--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-08.txt 2019-03-11 08:13:12.459100580 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-09.txt 2019-03-11 08:13:12.515101935 -0700 @@ -1,26 +1,26 @@ I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University Intended status: Informational S. Hyun -Expires: June 28, 2019 Chosun University +Expires: September 12, 2019 Chosun University T. Ahn Korea Telecom S. Hares Huawei D. Lopez Telefonica I+D - December 25, 2018 + March 11, 2019 Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Based Security Services - draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-08 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-09 Abstract This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. Status of This Memo @@ -30,58 +30,58 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on June 28, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 6. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 6. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 - 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-07 . . . 24 + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 + 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-08 . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1. Introduction Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions (NSFs). Note that Network Security Function (NSF) is defined as a funcional block for a security service within an I2NSF framework that has well-defined I2NSF NSF-facing interface and other external interfaces and well-defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology]. @@ -117,24 +117,24 @@ The implementation of I2NSF in these scenarios has allowed us to verify the applicability and effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for a variety of use cases. 2. Terminology This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7149], [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [NFV-Terminology], [RFC8329], - [i2nsf-terminology], [consumer-facing-inf-im], - [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], - [registration-inf-dm], and [nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition, - the following terms are defined below: + [i2nsf-terminology], [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], + [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-dm], and + [nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition, the following terms are + defined below: o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300]. o Network Function: A funcional block within a network infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well- defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology]. @@ -195,43 +195,48 @@ Figure 1: I2NSF Framework 3. I2NSF Framework This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329]. As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by delivering high-level security policies, which specify security requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface - [consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm]. + [consumer-facing-inf-dm]. The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies. The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies to the NSFs [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm]. The Security Controller requests NSFs to perform low-level security services via the NSF-Facing Interface. As shown in Figure 1, with a - Developer's Management System, developers (or vendors) inform the - Security Controller of the capabilities of the NSFs through the I2NSF - Registration Interface [registration-inf-dm] for registering (or - deregistering) the corresponding NSFs. Note that an inside attacker - at the Development Management System can seriously weaken the I2NSF - system's security. For the detection and prevention of inside - attacks, the Security Controller needs to monitor the activity of all - the Development Management Systems as well as the NSFs through the - I2NSF NSF monitoring functionality [nsf-monitoring-dm]. + Developer's Management System (DMS), developers (or vendors) inform + the Security Controller of the capabilities of the NSFs through the + I2NSF Registration Interface [registration-inf-dm] for registering + (or deregistering) the corresponding NSFs. Note that an inside + attacker at the DMS can seriously weaken the I2NSF system's security. + To deal with this type of threat, the role of the DMS should be + restricted to providing an I2NSF system with the software package/ + image for NSF execution, and the DMS should never be able to access + NSFs in online/activated status for the I2NSF system's security. On + the other hand, an access to running (online) NSFs should be allowed + only to the Security Controller, not the DMS. Also, the Security + Controller can detect and prevent inside attacks by monitoring the + activity of all the DMSs as well as the NSFs through the I2NSF NSF + monitoring functionality [nsf-monitoring-dm]. The Consumer-Facing Interface between an I2NSF User and the Security Controller can be implemented using, for example, RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level security policies to be specified by an I2NSF User. The data model defined in [consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. The NSF-Facing Interface between the Security Controller and NSFs can be implemented using NETCONF [RFC6241]. YANG data models describe @@ -251,26 +256,44 @@ The following sections describe different security service scenarios illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework. 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a particular Internet service (e.g., Example.com) during business hours. The following is an example high-level security policy rule - that the administrator requests: Block the staff members' access to - Example.com from 9 AM to 6 PM. The administrator sends this high- - level security policy to the Security Controller. Refer to an XML - file for the high-level security policy of a time-based web-filter in - [consumer-facing-inf-dm], whose data model is defined by YANG, and - which is delivered over RESTCONF. + for a web filter that the administrator requests: Block the staff + members' access to Example.com from 9 AM to 6 PM. Figure 2 is an + example XML code for this web filter: + + + block_website + + Staff_Member's_PC + Example.com + 9:00AM + -6:00PM + + block + + + Figure 2: An XML Example for Time-based Web-filter + + The security policy name is "block_website" with the tag "name". The + filtering condition has the source group "Staff_Member's_PC" with the + tag "src", the destination website "Example.com" with the tag "dest", + the filtering start time is the time "9:00AM" with the tag " time- + span-start", and the filtering end time is the time "6:00PM" with the + tag "time-span-end". The action is to "block" the packets satisfying + the above condition, that is, to drop those packets. After receiving the high-level security policy, the Security Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a received packet is an HTTP packet from a staff member. The URL inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of a received packet is in the Example.com domain or not. @@ -312,25 +335,37 @@ HTTP packet from the staff member. 3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web filter. SFC technology can be utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework [nsf-triggered-steering]. 4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received packet, and realizes the packet is toward Example.com. The web filter then checks that the current time is in business hours. - If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the staff member's access to Example.com during business hours is blocked. +5. I2NSF Framework with SFC + + In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security + action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the + result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a + firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI. + For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious + packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF. + SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security + action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g., + NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture + to support the advanced security action. + +------------+ | I2NSF User | +------------+ ^ | Consumer-Facing Interface v +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ ^ ^ @@ -347,36 +382,23 @@ | +-----+ | | | (DPI) | +-----------------+ | +--------------+ | . | . | . | +-----------------------+ ------>| NSF-n | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| +-----------------------+ - Figure 2: An I2NSF Framework with SFC - -5. I2NSF Framework with SFC - - In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security - action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the - result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a - firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI. - For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious - packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF. - SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security - action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g., - NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture - to support the advanced security action. + Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SFC - Figure 2 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown + Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown in the figure, SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions) a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with SFC, the Security Controller can take responsibilities of generating classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs. By analyzing high-level security @@ -408,20 +430,34 @@ This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF system. + Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to + support network-based security services. In this system, the + enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN + forwarding elements (e.g., switch running as either a hardware middle + box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., firewall running in + a form of a virtual network function [ETSI-NFV]). Especially, SDN + forwarding elements enforce simple packet filtering rules that can be + translated into their packet forwarding rules, whereas NSFs enforce + NSF-related security rules requiring the security capabilities of the + NSFs. For this purpose, the Security Controller instructs the SDN + Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements + can perform the required security services with flow tables under the + supervision of the SDN Controller. + +------------+ | I2NSF User | +------------+ ^ | Consumer-Facing Interface v +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ ^ ^ @@ -441,35 +477,21 @@ | +----------------+ | | ^ | | | SDN Southbound Interface | | v | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | |Switch-1|-| Switch-2 |-|Switch-3|.......|Switch-m| | | | | |(Classifier)| | (SFF) | | | | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network - - Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to - support network-based security services. In this system, the - enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN - forwarding elements (e.g., switch running as either a hardware middle - box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., firewall running in - a form of a virtual network function [ETSI-NFV]). Especially, SDN - forwarding elements enforce simple packet filtering rules that can be - translated into their packet forwarding rules, whereas NSFs enforce - NSF-related security rules requiring the security capabilities of the - NSFs. For this purpose, the Security Controller instructs the SDN - Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements - can perform the required security services with flow tables under the - supervision of the SDN Controller. + Figure 4: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules: Rule A is a simple packet filtering rule that checks only the IP address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time- consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached file being transmitted over a flow of packets contains malware. Rule A can be translated into packet forwarding rules of SDN forwarding elements and thus be enforced by these elements. In contrast, rule B cannot be enforced by forwarding elements, but it has to be enforced by NSFs with anti-malware capability. Specifically, a flow of @@ -484,28 +506,41 @@ elements and which should be enforced by NSFs. If some of the given rules requires security capabilities that can be provided by SDN forwarding elements, then the Security Controller instructs the SDN Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN forwarding elements can enforce those security policy rules with flow tables under the supervision of the SDN Controller. Or if some rules require security capabilities that cannot be provided by SDN forwarding elements but by NSFs, then the Security Controller instructs relevant NSFs to enforce those rules. + The distinction between software-based SDN forwarding elements and + NSFs, which can both run as virtual network functions, may be + necessary for some management purposes in this system. For this, we + can take advantage of the NFV MANO where there is a subsystem that + maintains the descriptions of the capabilities each VNF can offer + [ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This subsystem can determine whether a given + software element (VNF instance) is an NSF or a virtualized SDN + switch. For example, if a VNF instance has anti-malware capability + according to the description of the VNF, it could be considered as an + NSF. A VNF onboarding system [VNF-ONBOARDING] can be used as such a + subsystem that maintains the descriptions of each VNF to tell whether + a VNF instance is for an NSF or for a virtualized SDN switch. + For the support of SFC in the I2NSF framework with SDN, as shown in - Figure 3, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the + Figure 4, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the role of either SFC Classifier or SFF, which are explained in Section 5. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with Security Controller. This interface is used to update security service function chaining information for traffic flows. For example, when it needs to update an SFP for a traffic flow in an SDN - network, as shown in Figure 3, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks + network, as shown in Figure 4, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks Security Controller to update the SFP for the traffic flow (needing another security service as an NSF) via NSF-Facing Interface. This update lets Security Controller ask Classifier (denoted as Switch-2) to update the mapping between the traffic flow and SFP in Classifier via NSF-Facing Interface. The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192] @@ -604,21 +639,21 @@ 2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern. 3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function, such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the suspicious signal packet. In order for this triggering of VoIP IPS to be served, the suspicious packet is sent to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) that is usually a switch in an SDN - network, as shown in Figure 3. The SFF forwards the suspicious + network, as shown in Figure 4. The SFF forwards the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS. 4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet, such as calling number and session description headers [RFC4566]. 5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests the SDN Controller to block that packet and the subsequent @@ -786,44 +821,44 @@ | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | | | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | | | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management | | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration | | | | (MANO) | +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+ (a) = Registration Interface (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface - Figure 4: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV + Figure 5: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV Reference Architectural Framework 7. I2NSF Framework with NFV This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments, NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances. Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV - infrastructure as show in Figure 4. + infrastructure as show in Figure 5. - Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV + Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as - virtual network functions (VNFs) in Figure 4. The Developer's + virtual network functions (VNFs) in Figure 5. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF framework is responsible for registering capability information of NSFs into the Security Controller. Those NSFs are created or removed by a virtual network functions manager (VNFM) in the NFV architecture that performs the life-cycle management of VNFs. The Security Controller controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., function parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs. Both the DMS and Security Controller can be implemented as the Element Managements (EMs) in the NFV architecture. Finally, the I2NSF User can be implemented as OSS/BSS (Operational Support Systems/Business Support Systems) in the NFV architecture @@ -859,21 +894,21 @@ notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance. 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF instance for policy enforcement. We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the - Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 4. + Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 5. More details about the I2NSF framework based on the NFV reference architecture are described in [i2nsf-nfv-architecture]. 8. Security Considerations The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329] are applicable to this document. This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. @@ -908,46 +943,46 @@ o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) 11. References 11.1. Normative References [ETSI-NFV] - ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions Virtualisation - (NFV); Architectural Framework", Available: + "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural + Framework", Available: https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/ nfv/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv002v010101p.pdf, October 2013. [ITU-T.Y.3300] - Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of Software- - Defined Networking", Available: https://www.itu.int/rec/T- - REC-Y.3300-201406-I, June 2014. + "Framework of Software-Defined Networking", + Available: https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.3300-201406-I, + June 2014. [NFV-Terminology] - ETSI GS NFV 003 V1.2.1, "Network Functions Virtualisation - (NFV); Terminology for Main Concepts in NFV", Available: + "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Terminology for + Main Concepts in NFV", Available: https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/ NFV/001_099/003/01.02.01_60/gs_nfv003v010201p.pdf, December 2014. [ONF-OpenFlow] - ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)", + "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)", Available: https://www.opennetworking.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/10/openflow-spec-v1.4.0.pdf, October 2013. [ONF-SDN-Architecture] - ONF TR-521, "SDN Architecture (Issue 1.1)", Available: + "SDN Architecture (Issue 1.1)", Available: https://www.opennetworking.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/10/TR- 521_SDN_Architecture_issue_1.1.pdf, June 2016. [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, October 2010. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", @@ -978,154 +1013,121 @@ 11.2. Informative References [AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. [consumer-facing-inf-dm] Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- - ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-02 (work in - progress), November 2018. + ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-03 (work in + progress), March 2019. - [consumer-facing-inf-im] - Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, - S., Xia, L., and J. Jeong, "Information Model for - Consumer-Facing Interface to Security Controller", draft- - kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-im-07 (work in - progress), July 2018. + [ETSI-NFV-MANO] + "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and + Orchestration", Available: + https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/nfv- + man/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv-man001v010101p.pdf, + December 2014. [i2nsf-nfv-architecture] Yang, H., Kim, Y., Jeong, J., and J. Kim, "I2NSF on the NFV Reference Architecture", draft-yang-i2nsf-nfv- architecture-04 (work in progress), November 2018. [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- i2nsf-capability-04 (work in progress), October 2018. [i2nsf-terminology] Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) - Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-06 (work in - progress), July 2018. + Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-07 (work in + progress), January 2019. [ITU-T.X.1252] - Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline Identity Management - Terms and Definitions", April 2010. + "Baseline Identity Management Terms and Definitions", + April 2010. [ITU-T.X.800] - Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security Architecture for - Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applications", - March 1991. + "Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection + for CCITT Applications", March 1991. [nsf-facing-inf-dm] Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG - Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-02 - (work in progress), November 2018. + Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-03 + (work in progress), March 2019. [nsf-monitoring-dm] - Jeong, J., Kim, J., Hong, D., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. - Birkholz, "A YANG Data Model for Monitoring I2NSF Network - Security Functions", draft-hong-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data- - model-06 (work in progress), November 2018. + Jeong, J., Chung, C., Hares, S., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, + "A YANG Data Model for Monitoring I2NSF Network Security + Functions", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-00 + (work in progress), March 2019. [nsf-triggered-steering] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S. Hares, "Service Function Chaining-Enabled I2NSF Architecture", draft-hyun- i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-06 (work in progress), July 2018. [opsawg-firewalls] Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in progress), October 2012. [policy-translation] Yang, J., Jeong, J., and J. Kim, "Security Policy Translation in Interface to Network Security Functions", - draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation-02 (work in - progress), October 2018. + draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation-03 (work in + progress), March 2019. [registration-inf-dm] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf- - registration-interface-dm-01 (work in progress), November - 2018. + registration-interface-dm-02 (work in progress), March + 2019. [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006. -Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-07 - - The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- - applicability-07: - - o This version has reflected all the comments from Eric Rescorla who - is a Security Area Director as follows. - - o In Section 1, Network Security Function (NFV) is defined in the - viewpoint of the I2NSF framework. - - o In Section 1, a user using the I2NSF User is clarified as a system - administrator in the I2NSF framework. - - o In Section 1, as the applicability of the I2NSF framework, four - different scenarios are represented with a standard bulleted list. + [VNF-ONBOARDING] + "VNF Onboarding", Available: + https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/mano/VNF+Onboarding, + November 2016. - o The standard document about ETSI-NFV is moved to Normative - References. +Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-08 - o In Section 2, key terms (e.g., Network Function, Network Security - Function, Network Functions Virtualization, and Servive Function - Chaining) are internally defined along with the reference to open - specifications. + The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- + applicability-08: - o In Section 2, the definition of Firewall is corrected such that - some suspicious packets are inspected by the firewall rather than - every packet. + o This version has reflected the additional comments from Eric + Rescorla who is a Security Area Director as follows. o In Section 3, for a Developer's Management System, the problem of an inside attacker is addressed, and a possible solution for the inside attacks is suggested through I2NSF NSF monitoring - functionality. + functionality. Also, some restrictions on the role of the DMS are + required to deal with the inside attacks. - o In Section 4, an XML file for the RESTCONF/YANG for the time- - dependent web access control is pointed out with a reference to - the Consumer-Facing Interface's data model - [consumer-facing-inf-dm]. + o In Section 4, an XML code for the time-dependent web access + control is explained as an example. o In Section 6, the definitions of an SDN forwarding element and an NSF are clarified such that an SDN forwarding element is a switch running as either a hardware middle box or a software virtual switch, and an NSF is a virtual network function for a security - service. - - o In Section 6.3, a flow forwarding path management scheme in - [AVANT-GUARD] is described in a self-contained way as follows. - For DDoS-attack mitigation, the forwarding of traffic flows in - switches can be dynamically configured such that malicious traffic - flows are handled by the paths separated from normal traffic flows - in order to minimize the impact of those malicious traffic on the - the servers. This flow path separation can be done by a flow - forwarding path management scheme based on [AVANT-GUARD]. - - o Some typos are corrected such as "Interner -> Internet", - "Registation -> Registration", "The low-level security rules for - web filter checks -> The low-level security rules for web filter - check", "fltering -> filtering", "illegal packets -> malicious - packets", "manipulate rules -> configure rules", "managenent -> - management", and "DDoS-attack mitigation operations -> DDoS-attack - mitigation". + service. It also discusses about how to determine whether a given + software element in virtualized environments is an NSF or a + virtualized switch. Authors' Addresses Jaehoon Paul Jeong Department of Software Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Republic of Korea