--- 1/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-08.txt 2022-03-06 11:13:35.670148512 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-09.txt 2022-03-06 11:13:35.962155776 -0800 @@ -1,21 +1,21 @@ GNAP J. Richer, Ed. Internet-Draft Bespoke Engineering Intended status: Standards Track A. Parecki -Expires: 28 April 2022 Okta +Expires: 7 September 2022 Okta F. Imbault acert.io - 25 October 2021 + 6 March 2022 Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol - draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-08 + draft-ietf-gnap-core-protocol-09 Abstract GNAP defines a mechanism for delegating authorization to a piece of software, and conveying that delegation to the software. This delegation can include access to a set of APIs as well as information passed directly to the software. Status of This Memo @@ -25,176 +25,186 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 September 2022. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components - extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text - as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are - provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. + extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as + described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are + provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.4. Trust relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.5. Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 1.5.1. Redirect-based Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 1.5.2. User-code Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 - 1.5.3. Asynchronous Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 - 1.5.4. Software-only Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 1.5.5. Refreshing an Expired Access Token . . . . . . . . . 23 - 1.5.6. Requesting User Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + 1.5.1. Overall Protocol Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 1.5.2. Redirect-based Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 1.5.3. User-code Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 1.5.4. Asynchronous Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 1.5.5. Software-only Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 1.5.6. Refreshing an Expired Access Token . . . . . . . . . 23 + 1.5.7. Requesting User Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2. Requesting Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1. Requesting Access to Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.1. Requesting a Single Access Token . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.2. Requesting Multiple Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.2. Requesting Subject Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.3. Identifying the Client Instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.3.1. Identifying the Client Instance by Reference . . . . 35 2.3.2. Providing Displayable Client Instance Information . . 36 - 2.3.3. Authenticating the Client Instance . . . . . . . . . 36 + 2.3.3. Authenticating the Client Instance . . . . . . . . . 37 2.4. Identifying the User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.4.1. Identifying the User by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.5. Interacting with the User . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.5.1. Start Mode Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 - 2.5.2. Finish Interaction Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 - 2.5.3. Hints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 + 2.5.2. Finish Interaction Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 + 2.5.3. Hints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.5.4. Extending Interaction Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 2.6. Extending The Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 3. Grant Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 - 3.1. Request Continuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 - 3.2. Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 - 3.2.1. Single Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 - 3.2.2. Multiple Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 - 3.3. Interaction Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 - 3.3.1. Redirection to an arbitrary URL . . . . . . . . . . . 54 - 3.3.2. Launch of an application URL . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 - 3.3.3. Display of a Short User Code . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 - 3.3.4. Interaction Finish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 - 3.3.5. Extending Interaction Mode Responses . . . . . . . . 57 - 3.4. Returning Subject Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 + 2.6. Extending The Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 3. Grant Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 + 3.1. Request Continuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 + 3.2. Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 3.2.1. Single Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 + 3.2.2. Multiple Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 + 3.3. Interaction Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 + 3.3.1. Redirection to an arbitrary URI . . . . . . . . . . . 55 + 3.3.2. Launch of an application URI . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + 3.3.3. Display of a Short User Code . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 + 3.3.4. Display of a Short User Code and URI . . . . . . . . 57 + 3.3.5. Interaction Finish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 + 3.3.6. Extending Interaction Mode Responses . . . . . . . . 59 + 3.4. Returning Subject Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.5. Returning a Dynamically-bound Client Instance - Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 - 3.6. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 - 3.7. Extending the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 - 4. Determining Authorization and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 - 4.1. Interaction Start Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 - 4.1.1. Interaction at a Redirected URI . . . . . . . . . . . 63 - 4.1.2. Interaction at the User Code URI . . . . . . . . . . 64 - 4.1.3. Interaction through an Application URI . . . . . . . 65 - 4.2. Post-Interaction Completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 + Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 + 3.6. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 + 3.7. Extending the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + 4. Determining Authorization and Consent . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 + 4.1. Interaction Start Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 + 4.1.1. Interaction at a Redirected URI . . . . . . . . . . . 66 + 4.1.2. Interaction at the Static User Code URI . . . . . . . 66 + 4.1.3. Interaction at a Dynamic User Code URI . . . . . . . 67 + 4.1.4. Interaction through an Application URI . . . . . . . 68 + 4.2. Post-Interaction Completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.2.1. Completing Interaction with a Browser Redirect to the - Callback URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 + Callback URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.2.2. Completing Interaction with a Direct HTTP Request - Callback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 - 4.2.3. Calculating the interaction hash . . . . . . . . . . 68 - 5. Continuing a Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 - 5.1. Continuing After a Completed Interaction . . . . . . . . 71 - 5.2. Continuing During Pending Interaction . . . . . . . . . . 72 - 5.3. Modifying an Existing Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 - 5.4. Canceling a Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 - 6. Token Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 - 6.1. Rotating the Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 - 6.2. Revoking the Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 - 7. Securing Requests from the Client Instance . . . . . . . . . 83 - 7.1. Key Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 - 7.1.1. Key References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 - 7.2. Presenting Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 - 7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request . . . . . . . 86 - 7.3.1. HTTP Message Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 - 7.3.2. Mutual TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 - 7.3.3. Detached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 - 7.3.4. Attached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 - 8. Resource Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 - 8.1. Requesting Resources By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 - 9. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 - 9.1. RS-first Method of AS Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 - 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 - 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 - 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 - 12.1. TLS Protection in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 - 12.2. Signing Requests from the Client Software . . . . . . . 111 - 12.3. Protection of Client Instance Key Material . . . . . . . 112 - 12.4. Protection of Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . 114 - 12.5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Client Instance Keys . . . . . 114 - 12.6. Generation of Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 - 12.7. Bearer Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 - 12.8. Key-Bound Token Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 - 12.9. Exposure of End-user Credentials to Client Instance . . 117 - 12.10. Mixing Up Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 - 12.11. Processing of Client-Presented User Information . . . . 119 - 12.12. Client Instance Pre-registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 - 12.13. Client Instance Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 - 12.14. Interception of Information in the Browser . . . . . . . 122 - 12.15. Callback URL Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 - 12.16. MTLS Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 - 12.17. MTLS Deployment Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 - 12.18. Interception of Responses from the AS . . . . . . . . . 124 - 12.19. Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 - 12.20. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling . . . . . . . . . . 125 - 12.21. Storage of Information During Interaction and - Continuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 - 12.22. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation . . . 126 - 12.23. Exhaustion of Random Value Space . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 - 12.24. Front-channel URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 - 12.25. Processing Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 - 13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 - 13.1. Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 - 13.1.1. Surveillance by the Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 - 13.1.2. Surveillance by the Authorization Server . . . . . . 130 - 13.2. Stored Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 - 13.3. Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 - 13.4. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 - 13.4.1. Correlation by Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 - 13.4.2. Correlation by Resource Servers . . . . . . . . . . 132 - 13.4.3. Correlation by Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . 133 - 13.5. Disclosure in Shared References . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 - 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 - 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 - 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 - Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 - Appendix B. Compared to OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 - Appendix C. Component Data Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 - Appendix D. Example Protocol Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 - D.1. Redirect-Based User Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 - D.2. Secondary Device Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 - D.3. No User Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 - D.4. Asynchronous Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 - D.5. Applying OAuth 2.0 Scopes and Client IDs . . . . . . . . 154 - Appendix E. JSON Structures and Polymorphism . . . . . . . . . . 155 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 + Callback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 + 4.2.3. Calculating the interaction hash . . . . . . . . . . 71 + 5. Continuing a Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 + 5.1. Continuing After a Completed Interaction . . . . . . . . 74 + 5.2. Continuing During Pending Interaction . . . . . . . . . . 75 + 5.3. Modifying an Existing Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 + 5.4. Canceling a Grant Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 + 6. Token Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 + 6.1. Rotating the Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 + 6.2. Revoking the Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 + 7. Securing Requests from the Client Instance . . . . . . . . . 86 + 7.1. Key Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 + 7.1.1. Key References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 7.1.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 + 7.2. Presenting Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 + 7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request . . . . . . . 90 + 7.3.1. HTTP Message Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 + 7.3.2. Mutual TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 + 7.3.3. Detached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 + 7.3.4. Attached JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 + 8. Resource Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 + 8.1. Requesting Resources By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 + 9. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 + 9.1. RS-first Method of AS Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 + 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 + 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 + 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 + 12.1. TLS Protection in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 + 12.2. Signing Requests from the Client Software . . . . . . . 116 + 12.3. Protection of Client Instance Key Material . . . . . . . 117 + 12.4. Protection of Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . 118 + 12.5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Client Instance Keys . . . . . 119 + 12.6. Generation of Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 + 12.7. Bearer Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 + 12.8. Key-Bound Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 + 12.9. Exposure of End-user Credentials to Client Instance . . 122 + 12.10. Mixing Up Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 + 12.11. Processing of Client-Presented User Information . . . . 123 + 12.12. Client Instance Pre-registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 + 12.13. Client Instance Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 + 12.14. Interception of Information in the Browser . . . . . . . 126 + 12.15. Callback URI Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + 12.16. Redirection Status Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 + 12.17. MTLS Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 + 12.18. MTLS Deployment Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 + 12.19. Interception of Responses from the AS . . . . . . . . . 130 + 12.20. Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 + 12.21. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling . . . . . . . . . . 130 + 12.22. Session Management for Interaction Finish Methods . . . 131 + 12.23. Storage of Information During Interaction and + Continuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 + 12.24. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation . . . 133 + 12.25. Exhaustion of Random Value Space . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 + 12.26. Front-channel URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 + 12.27. Processing Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 + 12.28. Stolen Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 + 12.29. Self-contained Stateless Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 137 + 12.30. Network Problems and Token and Grant Management . . . . 138 + 12.31. Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) . . . . . . . . . . . 139 + 13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 + 13.1. Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 + 13.1.1. Surveillance by the Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 + 13.1.2. Surveillance by the Authorization Server . . . . . . 141 + 13.2. Stored Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 + 13.3. Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 + 13.4. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 + 13.4.1. Correlation by Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 + 13.4.2. Correlation by Resource Servers . . . . . . . . . . 143 + 13.4.3. Correlation by Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . 143 + 13.5. Disclosure in Shared References . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 + 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 + 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 + 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 + Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 + Appendix B. Compared to OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 + Appendix C. Component Data Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 + Appendix D. Example Protocol Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 + D.1. Redirect-Based User Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 + D.2. Secondary Device Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 + D.3. No User Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 + D.4. Asynchronous Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 + D.5. Applying OAuth 2.0 Scopes and Client IDs . . . . . . . . 165 + Appendix E. JSON Structures and Polymorphism . . . . . . . . . . 166 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 1. Introduction This protocol allows a piece of software, the client instance, to request delegated authorization to resource servers and to request direct information. This delegation is facilitated by an - authorization server usually on behalf of a resource owner. The end- + authorization server usually on behalf of a resource owner. The end user operating the software may interact with the authorization server to authenticate, provide consent, and authorize the request. The process by which the delegation happens is known as a grant, and GNAP allows for the negotiation of the grant process over time by multiple parties acting in distinct roles. This specification focuses on the portions of the delegation process facing the client instance. In particular, this specification defines interoperable methods for a client instance to request, @@ -226,71 +236,74 @@ 1.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete - HTTP messages, JSON structures, URLs, query components, keys, and - other elements. Some examples use a single trailing backslash \ to - indicate line wrapping for long values, as per [RFC8792]. The \ - character and leading spaces on wrapped lines are not part of the - value. + HTTP messages, JSON structures, URIs, query components, keys, and + other elements. Whenever possible, the document uses URI as a + generic term, since it aligns with [RFC3986] recommendations and + matches better with the intent that the identifier may be reachable + through various/generic means (compared to URLs). Some examples use + a single trailing backslash \ to indicate line wrapping for long + values, as per [RFC8792]. The \ character and leading spaces on + wrapped lines are not part of the value. 1.2. Roles The parties in GNAP perform actions under different roles. Roles are defined by the actions taken and the expectations leveraged on the role by the overall protocol. +-------------+ +------------+ | | | | |Authorization| | Resource | | Server | | Server | - | |<-+ +---->| | + | |<--+ +--->| | +-------------+ | | +------------+ + | | + | | + | | + | | + | | + +----------+ + | Client | + | Instance | + +----------+ + + + + + + +-----------+ + +------------+ - | | + + + +| | + | | + + + | | | Resource | | End | | Owner | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | User | | | | | +-----------+ +------------+ Legend + + + indicates interaction between a human and computer ----- indicates interaction between two pieces of software ~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band communication between roles Authorization Server (AS) server that grants delegated privileges to a particular instance of client software in the form of access tokens or other information (such as subject information). Client application that consumes resources from one or several RSs, possibly requiring access privileges from one or several ASs. The - client is operated by the end-user or it runs autonomously on + client is operated by the end user or it runs autonomously on behalf of a resource owner. Example: a client can be a mobile application, a web application, etc. Note: this specification differentiates between a specific instance (the client instance, identified by its unique key) and the software running the instance (the client software). For some kinds of client software, there could be many instances of that software, each instance with a different key. @@ -299,51 +312,51 @@ resources, where operations require a valid access token issued by an AS. Resource Owner (RO) subject entity that may grant or deny operations on resources it has authority upon. Note: the act of granting or denying an operation may be manual (i.e. through an interaction with a physical person) or automatic (i.e. through predefined organizational rules). - End-user natural person that operates a client instance. + End user natural person that operates a client instance. Note: that natural person may or may not be the same entity as the RO. The design of GNAP does not assume any one deployment architecture, but instead attempts to define roles that can be fulfilled in a number of different ways for different use cases. As long as a given role fulfills all of its obligations and behaviors as defined by the protocol, GNAP does not make additional requirements on its structure or setup. Multiple roles can be fulfilled by the same party, and a given party can switch roles in different instances of the protocol. For - example, the RO and end-user in many instances are the same person, + example, the RO and end user in many instances are the same person, where a user is authorizing the client instance to act on their own behalf at the RS. In this case, one party fulfills both of the RO and end-user roles, but the roles themselves are still defined separately from each other to allow for other use cases where they are fulfilled by different parties. For another example, in some complex scenarios, an RS receiving requests from one client instance can act as a client instance for a downstream secondary RS in order to fulfill the original request. In this case, one piece of software is both an RS and a client instance from different perspectives, and it fulfills these roles separately as far as the overall protocol is concerned. A single role need not be deployed as a monolithic service. For - example, A client instance could have components that are installed - on the end-user's device as well as a back-end system that it + example, a client instance could have components that are installed + on the end user's device as well as a back-end system that it communicates with. If both of these components participate in the delegation protocol, they are both considered part of the client instance. If there are several copies of the client software that run separately but all share the same key material, such as a deployed cluster, then this cluster is considered a single client instance. In these cases, the distinct components of what is considered a GNAP client instance may use any number of different communication mechanisms between them, all of which would be considered an @@ -378,48 +391,48 @@ Grant (verb): to permit an instance of client software to receive some attributes at a specific time and valid for a specific duration and/or to exercise some set of delegated rights to access a protected resource (noun): the act of granting. Privilege right or attribute associated with a subject. Note: the RO defines and maintains the rights and attributes associated to the protected resource, and might temporarily - delegate some set of those privileges to an end-user. This + delegate some set of those privileges to an end user. This process is refered to as privilege delegation. Protected Resource protected API (Application Programming Interface) served by an RS and that can be accessed by a client, if and only if a valid access token is provided. Note: to avoid complex sentences, the specification document may - simply refer to resource instead of protected resource. + simply refer to "resource" instead of "protected resource". Right ability given to a subject to perform a given operation on a resource under the control of an RS. Subject person, organization or device. It decides whether and under which conditions its attributes can be disclosed to other parties. Subject Information statement asserted by an AS about a subject. 1.4. Trust relationships GNAP defines its trust objective as: "the RO trusts the AS to ensure - access validation and delegation of protected resources to end-users, + access validation and delegation of protected resources to end users, through third party clients." This trust objective can be decomposed into trust relationships - between software elements and roles, especially the pairs end-user/ - RO, end-user/client, client/AS, RS/RO, AS/RO, AS/RS. Trust of an + between software elements and roles, especially the pairs end user/ + RO, end user/client, client/AS, RS/RO, AS/RO, AS/RS. Trust of an agent by its pair can exist if the pair is informed that the agent has made a promise to follow the protocol in the past (e.g. pre- registration, uncompromised cryptographic components) or if the pair is able to infer by indirect means that the agent has made such a promise (e.g. a compliant client request). Each agent defines its own valuation function of promises given or received. Examples of such valuations can be the benefits from interacting with other agents (e.g. safety in client access, interoperability with identity standards), the cost of following the protocol (including its security and privacy requirements and recommendations), a ranking of @@ -427,39 +440,39 @@ assessment of one's vulnerability or risk of not being able to defend against threats, etc. Those valuations may depend on the context of the request. For instance, the AS may decide to either take into account or discard hints provided by the client, the RS may refuse bearer tokens, etc. depending on the specific case in which GNAP is used. Some promises can be conditional of some previous interactions (e.g. repeated requests). Looking back on each trust relationship: - * end-user/RO: this relationship exists only when the end-user and - the RO are different, in which case the end-user needs some out of + * end user/RO: this relationship exists only when the end user and + the RO are different, in which case the end user needs some out of band mechanism of getting the RO consent (see Section 4). GNAP generally assumes that humans can be authenticated thanks to identity protocols (for instance, through an id_token assertion in Section 2.2). - * end-user/client: the client acts as a user agent. Depending on + * end user/client: the client acts as a user agent. Depending on the technology used (browser, SPA, mobile application, IoT device, etc.), some interactions may or may not be possible (as described in Section 2.5.1). Client developers promise to implement requirements and generally some recommendations or best practices, - so that the end-users may confidently use their software. - However, end-users might also be facing some attacker's client + so that the end users may confidently use their software. + However, end users might also be facing some attacker's client software, without even realizing it. - * end-user / AS: when the client supports it (see Section 3.3), the - end-user gets to interact with front-channel URLs provided by the - AS. See Section 12.24 for some considerations in trusting these + * end user/AS: when the client supports it (see Section 3.3), the + end user gets to interact with front-channel URIs provided by the + AS. See Section 12.26 for some considerations in trusting these interactions. * client/AS: An honest AS may be facing an attacker's client (as discussed just above), or the reverse, and GNAP aims at making common attacks impractical. The core specification makes access tokens opaque to the client and defines the request/response scheme in detail, therefore avoiding extra trust hypotheses from this critical piece of software. Yet the AS may further define cryptographic attestations or optional rules to simplify the access of clients it already trusts, due to past behavior or @@ -498,29 +511,36 @@ Note that a connection between roles in this process does not necessarily indicate that a specific protocol message is sent across the wire between the components fulfilling the roles in question, or that a particular step is required every time. For example, for a client instance interested in only getting subject information directly, and not calling an RS, all steps involving the RS below do not apply. In some circumstances, the information needed at a given stage is communicated out of band or is preconfigured between the components - or entities performing the roles. For example, one entity can fulfil - multiple roles, and so explicit communication between the roles is - not necessary within the protocol flow. Additionally some components - may not be involved in all use cases. For example, a client instance - could be calling the AS just to get direct user information and have - no need to get an access token to call an RS. + or entities performing the roles. For example, one entity can + fulfill multiple roles, and so explicit communication between the + roles is not necessary within the protocol flow. Additionally some + components may not be involved in all use cases. For example, a + client instance could be calling the AS just to get direct user + information and have no need to get an access token to call an RS. + +1.5.1. Overall Protocol Sequence + + The following diagram provides a general overview of GNAP, including + many different optional phases and connections. The diagrams in the + following sections provide views of GNAP under more specific + circumstances. +------------+ +------------+ - | End-user | ~ ~ ~ ~ | Resource | + | End user | ~ ~ ~ ~ | Resource | | | | Owner (RO) | +------------+ +------------+ + + + + (A) (B) + + + + +--------+ + +------------+ | Client | (1) + | Resource | |Instance| + | Server | @@ -540,46 +560,46 @@ | |-(13)->| | | | | | | | | | +--------+ +---------------+ +------------+ Legend + + + indicates a possible interaction with a human ----- indicates an interaction between protocol roles ~ ~ ~ indicates a potential equivalence or out-of-band communication between roles - * (A) The end-user interacts with the client instance to indicate a + * (A) The end user interacts with the client instance to indicate a need for resources on behalf of the RO. This could identify the RS the client instance needs to call, the resources needed, or the RO that is needed to approve the request. Note that the RO and - end-user are often the same entity in practice, but GNAP makes no + end user are often the same entity in practice, but GNAP makes no general assumption that they are. * (1) The client instance determines what access is needed and which AS to approach for access. Note that for most situations, the client instance is pre-configured with which AS to talk to and which kinds of access it needs, but some more dynamic processes are discussed in Section 9.1. * (2) The client instance requests access at the AS (Section 2). * (3) The AS processes the request and determines what is needed to fulfill the request. (See Section 4.) The AS sends its response to the client instance (Section 3). * (B) If interaction is required, the AS interacts with the RO (Section 4) to gather authorization. The interactive component of the AS can function using a variety of possible mechanisms including web page redirects, applications, challenge/response protocols, or other methods. The RO approves the request for the - client instance being operated by the end-user. Note that the RO - and end-user are often the same entity in practice, and many of + client instance being operated by the end user. Note that the RO + and end user are often the same entity in practice, and many of GNAP's interaction methods allow the client instance to facilitate the end user interacting with the AS in order to fulfill the role of the RO. * (4) The client instance continues the grant at the AS (Section 5). * (5) If the AS determines that access can be granted, it returns a response to the client instance (Section 3) including an access token (Section 3.2) for calling the RS and any directly returned information (Section 3.4) about the RO. @@ -614,29 +634,29 @@ * (13) The client instance disposes of the token (Section 6.2) once the client instance has completed its access of the RS and no longer needs the token. The following sections and Appendix D contain specific guidance on how to use GNAP in different situations and deployments. For example, it is possible for the client instance to never request an access token and never call an RS, just as it is possible for there not to be a user involved in the delegation process. -1.5.1. Redirect-based Interaction +1.5.2. Redirect-based Interaction In this example flow, the client instance is a web application that wants access to resources on behalf of the current user, who acts as - both the end-user and the resource owner (RO). Since the client - instance is capable of directing the user to an arbitrary URL and + both the end user and the resource owner (RO). Since the client + instance is capable of directing the user to an arbitrary URI and receiving responses from the user's browser, interaction here is handled through front-channel redirects using the user's browser. - The redirection URL used for interaction is a service hosted by the + The redirection URI used for interaction is a service hosted by the AS in this example. The client instance uses a persistent session with the user to ensure the same user that is starting the interaction is the user that returns from the interaction. +--------+ +--------+ +------+ | Client | | AS | | User | |Instance| | | | | | |< (1) + Start Session + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +| | | | | | | | | |--(2)--- Request Access --------->| | | | @@ -658,63 +678,63 @@ | |<-(9)----- Grant Access ----------| | | | | | | | | | +--------+ | |--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->| RS | | | | | | | | |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------| | | | | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ 1. The client instance establishes a verifiable session to the - user, in the role of the end-user. + user, in the role of the end user. 2. The client instance requests access to the resource (Section 2). The client instance indicates that it can redirect to an - arbitrary URL (Section 2.5.1.1) and receive a redirect from the + arbitrary URI (Section 2.5.1.1) and receive a redirect from the browser (Section 2.5.2.1). The client instance stores verification information for its redirect in the session created in (1). 3. The AS determines that interaction is needed and responds - (Section 3) with a URL to send the user to (Section 3.3.1) and - information needed to verify the redirect (Section 3.3.4) in + (Section 3) with a URI to send the user to (Section 3.3.1) and + information needed to verify the redirect (Section 3.3.5) in (7). The AS also includes information the client instance will need to continue the request (Section 3.1) in (8). The AS associates this continuation information with an ongoing request that will be referenced in (4), (6), and (8). 4. The client instance stores the verification and continuation information from (3) in the session from (1). The client - instance then redirects the user to the URL (Section 4.1.1) + instance then redirects the user to the URI (Section 4.1.1) given by the AS in (3). The user's browser loads the - interaction redirect URL. The AS loads the pending request - based on the incoming URL generated in (3). + interaction redirect URI. The AS loads the pending request + based on the incoming URI generated in (3). 5. The user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of the RO. 6. As the RO, the user authorizes the pending request from the client instance. 7. When the AS is done interacting with the user, the AS redirects the user back (Section 4.2.1) to the client instance using the - redirect URL provided in (2). The redirect URL is augmented + redirect URI provided in (2). The redirect URI is augmented with an interaction reference that the AS associates with the ongoing request created in (2) and referenced in (4). The - redirect URL is also augmented with a hash of the security + redirect URI is also augmented with a hash of the security information provided in (2) and (3). The client instance loads the verification information from (2) and (3) from the session created in (1). The client instance calculates a hash (Section 4.2.3) based on this information and continues only if the hash validates. Note that the client instance needs to ensure that the parameters for the incoming request match those that it is expecting from the session created in (1). The - client instance also needs to be prepared for the end-user never + client instance also needs to be prepared for the end user never being returned to the client instance and handle timeouts appropriately. 8. The client instance loads the continuation information from (3) and sends the interaction reference from (7) in a request to continue the request (Section 5.1). The AS validates the interaction reference ensuring that the reference is associated with the request being continued. 9. If the request has been authorized, the AS grants access to the @@ -723,32 +743,32 @@ 10. The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS. 11. The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate response for the API. An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in Appendix D.1. -1.5.2. User-code Interaction +1.5.3. User-code Interaction In this example flow, the client instance is a device that is capable of presenting a short, human-readable code to the user and directing - the user to enter that code at a known URL. The URL the user enters + the user to enter that code at a known URI. The URI the user enters the code at is an interactive service hosted by the AS in this example. The client instance is not capable of presenting an - arbitrary URL to the user, nor is it capable of accepting incoming + arbitrary URI to the user, nor is it capable of accepting incoming HTTP requests from the user's browser. The client instance polls the AS while it is waiting for the RO to authorize the request. The user's interaction is assumed to occur on a secondary device. In - this example it is assumed that the user is both the end-user and RO, + this example it is assumed that the user is both the end user and RO, though the user is not assumed to be interacting with the client instance through the same web browser used for interaction at the AS. +--------+ +--------+ +------+ | Client | | AS | | User | |Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --------->| | | | | | | | | | | |<-(2)-- Interaction Needed -------| | | | | | | | | | | |+ (3) + + Display User Code + + + + + + + + + + + + >| | @@ -777,40 +797,40 @@ | | | | | | | |<-(14)-- API Response ---------------------------| | | | | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ 1. The client instance requests access to the resource (Section 2). The client instance indicates that it can display a user code (Section 2.5.1.3). 2. The AS determines that interaction is needed and responds (Section 3) with a user code to communicate to the user - (Section 3.3.3). This could optionally include a URL to direct - the user to, but this URL should be static and so could be + (Section 3.3.3). This could optionally include a URI to direct + the user to, but this URI should be static and so could be configured in the client instance's documentation. The AS also includes information the client instance will need to continue the request (Section 3.1) in (8) and (10). The AS associates this continuation information with an ongoing request that will be referenced in (4), (6), (8), and (10). 3. The client instance stores the continuation information from (2) for use in (8) and (10). The client instance then communicates - the code to the user (Section 4.1.1) given by the AS in (2). + the code to the user (Section 4.1.2) given by the AS in (2). - 4. The user's directs their browser to the user code URL. This URL + 4. The users directs their browser to the user code URI. This URI is stable and can be communicated via the client software's documentation, the AS documentation, or the client software itself. Since it is assumed that the RO will interact with the AS through a secondary device, the client instance does not - provide a mechanism to launch the RO's browser at this URL. + provide a mechanism to launch the RO's browser at this URI. - 5. The end-user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of the + 5. The end user authenticates at the AS, taking on the role of the RO. 6. The RO enters the code communicated in (3) to the AS. The AS validates this code against a current request in process. 7. As the RO, the user authorizes the pending request from the client instance. 8. When the AS is done interacting with the user, the AS indicates to the RO that the request has been completed. @@ -841,23 +861,23 @@ 13. The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS. 14. The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate response for the API. An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in Appendix D.2. -1.5.3. Asynchronous Authorization +1.5.4. Asynchronous Authorization - In this example flow, the end-user and RO roles are fulfilled by + In this example flow, the end user and RO roles are fulfilled by different parties, and the RO does not interact with the client instance. The AS reaches out asynchronously to the RO during the request process to gather the RO's authorization for the client instance's request. The client instance polls the AS while it is waiting for the RO to authorize the request. +--------+ +--------+ +------+ | Client | | AS | | RO | |Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --------->| | | | | | | | | | @@ -876,21 +896,21 @@ | |<-(9)------ Grant Access ---------| | | | | | | | | | +--------+ | |--(10)-- Access API ---------------------------->| RS | | | | | | | | |<-(11)-- API Response ---------------------------| | | | | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ 1. The client instance requests access to the resource (Section 2). - The client instance does not send any interactions modes to the + The client instance does not send any interaction modes to the server, indicating that it does not expect to interact with the RO. The client instance can also signal which RO it requires authorization from, if known, by using the user request section (Section 2.4). 2. The AS determines that interaction is needed, but the client instance cannot interact with the RO. The AS responds (Section 3) with the information the client instance will need to continue the request (Section 3.1) in (6) and (8), including a signal that the client instance should wait before checking @@ -933,66 +953,66 @@ 10. The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS. 11. The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate response for the API. An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in Appendix D.4. -1.5.4. Software-only Authorization +1.5.5. Software-only Authorization In this example flow, the AS policy allows the client instance to - make a call on its own behalf, without the need for a RO to be + make a call on its own behalf, without the need for an RO to be involved at runtime to approve the decision. Since there is no explicit RO, the client instance does not interact with an RO. +--------+ +--------+ | Client | | AS | |Instance|--(1)--- Request Access --->| | | | | | | |<-(2)---- Grant Access -----| | | | | | +--------+ | |--(3)--- Access API ------------------->| RS | | | | | | | | |<-(4)--- API Response ------------------| | | | | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ 1. The client instance requests access to the resource (Section 2). - The client instance does not send any interactions modes to the + The client instance does not send any interaction modes to the server. - 2. The AS determines that the request is been authorized, the AS - grants access to the information in the form of access tokens + 2. The AS determines that the request has been authorized, the AS + grants access to the resource in the form of access tokens (Section 3.2) to the client instance. Note that direct subject information (Section 3.4) is not generally applicable in this use case, as there is no user involved. 3. The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS. 4. The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate response for the API. An example set of protocol messages for this method can be found in Appendix D.3. -1.5.5. Refreshing an Expired Access Token +1.5.6. Refreshing an Expired Access Token In this example flow, the client instance receives an access token to access a resource server through some valid GNAP process. The client instance uses that token at the RS for some time, but eventually the access token expires. The client instance then gets a new access token by rotating the expired access token at the AS using the - token's management URL. + token's management URI. +--------+ +--------+ | Client | | AS | |Instance|--(1)--- Request Access ----------------->| | | | | | | |<-(2)--- Grant Access --------------------| | | | | | | | +--------+ | | | |--(3)--- Access Resource --->| RS | | | | | | | | | @@ -1020,37 +1040,37 @@ 3. The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) to call the RS. 4. The RS validates the access token and returns an appropriate response for the API. 5. Time passes and the client instance uses the access token to call the RS again. 6. The RS validates the access token and determines that the access - token is expired The RS responds to the client instance with an + token is expired. The RS responds to the client instance with an error. 7. The client instance calls the token management URI returned in (2) to rotate the access token (Section 6.1). The client instance uses the access token (Section 7.2) in this call as well as the appropriate key, see the token rotation section for details. 8. The AS validates the rotation request including the signature and keys presented in (5) and returns a new access token (Section 3.2.1). The response includes a new access token and can also include updated token management information, which the client instance will store in place of the values returned in (2). -1.5.6. Requesting User Information +1.5.7. Requesting User Information In this scenario, the client instance does not call an RS and does not request an access token. Instead, the client instance only requests and is returned direct subject information (Section 3.4). Many different interaction modes can be used in this scenario, so these are shown only in the abstract as functions of the AS here. +--------+ +--------+ +------+ | Client | | AS | | User | |Instance| | | | | @@ -1099,50 +1119,52 @@ requested direct subject information (Section 3.4) to the client instance. At this stage, the user is generally considered "logged in" to the client instance based on the identifiers and assertions provided by the AS. Note that the AS can restrict the subject information returned and it might not match what the client instance requested, see the section on subject information for details. 2. Requesting Access - To start a request, the client instance sends JSON [RFC8259] document - with an object as its root. Each member of the request object - represents a different aspect of the client instance's request. Each - field is described in detail in a section below. + To start a request, the client instance sends a JSON [RFC8259] + document with an object as its root. Each member of the request + object represents a different aspect of the client instance's + request. Each field is described in detail in a section below. - access_token (object / array of objects) Describes the rights and - properties associated with the requested access token. - Section 2.1 + access_token (object / array of objects): Describes the rights and + properties associated with the requested access token. REQUIRED + if requesting an access token. See Section 2.1. - subject (object) Describes the information about the RO that the + subject (object): Describes the information about the RO that the client instance is requesting to be returned directly in the - response from the AS. Section 2.2 + response from the AS. REQUIRED if requesting subject information. + See Section 2.2. - client (object / string) Describes the client instance that is + client (object / string): Describes the client instance that is making this request, including the key that the client instance will use to protect this request and any continuation requests at the AS and any user-facing information about the client instance - used in interactions. Section 2.3 + used in interactions. REQUIRED. See Section 2.3. - user (object / string) Identifies the end-user to the AS in a manner - that the AS can verify, either directly or by interacting with the - end-user to determine their status as the RO. Section 2.4 + user (object / string): Identifies the end user to the AS in a + manner that the AS can verify, either directly or by interacting + with the end user to determine their status as the RO. OPTIONAL. + See Section 2.4. - interact (object) Describes the modes that the client instance has - for allowing the RO to interact with the AS and modes for the - client instance to receive updates when interaction is complete. - Section 2.5 + interact (object): Describes the modes that the client instance + supports for allowing the RO to interact with the AS and modes for + the client instance to receive updates when interaction is + complete. REQUIRED if interaction is supported. See Section 2.5. Additional members of this request object can be defined by - extensions to this protocol as described in Section 2.6 + extensions to this protocol as described in Section 2.6. A non-normative example of a grant request is below: { "access_token": { "access": [ { "type": "photo-api", "actions": [ "read", @@ -1179,22 +1201,22 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" } }, "subject": { - "formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"], - "assertions": ["id_token"] + "sub_id_formats": ["iss_sub", "opaque"], + "assertion_formats": ["id_token"] } } The request and response MUST be sent as a JSON object in the body of the HTTP POST request with Content-Type application/json, unless otherwise specified by the signature mechanism. The authorization server MUST include the HTTP "Cache-Control" response header field [RFC7234] with a value set to "no-store". @@ -1205,48 +1227,48 @@ access_token field. This field MUST be an object (for a single access token (Section 2.1.1)) or an array of these objects (for multiple access tokens (Section 2.1.2)), as described in the following sections. 2.1.1. Requesting a Single Access Token To request a single access token, the client instance sends an acccess_token object composed of the following fields. - access (array of objects/strings) Describes the rights that the + access (array of objects/strings): Describes the rights that the client instance is requesting for one or more access tokens to be - used at RS's. This field is REQUIRED. Section 8 + used at RS's. REQUIRED. See Section 8. - label (string) A unique name chosen by the client instance to refer + label (string): A unique name chosen by the client instance to refer to the resulting access token. The value of this field is opaque to the AS. If this field is included in the request, the AS MUST - include the same label in the token response (Section 3.2). This - field is REQUIRED if used as part of a multiple access token - request (Section 2.1.2), and is OPTIONAL otherwise. + include the same label in the token response (Section 3.2). + REQUIRED if used as part of a multiple access token request + (Section 2.1.2), OPTIONAL otherwise. - flags (array of strings) A set of flags that indicate desired + flags (array of strings): A set of flags that indicate desired attributes or behavior to be attached to the access token by the - AS. This field is OPTIONAL. + AS. OPTIONAL. The values of the flags field defined by this specification are as follows: - "bearer" If this flag is included, the access token being requested + "bearer": If this flag is included, the access token being requested is a bearer token. If this flag is omitted, the access token is bound to the key used by the client instance in this request (or that key's most recent rotation) and the access token MUST be presented using the same key and proofing method. Methods for presenting bound and bearer access tokens are described in Section 7.2. See Section 12.7 for additional considerations on the use of bearer tokens. - "split" If this flag is included, the client instance is capable of + "split": If this flag is included, the client instance is capable of receiving a different number of tokens than specified in the token request (Section 2.1), including receiving multiple access tokens (Section 3.2.2) in response to any single token request (Section 2.1.1) or a different number of access tokens than requested in a multiple access token request (Section 2.1.2). The label fields of the returned additional tokens are chosen by the AS. The client instance MUST be able to tell from the token response where and how it can use each of the access tokens. [[ See issue #37 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/37) ]] @@ -1368,80 +1390,79 @@ token response (Section 3.2.2) structure using the values of the label fields in the request. 2.2. Requesting Subject Information If the client instance is requesting information about the RO from the AS, it sends a subject field as a JSON object. This object MAY contain the following fields (or additional fields defined in a registry TBD (Section 11)). - formats (array of strings) An array of subject identifier subject - types requested for the RO, as defined by - [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers]. + sub_id_formats (array of strings): An array of subject identifier + subject formats requested for the RO, as defined by + [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers]. REQUIRED if subject + identifiers are requested. - assertions (array of strings) An array of requested assertion - formats. Possible values include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token - and saml2 for a SAML 2 assertion. Additional assertion values are - defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). [[ See issue #41 - (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/41) ]] + assertion_formats (array of strings): An array of requested + assertion formats. Possible values include id_token for an [OIDC] + ID Token and saml2 for a SAML 2 assertion. Additional assertion + formats are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). REQUIRED if + assertions are requested. "subject": { - "formats": [ "iss_sub", "opaque" ], - "assertions": [ "id_token", "saml2" ] + "sub_id_formats": [ "iss_sub", "opaque" ], + "assertion_formats": [ "id_token", "saml2" ] } The AS can determine the RO's identity and permission for releasing this information through interaction with the RO (Section 4), AS policies, or assertions presented by the client instance (Section 2.4). If this is determined positively, the AS MAY return the RO's information in its response (Section 3.4) as requested. Subject identifier types requested by the client instance serve only to identify the RO in the context of the AS and can't be used as communication channels by the client instance, as discussed in Section 3.4. The AS SHOULD NOT re-use subject identifiers for multiple different ROs. - Note: the "formats" and "assertions" request fields are independent - of each other, and a returned assertion MAY use a different subject - identifier. - - [[ See issue #43 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/43) ]] + The "formats" and "assertions" request fields are independent of each + other, and a returned assertion MAY use a different subject + identifier than other assertions and subject identifiers in the + response. All subject identifiers and assertions returned MUST refer + to the same person. 2.3. Identifying the Client Instance When sending a non-continuation request to the AS, the client instance MUST identify itself by including the client field of the request and by signing the request as described in Section 7.3. Note that for a continuation request (Section 5), the client instance is identified by its association with the request being continued and so this field is not sent under those circumstances. When client instance information is sent by value, the client field of the request consists of a JSON object with the following fields. - key (object / string) The public key of the client instance to be + key (object / string): The public key of the client instance to be used in this request as described in Section 7.1 or a reference to - a key as described in Section 7.1.1. This field is REQUIRED. + a key as described in Section 7.1.1. REQUIRED. - class_id (string) An identifier string that the AS can use to + class_id (string): An identifier string that the AS can use to identify the client software comprising this client instance. The - contents and format of this field are up to the AS. This field is - OPTIONAL. + contents and format of this field are up to the AS. OPTIONAL. - display (object) An object containing additional information that + display (object): An object containing additional information that the AS MAY display to the RO during interaction, authorization, - and management. This field is OPTIONAL. + and management. OPTIONAL. "client": { "key": { "proof": "httpsig", "jwk": { "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", "kid": "xyz-1", "alg": "RS256", "n": "kOB5rR4Jv0GMeLaY6_It_r3ORwdf8ci_JtffXyaSx8..." @@ -1482,31 +1503,35 @@ time and associated with a set of policies and allowable actions pertaining to that client. If this pre-registration includes other fields that can occur in the client request object described in this section, such as class_id or display, the pre-registered values MUST take precedence over any values given at runtime. Additional fields sent during a request but not present in a pre-registered client instance record at the AS SHOULD NOT be added to the client's pre- registered record. See additional considerations regarding client instance impersonation in Section 12.13. + A client instance that is capable of talking to multiple AS's SHOULD + use a different key for each AS to prevent a class of mix-up attacks + as described in Section 12.28. + 2.3.1. Identifying the Client Instance by Reference If the client instance has an instance identifier that the AS can use to determine appropriate key information, the client instance can send this instance identifier as a direct reference value in lieu of the client object. The instance identifier MAY be assigned to a - client instance at runtime through the Section 3.5 or MAY be obtained - in another fashion, such as a static registration process at the AS. + client instance at runtime through a grant response (Section 3.5) or + MAY be obtained in another fashion, such as a static registration + process at the AS. "client": "client-541-ab" - When the AS receives a request with an instance identifier, the AS MUST ensure that the key used to sign the request (Section 7.3) is associated with the instance identifier. If the AS does not recognize the instance identifier, the request MUST be rejected with an error. If the client instance is identified in this manner, the registered key for the client instance MAY be a symmetric key known to the AS. See considerations on symmetric keys in Section 12.5. @@ -1511,34 +1536,35 @@ key for the client instance MAY be a symmetric key known to the AS. See considerations on symmetric keys in Section 12.5. 2.3.2. Providing Displayable Client Instance Information If the client instance has additional information to display to the RO during any interactions at the AS, it MAY send that information in the "display" field. This field is a JSON object that declares information to present to the RO during any interactive sequences. - name (string) Display name of the client software + name (string): Display name of the client software. RECOMMENDED. - uri (string) User-facing web page of the client software + uri (string): User-facing web page of the client software. + OPTIONAL. - logo_uri (string) Display image to represent the client software + logo_uri (string) Display image to represent the client software. + The logo MAY be passed by value by using a data: URI [RFC2397] + referencing an image mediatype. OPTIONAL. "display": { "name": "My Client Display Name", - "uri": "https://example.net/client" + "uri": "https://example.net/client", + "logo_uri": "...=" } - [[ See issue #48 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/48) ]] - Additional display fields are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). The AS SHOULD use these values during interaction with the RO. The values are for informational purposes only and MUST NOT be taken as authentic proof of the client instance's identity or source. The AS MAY restrict display values to specific client instances, as identified by their keys in Section 2.3. See additional considerations for displayed client information in Section 12.13. 2.3.3. Authenticating the Client Instance @@ -1565,73 +1591,72 @@ pairs per instance and use the keys within the protocol without having to go through a separate registration step. The AS MAY limit which capabilities are made available to client instances with unknown keys. For example, the AS could have a policy saying that only previously-registered client instances can request particular resources, or that all client instances with unknown keys have to be interactively approved by an RO. 2.4. Identifying the User - If the client instance knows the identity of the end-user through one + If the client instance knows the identity of the end user through one or more identifiers or assertions, the client instance MAY send that information to the AS in the "user" field. The client instance MAY pass this information by value or by reference. - sub_ids (array of objects) An array of subject identifiers for the - end-user, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers]. + sub_ids (array of objects): An array of subject identifiers for the + end user, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers]. + OPTIONAL. - assertions (object) An object containing assertions as values keyed - on the assertion type defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). - Possible keys include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 - for a SAML 2 assertion. The assertion values are the string - serialization of the assertion format, encoded as a plain JSON - string. Additional assertion types are defined by a registry TBD - (Section 11). [[ See issue #41 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/ - gnap-core-protocol/issues/41) ]] + assertions (array of objects) An array containing assertions as + objects each containing the assertion format and the assertion + value as the JSON string serialization of the assertion. + OPTIONAL. "user": { "sub_ids": [ { "format": "opaque", "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" } ], - "assertions": { - "id_token": "eyj..." - } + "assertions": [ { + "format": "id_token", + "value": "eyj..." + } ] } + Subject identifiers are hints to the AS in determining the RO and MUST NOT be taken as declarative statements that a particular RO is - present at the client instance and acting as the end-user. + present at the client instance and acting as the end user. Assertions SHOULD be validated by the AS. [[ See issue #49 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/49) ]] - If the identified end-user does not match the RO present at the AS + If the identified end user does not match the RO present at the AS during an interaction step, the AS SHOULD reject the request with an error. [[ See issue #50 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/50) ]] If the AS trusts the client instance to present verifiable assertions, the AS MAY decide, based on its policy, to skip interaction with the RO, even if the client instance provides one or more interaction modes in its request. - See Section 12.25 for considerations that the AS has to make when + See Section 12.27 for considerations that the AS has to make when accepting and processing assertions from the client instance. 2.4.1. Identifying the User by Reference - The AS can identify the current end-user to the client instance with + The AS can identify the current end user to the client instance with a reference which can be used by the client instance to refer to the - end-user across multiple requests. If the client instance has a - reference for the end-user at this AS, the client instance MAY pass + end user across multiple requests. If the client instance has a + reference for the end user at this AS, the client instance MAY pass that reference as a string. The format of this string is opaque to the client instance. "user": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM" One means of dynamically obtaining such a user reference is from the AS returning an opaque subject identifier as described in Section 3.4. Other means of configuring a client instance with a user identifier are out of scope of this specification. @@ -1641,215 +1666,241 @@ instead. If the AS does not recognize the user reference, it MUST return an error. 2.5. Interacting with the User Often, the AS will require interaction with the RO (Section 4) in order to approve a requested delegation to the client instance for both access to resources and direct subject information. Many times - the end-user using the client instance is the same person as the RO, + the end user using the client instance is the same person as the RO, and the client instance can directly drive interaction with the end user by facilitating the process through means such as redirection to - a URL or launching an application. Other times, the client instance + a URI or launching an application. Other times, the client instance can provide information to start the RO's interaction on a secondary device, or the client instance will wait for the RO to approve the request asynchronously. The client instance could also be signaled that interaction has concluded through a callback mechanism. The client instance declares the parameters for interaction methods that it can support using the interact field. The interact field is a JSON object with three keys whose values declare how the client can initiate and complete the request, as well as provide hints to the AS about user preferences such as locale. A client instance MUST NOT declare an interaction mode it does not support. The client instance MAY send multiple modes in the same request. There is no preference order specified in this request. An AS MAY respond to any, all, or none of the presented interaction modes (Section 3.3) in a request, depending on its capabilities and what is allowed to fulfill the request. - start (list of strings/objects) Indicates how the client instance - can start an interaction. - - finish (object) Indicates how the client instance can receive an - indication that interaction has finished at the AS. + start (array of strings/objects): Indicates how the client instance + can start an interaction. REQUIRED. - hints (object) Provides additional information to inform the - interaction process at the AS. + finish (object): Indicates how the client instance can receive an + indication that interaction has finished at the AS. OPTIONAL. - The interact field MUST contain the start key, and MAY contain the - finish and hints keys. The value of each key is an array which - contains strings or JSON objects as defined below. + hints (object): Provides additional information to inform the + interaction process at the AS. OPTIONAL. In this non-normative example, the client instance is indicating that - it can redirect (Section 2.5.1.1) the end-user to an arbitrary URL + it can redirect (Section 2.5.1.1) the end user to an arbitrary URI and can receive a redirect (Section 2.5.2.1) through a browser request. "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" } } In this non-normative example, the client instance is indicating that - it can display a user code (Section 2.5.1.3) and direct the end-user - to an arbitrary URL (Section 2.5.1.1) on a secondary device, but it + it can display a user code (Section 2.5.1.3) and direct the end user + to an arbitrary URI (Section 2.5.1.1) on a secondary device, but it cannot accept a redirect or push callback. "interact": { "start": ["redirect", "user_code"] } If the client instance does not provide a suitable interaction mechanism, the AS cannot contact the RO asynchronously, and the AS determines that interaction is required, then the AS SHOULD return an error since the client instance will be unable to complete the request without authorization. - The AS SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any interaction mechanisms - provided, including user codes and redirection URLs. The client - instance SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any callback URLs. + The AS SHOULD handle any interact request as a one-time-use mechanism + and SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any interaction mechanisms + provided, including user codes and redirection URIs. The client + instance SHOULD apply suitable timeouts to any callback URIs. 2.5.1. Start Mode Definitions This specification defines the following interaction start modes as an array of string values under the start key: - "redirect" Indicates that the client instance can direct the end- - user to an arbitrary URL for interaction. Section 2.5.1.1 + "redirect": Indicates that the client instance can direct the end + user to an arbitrary URI for interaction. Section 2.5.1.1 - "app" Indicates that the client instance can launch an application - on the end-user's device for interaction. Section 2.5.1.2 + "app": Indicates that the client instance can launch an application + on the end user's device for interaction. Section 2.5.1.2 - "user_code" Indicates that the client instance can communicate a - human-readable short code to the end-user for use with a stable - URL. Section 2.5.1.3 + "user_code": Indicates that the client instance can communicate a + human-readable short code to the end user for use with a stable + URI. Section 2.5.1.3 -2.5.1.1. Redirect to an Arbitrary URL + "user_code_uri": Indicates that the client instance can communicate + a human-readable short code to the end user for use with a short, + dynamic URI. Section 2.5.1.4 - If the client instance is capable of directing the end-user to a URL +2.5.1.1. Redirect to an Arbitrary URI + + If the client instance is capable of directing the end user to a URI defined by the AS at runtime, the client instance indicates this by including redirect in the array under the start key. The means by - which the client instance will activate this URL is out of scope of + which the client instance will activate this URI is out of scope of this specification, but common methods include an HTTP redirect, - launching a browser on the end-user's device, providing a scannable - image encoding, and printing out a URL to an interactive console. - While this URL is generally hosted at the AS, the client instance can + launching a browser on the end user's device, providing a scannable + image encoding, and printing out a URI to an interactive console. + While this URI is generally hosted at the AS, the client instance can make no assumptions about its contents, composition, or relationship - to the AS grant URL. + to the AS grant URI. "interact": { "start": ["redirect"] } If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and request, the AS returns a redirect interaction response Section 3.3.1. The client instance manages this interaction method as described in Section 4.1.1. - See Section 12.24 for more considerations regarding the use of front- + See Section 12.26 for more considerations regarding the use of front- channel communication techniques such as this. -2.5.1.2. Open an Application-specific URL +2.5.1.2. Open an Application-specific URI - If the client instance can open a URL associated with an application - on the end-user's device, the client instance indicates this by + If the client instance can open a URI associated with an application + on the end user's device, the client instance indicates this by including app in the array under the start key. The means by which - the client instance determines the application to open with this URL + the client instance determines the application to open with this URI are out of scope of this specification. "interact": { "start": ["app"] } If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and - request, the AS returns an app interaction response with an app URL + request, the AS returns an app interaction response with an app URI payload Section 3.3.2. The client instance manages this interaction - method as described in Section 4.1.3. + method as described in Section 4.1.4. [[ See issue #54 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/54) ]] 2.5.1.3. Display a Short User Code If the client instance is capable of displaying or otherwise communicating a short, human-entered code to the RO, the client instance indicates this by including user_code in the array under the - start key. This code is to be entered at a static URL that does not - change at runtime. While this URL is generally hosted at the AS, the - client instance can make no assumptions about its contents, - composition, or relationship to the AS grant URL. + start key. This code is to be entered at a static URI that does not + change at runtime. The client instance has no reasonable means to + communicate a dynamic URI to the RO, and so this URI is usually + communicated out of band to the RO through documentation or other + messaging outside of GNAP. While this URI is generally hosted at the + AS, the client instance can make no assumptions about its contents, + composition, or relationship to the AS grant URI. "interact": { "start": ["user_code"] } If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and + request, the AS returns a user code as specified in Section 3.3.3. + The client instance manages this interaction method as described in + Section 4.1.2. + +2.5.1.4. Display a Short User Code and URI + + If the client instance is capable of displaying or otherwise + communicating a short, human-entered code along with a short, human- + entered URI to the RO, the client instance indicates this by + including user_code_uri in the array under the start key. This code + is to be entered at the dynamic URL given in the response. While + this URL is generally hosted at the AS, the client instance can make + no assumptions about its contents, composition, or relationship to + the AS grant URL. + + "interact": { + "start": ["user_code_uri"] + } + + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and request, the AS returns a user code and interaction URL as specified - in Section 3.3.3. The client instances manages this interaction - method as described in Section 4.1.2 + in Section 3.3.4. The client instance manages this interaction + method as described in Section 4.1.3. -2.5.2. Finish Interaction Modes +2.5.2. Finish Interaction Methods If the client instance is capable of receiving a message from the AS indicating that the RO has completed their interaction, the client instance indicates this by sending the following members of an object under the finish key. - method (string) REQUIRED. The callback method that the AS will use - to contact the client instance. This specification defines the - following interaction completion methods, with other values - defined by a registry TBD (Section 11): - - "redirect" Indicates that the client instance can receive a - redirect from the end-user's device after interaction with the - RO has concluded. Section 2.5.2.1 - - "push" Indicates that the client instance can receive an HTTP - POST request from the AS after interaction with the RO has - concluded. Section 2.5.2.2 + method (string): The callback method that the AS will use to contact + the client instance. REQUIRED. - uri (string) REQUIRED. Indicates the URI that the AS will either - send the RO to after interaction or send an HTTP POST request. - This URI MAY be unique per request and MUST be hosted by or - accessible by the client instance. This URI MUST NOT contain any - fragment component. This URI MUST be protected by HTTPS, be - hosted on a server local to the RO's browser ("localhost"), or use - an application-specific URI scheme. If the client instance needs - any state information to tie to the front channel interaction + uri (string): Indicates the URI that the AS will either send the RO + to after interaction or send an HTTP POST request. This URI MAY + be unique per request and MUST be hosted by or accessible by the + client instance. This URI MUST NOT contain any fragment + component. This URI MUST be protected by HTTPS, be hosted on a + server local to the RO's browser ("localhost"), or use an + application-specific URI scheme. If the client instance needs any + state information to tie to the front channel interaction response, it MUST use a unique callback URI to link to that ongoing state. The allowable URIs and URI patterns MAY be restricted by the AS based on the client instance's presented key information. The callback URI SHOULD be presented to the RO - during the interaction phase before redirect. + during the interaction phase before redirect. REQUIRED for + redirect and push methods. - nonce (string) REQUIRED. Unique value to be used in the calculation - of the "hash" query parameter sent to the callback URL, must be + nonce (string): Unique value to be used in the calculation of the + "hash" query parameter sent to the callback URI, must be sufficiently random to be unguessable by an attacker. MUST be generated by the client instance as a unique value for this - request. + request. REQUIRED. - hash_method (string) OPTIONAL. The hash calculation mechanism to be - used for the callback hash in Section 4.2.3. Can be one of sha3 - or sha2. If absent, the default value is sha3. [[ See issue #56 + hash_method (string): The hash calculation mechanism to be used for + the callback hash in Section 4.2.3. Can be one of sha3 or sha2. + If absent, the default value is sha3. OPTIONAL. [[ See issue #56 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/56) ]] + This specification defines the following values for the method + parameter, with other values defined by a registry TBD (Section 11): + + "redirect": Indicates that the client instance can receive a + redirect from the end user's device after interaction with the RO + has concluded. Section 2.5.2.1 + + "push": Indicates that the client instance can receive an HTTP POST + request from the AS after interaction with the RO has concluded. + Section 2.5.2.2 + If this interaction mode is supported for this client instance and request, the AS returns a nonce for use in validating the callback - response (Section 3.3.4). Requests to the callback URI MUST be + response (Section 3.3.5). Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed as described in Section 4.2, and the AS MUST require presentation of an interaction callback reference as described in Section 5.1. [[ See issue #58 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/58) ]] 2.5.2.1. Receive an HTTP Callback Through the Browser A finish method value of redirect indicates that the client instance @@ -1860,69 +1911,70 @@ "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" } } Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed by the client instance as described in Section 4.2.1. - Since the incoming request to the callback URL is from the RO's - browser, this method is usually used when the RO and end-user are the - same entity. As such, the client instance MUST ensure the end-user - is present on the request to prevent substitution attacks. - - See Section 12.24 for more considerations regarding the use of front- + Since the incoming request to the callback URI is from the RO's + browser, this method is usually used when the RO and end user are the + same entity. See Section 12.22 for considerations on ensuring the + incoming HTTP message matches the expected context of the request. + See Section 12.26 for more considerations regarding the use of front- channel communication techniques such as this. 2.5.2.2. Receive an HTTP Direct Callback A finish method value of push indicates that the client instance will expect a request from the AS directly using the HTTP method POST as described in Section 4.2.2. "interact": { "finish": { "method": "push", "uri": "https://client.example.net/return/123455", "nonce": "LKLTI25DK82FX4T4QFZC" } } Requests to the callback URI MUST be processed by the client instance as described in Section 4.2.2. - Since the incoming request to the callback URL is from the AS and not - from the RO's browser, the client instance MUST NOT require the end- - user to be present on the incoming HTTP request. + Since the incoming request to the callback URI is from the AS and not + from the RO's browser, this request is not expected to have any + shared session information from the start method. See Section 12.22 + and Section 12.21 for more considerations regarding the use of back- + channel and polling mechanisms like this. 2.5.3. Hints The hints key is an object describing one or more suggestions from the client instance that the AS can use to help drive user interaction. This specification defines the following properties under the hints key: - ui_locales (array of strings) Indicates the end-user's preferred + ui_locales (array of strings): Indicates the end user's preferred locales that the AS can use during interaction, particularly - before the RO has authenticated. Section 2.5.3.1 + before the RO has authenticated. OPTIONAL. Section 2.5.3.1 - The following sections detail requests for interaction modes. - Additional interaction modes are defined in a registry TBD + The following sections detail requests for interaction hints. + Additional interaction hints are defined in a registry TBD (Section 11). 2.5.3.1. Indicate Desired Interaction Locales - If the client instance knows the end-user's locale and language + If the client instance knows the end user's locale and language preferences, the client instance can send this information to the AS using the ui_locales field with an array of locale strings as defined by [RFC5646]. "interact": { "hints": { "ui_locales": ["en-US", "fr-CA"] } } @@ -1941,86 +1993,93 @@ The request object MAY be extended by registering new items in a registry TBD (Section 11). Extensions SHOULD be orthogonal to other parameters. Extensions MUST document any aspects where the extension item affects or influences the values or behavior of other request and response objects. 3. Grant Response In response to a client instance's request, the AS responds with a JSON object as the HTTP entity body. Each possible field is detailed - in the sections below + in the sections below. - continue (object) Indicates that the client instance can continue - the request by making one or more continuation requests. - Section 3.1 + continue (object): Indicates that the client instance can continue + the request by making one or more continuation requests. REQUIRED + if continuation calls are allowed for this client instance on this + grant request. See Section 3.1. - access_token (object / array of objects) A single access token or + access_token (object / array of objects): A single access token or set of access tokens that the client instance can use to call the - RS on behalf of the RO. Section 3.2.1 + RS on behalf of the RO. REQUIRED if an access token is included. + See Section 3.2. - interact (object) Indicates that interaction through some set of - defined mechanisms needs to take place. Section 3.3 + interact (object): Indicates that interaction through some set of + defined mechanisms needs to take place. REQUIRED if interaction + is needed or allowed. See Section 3.3. - subject (object) Claims about the RO as known and declared by the - AS, as described in Section 3.4. + subject (object): Claims about the RO as known and declared by the + AS. REQUIRED if subject information is included. See + Section 3.4. - instance_id (string) An identifier this client instance can use to - identify itself when making future requests. Section 3.5 + instance_id (string): An identifier this client instance can use to + identify itself when making future requests. OPTIONAL. See + Section 3.5. - error (object) An error code indicating that something has gone - wrong. Section 3.6 + error (object): An error code indicating that something has gone + wrong. REQUIRED for an error condition. If included, other + fields MUST NOT be included. See Section 3.6. - In this example, the AS is returning an interaction URL - (Section 3.3.1), a callback nonce (Section 3.3.4), and a continuation + In this example, the AS is returning an interaction URI + (Section 3.3.1), a callback nonce (Section 3.3.5), and a continuation response (Section 3.1). NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 { "interact": { "redirect": "https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492ML\ VMSW9MKMXKHQ", "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH" }, "continue": { "access_token": { "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU", }, "uri": "https://server.example.com/tx" } } In this example, the AS is returning a bearer access token - (Section 3.2.1) with a management URL and a subject identifier + (Section 3.2.1) with a management URI and a subject identifier (Section 3.4) in the form of an opaque identifier. - NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 +NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 and a [subject identifier](#response-subject) in the form of +an opaque identifier. { "access_token": { "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", "flags": ["bearer"], "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", }, "subject": { "sub_ids": [ { "format": "opaque", "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" } ] } } In this example, the AS is returning set of subject identifiers (Section 3.4), simultaneously as an opaque identifier, an email - address, and a decentralized identifier (DID). + address, and a decentralized identifier URL (DID). { "subject": { "sub_ids": [ { "format": "opaque", "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" }, { "format": "email", "email": "user@example.com" }, { @@ -2029,38 +2088,42 @@ } ] } } 3.1. Request Continuation If the AS determines that the request can be continued with additional requests, it responds with the continue field. This field contains a JSON object with the following properties. - uri (string) REQUIRED. The URI at which the client instance can - make continuation requests. This URI MAY vary per request, or MAY - be stable at the AS. The client instance MUST use this value - exactly as given when making a continuation request (Section 5). + uri (string): The URI at which the client instance can make + continuation requests. This URI MAY vary per request, or MAY be + stable at the AS. The client instance MUST use this value exactly + as given when making a continuation request (Section 5). + REQUIRED. - wait (integer) RECOMMENDED. The amount of time in integer seconds - the client instance SHOULD wait after receiving this continuation - handle and calling the URI. + wait (integer): The amount of time in integer seconds the client + instance MUST wait after receiving this request continuation + response and calling the continuation URI. The value SHOULD NOT + be less than five seconds, and omission of the value MUST NOT be + interpreted as zero (i.e., no delay between requests). + RECOMMENDED. - access_token (object) REQUIRED. A unique access token for - continuing the request, called the "continuation access token". - The value of this property MUST be in the format specified in - Section 3.2.1. This access token MUST be bound to the client - instance's key used in the request and MUST NOT be a bearer token. - As a consequence, the flags array of this access token MUST NOT - contain the string bearer and the key field MUST be omitted. The - client instance MUST present the continuation access token in all - requests to the continuation URI as described in Section 7.2. + access_token (object): A unique access token for continuing the + request, called the "continuation access token". The value of + this property MUST be in the format specified in Section 3.2.1. + This access token MUST be bound to the client instance's key used + in the request and MUST NOT be a bearer token. As a consequence, + the flags array of this access token MUST NOT contain the string + bearer and the key field MUST be omitted. The client instance + MUST present the continuation access token in all requests to the + continuation URI as described in Section 7.2. REQUIRED. { "continue": { "access_token": { "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" }, "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", "wait": 60 } } @@ -2086,99 +2149,100 @@ The client instance uses any access tokens in this response to call the RS as described in Section 7.2. 3.2.1. Single Access Token If the client instance has requested a single access token and the AS has granted that access token, the AS responds with the "access_token" field. The value of this field is an object with the following properties. - value (string) REQUIRED. The value of the access token as a string. - The value is opaque to the client instance. The value SHOULD be + value (string): The value of the access token as a string. The + value is opaque to the client instance. The value SHOULD be limited to ASCII characters to facilitate transmission over HTTP headers within other protocols without requiring additional - encoding. + encoding. REQUIRED. - label (string) REQUIRED for multiple access tokens, OPTIONAL for - single access token. The value of the label the client instance - provided in the associated token request (Section 2.1), if - present. If the token has been split by the AS, the value of the - label field is chosen by the AS and the split flag is used. + label (string): The value of the label the client instance provided + in the associated token request (Section 2.1), if present. If the + token has been split by the AS, the value of the label field is + chosen by the AS and the split flag is used. REQUIRED for + multiple access tokens, OPTIONAL for single access token. - manage (string) OPTIONAL. The management URI for this access token. - If provided, the client instance MAY manage its access token as + manage (string): The management URI for this access token. If + provided, the client instance MAY manage its access token as described in Section 6. This management URI is a function of the AS and is separate from the RS the client instance is requesting access to. This URI MUST NOT include the access token value and SHOULD be different for each access token issued in a request. + OPTIONAL. - access (array of objects/strings) RECOMMENDED. A description of the - rights associated with this access token, as defined in Section 8. - If included, this MUST reflect the rights associated with the - issued access token. These rights MAY vary from what was - requested by the client instance. + access (array of objects/strings): A description of the rights + associated with this access token, as defined in Section 8. If + included, this MUST reflect the rights associated with the issued + access token. These rights MAY vary from what was requested by + the client instance. REQUIRED. - expires_in (integer) OPTIONAL. The number of seconds in which the - access will expire. The client instance MUST NOT use the access - token past this time. An RS MUST NOT accept an access token past - this time. Note that the access token MAY be revoked by the AS or - RS at any point prior to its expiration. + expires_in (integer): The number of seconds in which the access will + expire. The client instance MUST NOT use the access token past + this time. An RS MUST NOT accept an access token past this time. + Note that the access token MAY be revoked by the AS or RS at any + point prior to its expiration. OPTIONAL. - key (object / string) OPTIONAL. The key that the token is bound to, - if different from the client instance's presented key. The key - MUST be an object or string in a format described in Section 7.1. - The client instance MUST be able to dereference or process the key - information in order to be able to sign the request. + key (object / string): The key that the token is bound to, if + different from the client instance's presented key. The key MUST + be an object or string in a format described in Section 7.1. The + client instance MUST be able to dereference or process the key + information in order to be able to sign the request. OPTIONAL. - flags (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A set of flags that represent - attributes or behaviors of the access token issued by the AS. + flags (array of strings): A set of flags that represent attributes + or behaviors of the access token issued by the AS. OPTIONAL. The values of the flags field defined by this specification are as follows: - "bearer" This flag indicates whether the token is a bearer token, + "bearer": This flag indicates whether the token is a bearer token, not bound to a key and proofing mechanism. If the bearer flag is present, the access token is a bearer token, and the key field in this response MUST be omitted. If the bearer flag is omitted and the key field in this response is omitted, the token is bound the key used by the client instance (Section 2.3) in its request for access. If the bearer flag is omitted, and the key field is present, the token is bound to the key and proofing mechanism indicated in the key field. See Section 12.7 for additional considerations on the use of bearer tokens. - "durable" OPTIONAL. Flag indicating a hint of AS behavior on token - rotation. If this flag is present, then the client instance can - expect a previously-issued access token to continue to work after - it has been rotated (Section 6.1) or the underlying grant request - has been modified (Section 5.3), resulting in the issuance of new + "durable": Flag indicating a hint of AS behavior on token rotation. + If this flag is present, then the client instance can expect a + previously-issued access token to continue to work after it has + been rotated (Section 6.1) or the underlying grant request has + been modified (Section 5.3), resulting in the issuance of new access tokens. If this flag is omitted, the client instance can - anticipate a given access token will stop working after token + anticipate a given access token could stop working after token rotation or grant request modification. Note that a token flagged as durable can still expire or be revoked through any normal means. - "split" OPTIONAL. Flag indicating that this token was generated by - issuing multiple access tokens in response to one of the client - instance's token request (Section 2.1) objects. This behavior - MUST NOT be used unless the client instance has specifically - requested it by use of the split flag. + "split": Flag indicating that this token was generated by issuing + multiple access tokens in response to one of the client instance's + token request (Section 2.1) objects. This behavior MUST NOT be + used unless the client instance has specifically requested it by + use of the split flag. Flag values MUST NOT be included more than once. Additional flags can be defined by extensions using a registry TBD (Section 11). The following non-normative example shows a single access token bound to the client instance's key used in the initial request, with a - management URL, and that has access to three described resources (one + management URI, and that has access to three described resources (one using an object and two described by reference strings). NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 "access_token": { "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", "access": [ { @@ -2227,21 +2291,21 @@ If the client instance has requested multiple access tokens and the AS has granted at least one of them, the AS responds with the "access_token" field. The value of this field is a JSON array, the members of which are distinct access tokens as described in Section 3.2.1. Each object MUST have a unique label field, corresponding to the token labels chosen by the client instance in the multiple access token request (Section 2.1.2). In this non-normative example, two tokens are issued under the names - token1 and token2, and only the first token has a management URL + token1 and token2, and only the first token has a management URI associated with it. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 "access_token": [ { "label": "token1", "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0", "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", @@ -2287,238 +2351,281 @@ "label": "split-2", "value": "FG7VGZZPJ3IZEMN21EVU71FHCAR-UFGLO2FDAP4J1", "flags": ["split"], "access": [ "vegetables" ] } } Each access token MAY be bound to different keys with different proofing mechanisms. - If token management (Section 6) is allowed, each access token SHOULD - have different manage URIs. - - [[ See issue #70 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/70) ]] + The manage URI MUST NOT contain the access token value. 3.3. Interaction Modes If the client instance has indicated a capability to interact with the RO in its request (Section 2.5), and the AS has determined that interaction is both supported and necessary, the AS responds to the client instance with any of the following values in the interact field of the response. There is no preference order for interaction modes in the response, and it is up to the client instance to determine which ones to use. All supported interaction methods are included in the same interact object. - redirect (string) Redirect to an arbitrary URL. Section 3.3.1 + redirect (string): Redirect to an arbitrary URI. REQUIRED if the + redirect interaction start mode is possible for this request. See + Section 3.3.1. - app (string) Launch of an application URL. Section 3.3.2 + app (string): Launch of an application URI. REQUIRED if the app + interaction start mode is possible for this request. See + Section 3.3.2. - finish (string) A nonce used by the client instance to verify the - callback after interaction is completed. Section 3.3.4 + user_code (object): Display a short user code. REQUIRED if the + user_code interaction start mode is possible for this request. + See Section 3.3.3. + + user_code_uri (object): Display a short user code and URL. REQUIRED + if the user_code_uri interaction start mode is possible for this + request. Section 3.3.4 + + finish (string): A nonce used by the client instance to verify the + callback after interaction is completed. REQUIRED if the + interaction finish method requested by the client instance is + possible for this request. See Section 3.3.5. - user_code (object) Display a short user code. Section 3.3.3 Additional interaction mode responses can be defined in a registry TBD (Section 11). The AS MUST NOT respond with any interaction mode that the client instance did not indicate in its request. The AS MUST NOT respond with any interaction mode that the AS does not support. Since interaction responses include secret or unique information, the AS SHOULD respond to each interaction mode only once in an ongoing request, particularly if the client instance modifies its request (Section 5.3). -3.3.1. Redirection to an arbitrary URL +3.3.1. Redirection to an arbitrary URI If the client instance indicates that it can redirect to an arbitrary - URL (Section 2.5.1.1) and the AS supports this mode for the client + URI (Section 2.5.1.1) and the AS supports this mode for the client instance's request, the AS responds with the "redirect" field, which - is a string containing the URL to direct the end-user to. This URL + is a string containing the URI to direct the end user to. This URI MUST be unique for the request and MUST NOT contain any security- sensitive information such as user identifiers or access tokens. "interact": { "redirect": "https://interact.example.com/4CF492MLVMSW9MKMXKHQ" } - The URL returned is a function of the AS, but the URL itself MAY be - completely distinct from the URL the client instance uses to request + The URI returned is a function of the AS, but the URI itself MAY be + completely distinct from the URI the client instance uses to request access (Section 2), allowing an AS to separate its user-interactive functionality from its back-end security functionality. If the AS does not directly host the functionality accessed through the given - URL, then the means for the interaction functionality to communicate + URI, then the means for the interaction functionality to communicate with the rest of the AS are out of scope for this specification. [[ See issue #72 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/72) ]] - The client instance sends the end-user to the URL to interact with - the AS. The client instance MUST NOT alter the URL in any way. The - means for the client instance to send the end-user to this URL is out + The client instance sends the end user to the URI to interact with + the AS. The client instance MUST NOT alter the URI in any way. The + means for the client instance to send the end user to this URI is out of scope of this specification, but common methods include an HTTP redirect, launching the system browser, displaying a scannable code, - or printing out the URL in an interactive console. See details of + or printing out the URI in an interactive console. See details of the interaction in Section 4.1.1. -3.3.2. Launch of an application URL +3.3.2. Launch of an application URI If the client instance indicates that it can launch an application - URL (Section 2.5.1.2) and the AS supports this mode for the client + URI (Section 2.5.1.2) and the AS supports this mode for the client instance's request, the AS responds with the "app" field, which is a - string containing the URL for the client instance to launch. This - URL MUST be unique for the request and MUST NOT contain any security- + string containing the URI for the client instance to launch. This + URI MUST be unique for the request and MUST NOT contain any security- sensitive information such as user identifiers or access tokens. "interact": { "app": "https://app.example.com/launch?tx=4CF492MLV" } The means for the launched application to communicate with the AS are out of scope for this specification. - The client instance launches the URL as appropriate on its platform, - and the means for the client instance to launch this URL is out of + The client instance launches the URI as appropriate on its platform, + and the means for the client instance to launch this URI is out of scope of this specification. The client instance MUST NOT alter the - URL in any way. The client instance MAY attempt to detect if an - installed application will service the URL being sent before - attempting to launch the application URL. See details of the - interaction in Section 4.1.3. + URI in any way. The client instance MAY attempt to detect if an + installed application will service the URI being sent before + attempting to launch the application URI. See details of the + interaction in Section 4.1.4. [[ See issue #71 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/71) ]] 3.3.3. Display of a Short User Code If the client instance indicates that it can display a short user-typeable code (Section 2.5.1.3) and the AS supports this mode for the client instance's request, the AS responds with a "user_code" field. This field is an object that contains the following members. - code (string) REQUIRED. A unique short code that the user can type - into an authorization server. This string MUST be case- - insensitive, MUST consist of only easily typeable characters (such - as letters or numbers). The time in which this code will be - accepted SHOULD be short lived, such as several minutes. It is - RECOMMENDED that this code be no more than eight characters in - length. - - url (string) RECOMMENDED. The interaction URL that the client - instance will direct the RO to. This URL MUST be stable such that - client instances can be statically configured with it. + code (string): A unique short code that the user can type into a web + page. This string MUST be case-insensitive, MUST consist of only + easily typeable characters (such as letters or numbers). The time + in which this code will be accepted SHOULD be short lived, such as + several minutes. It is RECOMMENDED that this code be no more than + eight characters in length. REQUIRED. "interact": { "user_code": { "code": "A1BC-3DFF", - "url": "https://srv.ex/device" } } - The client instance MUST communicate the "code" to the end-user in + The client instance MUST communicate the "code" to the end user in some fashion, such as displaying it on a screen or reading it out - audibly. + audibly. This code is used by the interaction component of the AS as + a means of identifying the pending grant request and does not + function as an authentication factor for the RO. - The client instance SHOULD also communicate the URL if possible to - facilitate user interaction, but since the URL should be stable, the - client instance should be able to safely decide to not display this - value. As this interaction mode is designed to facilitate - interaction via a secondary device, it is not expected that the - client instance redirect the end-user to the URL given here at - runtime. Consequently, the URL needs to be stable enough that a - client instance could be statically configured with it, perhaps - referring the end-user to the URL via documentation instead of - through an interactive means. If the client instance is capable of - communicating an arbitrary URL to the end-user, such as through a - scannable code, the client instance can use the "redirect" - (Section 2.5.1.1) mode for this purpose instead of or in addition to - the user code mode. + The URI that the end user is intended to enter the code into MUST be + stable, since the client instance is expected to have no means of + communicating a dynamic URI to the end user at runtime. - The URL returned is a function of the AS, but the URL itself MAY be - completely distinct from the URL the client instance uses to request + As this interaction mode is designed to facilitate interaction via a + secondary device, it is not expected that the client instance + redirect the end user to the URL given here at runtime. If the + client instance is capable of communicating an short arbitrary URI to + the end user for use with the user code, the client instance can + instead use the "user_code_uri" (Section 2.5.1.4) method instead. If + the client instance is capable of communicating a long arbitrary URI + to the end user, such as through a scannable code, the client + instance can use the "redirect" (Section 2.5.1.1) mode for this + purpose instead of or in addition to the user code mode. + + See details of the interaction in Section 4.1.2. + +3.3.4. Display of a Short User Code and URI + + If the client instance indicates that it can display a short + user-typeable code (Section 2.5.1.3) and the AS supports this mode + for the client instance's request, the AS responds with a + "user_code_uri" object that contains the following members. + + code (string): A unique short code that the end user can type into a + provided URI. This string MUST be case-insensitive, MUST consist + of only easily typeable characters (such as letters or numbers). + The time in which this code will be accepted SHOULD be short + lived, such as several minutes. It is RECOMMENDED that this code + be no more than eight characters in length. REQUIRED. + + uri (string): The interaction URI that the client instance will + direct the RO to. This URI MUST be short enough to be + communicated to the end user. It is RECOMMENDED that this URI be + short enough for an end user to type in manually. The URI MUST + NOT contain the code value. REQUIRED. + + "interact": { + "user_code_uri": { + "code": "A1BC-3DFF", + "uri": "https://srv.ex/device" + } + } + + The client instance MUST communicate the "code" to the end user in + some fashion, such as displaying it on a screen or reading it out + audibly. This code is used by the interaction component of the AS as + a means of identifying the pending grant request and does not + function as an authentication factor for the RO. + + The client instance MUST also communicate the URI to the end user. + Since it is expected that the end user will continue interaction on a + secondary device, the URI needs to be short enough to allow the end + user to type or copy it to a secondary device without mistakes. + + The URI returned is a function of the AS, but the URI itself MAY be + completely distinct from the URI the client instance uses to request access (Section 2), allowing an AS to separate its user-interactive functionality from its back-end security functionality. If the AS does not directly host the functionality accessed through the given - URL, then the means for the interaction functionality to communicate + URI, then the means for the interaction functionality to communicate with the rest of the AS are out of scope for this specification. See details of the interaction in Section 4.1.2. - [[ See issue #72 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/72) ]] - -3.3.4. Interaction Finish +3.3.5. Interaction Finish If the client instance indicates that it can receive a - post-interaction redirect or push at a URL (Section 2.5.2) and the AS + post-interaction redirect or push at a URI (Section 2.5.2) and the AS supports this mode for the client instance's request, the AS responds with a finish field containing a nonce that the client instance will use in validating the callback as defined in Section 4.2. "interact": { "finish": "MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH" } When the interaction is completed, the interaction component MUST contact the client instance using either a redirect or launch of the RO's browser or through an HTTP POST to the client instance's - callback URL using the method indicated in the interaction request + callback URI using the method indicated in the interaction request (Section 2.5.2) as described in Section 4.2. If the AS returns a nonce, the client instance MUST NOT continue a grant request before it receives the associated interaction reference on the callback URI. See details in Section 4.2. -3.3.5. Extending Interaction Mode Responses +3.3.6. Extending Interaction Mode Responses Extensions to this specification can define new interaction mode responses in a registry TBD (Section 11). Extensions MUST document the corresponding interaction request. 3.4. Returning Subject Information If information about the RO is requested and the AS grants the client instance access to that data, the AS returns the approved information in the "subject" response field. The AS MUST return the subject - field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end-user + field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end user are the same party. This can be accomplished through some forms of interaction with the RO (Section 4). This field is an object with the following OPTIONAL properties. - sub_ids (array of objects) An array of subject identifiers for the + sub_ids (array of objects): An array of subject identifiers for the RO, as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers]. + REQUIRED if returning subject identifiers. - An object containing assertions as values keyed on the assertion - type defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). Possible keys - include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 for a SAML 2 - assertion. The assertion values are the string serialization of - the assertion format, encoded as a plain JSON string. Additional - assertion types are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). [[ - See issue #41 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/41) ]] + assertions (array of objects): An array containing assertions as + objects each containing the assertion format and the assertion + value as the JSON string serialization of the assertion. Possible + formats include id_token for an [OIDC] ID Token and saml2 for a + SAML 2 assertion. Additional assertion formats are defined by a + registry TBD (Section 11). REQUIRED if returning assertions. - updated_at (string) Timestamp as an ISO8610 date string, indicating + updated_at (string): Timestamp as an ISO8610 date string, indicating when the identified account was last updated. The client instance MAY use this value to determine if it needs to request updated profile information through an identity API. The definition of such an identity API is out of scope for this specification. + RECOMMENDED. "subject": { "sub_ids": [ { "format": "opaque", "id": "XUT2MFM1XBIKJKSDU8QM" } ], - "assertions": { - "id_token": "eyj..." - } + "assertions": [ { + "format": "id_token", + "value": "eyj..." + } ] } Subject identifiers returned by the AS SHOULD uniquely identify the RO at the AS. Some forms of subject identifier are opaque to the client instance (such as the subject of an issuer and subject pair), while others forms (such as email address and phone number) are intended to allow the client instance to correlate the identifier with other account information at the client instance. The AS MUST ensure that the returned subject identifiers only apply to the authenticated end user. The client instance MUST NOT request or use @@ -2529,21 +2636,21 @@ represented email address or phone number in the identifier is suitable for communication with the current user. To get such information, the client instance MUST use an identity protocol to request and receive additional identity claims. The details of an identity protocol and associated schema are outside the scope of this specification. Extensions to this specification MAY define additional response properties in a registry TBD (Section 11). - See Section 12.25 for considerations that the client instance has to + See Section 12.27 for considerations that the client instance has to make when accepting and processing assertions from the AS. 3.5. Returning a Dynamically-bound Client Instance Identifier Many parts of the client instance's request can be passed as either a value or a reference. The use of a reference in place of a value allows for a client instance to optimize requests to the AS. Some references, such as for the client instance's identity (Section 2.3.1) or the requested resources (Section 8.1), can be @@ -2555,26 +2662,26 @@ If desired, the AS MAY also generate and return an instance identifier dynamically to the client instance in the response to facilitate multiple interactions with the same client instance over time. The client instance SHOULD use this instance identifier in future requests in lieu of sending the associated data values in the client field. Dynamically generated client instance identifiers are string values that MUST be protected by the client instance as secrets. Instance identifier values MUST be unguessable and MUST NOT contain any - sensitive information. Instance identifier values are opaque to the - client instance. + information that would compromise any party if revealed. Instance + identifier values are opaque to the client instance. - instance_id (string) A string value used to represent the + instance_id (string): A string value used to represent the information in the client object that the client instance can use - in a future request, as described in Section 2.3.1. + in a future request, as described in Section 2.3.1. OPTIONAL. This non-normative example shows an instance identifier along side an issued access token. { "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", "access_token": { "value": "OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0" } } @@ -2583,41 +2690,52 @@ issues/77) ]] [[ See issue #78 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/78) ]] 3.6. Error Response If the AS determines that the request cannot be issued for any reason, it responds to the client instance with an error message. - error (string) The error code. + error (string): A single ASCII error code from the following, with + additional values available in a registry TBD (Section 11). + REQUIRED. - { + "invalid_request": The request is missing a required parameter, + includes an invalid parameter value or is otherwise malformed. - "error": "user_denied" + "invalid_client": The request was made from a client that was not + recognized or allowed by the AS, or the client's signature + validation failed. - } + "user_denied": The RO denied the request. - The error code is one of the following, with additional values - available in a registry TBD (Section 11): + "too_fast": The client instance did not respect the timeout in + the wait response. - user_denied The RO denied the request. + "unknown_request": The request referenced an unknown ongoing + access request. - too_fast The client instance did not respect the timeout in the wait - response. + "request_denied": The request was denied for an unspecified + reason. - unknown_request The request referenced an unknown ongoing access - request. + error_description (string): A human-readable string description of + the error intended for the developer of the client. OPTIONAL. - [[ See issue #79 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/79) ]] + For example, if the RO denied the request while interacting with the + AS, the AS would return the following error when the client instance + tries to continue the grant request: + + { + "error": "user_denied" + } 3.7. Extending the Response Extensions to this specification MAY define additional fields for the grant response in a registry TBD (Section 11). 4. Determining Authorization and Consent When the client instance makes its initial request (Section 2) to the AS for delegated access, it is capable of asking for several @@ -2670,21 +2788,21 @@ * starting interaction with the end user facilitated by the client software, such as a redirection or user code * challenging the client instance through a challenge-response mechanism * requesting that the client instance present specific additional information, such as a user's credential or an assertion - * contacting a RO through an out-of-band mechanism, such as a push + * contacting an RO through an out-of-band mechanism, such as a push notification * contacting an auxiliary software process through an out-of-band mechanism, such as querying a digital wallet The authorization and consent gathering process in GNAP is left deliberately flexible to allow for a wide variety of different deployments, interactions, and methodologies. In this process, the AS can gather consent from the RO as necessitated by the access that has been requested. The AS can sometimes determine which RO needs to @@ -2773,95 +2891,128 @@ 4.1.1. Interaction at a Redirected URI When the end user is directed to an arbitrary URI through the "redirect" (Section 3.3.1) mode, the client instance facilitates opening the URI through the end user's web browser. The client instance could launch the URI through the system browser, provide a clickable link, redirect the user through HTTP response codes, or display the URI in a form the end user can use to launch such as a multidimensional barcode. With this method, it is common (though not - required) for the RO to be the same party as the end-user, since the - client instance has to communicate the redirection URI to the end- + required) for the RO to be the same party as the end user, since the + client instance has to communicate the redirection URI to the end user. In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and - interactively provide consent. If the URI is hosted by the AS, the - AS MUST determine the grant request being referenced from the URL - value itself. If the URL cannot be associated with a currently - active request, the AS MUST display an error to the RO and MUST NOT - attempt to redirect the RO back to any client instance even if a - redirect finish method is supplied (Section 2.5.2.1). If the URI is - not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication between the - AS and this URI are out of scope for this specification. + interactively provide consent. The URI value is used to identify the + grant request being authorized. If the URI cannot be associated with + a currently active request, the AS MUST display an error to the RO + and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any client instance + even if a redirect finish method is supplied (Section 2.5.2.1). If + the URI is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication + between the AS and this URI are out of scope for this specification. The client instance MUST NOT modify the URI when launching it, in particular the client instance MUST NOT add any parameters to the URI. The URI MUST be reachable from the end user's browser, though the URI MAY be opened on a separate device from the client instance itself. The URI MUST be accessible from an HTTP GET request and MUST be protected by HTTPS or equivalent means. -4.1.2. Interaction at the User Code URI +4.1.2. Interaction at the Static User Code URI When the end user is directed to enter a short code through the "user_code" (Section 3.3.3) mode, the client instance communicates - the user code to the end-user and directs the end user to enter that + the user code to the end user and directs the end user to enter that code at an associated URI. This mode is used when the client - instance is not able to facilitate launching an arbitrary URI. The - associated URI could be statically configured with the client - instance or communicated in the response from the AS, but the client - instance communicates that URL to the end user. As a consequence, - these URIs SHOULD be short. + instance is not able to communicate or facilitate launching an + arbitrary URI. The associated URI could be statically configured + with the client instance or in the client software's documentation. + As a consequence, these URIs SHOULD be short. The user code URI MUST + be reachable from the end user's browser, though the URI is usually + be opened on a separate device from the client instance itself. + Since it is designed to be typed in, the URI SHOULD be accessible + from an HTTP GET request and MUST be protected by HTTPS or equivalent + means. In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and - interactively provide consent. If the URI is hosted by the AS, the - AS MUST determine the grant request being referenced from the user - code. If the user code cannot be associated with a currently active - request, the AS MUST display an error to the RO and MUST NOT attempt - to redirect the RO back to any client instance even if a redirect - finish method is supplied (Section 2.5.2.1). If the interaction - component at the user code URI is not hosted by the AS directly, the - means of communication between the AS and this URI, including - communication of the user code itself, are out of scope for this - specification. + interactively provide consent. The value of the user code is used to + identify the grant request being authorized. If the user code cannot + be associated with a currently active request, the AS MUST display an + error to the RO and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any + client instance even if a redirect finish method is supplied + (Section 2.5.2.1). If the interaction component at the user code URI + is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication between + the AS and this URI, including communication of the user code itself, + are out of scope for this specification. When the RO enters this code at the user code URI, the AS MUST uniquely identify the pending request that the code was associated with. If the AS does not recognize the entered code, the interaction component MUST display an error to the user. If the AS detects too many unrecognized code enter attempts, the interaction component SHOULD display an error to the user and MAY take additional actions such as slowing down the input interactions. The user should be warned as such an error state is approached, if possible. - The client instance MUST NOT modify the URI when launching it, in +4.1.3. Interaction at a Dynamic User Code URI + + When the end user is directed to enter a short code through the + "user_code_uri" (Section 3.3.4) mode, the client instance + communicates the user code and associated URI to the end user and + directs the end user to enter that code at the URI. This mode is + used when the client instance is not able to facilitate launching an + arbitrary URI but can communicate arbitrary values like URIs. As a + consequence, these URIs SHOULD be short. The client instance MUST + NOT modify the URI when communicating it to the end user; in particular the client instance MUST NOT add any parameters to the URI. The user code URI MUST be reachable from the end user's browser, though the URI is usually be opened on a separate device - from the client instance itself. The URI MUST be accessible from an - HTTP GET request and MUST be protected by HTTPS or equivalent means. + from the client instance itself. Since it is designed to be typed + in, the URI SHOULD be accessible from an HTTP GET request and MUST be + protected by HTTPS or equivalent means. -4.1.3. Interaction through an Application URI + In many cases, the URI indicates a web page hosted at the AS, + allowing the AS to authenticate the end user as the RO and + interactively provide consent. The value of the user code is used to + identify the grant request being authorized. If the user code cannot + be associated with a currently active request, the AS MUST display an + error to the RO and MUST NOT attempt to redirect the RO back to any + client instance even if a redirect finish method is supplied + (Section 2.5.2.1). If the interaction component at the user code URI + is not hosted by the AS directly, the means of communication between + the AS and this URI, including communication of the user code itself, + are out of scope for this specification. + + When the RO enters this code at the given URI, the AS MUST uniquely + identify the pending request that the code was associated with. If + the AS does not recognize the entered code, the interaction component + MUST display an error to the user. If the AS detects too many + unrecognized code enter attempts, the interaction component SHOULD + display an error to the user and MAY take additional actions such as + slowing down the input interactions. The user should be warned as + such an error state is approached, if possible. + +4.1.4. Interaction through an Application URI When the client instance is directed to launch an application through - the "app" (Section 3.3.2) mode, the client launches the URL as + the "app" (Section 3.3.2) mode, the client launches the URI as appropriate to the system, such as through a deep link or custom URI scheme registered to a mobile application. The means by which the AS and the launched application communicate with each other and perform any of the required actions are out of scope for this specification. 4.2. Post-Interaction Completion - If an interaction "finish" (Section 3.3.4) method is associated with + If an interaction "finish" (Section 3.3.5) method is associated with the current request, the AS MUST follow the appropriate method at upon completion of interaction in order to signal the client instance to continue, except for some limited error cases discussed below. If a finish method is not available, the AS SHOULD instruct the RO to return to the client instance upon completion. The AS MUST create an interaction reference and associate that reference with the current interaction and the underlying pending request. This interaction reference value MUST be sufficiently random so as not to be guessable by an attacker. The interaction @@ -2887,112 +3038,117 @@ method are dangerous or blocked. * The AS cannot determine which ongoing grant request is being referenced. * The ongoing grant request has been cancelled or otherwise blocked. 4.2.1. Completing Interaction with a Browser Redirect to the Callback URI - When using the redirect interaction finish method (Section 3.3.4), + When using the redirect interaction finish method (Section 3.3.5), the AS signals to the client instance that interaction is complete and the request can be continued by directing the RO (in their - browser) back to the client instance's redirect URL sent in the + browser) back to the client instance's redirect URI sent in the callback request (Section 2.5.2.1). The AS secures this redirect by adding the hash and interaction - reference as query parameters to the client instance's redirect URL. + reference as query parameters to the client instance's redirect URI. - hash REQUIRED. The interaction hash value as described in - Section 4.2.3. + hash: The interaction hash value as described in Section 4.2.3. + REQUIRED. - interact_ref REQUIRED. The interaction reference generated for this - interaction. + interact_ref: The interaction reference generated for this + interaction. REQUIRED. - The means of directing the RO to this URL are outside the scope of + The means of directing the RO to this URI are outside the scope of this specification, but common options include redirecting the RO - from a web page and launching the system browser with the target URL. + from a web page and launching the system browser with the target URI. + See Section 12.16 for considerations on which HTTP status code to use + when redirecting a request that potentially contains credentials. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 https://client.example.net/return/123455\ ?hash=p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2\ HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A\ &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1 When receiving the request, the client instance MUST parse the query parameters to calculate and validate the hash value as described in Section 4.2.3. If the hash validates, the client instance sends a continuation request to the AS as described in Section 5.1 using the interaction reference value received here. 4.2.2. Completing Interaction with a Direct HTTP Request Callback - When using the push interaction finish method (Section 3.3.4), the AS + When using the push interaction finish method (Section 3.3.5), the AS signals to the client instance that interaction is complete and the request can be continued by sending an HTTP POST request to the - client instance's callback URL sent in the callback request + client instance's callback URI sent in the callback request (Section 2.5.2.2). The entity message body is a JSON object consisting of the following two fields: - hash (string) REQUIRED. The interaction hash value as described in - Section 4.2.3. + hash (string): The interaction hash value as described in + Section 4.2.3. REQUIRED. - interact_ref (string) REQUIRED. The interaction reference generated - for this interaction. + interact_ref (string) The interaction reference generated for this + interaction. REQUIRED. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 POST /push/554321 HTTP/1.1 Host: client.example.net Content-Type: application/json { "hash": "p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R\ 2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A", "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" } + When processing such a call, the AS MUST protect itself against SSRF + attacks as discussed in Section 12.31. + When receiving the request, the client instance MUST parse the JSON object and validate the hash value as described in Section 4.2.3. If the hash validates, the client instance sends a continuation request to the AS as described in Section 5.1 using the interaction reference value received here. 4.2.3. Calculating the interaction hash The "hash" parameter in the request to the client instance's callback - URL ties the front channel response to an ongoing request by using + URI ties the front channel response to an ongoing request by using values known only to the parties involved. This security mechanism allows the client instance to protect itself against several kinds of session fixation and injection attacks. The AS MUST always provide this hash, and the client instance MUST validate the hash when received. To calculate the "hash" value, the party doing the calculation creates a hash string by concatenating the following values in the following order using a single newline (\n) character to separate them: * the "nonce" value sent by the client instance in the interaction "finish" section of the initial request (Section 2.5.2) * the AS's nonce value from the interaction finish response - (Section 3.3.4) + (Section 3.3.5) * the "interact_ref" returned from the AS as part of the interaction finish method (Section 4.2) - * the grant endpoint URL the client instance used to make its + * the grant endpoint URI the client instance used to make its initial request (Section 2) There is no padding or whitespace before or after any of the lines, and no trailing newline character. VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO MBDOFXG4Y5CVJCX821LH 4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1 https://server.example.com/tx @@ -3001,32 +3157,34 @@ "hash_method" value is not present in the client instance's request, the algorithm defaults to "sha3". [[ See issue #56 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ issues/56) ]] 4.2.3.1. SHA3-512 The "sha3" hash method consists of hashing the input string with the 512-bit SHA3 algorithm. The byte array is then encoded using URL - Safe Base64 with no padding. The resulting string is the hash value. + Safe Base64 with no padding [RFC4648]. The resulting string is the + hash value. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2HZT8BOWYHcLmObM\ 7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A 4.2.3.2. SHA2-512 The "sha2" hash method consists of hashing the input string with the 512-bit SHA2 algorithm. The byte array is then encoded using URL - Safe Base64 with no padding. The resulting string is the hash value. + Safe Base64 with no padding [RFC4648]. The resulting string is the + hash value. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 62SbcD3Xs7L40rjgALA-ymQujoh2LB2hPJyX9vlcr1H6ecChZ8BNKkG_HrOKP_Bp\ j84rh4mC9aE9x7HPBFcIHw 5. Continuing a Grant Request While it is possible for the AS to return a grant response (Section 3) with all the client instance's requested information @@ -3040,21 +3198,21 @@ To enable this ongoing negotiation, the AS provides a continuation API to the client software. The AS returns a continue field in the response (Section 3.1) that contains information the client instance needs to access this API, including a URI to access as well as a continuation access token to use during the requests. The continuation access token is initially bound to the same key and method the client instance used to make the initial request. As a consequence, when the client instance makes any calls to the - continuation URL, the client instance MUST present the continuation + continuation URI, the client instance MUST present the continuation access token as described in Section 7.2 and present proof of the client instance's key (or its most recent rotation) by signing the request as described in Section 7.3. The AS MUST validate all keys presented by the client instance or referenced in an ongoing request for each call within that request. Access tokens other than the continuation access tokens MUST NOT be usable for continuation requests. [[ See issue #85 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ @@ -3064,54 +3222,54 @@ unique URI and signs the request with HTTP Message Signatures: POST /continue/KSKUOMUKM HTTP/1.1 Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Host: server.example.com Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... The AS MUST be able to tell from the client instance's request which specific ongoing request is being accessed, using a combination of - the continuation URL, the provided continuation access token, and the + the continuation URI, the provided continuation access token, and the client instance identified by the key signature. If the AS cannot determine a single active grant request to map the continuation request to, the AS MUST return an error. The ability to continue an already-started request allows the client instance to perform several important functions, including presenting additional information from interaction, modifying the initial request, and getting the current state of the request. All requests to the continuation API are protected by this bound continuation access token. For example, here the client instance - makes a POST request to a stable continuation endpoint URL with the + makes a POST request to a stable continuation endpoint URI with the interaction reference (Section 5.1), includes the access token, and signs with HTTP Message Signatures: POST /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" } - If a wait parameter was included in the continuation response (Section 3.1), the client instance MUST NOT call the continuation URI prior to waiting the number of seconds indicated. If no wait period - is indicated, the client instance SHOULD wait at least 5 seconds. If - the client instance does not respect the given wait period, the AS - MUST return an error. + is indicated, the client instance MUST NOT poll immediately and + SHOULD wait at least 5 seconds. If the client instance does not + respect the given wait period, the AS MUST return the error too_fast + defined in Section 3.6. The response from the AS is a JSON object and MAY contain any of the fields described in Section 3, as described in more detail in the sections below. If the AS determines that the client instance can make a further continuation request, the AS MUST include a new "continue" response (Section 3.1). The new continue response MUST include a continuation access token as well, and this token SHOULD be a new access token, invalidating the previous access token. If the AS does not return a @@ -3129,21 +3287,21 @@ Section 4.2.1, this response includes an interaction reference. The client instance MUST include that value as the field interact_ref in a POST request to the continuation URI. POST /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" } Since the interaction reference is a one-time-use value as described in Section 4.2.1, if the client instance needs to make additional continuation calls after this request, the client instance MUST NOT include the interaction reference. If the AS detects a client instance submitting the same interaction reference multiple times, @@ -3241,21 +3399,21 @@ M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", }, "subject": { "sub_ids": [ { "format": "opaque", "id": "J2G8G8O4AZ" } ] } } - See Section 12.20 for considerations on polling for continuation + See Section 12.21 for considerations on polling for continuation without an interaction finish method. 5.3. Modifying an Existing Request The client instance might need to modify an ongoing request, whether or not tokens have already been issued or claims have already been released. In such cases, the client instance makes an HTTP PATCH request to the continuation URI and includes any fields it needs to modify. Fields that aren't included in the request are considered unchanged from the original request. @@ -3273,21 +3431,21 @@ core-protocol/issues/92) ]] The client instance MAY include the interact field as described in Section 2.5. Inclusion of this field indicates that the client instance is capable of driving interaction with the RO, and this field replaces any values from a previous request. The AS MAY respond to any of the interaction responses as described in Section 3.3, just like it would to a new request. The client instance MAY include the user field as described in - Section 2.4 to present new assertions or information about the end- + Section 2.4 to present new assertions or information about the end user. [[ See issue #93 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core- protocol/issues/93) ]] The client instance MUST NOT include the client section of the request. [[ See issue #94 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core- protocol/issues/94) ]] The client instance MAY include post-interaction responses such as described in Section 5.1. [[ See issue #95 (https://github.com/ietf- wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/95) ]] @@ -3306,21 +3464,21 @@ contain interaction responses (Section 3.3) as well. For example, a client instance initially requests a set of resources using references: POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "read", "write" ] }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { @@ -3356,21 +3514,21 @@ it no longer needs "write" access and therefore modifies its ongoing request, here asking for just "read" access instead of both "read" and "write" as before. PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "read" ] } ... } @@ -3400,21 +3558,21 @@ } For another example, the client instance initially requests read-only access but later needs to step up its access. The initial request could look like this example. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "read" ] }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { @@ -3448,30 +3606,27 @@ call. The client instance later realizes that it now needs "write" access in addition to the "read" access. Since this is an expansion of what it asked for previously, the client instance also includes a new interaction section in case the AS needs to interact with the RO again to gather additional authorization. Note that the client instance's nonce and callback are different from the initial request. Since the original callback was already used in the initial exchange, and the callback is intended for one-time-use, a new one needs to be included in order to use the callback again. - [[ See issue #97 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/ - issues/97) ]] - PATCH /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "read", "write" ] }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { @@ -3502,88 +3657,104 @@ Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... If the request is successfully cancelled, the AS responds with an HTTP 202. The AS SHOULD revoke all associated access tokens. 6. Token Management - If an access token response includes the "manage" parameter as - described in Section 3.2.1, the client instance MAY call this URL to + If an access token response includes the manage parameter as + described in Section 3.2.1, the client instance MAY call this URI to manage the access token with any of the actions defined in the - following sections. Other actions are undefined by this - specification. + following sections: rotate and revoke. Other actions are undefined + by this specification. The access token being managed acts as the access element for its own management API. The client instance MUST present proof of an appropriate key along with the access token. If the token is sender-constrained (i.e., not a bearer token), it MUST be sent with the appropriate binding for the access token (Section 7.2). If the token is a bearer token, the client instance MUST present proof of the same key identified in the initial request (Section 2.3) as described in Section 7.3. The AS MUST validate the proof and assure that it is associated with either the token itself or the client instance the token was issued to, as appropriate for the token's presentation type. 6.1. Rotating the Access Token - The client instance makes an HTTP POST to the token management URI, - sending the access token in the appropriate header and signing the - request with the appropriate key. + If the client instance has an access token and that access token + expires, the client instance might want to rotate the access token. + Rotating an access token consists of issuing a new access token in + place of an existing access token, with the same rights and + properties as the original token, apart from an updated expiration + time. + + To rotate an access token, the client instance makes an HTTP POST to + the token management URI, sending the access token in the appropriate + header and signing the request with the appropriate key. POST /token/PRY5NM33OM4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: GNAP OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0 Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... The AS validates that the token presented is associated with the - management URL, that the AS issued the token to the given client + management URI, that the AS issued the token to the given client instance, and that the presented key is appropriate to the token. - If the access token has expired, the AS SHOULD honor the rotation - request to the token management URL since it is likely that the - client instance is attempting to refresh the expired token. To - support this, the AS MAY apply different lifetimes for the use of the - token in management vs. its use at an RS. An AS MUST NOT honor a - rotation request for an access token that has been revoked, either by - the AS or by the client instance through the token management URI - (Section 6.2). + Note that in many cases, the access token will have expired for + regular use. To facilitate token rotation, the AS SHOULD honor the + rotation request of the expired access token since it is likely that + the client instance is attempting to refresh the expired token. To + support this, the AS MAY allow a longer lifetime for token management + compared to its use at an RS. An AS MUST NOT honor a rotation + request for an access token that has been revoked or otherwise + disabled. If the token is validated and the key is appropriate for the request, the AS MUST invalidate the current access token associated with this - URL, if possible, and return a new access token response as described - in Section 3.2.1, unless the multi_token flag is specified in the - request. The value of the access token MUST NOT be the same as the - current value of the access token used to access the management API. - The response MAY include an updated access token management URL as - well, and if so, the client instance MUST use this new URL to manage - the new access token. [[ See issue #101 (https://github.com/ietf-wg- - gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/101) ]] + URI, if possible. Note that stateless access tokens can make + proactive revocation difficult within a system, see Section 12.29. + + The AS responds with an HTTP 200 with a JSON body consisting of the + rotated access token in the access_token field described in + Section 3.2.1. The value of the access token MUST NOT be the same as + the current value of the access token used to access the management + API. The response MUST include an access token management URI, and + the value of this URI MAY be different from the URI used by the + client instance to make the rotation call. The client instance MUST + use this new URI to manage the rotated access token. + + The access rights in the access array for the rotated access token + MUST be included in the response and MUST be the same as the token + before rotation. If the client instance requires different access + rights, the client instance can request a new access token by + creating a new request (Section 2) or by updating an existing grant + request (Section 5.3). - [[ See issue #102 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core- - protocol/issues/102) ]] NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 { "access_token": { "value": "FP6A8H6HY37MH13CK76LBZ6Y1UADG6VEUPEER5H2", "manage": "https://server.example.com/token/PRY5NM33O\ M4TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1L", + "expires_in": 3600, "access": [ { "type": "photo-api", "actions": [ "read", "write", "dolphin" ], "locations": [ "https://server.example.net/", @@ -3624,21 +3795,21 @@ If the key presented is associated with the token (or the client instance, in the case of a bearer token), the AS MUST invalidate the access token, if possible, and return an HTTP 204 response code. 204 No Content Though the AS MAY revoke an access token at any time for any reason, the token management function is specifically for the client instance's use. If the access token has already expired or has been revoked through other means, the AS SHOULD honor the revocation - request to the token management URL as valid, since the end result is + request to the token management URI as valid, since the end result is still the token not being usable. 7. Securing Requests from the Client Instance In GNAP, the client instance secures its requests to the AS and RS by presenting an access token, presenting proof of a key that it possesses (aka, a "key proof"), or both an access token and key proof together. * When an access token is used with a key proof, this is a bound @@ -3670,38 +3841,39 @@ that request. For a key used as part of an access token response in Section 3.2.1, the proof of that key MUST be used when presenting the access token. A key presented by value MUST be a public key in at least one supported format. If a key is sent in multiple formats, all the key format values MUST be equivalent. Note that while most formats present the full value of the public key, some formats present a value cryptographically derived from the public key. - proof (string) The form of proof that the client instance will use + proof (string): The form of proof that the client instance will use when presenting the key. The valid values of this field and the - processing requirements for each are detailed in Section 7.3. The - proof field is REQUIRED. + processing requirements for each are detailed in Section 7.3. + REQUIRED. - jwk (object) The public key and its properties represented as a JSON - Web Key [RFC7517]. A JWK MUST contain the alg (Algorithm) and kid - (Key ID) parameters. The alg parameter MUST NOT be "none". The - x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) parameter MAY be used to provide the - X.509 representation of the provided public key. + jwk (object): The public key and its properties represented as a + JSON Web Key [RFC7517]. A JWK MUST contain the alg (Algorithm) + and kid (Key ID) parameters. The alg parameter MUST NOT be + "none". The x5c (X.509 Certificate Chain) parameter MAY be used + to provide the X.509 representation of the provided public key. + OPTIONAL. - cert (string) PEM serialized value of the certificate used to sign + cert (string): PEM serialized value of the certificate used to sign the request, with optional internal whitespace per [RFC7468]. The - PEM header and footer are optionally removed. + PEM header and footer are optionally removed. OPTIONAL. - cert#S256 (string) The certificate thumbprint calculated as per + cert#S256 (string): The certificate thumbprint calculated as per OAuth-MTLS [RFC8705] in base64 URL encoding. Note that this - format does not include the full public key. + format does not include the full public key. OPTIONAL. Additional key formats are defined in a registry TBD (Section 11). This non-normative example shows a single key presented in multiple formats. This example key is intended to be used with the HTTP Message Signatures ({{httpsig-binding}}) proofing mechanism, as indicated by the httpsig value of the proof field. "key": { "proof": "httpsig", @@ -3724,21 +3896,37 @@ "key": "S-P4XJQ_RYJCRTSU1.63N3E" Keys referenced in this manner MAY be shared symmetric keys. The key reference MUST NOT contain any unencrypted private or shared symmetric key information. Keys referenced in this manner MUST be bound to a single proofing mechanism. The means of dereferencing this value are out of scope for this - specification. + specification. Commonly, key references are created by the AS and + are not necessarily needed to be dereferencable by the client. These + types of key references are an internal reference to the AS, such as + an identifier of a record in a database. In other applications, it + can be useful to use key references that are resolvable by both + clients and ASs, which could be accomplished by e.g. a client + publishing a public key at a URI. For interoperability, this method + could later be described as an extension. + +7.1.2. Key Protection + + The security of GNAP relies on the cryptographic security of the keys + themselves. When symmetric keys are used in GNAP, a key management + system or secure key derivation mechanism MUST be used to supply the + keys. Symmetric keys MUST NOT be a human memorable password or a + value derived from one. Symmetric keys MUST NOT be passed by value + from the client instance to the AS. 7.2. Presenting Access Tokens The method the client instance uses to send an access token depends on whether the token is bound to a key, and if so which proofing method is associated with the key. This information is conveyed by the key parameter and the bearer flag in the single (Section 3.2.1) and multiple access tokens (Section 3.2.2) responses. If the flags field does not contain the bearer flag and the key is @@ -3756,27 +3944,27 @@ proof as described in Section 7.3 for the key bound to the access token. For example, an "httpsig"-bound access token is sent as follows: NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 GET /stuff HTTP/1.1 Host: resource.example.com Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "authorization")\ - ;created=1618884475;keyid="gnap-rsa" - Signature: sig1=:KymTn1/++nwWsNHdc48sguMjnVSnvqQNrijQT0/kXDfljaIgHl\ - o12NkEt4e5qZeCFutzRxWpHKtjVEDldIUSsktxj4Li7PgUNJtIkJkdA1EoebGz1X/\ - AD3coqYpoaFsOcPyfXjYHYWFd8HxLOUz3imA8xbxS+J9GZAjyDjTfG6yfsMsfd10f\ - nrDRJqalPNDEgOOwwyEtjht4MnzpV1Wf43YWwgEJOC2rvxPIeuNxWbUc5v/o3s3Zr\ - ywo2sunUcwXwlmbgyiGY0vgGFWjdHfgKvjda7eNLTr7r3jPgo/GlOB3jyadD4xcKs\ - S/idS3RGk1+e9jbGHK5cRTp0ZzF94kWw==: + ;created=1618884473;keyid="gnap-rsa" + Signature: sig1=:ThgXGQjGiJYQW8JYxcNypXk7wQWG8KZ6AtyKOrqNOkgoa8iWgm\ + feHLkRmT6BUj83DkLX84TQehhK3D5Lcgllhghuu2Pr3JmYVY7FFYwYAcfoISzVPKp\ + YyDbh/g34qOpFvlCYDgG94ZX16LAKlqYXWn5vYgealgm54zzCCnvyaLKViGVWz6PM\ + 7rOIZqMQPOu6JceqdsiVn8xj2qTS9CWEmuJABtTnRoXNGVg8tUEQp7qt3F7tCI/AM\ + vHW4FAYrQbE47qQsjh4zPiES1EM+lHdA9fCE0OEsfabxB7Gr9GvkMyiApWTf/Zs45\ + IoJhr1OVtOCGVhEmoiNFreBTm7cTyTgg==: If the flags field contains the bearer flag, the access token is a bearer token that MUST be sent using the Authorization Request Header Field method defined in [RFC6750]. Authorization: Bearer OS9M2PMHKUR64TB8N6BW7OZB8CDFONP219RP1LT0 The Form-Encoded Body Parameter and URI Query Parameter methods of [RFC6750] MUST NOT be used. @@ -3788,26 +3976,27 @@ with any value. 7.3. Proving Possession of a Key with a Request Any keys presented by the client instance to the AS or RS MUST be validated as part of the request in which they are presented. The type of binding used is indicated by the proof parameter of the key object in Section 7.1. Values defined by this specification are as follows: - httpsig HTTP Signing signature header + "httpsig": HTTP Signing signature headers. See Section 7.3.1. - mtls Mutual TLS certificate verification - jwsd A detached JWS signature header + "mtls": Mutual TLS certificate verification. See Section 7.3.2. - jws Attached JWS payload + "jwsd": A detached JWS signature header. See Section 7.3.3. + + "jws": Attached JWS payload. See Section 7.3.4. Additional proofing methods are defined by a registry TBD (Section 11). All key binding methods used by this specification MUST cover all relevant portions of the request, including anything that would change the nature of the request, to allow for secure validation of the request. Relevant aspects include the URI being called, the HTTP method being used, any relevant HTTP headers and values, and the HTTP message body itself. The verifier of the signed message MUST @@ -3882,37 +4072,39 @@ bunS0K3bA_3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kO\ zywzwPTuq-cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" } 7.3.1. HTTP Message Signing This method is indicated by httpsig in the proof field. The signer creates an HTTP Message Signature as described in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-message-signatures]. - The message components of the signature MUST include the following: + The covered components of the signature MUST include the following: - @method: the method used in the HTTP request + "@method": The method used in the HTTP request. - @target-uri: the full request URL of the HTTP request + "@target-uri": The full request URI of the HTTP request. - content-digest or digest: The Content-Digest or Digest header as - defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-digest-headers]. When the request - message has a body, the signer MUST calculate this header value - and the verifier MUST validate this field value. Use of Content- - Digest is RECOMMENDED. Use of content-encoding agnostic digest - methods (such as id-sha-256) is RECOMMENDED. + When the message contains a request body, the covered components MUST + also include the following: - When the request is bound to an access token, the covered content - MUST also include: + "content-digest": The Content-Digest header as defined in + [I-D.ietf-httpbis-digest-headers]. When the request message has a + body, the signer MUST calculate this header value and the verifier + MUST validate this field value. Use of content-encoding agnostic + digest methods (such as sha-256) is RECOMMENDED. - authorization: The Authorization header used to present the access + When the request is bound to an access token, the covered components + MUST also include the following: + + "authorization": The Authorization header used to present the access token as discussed in Section 7.2. Other message components MAY also be included. If the signer's key presented is a JWK, the keyid parameter of the signature MUST be set to the kid value of the JWK, the signing algorithm used MUST be the JWS algorithm denoted by the key's alg field, and the explicit alg signature parameter MUST NOT be included. In this example, the message body is the following JSON object: @@ -3927,104 +4119,102 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "httpsig", "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", "jwk": { "kid": "gnap-rsa", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", - "alg": "RS256", + "alg": "PS512", "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" } } "display": { "name": "My Client Display Name", "uri": "https://client.foo/" }, } } - This body is hashed for the Content-Digest header using id-sha-256 - into the following encoded value: + This body is hashed for the Content-Digest header using sha-256 into + the following encoded value: - id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+CrwwvUoiaDCSjKxw= + sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAGg=: The HTTP message signature input string is calculated to be the following: NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 "@method": POST "@target-uri": https://server.example.com/gnap + "content-digest": \ + sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAGg=: + "content-length": 988 "content-type": application/json - "content-digest": id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+Crwwv\ - UoiaDCSjKxw= - "content-length": 986 - "@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-type" \ - "content-digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\ - ;keyid="gnap-rsa" + "@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "content-length" "content-type");created=1618884473;keyid="gnap-rsa" This leads to the following full HTTP message request: NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 POST /gnap HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json - Content-Length: 986 - Content-Digest: id-sha-256=98QzyNVYpdgTrWBKpC4qFSCmmR+CrwwvUoiaDCSj\ - Kxw= - Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-type" \ - "content-digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\ - ;keyid="gnap-rsa" - Signature: sig1=:SatKrAh2qNxbDBY6H3XUtpWn07aSrukpi3202L4DIPLLGgKdSu\ - XyObjdCK/agmEx36xyn40iiCAqYskXugpNARianBiWKOkcWHhSs31FSTSoJ8vvGpJ\ - 4GxemDPvI6BXmLZtJvYBehoXtfcRFKGLzYOtbbtefzw2vP+k19W4PrhNmxFEUCepT\ - KRk0sBoz4zIYK6FqEAHir0oRjwdCcXHFqI9U6+/DgpuxjFFX+OSZehmN6Q1quJgu0\ - FITmsC9OANs5hwIAkXGJNdv3FuxAZAVrSnUScuGutSJXAn1daXToewVgBA+IrQ86m\ - lsXtWgvmTTXENUvOELV6qTV2nenwr/UQ==: + Content-Length: 988 + Content-Digest: sha-256=:q2XBmzRDCREcS2nWo/6LYwYyjrlN1bRfv+HKLbeGAG\ + g=: + Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \ + "content-length" "content-type");created=1618884473;keyid="gnap-rsa" + Signature: sig1=:EWJgAONk3D6542Scj8g51rYeMHw96cH2XiCMxcyL511wyemGcw\ + 5PosYVO3eK+v+h1H+LiO4BjapL5ffZV+SgU8Q2v+qEDA4FrP0+/ni9W+lazjIrzNs\ + FAojwTlngMkAjZyDC/5+qUYB0KeEb4gnAhmuikv28DF30MT28yxCjeui2NGyzpPxB\ + cWk1K2Cxb6hS1WXUSZufFN9jOzrTg2c8/jcKkROKbLZLshF/oCuxAAgDabTqJy+qk\ + kz/Z/U5hI181qlTzNIYijnAvXzezlsLPZcMpJ1Au9APyBYAtDipAzyD6+IZl3rhzP\ + 2leuCMCOvDxg9qA83LVtsqfjNJO+dEHA==: { "access_token": { "access": [ "dolphin-metadata" ] }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "httpsig", "key": { + "proof": "httpsig", "jwk": { "kid": "gnap-rsa", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", - "alg": "RS256", + "alg": "PS512", "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ N7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQ" } } "display": { "name": "My Client Display Name", @@ -4079,22 +4269,22 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "jws", "key": { + "proof": "mtls", "cert": "MIIC6jCCAdKgAwIBAgIGAXjw74xPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMD\ YxNDAyBgNVBAMMK05JWU15QmpzRGp5QkM5UDUzN0Q2SVR6a3BEOE50UmppOXlhcEV\ 6QzY2bVEwHhcNMjEwNDIwMjAxODU0WhcNMjIwMjE0MjAxODU0WjA2MTQwMgYDVQQD\ DCtOSVlNeUJqc0RqeUJDOVA1MzdENklUemtwRDhOdFJqaTl5YXBFekM2Nm1RMIIBI\ jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAhYOJ+XOKISdMMShn/G4W9m20mT\ 0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8BfYdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8\ KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZGYXjHpwjzvfGvXH/5KJlnR3/uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn\ 11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jRETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDad\ z8BkPo+uv4BC0bunS0K3bA/3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp/muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKX\ fGhi3kOzywzwPTuq+cVQDyEN7aL0SxCb3Hc4IdqDaMg8qHUyObpPitDQIDAQABMA0\ @@ -4117,56 +4308,58 @@ The verifier compares the TLS client certificate presented during mutual TLS negotiation to the expected key of the signer. Since the TLS connection covers the entire message, there are no additional requirements to check. Note that in many instances, the verifier will not do a full certificate chain validation of the presented TLS client certificate, as the means of trust for this certificate could be in something other than a PKI system, such as a static registration or trust-on- - first-use. See Section 12.16 and Section 12.17 for some additional + first-use. See Section 12.17 and Section 12.18 for some additional considerations for this key proofing method. 7.3.3. Detached JWS This method is indicated by jwsd in the proof field. A JWS [RFC7515] object is created as follows: To protect the request, the JOSE header of the signature contains the - following parameters: + following claims: - kid (string) The key identifier. RECOMMENDED. If the key is - presented in JWK format, this MUST be the value of the kid field - of the key. + kid (string): The key identifier. REQUIRED if the key is presented + in JWK format, this MUST be the value of the kid field of the key. - alg (string) The algorithm used to sign the request. REQUIRED. - MUST be appropriate to the key presented. If the key is presented - as a JWK, this MUST be equal to the alg parameter of the key. - MUST NOT be none. + alg (string): The algorithm used to sign the request. MUST be + appropriate to the key presented. If the key is presented as a + JWK, this MUST be equal to the alg parameter of the key. MUST NOT + be none. REQUIRED. - typ (string) The type header, value "gnap-binding+jwsd". REQUIRED + typ (string): The type header, value "gnap-binding+jwsd". REQUIRED. - htm (string) The HTTP Method used to make this request, as an - uppercase ASCII string. REQUIRED + htm (string): The HTTP Method used to make this request, as a case- + sensitive ASCII string. Note that most public HTTP methods are in + uppercase ASCII by convention. REQUIRED. - uri (string) The HTTP URI used for this request, including all path - and query components and no fragment component. REQUIRED + uri (string): The HTTP URI used for this request, including all path + and query components and no fragment component. REQUIRED. - created (integer) A timestamp of when the signature was created, in - integer seconds since UNIX Epoch + created (integer): A timestamp of when the signature was created, in + integer seconds since UNIX Epoch. REQUIRED. - ath (string) When a request is bound to an access token, the access - token hash value. The value MUST be the result of Base64url - encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest of the ASCII - encoding of the associated access token's value. REQUIRED if the - request protects an access token. + When the request is bound to an access token, the JOSE header MUST + also include the following: + + ath (string): The hash of the access token. The value MUST be the + result of Base64url encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest + of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value. + REQUIRED. If the HTTP request has a message body, such as an HTTP POST or PUT method, the payload of the JWS object is the Base64url encoding (without padding) of the SHA256 digest of the bytes of the body. If the request being made does not have a message body, such as an HTTP GET, OPTIONS, or DELETE method, the JWS signature is calculated over an empty payload. The signer presents the signed object in compact form [RFC7515] in the Detached-JWS HTTP Header field. @@ -4194,22 +4387,22 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "jwsd", "key": { + "proof": "jwsd", "jwk": { "kid": "gnap-rsa", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", "alg": "RS256", "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ @@ -4253,22 +4446,22 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "jwsd", "key": { + "proof": "jwsd", "jwk": { "kid": "gnap-rsa", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", "alg": "RS256", "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ @@ -4287,42 +4480,49 @@ expected key of the signer. All required fields MUST be present and their values MUST be valid. If the HTTP message request contains a body, the verifier MUST calculate the hash of body just as the signer does, with no normalization or transformation of the request. 7.3.4. Attached JWS This method is indicated by jws in the proof field. A JWS [RFC7515] object is created as follows: - The JOSE header MUST contain the kid parameter of the key bound to - this signer for this request. The alg parameter MUST be set to a - value appropriate for the key identified by kid and MUST NOT be none. + To protect the request, the JWS header contains the following claims. - To protect the request, the JWS header MUST contain the following - additional parameters. + kid (string): The key identifier. REQUIRED if the key is presented + in JWK format, this MUST be the value of the kid field of the key. - typ (string) The type header, value "gnap-binding+jws". + alg (string): The algorithm used to sign the request. MUST be + appropriate to the key presented. If the key is presented as a + JWK, this MUST be equal to the alg parameter of the key. MUST NOT + be none. REQUIRED. - htm (string) The HTTP Method used to make this request, as an - uppercase ASCII string. + typ (string): The type header, value "gnap-binding+jwsd". REQUIRED. - uri (string) The HTTP URI used for this request, including all path - and query components and no fragment component. + htm (string): The HTTP Method used to make this request, as a case- + sensitive ASCII string. (Note that most public HTTP methods are + in uppercase.) REQUIRED. - created (integer) A timestamp of when the signature was created, in - integer seconds since UNIX Epoch + uri (string): The HTTP URI used for this request, including all path + and query components and no fragment component. REQUIRED. - ath (string) When a request is bound to an access token, the access - token hash value. The value MUST be the result of Base64url - encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest of the ASCII - encoding of the associated access token's value. + created (integer): A timestamp of when the signature was created, in + integer seconds since UNIX Epoch. REQUIRED. + + When the request is bound to an access token, the JOSE header MUST + also include the following: + + ath (string): The hash of the access token. The value MUST be the + result of Base64url encoding (with no padding) the SHA-256 digest + of the ASCII encoding of the associated access token's value. + REQUIRED. If the HTTP request has a message body, such as an HTTP POST or PUT method, the payload of the JWS object is the JSON serialized body of the request, and the object is signed according to JWS and serialized into compact form [RFC7515]. The signer presents the JWS as the body of the request along with a content type of application/jose. The verifier MUST extract the payload of the JWS and treat it as the request body for further processing. If the request being made does not have a message body, such as an @@ -4354,22 +4554,22 @@ }, "interact": { "start": ["redirect"], "finish": { "method": "redirect", "uri": "https://client.foo/callback", "nonce": "VJLO6A4CAYLBXHTR0KRO" } }, "client": { - "proof": "jws", "key": { + "proof": "jws", "jwk": { "kid": "gnap-rsa", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", "alg": "RS256", "n": "hYOJ-XOKISdMMShn_G4W9m20mT0VWtQBsmBBkI2cmRt4Ai8Bf\ YdHsFzAtYKOjpBR1RpKpJmVKxIGNy0g6Z3ad2XYsh8KowlyVy8IkZ8NMwSrcUIBZG\ YXjHpwjzvfGvXH_5KJlnR3_uRUp4Z4Ujk2bCaKegDn11V2vxE41hqaPUnhRZxe0jR\ ETddzsE3mu1SK8dTCROjwUl14mUNo8iTrTm4n0qDadz8BkPo-uv4BC0bunS0K3bA_\ 3UgVp7zBlQFoFnLTO2uWp_muLEWGl67gBq9MO3brKXfGhi3kOzywzwPTuq-cVQDyE\ @@ -4418,23 +4618,20 @@ gImRpc3BsYXkiOiB7CiAgICAgICAgIm5hbWUiOiAiTXkgQ2xpZW50IERpc3BsYXkgTm\ FtZSIsCiAgICAgICAgInVyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2NsaWVudC5mb28vIgogICAgICB9L\ AogICAgfSwKICAgICJzdWJqZWN0IjogewogICAgICAgICJmb3JtYXRzIjogWyJpc3Nf\ c3ViIiwgIm9wYXF1ZSJdCiAgICB9Cn0K.MwNoVMQp5hVxI0mCs9LlOUdFtkDXaA1_eT\ vOXq7DOGrtDKH7q4vP2xUq3fH2jRAZqnobo0WdPP3eM3NH5QUjW8pa6_QpwdIWkK7r-\ u_52puE0lPBp7J4U2w4l9gIbg8iknsmWmXeY5F6wiGT8ptfuEYGgmloAJd9LIeNvD3U\ LW2h2dz1Pn2eDnbyvgB0Ugae0BoZB4f69fKWj8Z9wvTIjk1LZJN1PcL7_zT8Lrlic9a\ PyzT7Q9ovkd1s-4whE7TrnGUzFc5mgWUn_gsOpsP5mIIljoEEv-FqOW2RyNYulOZl0Q\ 8EnnDHV_vPzrHlUarbGg4YffgtwkQhdK72-JOxYQ - [[ See issue #109 (https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core- - protocol/issues/109) ]] - When the verifier receives an attached JWS request, it MUST parse and validate the JWS object. The signature MUST be validated against the expected key of the signer. All required fields MUST be present and their values MUST be valid. If the HTTP message request contains a body, the verifier MUST decode the payload of the JWS object and treat this as the HTTP message body. 8. Resource Access Rights GNAP provides a rich structure for describing the protected resources @@ -4445,60 +4642,61 @@ The root of this structure is a JSON array. The elements of the JSON array represent rights of access that are associated with the the access token. The resulting access is the union of all elements within the array. The access associated with the access token is described using objects that each contain multiple dimensions of access. Each object contains a REQUIRED type property that determines the type of API that the token is used for. - type (string) The type of resource request as a string. This field + type (string): The type of resource request as a string. This field MAY define which other fields are allowed in the request object. - This field is REQUIRED. + REQUIRED. The value of the type field is under the control of the AS. This field MUST be compared using an exact byte match of the string value against known types by the AS. The AS MUST ensure that there is no collision between different authorization data types that it supports. The AS MUST NOT do any collation or normalization of data types during comparison. It is RECOMMENDED that designers of general-purpose APIs use a URI for this field to avoid collisions between multiple API types protected by a single AS. While it is expected that many APIs will have their own properties, a set of common properties are defined here. Specific API implementations SHOULD NOT re-use these fields with different semantics or syntax. The available values for these properties are - determined by the API being protected at the RS. + determined by the API being protected at the RS. All values are + OPTIONAL at the discretion of the API definition. - actions (array of strings) The types of actions the client instance + actions (array of strings): The types of actions the client instance will take at the RS as an array of strings. For example, a client instance asking for a combination of "read" and "write" access. - locations (array of strings) The location of the RS as an array of + locations (array of strings): The location of the RS as an array of strings. These strings are typically URIs identifying the location of the RS. - datatypes (array of strings) The kinds of data available to the + datatypes (array of strings): The kinds of data available to the client instance at the RS's API as an array of strings. For example, a client instance asking for access to raw "image" data and "metadata" at a photograph API. - identifier (string) A string identifier indicating a specific + identifier (string): A string identifier indicating a specific resource at the RS. For example, a patient identifier for a medical API or a bank account number for a financial API. - privileges (array of strings) The types or levels of privilege being - requested at the resource. For example, a client instance asking - for administrative level access, or access when the resource owner - is no longer online. + privileges (array of strings): The types or levels of privilege + being requested at the resource. For example, a client instance + asking for administrative level access, or access when the + resource owner is no longer online. The following non-normative example is describing three kinds of access (read, write, delete) to each of two different locations and two different data types (metadata, images) for a single access token using the fictitious photo-api type definition. "access": [ { "type": "photo-api", "actions": [ @@ -4684,61 +4883,63 @@ By design, the protocol minimizes the need for any pre-flight discovery. To begin a request, the client instance only needs to know the endpoint of the AS and which keys it will use to sign the request. Everything else can be negotiated dynamically in the course of the protocol. However, the AS can have limits on its allowed functionality. If the client instance wants to optimize its calls to the AS before making a request, it MAY send an HTTP OPTIONS request to the grant request endpoint to retrieve the server's discovery information. The AS MUST - respond with a JSON document containing the following information: + respond with a JSON document with Content-Type application/json + containing a single object with the following information: - grant_request_endpoint (string) REQUIRED. The location of the AS's - grant request endpoint. The location MUST be a URL [RFC3986] with - a scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and + grant_request_endpoint (string): The location of the AS's grant + request endpoint. The location MUST be a URL [RFC3986] with a + scheme component that MUST be https, a host component, and optionally, port, path and query components and no fragment components. This URL MUST match the URL the client instance used - to make the discovery request. + to make the discovery request. REQUIRED. - interaction_start_modes_supported (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A - list of the AS's interaction start methods. The values of this - list correspond to the possible values for the interaction start - section (Section 2.5.1) of the request. + interaction_start_modes_supported (array of strings): A list of the + AS's interaction start methods. The values of this list + correspond to the possible values for the interaction start + section (Section 2.5.1) of the request. OPTIONAL. - interaction_finish_methods_supported (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A - list of the AS's interaction finish methods. The values of this - list correspond to the possible values for the method element of - the interaction finish section (Section 2.5.2) of the request. + interaction_finish_methods_supported (array of strings): A list of + the AS's interaction finish methods. The values of this list + correspond to the possible values for the method element of the + interaction finish section (Section 2.5.2) of the request. + OPTIONAL. - key_proofs_supported (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A list of the - AS's supported key proofing mechanisms. The values of this list + key_proofs_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported key proofing mechanisms. The values of this list correspond to possible values of the proof field of the key - section (Section 7.1) of the request. + section (Section 7.1) of the request. OPTIONAL. - subject_formats_supported (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A list of - the AS's supported subject identifier types. The values of this - list correspond to possible values of the subject identifier - section (Section 2.2) of the request. + sub_id_formats_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported subject identifier formats. The values of this list + correspond to possible values of the subject identifier section + (Section 2.2) of the request. OPTIONAL. - assertions_supported (array of strings) OPTIONAL. A list of the - AS's supported assertion formats. The values of this list - correspond to possible values of the subject assertion section - (Section 2.2) of the request. + assertion_formats_supported (array of strings): A list of the AS's + supported assertion formats. The values of this list correspond + to possible values of the subject assertion section (Section 2.2) + of the request. OPTIONAL. The information returned from this method is for optimization purposes only. The AS MAY deny any request, or any portion of a request, even if it lists a capability as supported. For example, a given client instance can be registered with the mtls key proofing - mechanism, but the AS also returns other proofing methods, then the - AS will deny a request from that client instance using a different - proofing mechanism. + mechanism, but the AS also returns other proofing methods from the + discovery document, then the AS will still deny a request from that + client instance using a different proofing mechanism. 9.1. RS-first Method of AS Discovery If the client instance calls an RS without an access token, or with an invalid access token, the RS MAY respond to the client instance with an authentication header indicating that GNAP needs to be used to access the resource. The address of the GNAP endpoint MUST be sent in the "as_uri" parameter. The RS MAY additionally return a resource reference that the client instance MAY use in its access token request. This resource reference MUST be sufficient for at @@ -4764,43 +4965,43 @@ single access token using the resource reference FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1 received from the RS in addition to the dolphin-metadata resource reference that the client instance has been configured with out of band. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "FWWIKYBQ6U56NL1", "dolphin-metadata" ] }, "client": "KHRS6X63AJ7C7C4AZ9AO" } If issued, the resulting access token would contain sufficient access to be used at both referenced resources. 10. Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank the feedback of the following individuals for their reviews, implementations, and contributions: - Aeke Axeland, Aaron Parecki, Adam Omar Oueidat, Andrii Deinega, + Åke Axeland, Aaron Parecki, Adam Omar Oueidat, Andrii Deinega, Annabelle Backman, Dick Hardt, Dmitri Zagidulin, Dmitry Barinov, - Fabien Imbault, Francis Pouatcha, George Fletcher, Haardik Haardik, - Florian Helmschmidt, Hamid Massaoud, Jacky Yuan, Joseph Heenan, + Fabien Imbault, Florian Helmschmidt, Francis Pouatcha, George + Fletcher, Haardik Haardik, Hamid Massaoud, Jacky Yuan, Joseph Heenan, Justin Richer, Kathleen Moriarty, Mike Jones, Mike Varley, Nat Sakimura, Takahiko Kawasaki, Takahiro Tsuchiya. The editors would also like to thank the GNAP working group design team of Kathleen Moriarty, Fabien Imbault, Dick Hardt, Mike Jones, and Justin Richer, who incorporated elements from the XAuth and XYZ proposals to create the first version of this document. In addition, the editors would like to thank Aaron Parecki and Mike Jones for insights into how to integrate identity and authentication @@ -4968,27 +5168,27 @@ Finally, if multiple instances of client software each have the same key, then from GNAP's perspective, these are functionally the same client instance as GNAP has no reasonable way to differentiate between them. This situation could happen if multiple instances within a cluster can securely share secret information among themselves. Even though there are multiple copies of the software, the shared key makes these copies all present as a single instance. It is considered bad practice to share keys between copies of software unless they are very tightly integrated with each other and can be closely managed. It is particularly bad practice to allow an - end-user to copy keys between client instances and to willingly use + end user to copy keys between client instances and to willingly use the same key in multiple instances. 12.4. Protection of Authorization Server The AS performs critical functions in GNAP, including authenticating - client software, managing interactions with end-users to gather + client software, managing interactions with end users to gather consent and provide notice, and issuing access tokens for client instances to present to resource servers. As such, protecting the AS is central to any GNAP deployment. If an attacker is able to gain control over an AS, they would be able to create fraudulent tokens and manipulate registration information to allow for malicious clients. These tokens and clients would be trusted by other components in the ecosystem under the protection of the AS. @@ -5049,21 +5249,22 @@ material to any parties on the request path, including any attackers, sending these kinds of keys is prohibited. Symmetric keys can still be used by client instances, but only a reference to the key and not its value can be sent. This allows the AS to use pre-registered symmetric keys as well as key derivation schemes to take advantage of symmetric cryptography but without requiring key distribution at runtime, which would expose the keys in transit. Both the AS and client software can use systems such as hardware security modules to strengthen their key security storage and - generation for both asymmetric and symmetric keys. + generation for both asymmetric and symmetric keys (see also + Section 7.1.2). 12.6. Generation of Access Tokens The content of access tokens need to be such that only the generating AS would be able to create them, and the contents cannot be manipulated by an attacker to gain different or additional access rights. One method for accomplishing this is to use a cryptographically random value for the access token, generated by the AS using a secure @@ -5096,24 +5297,24 @@ consequence, any RS that a bearer token is presented to has the technical capability of presenting that bearer token to another RS, as long as the token is valid. It also means that any party that is able capture of the token value in storage or in transit is able to use the access token. While bearer tokens are inherently simpler, this simplicity has been misapplied and abused in making needlessly insecure systems. In GNAP, key-bound access tokens are the default due to their higher security properties. While bearer tokens can be used in GNAP, their - use should be limited onto to cases where the simplicity benefits - outweigh the significant security downsides. + use should be limited to cases where the simplicity benefits outweigh + the significant security downsides. -12.8. Key-Bound Token Access Tokens +12.8. Key-Bound Access Tokens Key-bound access tokens, as the name suggests, are bound to a specific key and must be presented along with proof of that key during use. The key itself is not presented at the same time as the token, so even if a token value is captured, it cannot be used to make a new request. This is particularly true for an RS, which will see the token value but will not see the keys used to make the request. Key-bound access tokens provide this additional layer of protection @@ -5124,21 +5325,21 @@ related signing key material. In addition to validating the signature of the presentation message itself, the RS also needs to ensure that the signing key used is appropriate for the presented token. If an RS does not ensure that the right keys were used to sign a message with a specific token, an attacker would be able to capture an access token and sign the request with their own keys, thereby negating the benefits of using key-bound access tokens. - The RS also needs to ensure that a sufficient portions of the message + The RS also needs to ensure that sufficient portions of the message are covered by the signature. Any items outside the signature could still affect the API's processing decisions, but these items would not be strongly bound to the token presentation. As such, an attacker could capture a valid request, then manipulate portions of the request outside of the signature envelope in order to cause unwanted actions at the protected API. Some key-bound tokens are susceptible to replay attacks, depending on the details of the signing method used. If a signature method covers only portions of a given request, that same signature proof can be @@ -5150,32 +5351,32 @@ uniqueness constraints. The details of using these will vary depending on the key proofing mechanism in use, but for example, HTTP Message Signatures has both a created and nonce signature parameter as well as the ability to cover significant portions of the HTTP message. 12.9. Exposure of End-user Credentials to Client Instance As a delegation protocol, one of the main goals of GNAP is to prevent the client software from being exposed to any credentials or - information about the end-user or resource owner as a requirement of + information about the end user or resource owner as a requirement of the delegation process. By using the variety of interaction mechanisms, the resource owner can interact with the AS without ever authenticating to the client software, and without the client software having to impersonate the resource owner through replay of their credentials. Consequently, no interaction methods defined in the GNAP core require - the end-user to enter their credentials, but it is technologically + the end user to enter their credentials, but it is technologically possible for an extension to be defined to carry such values. Such an extension would be dangerous as it would allow rogue client - software to directly collect, store, and replay the end-user's + software to directly collect, store, and replay the end user's credentials outside of any legitimate use within a GNAP request. The concerns of such an extension could be mitigated through use of a challenge and response unlocked by the end user's credentials. For example, the AS presents a challenge as part of an interaction start method, and the client instance signs that challenge using a key derived from a password presented by the end user. It would be possible for the client software to collect this password in a secure software enclave without exposing the password to the rest of the client software or putting it across the wire to the AS. The AS can @@ -5197,22 +5398,22 @@ legitimate client instance. A client instance needs to always be aware of which AS it is talking to throughout a grant process, and ensure that any callback for one AS does not get conflated with the callback to different AS. The interaction finish hash calculate allows a client instance to protect against this kind of substitution, but only if the client instance validates the hash. If the client instance does not use an interaction finish method or does not check the interaction finish hash value, the compromised AS can be granted a valid access token on - behalf of the resource owner. See [attack-surfaces] for details of - one such attack, which has been since addressed in this document by + behalf of the resource owner. See [AXELAND2021] for details of one + such attack, which has been since addressed in this document by including the grant endpoint in the interaction hash calculation. The client instance still needs to validate the hash for the attack to be prevented. 12.11. Processing of Client-Presented User Information GNAP allows the client instance to present assertions and identifiers of the current user to the AS as part of the initial request. This information should only ever be taken by the AS as a hint, since the AS has no way to tell if the represented person is present at the @@ -5222,21 +5423,21 @@ into account. For example, if a specific user is claimed to be present prior to interaction, but a different user is shown to be present during interaction, the AS can either determine this to be an error or signal to the client instance through returned subject information that the current user has changed from what the client instance thought. This user information can also be used by the AS to streamline the interaction process when the user is present. For example, instead of having the user type in their account identifier - during interaction at a redirected URL, the AS can immediately + during interaction at a redirected URI, the AS can immediately challenge the user for their account credentials. Alternatively, if an existing session is detected, the AS can determine that it matches the identifier provided by the client and subsequently skip an explicit authentication event by the resource owner. In cases where the AS trusts the client software more completely, due to policy or by previous approval of a given client instance, the AS can take this user information as a statement that the user is present and could issue access tokens and release subject information without interaction. The AS should only take such action in very @@ -5280,39 +5481,39 @@ Furthermore, it is the case that any clients using symmetric cryptography for key proofing mechanisms need to have their keys pre- registered. The registration should also include any information that would aid in the authorization process, such as a display name and logo. The registration record can also limit a given client to ask for certain kinds of information and access, or be limited to specific interaction mechanisms at runtime. It also is sensible to pre-register client instances when the software is acting autonomously, without the need for a runtime - approval by a resource owner or any interaction with an end-user. In + approval by a resource owner or any interaction with an end user. In these cases, an AS needs to rest on the trust decisions that have been determined prior to runtime in determining what rights and tokens to grant to a given client instance. However, it does not make sense to pre-register many types of clients. Single-page applications (SPAs) and mobile/desktop applications in particular present problems with pre-registration. For SPAs, the instances are ephemeral in nature and long-term registration of a single instance leads to significant storage and management overhead at the AS. For mobile applications, each installation of the client software is a separate instance, and sharing a key among all instances would be detrimental to security as the compromise of any single installation would compromise all copies for all users. An AS can treat these classes of client software differently from each other, perhaps by allowing access to certain high-value APIs - only to pre-registered known clients, or by requiring an active end- + only to pre-registered known clients, or by requiring an active end user delegation of authority to any client software not pre- registered. An AS can also provide warnings and caveats to resource owners during the authorization process, allowing the user to make an informed decision regarding the software they are authorizing. For example, if the AS has done vetting of the client software and this specific instance, it can present a different authorization screen compared to a client instance that is presenting all of its information at runtime. @@ -5339,105 +5540,143 @@ information it is displaying, allowing the resource owner to make a more informed delegation decision. For example, an AS can visually differentiate between a client instance that can be traced back to a specific developer's registration and an instance that has self- asserted its own key and display information. 12.14. Interception of Information in the Browser Most information passed through the web-browser is susceptible to interception and possible manipulation by elements within the browser - such as scripts loaded within pages. Information in the URL is + such as scripts loaded within pages. Information in the URI is exposed through browser and server logs, and can also leak to other - parties through HTTP Referrer headers. + parties through HTTP Referer headers. GNAP's design limits the information passed directly through the - browser, allowing for opaque URLs in most circumstances. For the + browser, allowing for opaque URIs in most circumstances. For the redirect-based interaction finish mechanism, named query parameters are used to carry unguessable opaque values. For these, GNAP requires creation and validation of a cryptographic hash to protect - the query parameters added to the URL and associate them with an + the query parameters added to the URI and associate them with an ongoing grant process. The client instance has to properly validate this hash to prevent an attacker from injecting an interaction reference intended for a different AS or client instance. - Several interaction start mechanisms use URLs created by the AS and - passed to the client instance. While these URLs are opaque to the + Several interaction start mechanisms use URIs created by the AS and + passed to the client instance. While these URIs are opaque to the client instance, it's possible for the AS to include parameters, paths, and other pieces of information that could leak security data or be manipulated by a party in the middle of the transaction. -12.15. Callback URL Manipulation +12.15. Callback URI Manipulation - The callback URL used in interaction finish mechanisms is defined by - the client instance. This URL is opaque to the AS, but can contain + The callback URI used in interaction finish mechanisms is defined by + the client instance. This URI is opaque to the AS, but can contain information relevant to the client instance's operations. In particular, the client instance can include state information to allow the callback request to be associated with an ongoing grant request. - Since this URL is exposed to the end-user's browser, it is + Since this URI is exposed to the end user's browser, it is susceptible to both logging and manipulation in transit before the request is made to the client software. As such, a client instance should never put security-critical or private information into the - callback URL in a cleartext form. For example, if the client - software includes a post-redirect target URL in its callback URL to - the AS, this target URL could be manipulated by an attacker, creating + callback URI in a cleartext form. For example, if the client + software includes a post-redirect target URI in its callback URI to + the AS, this target URI could be manipulated by an attacker, creating an open redirector at the client. Instead, a client instance can use - an unguessable identifier into the URL that can then be used by the + an unguessable identifier into the URI that can then be used by the client software to look up the details of the pending request. Since this approach requires some form of statefulness by the client software during the redirection process, clients that are not capable of holding state through a redirect should not use redirect-based interaction mechanisms. -12.16. MTLS Message Integrity +12.16. Redirection Status Codes + + As already described in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics], a server + should never use the HTTP 307 status code to redirect a request that + potentially contains user credentials. If an HTTP redirect is used + for such a request, the HTTP status code 303 "See Other" should be + used instead. + + The status code 307, as defined in the HTTP standard [RFC7231], + requires the user agent to preserve the method and body of a request, + thus submitting the body of the POST request to the redirect target. + In the HTTP standard [RFC7231], only the status code 303 + unambiguously enforces rewriting the HTTP POST request to an HTTP GET + request, which eliminates the POST body from the redirected request. + For all other status codes, including status code 302, user agents + are allowed not to rewrite a POST request into a GET request and thus + to resubmit the body. + + The use of status code 307 results in a vulnerability when using the + redirect interaction finish method (Section 3.3.5). With this + method, the AS potentially prompts the RO to enter their credentials + in a form that is then submitted back to the AS (using an HTTP POST + request). The AS checks the credentials and, if successful, may + directly redirect the RO to the client instance's redirect URI. Due + to the use of status code 307, the RO's user agent now transmits the + RO's credentials to the client instance. A malicious client instance + can then use the obtained credentials to impersonate the RO at the + AS. + + Redirection away from the initial URI in an interaction session could + also leak information found in that initial URI through the HTTP + Referer header field, which would be sent by the user agent to the + redirect target. To avoid such leakage, a server can first redirect + to an internal interstitial page without any identifying or sensitive + information on the URI before processing the request. When the user + agent is ultimately redirected from this page, no part of the + original interaction URI will be found in the Referrer header. + +12.17. MTLS Message Integrity The MTLS key proofing mechanism (Section 7.3.2) provides a means for - a client instance to present a key using a certificate the TLS layer. - Since TLS protects the entire HTTP message in transit, verification - of the TLS client certificate presented with the message provides a - sufficient binding between the two. However, since TLS is + a client instance to present a key using a certificate at the TLS + layer. Since TLS protects the entire HTTP message in transit, + verification of the TLS client certificate presented with the message + provides a sufficient binding between the two. However, since TLS is functioning at a separate layer from HTTP, there is no direct connection between the TLS key presentation and the message itself, other than the fact that the message was presented over the TLS channel. That is to say, any HTTP message can be presented over the TLS channel in question with the same level of trust. The verifier is responsible for ensuring the key in the TLS client certificate is the one expected for a particular request. For example, if the - request is a grant request (request), the AS needs to compare the TLS - client certificate presented at the TLS layer to the key identified - in the request body itself (either by value or through a referenced - identifier). + request is a grant request (Section 2), the AS needs to compare the + TLS client certificate presented at the TLS layer to the key + identified in the request body itself (either by value or through a + referenced identifier). Furthermore, the prevalence of the TLS-terminating reverse proxy (TTRP) pattern in deployments adds a wrinkle to the situation. In this common pattern, the TTRP validates the TLS connection and then forwards the HTTP message contents onward to an internal system for processing. The system processing the HTTP message no longer has access to the original TLS connection's information and context. To compensate for this, the TTRP could inject the TLS client certificate into the forwarded request as a header parameter using [I-D.ietf-httpbis-client-cert-field], giving the downstream system access to the certificate information. The TTRP has to be trusted to provide accurate certificate information, and the connection between the TTRP and the downstream system also has to be protected. The TTRP could provide some additional assurance, for example, by adding its own signature to the Client-Cert header field using [I-D.ietf-httpbis-message-signatures]. This signature would be effectively ignored by GNAP but understood by the downstream service as part of its deployment. Additional considerations for different types of deployment patterns - and key distribution mechanisms for MTLS are found in Section 12.17. + and key distribution mechanisms for MTLS are found in Section 12.18. -12.17. MTLS Deployment Patterns +12.18. MTLS Deployment Patterns GNAP does not specify how a client instance's keys could be made known to the AS ahead of time. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be used to manage the keys used by client instances when calling the AS, allowing the AS to trust a root key from a trusted authority. This method is particularly relevant to the MTLS key proofing method, where the client instance presents its certificate to the AS as part of the TLS connection. An AS using PKI to validate the MTLS connection would need to ensure that the presented certificate was issued by a trusted certificate authority before allowing the @@ -5447,60 +5686,60 @@ the AS. PKI has historically been difficult to deploy, especially at scale, but it remains an appropriate solution for systems where the required overhead is not an impediment. MTLS in GNAP need not use a PKI backing, as self-signed certificates and certificates from untrusted authorities can still be presented as part of a TLS connection. In this case, the verifier would validate the connection but accept whatever certificate was presented by the client software. This specific certificate would then be bound to all future connections from that client software by being bound to - the resulting access tokens. See Section 12.16 for more + the resulting access tokens. See Section 12.17 for more considerations on MTLS as a key proofing mechanism. -12.18. Interception of Responses from the AS +12.19. Interception of Responses from the AS Responses from the AS contain information vital to both the security and privacy operations of GNAP. This information includes nonces used in cryptographic calculations, subject identifiers, assertions, public keys, and information about what client software is requesting and was granted. In addition, if bearer tokens are used or keys are issued alongside a bound access token, the response from the AS contains all information necessary for use of the contained access token. Any party that is capable of viewing such a response, such as an intermediary proxy, would be able to exfiltrate and use this token. If the access token is instead bound to the client instance's presented key, intermediaries no longer have sufficient information to use the token. They can still, however, gain information about the end user as well as the actions of the client software. -12.19. Key Distribution +12.20. Key Distribution The keys for client instances could be distributed as part of the deployment process of instances of the client software. For example, an application installation framework could generate a keypair for each copy of client software, then both install it into the client software upon installation and registering that instance with the AS. Additionally, it's possible for the AS to generate keys to be used with access tokens that are separate from the keys used by the client instance to request tokens. In this method, the AS would generate the asymmetric keypair or symmetric key and return the entire key, including all private signing information, to the client instance alongside the access token itself. This approach would make interception of the return from the token endpoint equivalent to that of a bearer token, since all information required to use the access token would be present in the request. -12.20. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling +12.21. Interaction Finish Modes and Polling During the interaction process, the client instance usually hands control of the user experience over to another component, beit the system browser, another application, or some action the resource owner is instructed to take on another device. By using an interaction finish method, the client instance can be securely notified by the AS when the interaction is completed and the next phase of the protocol should occur. This process includes information that the client instance can use to validate the finish call from the AS and prevent some injection, session hijacking, and @@ -5522,52 +5761,130 @@ separate device. The smart device has to poll because the expected behavior is that the interaction will take place on the separate device, without a way to return information to the original device's context. As such, developers need to weigh the risks of forgoing an interaction finish method against the deployment capabilities of the client software and its environment. Due to the increased security, an interaction finish method should be employed whenever possible. -12.21. Storage of Information During Interaction and Continuation +12.22. Session Management for Interaction Finish Methods + + When using an interaction finish method such as redirect or push, the + client instance receives an unsolicited HTTP request from an unknown + party. The client instance needs to be able to successfully + associate this incoming request with a specific pending grant request + being managed by the client instance. If the client instance is not + careful and precise about this, an attacker could associate their own + session at the client instance with a stolen interaction response. + The means of preventing this varies by the type of client software + and interaction methods in use. Some common patterns are enumerated + here. + + If the end user interacts with the client instance through a web + browser and the redirect interaction finish method is used, the + client instance can ensure that the incoming HTTP request from the + finish method is presented in the same browser session that the grant + request was started in. This technique is particularly useful when + the redirect interaction start mode is used as well, since in many + cases the end user will follow the redirection with the same browser + that they are using to interact with the client instance. The client + instance can then store the relevant pending grant information in the + session, either in the browser storage directly (such as with a + single-page application) or in an associated session store on a back- + end server. In both cases, when the incoming request reaches the + client instance, the session information can be used to ensure that + the same party that started the request is present as the request + finishes. + + Ensuring that the same party that started a request is present when + that request finishes can prevent phishing attacks, where an attacker + starts a request at an honest client instance and tricks an honest RO + into authorizing it. For example, if an honest end user (that also + acts as the RO) wants to start a request through a client instance + controlled by the attacker, the attacker can start a request at an + honest client instance and then redirect the honest end user to the + interaction URI from the attackers session with the honest client + instance. If the honest end user then fails to realize that it is + not authorizing the attacker-controlled client instance (with which + it started its request) but the honest client instance when + interacting with the AS, the attacker's session with the honest + client instance would be authorized. This would give the attacker + access to the honest end user's resources that the honest client + instance is authorized to access. However, if after the interaction + the AS redirects the honest end user back to the client instance + whose grant request the end user just authorized, the honest end user + is redirected to the honest client instance. The honest client + instance can then detect that it is not the party that started the + request that is present, since the request at the honest client + instance was started by the attacker, which can prevent the attack. + This is related to Section 12.13, because again the attack can be + prevented by the AS informing the user as much as possible about the + client instance that is to be authorized. + + If the end user does not interact with the client instance through a + web browser or the interaction start method does not use the same + browser or device that the end user is interacting through (such as + the launch of a second device through a scannable code or + presentation of a user code) the client instance will not be able to + strongly associate an incoming HTTP request with an established + session with the end user. This is also true when the push + interaction finish method is used, since the HTTP request comes + directly from the interaction component of the AS. In these + circumstances, the client instance can at least ensure that the + incoming HTTP request can be uniquely associated with an ongoing + grant request by making the interaction finish callback URI unique + for the grant when making the interaction request (Section 2.5.2). + Mobile applications and other client instances that generally serve + only a single end user at a time can use this unique incoming URL to + differentiate between a legitimate incoming request and an attacker's + stolen request. + + If the client instance does not have the ability to use an + interaction finish method, it can use polling to continue the + request. The tradeoffs of this approach are discussed in + Section 12.21, and if possible, an explicit interaction finish method + should be used instead. + +12.23. Storage of Information During Interaction and Continuation When starting an interactive grant request, a client application has a number of protocol elements that it needs to manage, including nonces, references, keys, access tokens, and other elements. During the interaction process, the client instance usually hands control of the user experience over to another component, beit the system browser, another application, or some action the resource owner is instructed to take on another device. In order for the client instance to make its continuation call, it will need to recall all of these protocol elements. Usually this means the client instance will need to store these protocol elements in some retrievable fashion. - If the security protocol elements are stored on the end-user's + If the security protocol elements are stored on the end user's device, such as in browser storage or in local application data stores, capture and exfiltration of this information could allow an attacker to continue a pending transaction instead of the client instance. Client software can make use of secure storage mechanisms, including hardware-based key and data storage, to prevent such exfiltration. Note that in GNAP, the client instance has to choose its interaction - finish URL prior to making the first call to the AS. As such, the - interaction finish URL will often have a unique identifier for the + finish URI prior to making the first call to the AS. As such, the + interaction finish URI will often have a unique identifier for the ongoing request, allowing the client instance to access the correct - portion of its storage. Since this URL is passed to other parties - and often used through a browser, this URL should not contain any + portion of its storage. Since this URI is passed to other parties + and often used through a browser, this URI should not contain any security-sensitive information that would be valuable to an attacker, such as any token identifier, nonce, or user information. Instead, a cryptographically random value is suggested. -12.22. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation +12.24. Denial of Service (DoS) through Grant Continuation When a client instance starts off an interactive process, it will eventually need to continue the grant request in a subsequent message to the AS. It's possible for a naive client implementation to continuously send continuation requests to the AS while waiting for approval, especially if no interaction finish method is used. Such constant requests could overwhelm the AS's ability to respond to both these and other requests. To mitigate this for well-behaved client software, the continuation @@ -5578,24 +5895,24 @@ client instance. If client software ignores the wait value and makes its continuation calls too quickly, or if the client software assumes the absence of the wait values means it should poll immediately, the AS can choose to return errors to the offending client instance, including possibly canceling the ongoing grant request. With well-meaning client software these errors can indicate a need to change the client software's programmed behavior. -12.23. Exhaustion of Random Value Space +12.25. Exhaustion of Random Value Space Several parts of the GNAP process make use of unguessable randomized - values, such as nonces, tokens, and randomized URLs. Since these + values, such as nonces, tokens, and randomized URIs. Since these values are intended to be unique, a sufficiently powerful attacker could make a large number of requests to trigger generation of randomized values in an attempt to exhaust the random number generation space. While this attack is particularly applicable to the AS, client software could likewise be targeted by an attacker triggering new grant requests against an AS. To mitigate this, software can ensure that its random values are chosen from a significantly large pool that exhaustion of that pool is prohibitive for an attacker. Additionally, the random values can @@ -5606,66 +5923,67 @@ For example, the nonces used for interaction finish hash calculation need only to be valid while the client instance is waiting for the finish callback and can be functionally expired when the interaction has completed. Similarly, artifacts like access tokens and the interaction reference can be limited to have lifetimes tied to their functional utility. Finally, each different category of artifact (nonce, token, reference, identifier, etc.) can be generated from a separate random pool of values instead of a single global value space. -12.24. Front-channel URLs +12.26. Front-channel URIs - Some interaction methods in GNAP make use of URLs accessed through - the end-user's browser, known collectively as front-channel - communication. These URLs are most notably present in the redirect + Some interaction methods in GNAP make use of URIs accessed through + the end user's browser, known collectively as front-channel + communication. These URIs are most notably present in the redirect interaction start method and the redirect interaction finish mode. - Since these URLs are intended to be given to the end-user, the end + Since these URIs are intended to be given to the end user, the end user and their browser will be subjected to anything hosted at that - URL including viruses, malware, and phishing scams. This kind of + URI including viruses, malware, and phishing scams. This kind of risk is inherent to all redirection-based protocols, including GNAP when used in this way. When talking to a new or unknown AS, a client instance might want to - check the URL from the interaction start against a blocklist and warn - the end-user before redirecting them. Many client instances will + check the URI from the interaction start against a blocklist and warn + the end user before redirecting them. Many client instances will provide an interstitial message prior to redirection in order to prepare the user for control of the user experience being handed to the domain of the AS, and such a method could be used to warn the user of potential threats. For instance, a rogue AS impersonating a well-known service provider. Client software can also prevent this by managing an allowlist of known and trusted AS's. Alternatively, an attacker could start a GNAP request with a known - and trusted AS but include their own attack site URL as the callback - for the finish method. The attacker would then send the interaction - start URL to the victim and get them to click on it. Since the URL - is at the known AS, the victim is inclined to do so. The victim will - then be prompted to approve the attacker's application, and in most - circumstances the victim will then be redirected to the attacker's - site whether or not the user approved the request. The AS could - mitigate this partially by using a blocklist and allowlist of - interaction finish URLs during the client instance's initial request, - but this approach can be especially difficult if the URL has any - dynamic portion chosen by the client software. The AS can couple - these checks with policies associated with the client instance that - has been authenticated in the request. If the AS has any doubt about - the interaction finish URL, the AS can provide an interstitial - warning to the end-user before processing the redirect. + and trusted AS but include their own attack site URI as the callback + for the redirect finish method. The attacker would then send the + interaction start URI to the victim and get them to click on it. + Since the URI is at the known AS, the victim is inclined to do so. + The victim will then be prompted to approve the attacker's + application, and in most circumstances the victim will then be + redirected to the attacker's site whether or not the user approved + the request. The AS could mitigate this partially by using a + blocklist and allowlist of interaction finish URIs during the client + instance's initial request, but this approach can be especially + difficult if the URI has any dynamic portion chosen by the client + software. The AS can couple these checks with policies associated + with the client instance that has been authenticated in the request. + If the AS has any doubt about the interaction finish URI, the AS can + provide an interstitial warning to the end user before processing the + redirect. Ultimately, all protocols that use redirect-based communication through the user's browser are susceptible to having an attacker try - to co-opt one or more of those URLs in order to harm the user. It is + to co-opt one or more of those URIs in order to harm the user. It is the responsibility of the AS and the client software to provide appropriate warnings, education, and mitigation to protect end users. -12.25. Processing Assertions +12.27. Processing Assertions Identity assertions can be used in GNAP to convey subject information, both from the AS to the client instance in a response (Section 3.4) and from the client instance to the AS in a request (Section 2.2). In both of these circumstances, when an assertion is passed in GNAP, the receiver of the assertion needs to parse and process the assertion. As assertions are complex artifacts with their own syntax and security, special care needs to be taken to prevent the assertion values from being used as an attack vector. @@ -5681,20 +5999,185 @@ attacked through the use of processing instructions and entity expansions to cause problems with the processor. Therefore, any system capable of processing SAML 2 assertions also needs to have a secure and correct XML parser. In addition to this, the SAML 2 specification uses XML Signatures, which have their own implementation problems that need to be accounted for. Similar requirements exist for OpenID Connect's ID token, which is based on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format and the related JSON Object Signing And Encryption (JOSE) cryptography suite. +12.28. Stolen Token Replay + + If a client instance can request tokens at multiple AS's, and the + client instance uses the same keys to make its requests across those + different AS's, then it is possible for an attacker to replay a + stolen token issued by an honest AS from a compromised AS, thereby + binding the stolen token to the client instance's key in a different + context. The attacker can manipulate the client instance into using + the stolen token at an RS, particularly at an RS that is expecting a + token from the honest AS. Since the honest AS issued the token and + the client instance presents the token with its expected bound key, + the attack succeeds. + + This attack has several preconditions. In this attack, the attacker + does not need access to the client instance's key and cannot use the + stolen token directly at the RS, but the attacker is able to get the + access token value in some fashion. The client instance also needs + to be configured to talk to multiple AS's, including the attacker's + controlled AS. Finally, the client instance needs to be able to be + manipulated by the attacker to call the RS while using a token issued + from the stolen AS. The RS does not need to be compromised or made + to trust the attacker's AS. + + To protect against this attack, the client instance can use a + different key for each AS that it talks to. Since the replayed token + will be bound to the key used at the honest AS, the uncompromised RS + will reject the call since the client instance will be using the key + used at the attacker's AS instead with the same token. When the MTLS + key proofing method is used, a client instance can use self-signed + certificates to use a different key for each AS that it talks to, as + discussed in Section 12.18. + + Additionally, the client instance can keep a strong association + between the RS and a specific AS that it trusts to issue tokens for + that RS. This strong binding also helps against some forms of AS + mix-up attacks (Section 12.10). Managing this binding is outside the + scope of GNAP core, but it can be managed either as a configuration + element for the client instance or dynamically through discovering + the AS from the RS (Section 9.1). + + The details of this attack are available in [HELMSCHMIDT2022] with + additional discussion and considerations. + +12.29. Self-contained Stateless Access Tokens + + The contents and format of the access token are at the discretion of + the AS, and are opaque to the client instance within GNAP. As + discussed in the companion document, + [I-D.ietf-gnap-resource-servers], the AS and RS can make use of + stateless access tokens with an internal structure and format. These + access tokens allow an RS to validate the token without having to + make any external calls at runtime, allowing for benefits in some + deployments, the discussion of which are outside the scope of this + specification. + + However, the use of such self-contained access tokens has an effect + on the ability of the AS to provide certain functionality defined + within this specification. Specifically, since the access token is + self-contained, it is difficult or impossible for an AS to signal to + all RS's within an ecosystem when a specific access token has been + revoked. Therefore, an AS in such an ecosystem should probably not + offer token revocation functionality to client instances, since the + client instance's calls to such an endpoint is effectively + meaningless. However, a client instance calling the token revocation + function will also throw out its copy of the token, so such a placebo + endpoint might not be completely meaningless. Token rotation + similarly difficult because the AS has to revoke the old access token + after a rotation call has been made. If the access tokens are + completely self-contained and non-revocable, this means that there + will be a period of time during which both the old and new access + tokens are valid and usable, which is an increased security risk for + the environment. + + These problems can be mitigated by keeping the validity time windows + of self-contained access tokens reasonably short, limiting the time + after a revocation event that a revoked token could be used. + Additionally, the AS could proactively signal to RS's under its + control identifiers for revoked tokens that have yet to expire. This + type of information push would be expected to be relatively small and + infrequent, and its implementation is outside the scope of this + specification. + +12.30. Network Problems and Token and Grant Management + + If a client instance makes a call to rotate an access token but the + network connection is dropped before the client instance receives the + response with the new access token, the system as a whole can end up + in an inconsistent state, where the AS has already rotated the old + access token and invalidated it, but the client instance only has + access to the invalidated access token and not the newly rotated + token value. If the client instance retries the rotation request, it + would fail because the client is no longer presenting a valid and + current access token. A similar situation can occur during grant + continuation, where the same client instance calls to continue or + update a grant request without successfully receiving the results of + the update. + + To combat this, both grant Management (Section 5) and token + management (Section 6) are designed to be idempotent, where + subsequent calls to the same function with the same credentials are + meant to produce the same results. For example, multiple calls to + rotate the same access token need to result in the same rotated token + value. + + In practice, an AS can hold on to an old token value for such limited + purposes. For example, to support rotating access tokens over + unreliable networks, the AS receives the initial request to rotate an + access token and creates a new token value and returns it. The AS + also marks the old token value as having been used to create the + newly-rotated token value. If the AS sees the old token value within + a small enough time window, such as a few seconds since the first + rotation attempt, the AS can return the same rotated access token. + Furthermore, once the system has seen the newly-rotated token in use, + the original token can be discarded because the client instance has + proved that it did receive the token. The result of this is a system + that is eventually self-consistent without placing an undue + complexity burden on the client instance. + +12.31. Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) + + There are several places within GNAP where a URI can be given to a + party causing it to fetch that URI during normal operation of the + protocol. If an attacker is able to control the value of one of + these URIs within the protocol, the attacker could cause the target + system to execute a request on a URI that is within reach of the + target system but normally unavailable to the attacker. For example, + an attacker sending a URL of http://localhost/admin to cause the + server to access an internal function on itself, or + https://192.168.0.14/ to call a service behind a firewall. Even if + the attacker does not gain access to the results of the call, the + side effects of such requests coming from a trusted host can be + problematic to the security and sanctity of such otherwise unexposed + endpoints. + + In GNAP, the most vulnerable place in the core protocol is the + push-based post-interaction finish method (Section 4.2.2), as the + client instance is less trusted than the AS and can use this method + to make the AS call an arbitrary URI. While it is not required by + the protocol, the AS can fetch other client-instance provided URIs + such as the logo image or home page, for verification or privacy- + preserving purposes before displaying them to the resource owner as + part of a consent screen. Furthermore, extensions to GNAP that allow + or require URI fetch could also be similarly susceptible, such as a + system for having the AS fetch a client instance's keys from a + presented URI instead of the client instance presenting the key by + value. Such extensions are outside the scope of this specification, + but any system deploying such an extension would need to be aware of + this issue. + + To help mitigate this problem, similar approaches to protecting + parties against malicious redirects (Section 12.26) can be used. For + example, all URIs that can result in a direct request being made by a + party in the protocol can be filtered through an allowlist or + blocklist. For example, an AS that supports the push based + interaction finish can compare the callback URI in the interaction + request to a known URI for a pre-registered client instance, or it + can ensure that the URI is not on a blocklist of sensitive URLs such + as internal network addresses. However, note that because these + types of calls happen outside of the view of human interaction, it is + not usually feasible to provide notification and warning to someone + before the request needs to be executed, as is the case with + redirection URLs. As such, SSRF is somewhat more difficult to manage + at runtime, and systems should generally refuse to fetch a URI if + unsure. + 13. Privacy Considerations The privacy considerations in this section are modeled after the list of privacy threats in [RFC6973], "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", and either explain how these threats are mitigated or advise how the threats relate to GNAP. 13.1. Surveillance Surveillance is the observation or monitoring of an individual's @@ -5747,21 +6230,21 @@ Several parties in the GNAP process are expected to persist data at least temporarily, if not semi-permanently, for the normal functioning of the system. If compromised, this could lead to exposure of sensitive information. This section documents the potentially sensitive information each party in GNAP is expected to store for normal operation. Naturally it is possible that any party is storing information for longer than technically necessary of the protocol mechanics (such as audit logs, etc). The authorization server is expected to store subject identifiers for - user indefinitely, in order to be able to include them in the + users indefinitely, in order to be able to include them in the responses to clients. The authorization server is also expected to store client key identifiers associated with display information about the client such as its name and logo. The client is expected to store its client instance key indefinitely, in order to authenticate to the authorization server for the normal functioning of the GNAP flows. Additionally, the client will be temporarily storing artifacts issued by the authorization server during a flow, and these artifacts SHOULD be discarded by the client when the transaction is complete. @@ -5872,77 +6354,86 @@ Richer, J., Parecki, A., and F. Imbault, "Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol Resource Server Connections", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-gnap-resource-servers-01, 12 July 2021, . [I-D.ietf-httpbis-digest-headers] Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-digest- - headers-06, 27 September 2021, + headers-07, 16 November 2021, . + digest-headers-07.txt>. [I-D.ietf-httpbis-message-signatures] Backman, A., Richer, J., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- - httpbis-message-signatures-06, 13 August 2021, + httpbis-message-signatures-09, 6 March 2022, . + message-signatures-09.txt>. [I-D.ietf-oauth-rar] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", Work in Progress, Internet- - Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-rar-08, 18 October 2021, + Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-rar-10, 26 January 2022, . + 10.txt>. [I-D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers] Backman, A. and M. Scurtescu, "Subject Identifiers for Security Event Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, - draft-ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers-08, 24 May 2021, - . + draft-ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers-09, 25 February + 2022, . [OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November 2014, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . - [RFC3230] Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP", - RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002, - . + [RFC2397] Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998, + . [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, . + [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data + Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, + . + [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, September 2009, . [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, . [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, . + [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer + Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, + . + [RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, . [RFC7468] Josefsson, S. and S. Leonard, "Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures", RFC 7468, DOI 10.17487/RFC7468, April 2015, . [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web @@ -5968,51 +6459,88 @@ DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, . [RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020, . 14.2. Informative References - [attack-surfaces] + [AXELAND2021] Axeland, Å. and O. Oueidat, "Security Analysis of Attack Surfaces on the Grant Negotiation and Authorization Protocol", 2021, . + [HELMSCHMIDT2022] + Helmschmidt, F., "tbd", 2022, . + [I-D.ietf-httpbis-client-cert-field] Campbell, B. and M. Bishop, "Client-Cert HTTP Header - Field: Conveying Client Certificate Information from TLS - Terminating Reverse Proxies to Origin Server - Applications", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- - ietf-httpbis-client-cert-field-00, 8 June 2021, + Field", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf- + httpbis-client-cert-field-01, 25 January 2022, . + client-cert-field-01.txt>. + + [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] + Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, + "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in + Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security- + topics-19, 16 December 2021, + . [promise-theory] Burgess, M. and J. Bergstra, "Promise theory", January 2014, . [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, . Appendix A. Document History + * -09 + + - Added security considerations on redirection status codes. + + - Added security considerations on cuckoo token attack. + + - Made token management URL required on token rotation. + + - Added considerations on token rotation and self-contained + tokens. + + - Added security considerations for SSRF. + + - Moved normative requirements about end user presence to + security considerations. + + - Clarified default wait times for continuation requests + (including polling). + + - Clarified URI vs. URL. + + - Added "user_code_uri" mode, removed "uri" from "user_code" + mode. + + - Consistently formatted all parameter lists. + + - Updated examples for HTTP Signatures. + * -08 - Update definition for "Client" to account for the case of no - end-user. + end user. - Change definition for "Subject". - Expanded security and privacy considerations for more situations. - Added cross-links from security and privacy considerations. - Editorial updates. @@ -6160,21 +6688,21 @@ information sent by the client instance, information supplied by external parties, and information gathered through the interaction process. GNAP allows a client instance to list different ways that it can start and finish an interaction, and these can be mixed together as needed for different use cases. GNAP interactions can use a browser, but don't have to. Methods can use inter-application messaging protocols, out-of-band data transfer, or anything else. GNAP allows extensions to define new ways to start and finish an interaction, as new methods and platforms are expected to become available over time. GNAP is - designed to allow the end-user and the resource owner to be two + designed to allow the end user and the resource owner to be two different people, but still works in the optimized case of them being the same party. 2. *Intent registration and inline negotiation:* OAuth 2.0 uses different "grant types" that start at different endpoints for different purposes. Many of these require discovery of several interrelated parameters. GNAP requests all start with the same type of request to the same @@ -6240,24 +6767,24 @@ time. GNAP does not have a notion of "public clients" because key information can always be sent and used dynamically. 6. *Privacy and usable security:* OAuth 2.0's deployment model assumes a strong binding between the AS and the RS. GNAP is designed to be interoperable with decentralized identity standards and to provide a human-centric authorization layer. In - addition to the core protocol, GNAP that supports various - patterns of communication between RSs and ASs through extensions. - GNAP tries to limit the odds of a consolidation to just a handful - of super-popular AS services. + addition to the core protocol, GNAP supports various patterns of + communication between RSs and ASs through extensions. GNAP tries + to limit the odds of a consolidation to just a handful of super- + popular AS services. Appendix C. Component Data Models While different implementations of this protocol will have different realizations of all the components and artifacts enumerated here, the nature of the protocol implies some common structures and elements for certain components. This appendix seeks to enumerate those common elements. TBD: Client has keys, allowed requested resources, identifier(s), @@ -6285,21 +6813,21 @@ Authorization Code grant type. The client instance initiates the request to the AS. Here the client instance identifies itself using its public key. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ { "actions": [ "read", "write", "dolphin" ], @@ -6361,51 +6889,50 @@ }, "instance_id": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO" } The client instance saves the response and redirects the user to the interaction_url by sending the following HTTP message to the user's browser. HTTP 302 Found Location: https://server.example.com/interact/4CF492MLVMSW9MKM - - The user's browser fetches the AS's interaction URL. The user logs + The user's browser fetches the AS's interaction URI. The user logs in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and approves the request. Since the AS has a callback parameter, the AS generates the interaction reference, calculates the hash, and redirects the user back to the client instance with these additional values added as query parameters. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 HTTP 302 Found Location: https://client.example.net/return/123455\ ?hash=p28jsq0Y2KK3WS__a42tavNC64ldGTBroywsWxT4md_jZQ1R2\ HZT8BOWYHcLmObM7XHPAdJzTZMtKBsaraJ64A\ &interact_ref=4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1 The client instance receives this request from the user's browser. The client instance ensures that this is the same user that was sent out by validating session information and retrieves the stored pending request. The client instance uses the values in this to validate the hash parameter. The client instance then calls the - continuation URL and presents the handle and interaction reference in + continuation URI and presents the handle and interaction reference in the request body. The client instance signs the request as above. POST /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "interact_ref": "4IFWWIKYBC2PQ6U56NL1" } The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and issues an access token and returns this to the client instance. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 @@ -6451,21 +6978,21 @@ needs to poll for updates while waiting for the user to authorize the request. The client instance initiates the request to the AS. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "dolphin-metadata", "some other thing" ], }, "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", "interact": { "start": ["redirect", "user_code"] @@ -6480,89 +7007,88 @@ for results. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "interact": { "redirect": "https://srv.ex/MXKHQ", "user_code": { - "code": "A1BC-3DFF", - "url": "https://srv.ex/device" + "code": "A1BC-3DFF" } }, "continue": { "access_token": { "value": "80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU" }, "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/VGJKPTKC50", "wait": 60 } } The client instance saves the response and displays the user code - visually on its screen along with the static device URL. The client - instance also displays the short interaction URL as a QR code to be + visually on its screen along with the static device URI. The client + instance also displays the short interaction URI as a QR code to be scanned. If the user scans the code, they are taken to the interaction endpoint and the AS looks up the current pending request based on the - incoming URL. If the user instead goes to the static page and enters + incoming URI. If the user instead goes to the static page and enters the code manually, the AS looks up the current pending request based on the value of the user code. In both cases, the user logs in, is identified as the RO for the resource being requested, and approves the request. Once the request has been approved, the AS displays to the user a message to return to their device. Meanwhile, the client instance periodically polls the AS every 60 - seconds at the continuation URL. The client instance signs the + seconds at the continuation URI. The client instance signs the request using the same key and method that it did in the first request. POST /continue/VGJKPTKC50 HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has not yet been authorized. The AS indicates to the client instance that no access token has yet been issued but it can continue to call after another 60 second timeout. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { "continue": { "access_token": { "value": "G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E" }, "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue/ATWHO4Q1WV", "wait": 60 } } - Note that the continuation URL and access token have been rotated + Note that the continuation URI and access token have been rotated since they were used by the client instance to make this call. The - client instance polls the continuation URL after a 60 second timeout + client instance polls the continuation URI after a 60 second timeout using this new information. POST /continue/ATWHO4Q1WV HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: GNAP G7YQT4KQQ5TZY9SLSS5E Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... - The AS retrieves the pending request based on the URL and access + The AS retrieves the pending request based on the URI and access token, determines that it has been approved, and issues an access token for the client to use at the RS. NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Cache-Control: no-store { @@ -6626,21 +7152,21 @@ asynchronously reach out to the RO for approval in this scenario. The client instance starts the request at the AS by requesting a set of resources. The client instance also identifies a particular user. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ { "type": "photo-api", "actions": [ "read", "write", "dolphin" @@ -6692,21 +7218,21 @@ "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", "wait": 60 } } The AS reaches out to the RO and prompts them for consent. In this example, the AS has an application that it can push notifications in to for the specified account. Meanwhile, the client instance periodically polls the AS every 60 - seconds at the continuation URL. + seconds at the continuation URI. POST /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: GNAP 80UPRY5NM33OMUKMKSKU Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has not yet been authorized. The AS indicates to the client instance that no access token has yet been issued but it @@ -6721,21 +7247,21 @@ "access_token": { "value": "BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D" }, "uri": "https://server.example.com/continue", "wait": 60 } } Note that the continuation handle has been rotated since it was used by the client instance to make this call. The client instance polls - the continuation URL after a 60 second timeout using the new handle. + the continuation URI after a 60 second timeout using the new handle. POST /continue HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: GNAP BI9QNW6V9W3XFJK4R02D Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... The AS retrieves the pending request based on the handle and determines that it has been approved and it issues an access token. @@ -6780,21 +7306,21 @@ Now the developer wants to make an analogous request to the AS using GNAP. To do so, the client instance makes an HTTP POST and places the OAuth 2.0 values in the appropriate places. POST /tx HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Content-Type: application/json Signature-Input: sig1=... Signature: sig1=... - Digest: sha256=... + Content-Digest: sha-256=... { "access_token": { "access": [ "read", "write", "dolphin" ], "flags": [ "bearer" ] }, "client": "7C7C4AZ9KHRS6X63AJAO", "interact": { @@ -6806,21 +7332,21 @@ } } } The client_id can be used to identify the client instance's keys that it uses for authentication, the scopes represent resources that the client instance is requesting, and the redirect_uri and state value are pre-combined into a finish URI that can be unique per request. The client instance additionally creates a nonce to protect the callback, separate from the state parameter that it has added to its - return URL. + return URI. From here, the protocol continues as above. Appendix E. JSON Structures and Polymorphism GNAP makes use of polymorphism within the JSON [RFC8259] structures used for the protocol. Each portion of this protocol is defined in terms of the JSON data type that its values can take, whether it's a string, object, array, boolean, or number. For some fields, different data types offer different descriptive capabilities and are