's packet observed by a switch. If the network firewall detects that the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's packet that exhibits some suspicious patterns, then it triggers the VoIP/VoLTE security system for more specialized security analysis of the suspicious VoIP call packet. -6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System +7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and configure rules to each switch for DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator) on a common server. The centralized DDoS- attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks outside the private network, that is, from public networks [RFC8612][dots-architecture]. Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers) and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack @@ -718,44 +914,44 @@ | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | | | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | | | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management | | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration | | | | (MANO) | +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+ (a) = Registration Interface (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface - Figure 5: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV + Figure 7: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV Reference Architectural Framework -7. I2NSF Framework with NFV +8. I2NSF Framework with NFV This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments, NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances. Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV - infrastructure as show in Figure 5. + infrastructure as show in Figure 7. - Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV + Figure 7 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as VNFs - in Figure 5. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF + in Figure 7. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF framework is responsible for registering capability information of NSFs into the Security Controller. However, those NSFs are created or removed by a virtual network function manager (VNFM) in the NFV MANO that performs the lifecycle management of VNFs. Note that the lifecycle management of VNFs is out of scope for I2NSF. The Security Controller controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., function parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs via the NSF-Facing Interface along with the NSF monitoring capability [nsf-facing-inf-dm][nsf-monitoring-dm]. Both the DMS and Security Controller can be implemented as the Element Managements (EMs) in the @@ -793,23 +989,23 @@ notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance. 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF instance for policy enforcement. We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the - Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 5. + Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 7. -8. Security Considerations +9. Security Considerations The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329] are applicable to this document. This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. The role of the DMS is to provide an I2NSF system with the software packages or images for NSF execution. The DMS must not access NSFs in activated status. An inside attacker or a supply chain attacker @@ -827,55 +1023,55 @@ NSFs from an untrusted DMS or without prior testing. The practices by which these packages are downloaded and loaded into the system are out of scope for I2NSF. I2NSF system operators should audit and monitor interactions with DMSs. Additionally, the operators should monitor the running NSFs through the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface [nsf-monitoring-dm] as part of the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. Note that the mechanics for monitoring the DMSs are out of scope for I2NSF. -9. Acknowledgments +10. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work has been partially supported by the European Commission under Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 700199 "Securing against intruders and other threats through a NFV-enabled environment (SHIELD)". This support does not imply endorsement. -10. Contributors +11. Contributors I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing authors. The following are considered co-authors: o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University) o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University) o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI) o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) -11. References +12. References -11.1. Normative References +12.1. Normative References [AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. [consumer-facing-inf-dm] Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06 (work in @@ -959,21 +1155,21 @@ [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018. [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018. [RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, May 2019. -11.2. Informative References +12.2. Informative References [ETSI-NFV-MANO] "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and Orchestration", Available: https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/nfv- man/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv-man001v010101p.pdf, December 2014. [i2nsf-terminology] Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. @@ -999,63 +1195,69 @@ [tls-esni] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, "Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft- ietf-tls-esni-04 (work in progress), July 2019. [VNF-ONBOARDING] "VNF Onboarding", Available: https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/mano/VNF+Onboarding, November 2016. -Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-16 +Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- - applicability-16: + applicability-17: - o The data model drafts for I2NSF are referenced as Normative - references rather than Informative references. + o In Section 4, a high-level security policy XML file in Figure 2 + and the corresponding low-level security policy XML file Figure 3 + are constructed using the Consumer-Facing Interface data model and + the NSF-Facing data model, respectively. - o An RFC and a draft for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat - Signaling (DOTS) are referenced for attack mitigation. + o For the applicability of I2NSF to the real world, Section 5 is + added to support the Intent-based Security Services using I2NSF. + This section explains the security policy translation based on an + I2NSF User's intents on the required security services. Figure 4 + shows the archiecture and procedure of the I2NSF security policy + translator. Authors' Addresses Jaehoon Paul Jeong Department of Computer Science and Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 31 299 4957 Fax: +82 31 290 7996 EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php Sangwon Hyun Department of Computer Engineering - Chosun University - 309 Pilmun-daero, Dong-Gu - Gwangju 61452 + Myongji University + 116 Myongji-ro, Cheoin-gu + Yongin 17058 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 62 230 7473 EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr - Tae-Jin Ahn Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon 305-811 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 42 870 8409 EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com + Susan Hares Huawei 7453 Hickory Hill Saline, MI 48176 USA Phone: +1-734-604-0332 EMail: shares@ndzh.com Diego R. Lopez