--- 1/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02.txt 2018-07-02 09:13:27.494616739 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03.txt 2018-07-02 09:13:27.542617887 -0700 @@ -1,25 +1,26 @@ -Network Working Group J. Jeong -Internet-Draft S. Hyun -Intended status: Informational Sungkyunkwan University -Expires: September 6, 2018 T. Ahn +I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong +Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University +Intended status: Informational S. Hyun +Expires: January 3, 2019 Chosun University + T. Ahn Korea Telecom S. Hares Huawei D. Lopez Telefonica I+D - March 5, 2018 + July 2, 2018 Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Based Security Services - draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02 + draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03 Abstract This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. Status of This Memo @@ -29,21 +30,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018. + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -52,32 +53,34 @@ include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 4.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 4.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 4.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation - System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-01 . . . 19 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 4. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 5. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation + System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 6. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02 . . . 22 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1. Introduction Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defined a framework and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions (NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by different security solution vendors to be used in the NFV environment by utilizing the capabilities of such products and the virtualization of security functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework, each NSF initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into @@ -241,31 +245,31 @@ perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection. In this scenario, it is assumed that an NSF of firewall has the IP address and port number inspection capabilities and an NSF of web filter has URL inspection capability. The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in - use, company ID, and role) of each employee that is currently using - the network. Based on the retrieved information, the Security - Controller generates low-level security rules to check whether the - source IP address of a received packet matches any one being used by - a staff member. In addition, the low-level security rules should be - able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP protocol. The - low-level security rules for web filter checks that the target URL - field of a received packet is equal to facebook.com. Finally, the - Security Controller sends the low-level security rules of the IP - address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall and the - low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter. + use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is + currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the + Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check + whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one + being used by a staff member. In addition, the low-level security + rules should be able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP + protocol. The low-level security rules for web filter checks that + the target URL field of a received packet is equal to facebook.com. + Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules + of the IP address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall + and the low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter. The following describes how the time-dependent web access control service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter. 1. A staff member tries to access Fackbook.com during business hours, e.g., 10 am. 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an @@ -277,31 +281,108 @@ utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework [nsf-triggered-steering]. 4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received packet, and realizes the packet is toward Facebook.com. The web filter then checks that the current time is in business hours. If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the staff member's access to Facebook during business hours is blocked. -4. I2NSF Framework with SDN +4. I2NSF Framework with SFC + + In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security + action (e.g., DPI and DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on + the result of its own security inspection of the packet. For + example, a firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious + packet with DPI. For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, + the suspicious packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the + successor NSF. Service Function Chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] is a + technology that enables this advanced security action by steering a + packet with multiple service functions (e.g., NSFs), and this + technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture to support the + advanced security action. + + SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders + (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service + function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions) + a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured + classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to + the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by + referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with + SFC, the security controller can take responsibilities of generating + classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs. + In particular, by analyzing high-level security policies from I2NSF + users, the security controller can construct SFPs that are required + to meet the high-level security policies, generates classification + rules of the SFPs, and then configures classifiers with the + classification rules so that relevant traffic packets can follow the + SFPs. Also, based on the global view of NSF instances available in + the system, the security controller can construct forwarding tables + required for SFFs to forward a given packet to the next NSF over the + SFP. + + +------------+ + | I2NSF User | + +------------+ + ^ + | Consumer-Facing Interface + v + +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ + |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| + +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ + ^ ^ + | | NSF-Facing Interface + | |------------------------- + | | + +-+-+-v-+-+-+-+-+-+ +------v-------+ + | +-----------+ | ------>| NSF-1 | + | |Classifier | | | | (Firewall) | + | +-----------+ | | +--------------+ + | +-----+ |<-----| +--------------+ + | | SFF | | |----->| NSF-2 | + | +-----+ | | | (DPI) | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +--------------+ + | . + | . + | . + | +-----------------------+ + ------>| NSF-n | + |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| + +-----------------------+ + + Figure 2: An I2NSF Framework with SFC + + To trigger an advanced security action in the I2NSF architecture, the + current NSF appends a metadata describing the security capability + required for the advanced action to the suspicious packet and sends + the packet to the classifier. Based on the metadata information, the + classifier searches an SFP which includes an NSF with the required + security capability, changes the SFP-related information (e.g., + service path identifier and service index [RFC8300]) of the packet + with the new SFP that has been found, and then forwards the packet to + the SFF. When receiving the packet, the SFF checks the SFP-related + information such as the service path identifier and service index + contained in the packet and forwards the packet to the next NSF on + the SFP of the packet, according to its forwarding table. + +5. I2NSF Framework with SDN This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some packet filtering rules to be enforced in the network switches by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF system. - Figure 2 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to + Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to support network-based security services. In this system, the enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN switches and NSFs. Especially, SDN switches enforce simple packet filtering rules that can be translated into their packet forwarding rules, whereas NSFs enforce NSF-related security rules requiring the security capabilities of the NSFs. For this purpose, the Security Controller instructs the Switch Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN switches can perform the required security services with flow tables under the supervision of the Switch Controller (i.e., SDN Controller). @@ -364,27 +445,27 @@ | |Switch Controller| | | +-----------------+ | | ^ | | | SDN Southbound Interface | | v | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|-|Switch 3|......|Switch m| | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ - Figure 2: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network + Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192] -4.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System +5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a centralized server for firewall (called Firewall). The centralized network firewall controls each switch for the network resource management and the firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically. The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows: 1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the Switch @@ -438,21 +519,21 @@ are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system through the centralized server. -4.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System +5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized server for VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security system controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically. A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. Specifically, a @@ -472,21 +553,21 @@ inspection. 2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern. 3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function, such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the suspicious signal packet. That is, the firewall sends the packet to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) in the I2NSF framework - [nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 2. The SFF forwards + [nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 3. The SFF forwards the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS. 4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet, such as calling number and session description headers [RFC4566]. 5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent @@ -524,21 +605,21 @@ that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server. o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. -4.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System +5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network. Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers) and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by @@ -614,81 +695,202 @@ So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and [registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF- Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241]. -5. Security Considerations +6. I2NSF Framework with NFV + + This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework with + Network Functions Virtualization (called NFV). + + +--------------------+ + +-------------------------------------------+ | ---------------- | + | I2NSF User (OSS/BSS) | | | NFV | | + +------+------------------------------------+ | | Orchestrator +-+ | + | Consumer-Facing Interface | ---+------------ | | + +------|------------------------------------+ | | | | + | ----+-------------------------------- | | | | | + | | Security Controller(EM) | | | | | | + | ----+-------------+-------------+---- | | ---+---------- | | + | | NSF-Facing Interface | |(a)-| Developer's| | | + | ----+---- ----+---- ----+---- | | Mgmt System| | | + | |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| |(b)-| (VNFM) | | | + | ----+---- ----+---- ----+---- | | ---+---------- | | + | | | | | | | | | + +------|-------------|-------------|--------+ | | | | + | | | | | | | + +------+-------------+-------------+--------+ | | | | + | NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) | | | | | + | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | + | | Virtual | | Virtual | | Virtual | | | | | | + | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | | + | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | ---+------ | | + | +---------------------------------------+ | | | | | | + | | Virtualization Layer | |--|-| VIM(s) +-------- | + | +---------------------------------------+ | | | | | + | +---------------------------------------+ | | ---------- | + | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | + | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | + | | | hardware| | hardware| | hardware| | | | | + | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | + | | Hardware resources | | | NFV Management | + | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration | + +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+ + (a) = Registration Interface + (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface + + Figure 4: I2NSF Framework Implementation in NFV Reference + Architectural Framework + + NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and + efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments, + NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances + rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible + to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by + dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances. + Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding + NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes + on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV + technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV + infrastructure as show in Figure 4. + + Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV + reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards + Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as + virtual network functions (VNFs) in Figure 4. The Developer's + Management System in the I2NSF framework is responsible for creating + or removing NSF instances, and can be implemented as the virtual + network functions manager (VNFM) in the NFV architecture that + performs the life-cycle management of VNFs. The Security Controller + can be implemented as the Element Management (EM) in the NFV + architecture that controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., + function parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs. Finally, the + I2NSF User can be implemented as OSS/BSS (Operational Support + Systems/Business Support Systems) in the NFV architecture that + provides interfaces for users in the NFV system. + + The operation procedure in the I2NSF framework based on the NFV + architecture is as follows: + + 1. The Developer's Mgmt System (DMS) has a set of virtual machine + (VM) images of NSFs, and each VM image can be used to create an + NSF instance that provides a set of security capabilities. The + DMS initially registers a mapping table of the ID of each VM + image and the set of capabilities that can be provided by an NSF + instance created from the VM image into the Security Controller. + + 2. If the Security Controller does not have any instantiated NSF + that has the set of capabilities required to meet the security + requirements from users, it searches the mapping table + (registered by the DMS) for the VM image ID corresponding to the + required set of capabilities. + + 3. The Security Controller requests the DMS to instantiate an NSF + with the VM image ID. + + 4. When receiving the instantiation request, the DMS first asks the + NFV orchestrator for the permission required to create the NSF + instance, requests the VIM to allocate resources for the NSF + instance, and finally creates the NSF instance based on the + allocated resources. + + 5. Once the NSF instance has been created, the DMS performs the + initial configurations of the NSF instance and then notifies the + Security Controller of the NSF instance. + + 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security + Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF + instance for policy enforcement. + + The I2NSF framework can be implemented based on the NFV architecture. + Note that the registration of the capabilities of NSFs is performed + through the Registration Interface and the life-cycle management for + NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the Ve-Vnfm interface, as shown in + Figure 4. More details about the I2NSF framework based on the NFV + reference architecture are described in [i2nsf-nfv-architecture]. + +7. Security Considerations The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived from the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the security considerations of the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. Therefore, proper secure communication channels should be used the delivery of control or management messages among the components in the proposed framework. This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. -6. Acknowledgments +8. Acknowledgments This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). -7. Contributors +9. Contributors I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing authors. The following are considered co-authors: o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) + o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) + o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University) + + o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University) + o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI) o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) -8. Informative References +10. Informative References [AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. [consumer-facing-inf-dm] Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- - ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-00 (work in - progress), March 2018. + ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-01 (work in + progress), July 2018. [consumer-facing-inf-im] Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, S., Xia, L., and J. Jeong, "Information Model for Consumer-Facing Interface to Security Controller", draft- - kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-im-04 (work in - progress), October 2017. + kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-im-06 (work in + progress), July 2018. [ETSI-NFV] - ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions Virtualisation + ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions Virtualization (NFV); Architectural Framework", October 2013. + [i2nsf-nfv-architecture] + Yang, H. and Y. Kim, "I2NSF on the NFV Reference + Architecture", draft-yang-i2nsf-nfv-architecture-02 (work + in progress), June 2018. + [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- - i2nsf-capability-00 (work in progress), September 2017. + i2nsf-capability-02 (work in progress), July 2018. [i2nsf-terminology] Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-05 (work in progress), January 2018. [ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline Identity Management Terms and Definitions", April 2010. @@ -699,126 +901,127 @@ March 1991. [ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of Software- Defined Networking", June 2014. [nsf-facing-inf-dm] Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-data- - model-00 (work in progress), March 2018. + model-01 (work in progress), July 2018. [nsf-triggered-steering] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S. Hares, "Service Function Chaining-Enabled I2NSF Architecture", draft-hyun- - i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-05 (work in progress), March + i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-06 (work in progress), July 2018. [ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)", October 2013. [ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014. [opsawg-firewalls] Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in progress), October 2012. [registration-inf-dm] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf- - registration-dm-03 (work in progress), March 2018. + registration-dm-04 (work in progress), July 2018. [registration-inf-im] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface Information Model", draft-hyun- - i2nsf-registration-interface-im-04 (work in progress), - March 2018. + i2nsf-registration-interface-im-05 (work in progress), + July 2018. [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006. [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, October 2010. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011. [RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider Environment", RFC 7149, March 2014. + [RFC7665] Halpern, J. and C. Pignataro, "Service Function Chaining + (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, October 2015. + [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017. [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July 2017. + [RFC8300] Quinn, P., Elzur, U., and C. Pignataro, "Network Service + Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, January 2018. + [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018. -Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-01 +Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02 The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- - applicability-01: + applicability-02: - o In Section 4, it is clarified what types of security policy rules - can be enforced by SDN switches or NSFs in the environment of - I2NSF framework with SDN. + o In Section 4, it is explained how the I2NSF framework and SFC can + be combined to support chaining NSFs. - o In Section 4, it is explained what should be done by the Security - Controller in order to divide the enforcement of security policy - rules into the SDN switches and NSFs in the I2NSF framework with - SDN. + o In Section 6, it is explained how the I2NSF framework can be + implemented based on the NFV reference architecture. Authors' Addresses Jaehoon Paul Jeong Department of Software Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 31 299 4957 Fax: +82 31 290 7996 EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php Sangwon Hyun - Department of Software - Sungkyunkwan University - 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu - Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 + Department of Computer Engineering + Chosun University + 309 Pilmun-daero, Dong-Gu + Gwangju 61452 Republic of Korea - Phone: +82 31 290 7222 - Fax: +82 31 299 6673 - EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu - URI: http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/ + Phone: +82 62 230 7473 + EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr + Tae-Jin Ahn Korea Telecom 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu Daejeon 305-811 Republic of Korea Phone: +82 42 870 8409 EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com - Susan Hares Huawei 7453 Hickory Hill Saline, MI 48176 USA Phone: +1-734-604-0332 EMail: shares@ndzh.com Diego R. Lopez