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EAP Method Update (Active WG)
Sec Area: Eric Rescorla, Benjamin Kaduk | 2006-Jan-20 — 2014-May-12 

IETF-103 emu minutes

Session 2018-11-05 1610-1810: Boromphimarn 1/2 - Audio stream - emu chatroom


minutes-103-emu-01 minutes

          EMU - Boromphimarn 1/2 - Monday  16:10-18:10
          Jabber Scribe: Jim Schaad
          Chairs: Joe Salowey, Mohit Sethi
          Note taker: Mohit Sethi
          John: Presenting EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
          2 things we decided to change: Session-ID
          and Empty TLS Record
          This is the best we can do aligning with RFC 5216
          We have figure of basically every error case. We don't have case for
          client rejecting session. Do we want such a figure?
          John: Can we do something more about the identity sent in the first
          message. Should we mandate Anonymous NAI.
          Jim: That is standard behavior
          John: Should we then make it MUST in the draft?
          Jim: Yes
          John: Should we give guidance or references on how implementations should
          mitigate attacks on earlier versions of EAP-TLS.
          Joe: Hesistant to include things about previous version of TLSs.
          Jari: Struggled with the same thing in EAP-AKA`. If there is a good
          reference to point to, you could just handle the things that just apply
          to your protocol.
          Elliot: If there are attacks against TLS 1.3 that would not be mitigated
          by advice given in Security Considerations of this document.
          John:Should we reference the draft in Using TLS in Applications (UTA)
          working group.
          Elliot: Add a reference. But don't re-do it.
          Elliot: Some of the attacks on TLS are browser related. A line or two on
          non-browser risks would be nice. There is a sort of blanket ask to move to
          TLS 1.3 without justifying reasons. You are the boy who cried wolf again.
          Darshak, Jim and Daniel commit to reviewing
          John: Jouni had implemented an earlier version
          Joe: Need more reviews and implementations to inter-op with
          John: Presenting EAP-TLS with large certificates
          Need more reviews. Both drafts are on github. You should look there and
          open issues.
          Jari: Presenting RFC5448-bis
          Things we missed or things that need to be fixed
          Talk about pervasive monitoring and privacy.
          Got comments.
          General status. Now really in sync with 3GPP specifications.
          Peer-Id and Server-Id is the empty string. Chose to use the empty
          string. I don't think it is a problem. Many implementations do not use.
          Joe: Maybe check if ABFAB is using these identities. May not be relevant
          for your case.
          Jari: New section 7.2 on discovered vulnerabilities. No reference on
          fair and balanced attacks.
          Russ and Mohit to review during WGLC
          Jari: Presenting EAP-AKA` PFS
          Not a working group item but on the charter
          Taken into account reviews and discussion
          More detailed and clarified use of negotiation process.
          Don't wait for everyone to deploy but do not penalize for those who have
          not yet deployed.
          Jari: DoS resistance
          Russ: Don't remember where the MAC check falls and where the MAC key
          comes from. It would also affect this.
          Jari: Higher quality keys exported. But MACs use other keys.
          Russ: MAC is dependent on the base AKA` authentication.
          Jari: Yes
          Jari: Need feedback. See this as WG document? We might be able to
          stick this in and have affect on people's security and protect from
          organizations that want to spy on us. Some interest from our side and
          another manufacturer working on chipsets. We might actually get this
          deployed if we do it. I would love to move forward.
          Joe: How many read?
          Hum if you support adoption: Hum in room
          Hum if you object: None
          Joe: Will confirm on list
          Tuomas Aura: EAP-NOOB
          Deploying of Wi-Fi appliances
          Scanning QR codes or dynamic NFC tags.
          Don't have to do scaning everytime.
          Different from current EAP methods that require pre-registeration.
          Elliot: Great work. Can use slides. Can we use EMU wiki
          Joe: They are not chartered items
          Dave: Talk to them all. What QR code do you present at all. User is
          going to pick one. That is great. The peer knows which one it was.
          Aura: Important that is delivered to the right Qr code.
          Erik: Is the AAA server authenticated. How?
          Aura: Yes, there is mutual authentication.
          Mariko: Do you need new code on the device? Is there requirement for
          IoT device vendors?
          Aura: Implementation on device required new code
          Elliot Lear: EAP-TEAP-BRSKI
          Dan: Do you need some NAI decoration for routing to the right AAA server
          Elliot: We will steal the idea from EAP-NOOB
          Dan: If TLS is unauthenticated. Why do you need EAP-TEAP. Why don't you
          just do EAP-BRSKI
          Brian: Provisional authentication is only on the client. BRSKI assumes
          that Server has trust anchor. That is the BRSKI model defined.
          Dan: Don't understand EAP flows. EAP is a lock step protocol.
          Dan: Overloading TLVs?

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