draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-09.txt   draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-10.txt 
DHC M. Stapp DHC M. Stapp
Internet-Draft B. Volz Internet-Draft B. Volz
Expires: July 28, 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. Expires: August 19, 2005 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Y. Rekhter Y. Rekhter
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
January 24, 2005 February 15, 2005
The DHCP Client FQDN Option The DHCP Client FQDN Option
<draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-09.txt> <draft-ietf-dhc-fqdn-option-10.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668. RFC 3668.
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 28, 2005. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2005.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a DHCP for IPv4, DHCPv4, option which can be This document specifies a DHCP for IPv4, DHCPv4, option which can be
used to exchange information about a DHCPv4 client's fully-qualified used to exchange information about a DHCPv4 client's fully-qualified
domain name and about responsibility for updating the DNS RR related domain name and about responsibility for updating the DNS RR related
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3. The Client FQDN Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. The Client FQDN Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 The Flags Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1 The Flags Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 The RCODE Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2 The RCODE Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 The Domain Name Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3 The Domain Name Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.1 Deprecated ASCII Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.1 Deprecated ASCII Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. DHCP Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. DHCP Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Interaction With Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1 Interaction With Other Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Client Desires to Update A RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2 Client Desires to Update A RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3 Client Desires Server to Do DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3 Client Desires Server to Do DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4 Client Desires No Server DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4 Client Desires No Server DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5 Domain Name and DNS Update Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.5 Domain Name and DNS Update Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. DHCP Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. DHCP Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1 When to Perform DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.1 When to Perform DNS Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. DNS Update Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. DNS Update Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 15 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 15
1. Terminology 1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
DNS ([2], [3]) maintains (among other things) the information about DNS ([2], [3]) maintains (among other things) the information about
the mapping between hosts' Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) [7] the mapping between hosts' Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) [8]
and IP addresses assigned to the hosts. The information is and IP addresses assigned to the hosts. The information is
maintained in two types of Resource Records (RRs): A and PTR. The maintained in two types of Resource Records (RRs): A and PTR. The
DNS update specification ([4]) describes a mechanism that enables DNS DNS update specification ([4]) describes a mechanism that enables DNS
information to be updated over a network. information to be updated over a network.
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4 or just DHCP The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4 or just DHCP
in this document) [5] provides a mechanism by which a host (a DHCP in this document) [5] provides a mechanism by which a host (a DHCP
client) can acquire certain configuration information, along with its client) can acquire certain configuration information, along with its
address. This document specifies a DHCP option, the Client FQDN address. This document specifies a DHCP option, the Client FQDN
option, which can be used by DHCP clients and servers to exchange option, which can be used by DHCP clients and servers to exchange
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The code for this option is 81. Its minimum length is 3 (octets). The code for this option is 81. Its minimum length is 3 (octets).
The format of the Client FQDN option is: The format of the Client FQDN option is:
Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name Code Len Flags RCODE1 RCODE2 Domain Name
+------+------+------+------+------+------+-- +------+------+------+------+------+------+--
| 81 | n | | | | ... | 81 | n | | | | ...
+------+------+------+------+------+------+-- +------+------+------+------+------+------+--
The above figure follows the conventions of [8]. The above figure follows the conventions of [9].
3.1 The Flags Field 3.1 The Flags Field
The format of the 1-octet Flags field is: The format of the 1-octet Flags field is:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MBZ |N|E|O|S| | MBZ |N|E|O|S|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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these to 0 when sending the option and SHOULD ignore them on receipt. these to 0 when sending the option and SHOULD ignore them on receipt.
A server SHOULD set these to 255 when sending the option and MUST A server SHOULD set these to 255 when sending the option and MUST
ignore them on receipt. ignore them on receipt.
As this option with these fields is already in wide use, the fields As this option with these fields is already in wide use, the fields
are retained. These fields were originally defined for use by a DHCP are retained. These fields were originally defined for use by a DHCP
server to indicate to a DHCP client the Response Code from any A server to indicate to a DHCP client the Response Code from any A
(RCODE1) or PTR (RCODE2) RR DNS updates it has performed or a value (RCODE1) or PTR (RCODE2) RR DNS updates it has performed or a value
of 255 was used to indicate that an update had been initiated but had of 255 was used to indicate that an update had been initiated but had
not yet completed. Each of these fields is one byte long. These not yet completed. Each of these fields is one byte long. These
fields were defined before EDNS0 [10], which describes a mechanism fields were defined before EDNS0 [11], which describes a mechanism
for extending the length of a DNS RCODE to 12 bits, which is another for extending the length of a DNS RCODE to 12 bits, which is another
reason to deprecate them. reason to deprecate them.
If the client needs to confirm the DNS update has been done, it MAY If the client needs to confirm the DNS update has been done, it MAY
use a DNS query to check whether the mapping is up to date. However, use a DNS query to check whether the mapping is up to date. However,
depending on the load on the DHCP and DNS servers and the DNS depending on the load on the DHCP and DNS servers and the DNS
propagation delays, the client can only infer success. If the propagation delays, the client can only infer success. If the
information is not found to be up to date in DNS, the servers might information is not found to be up to date in DNS, the servers might
not have completed the updates or zone transfers, or not yet updated not have completed the updates or zone transfers, or not yet updated
their caches. their caches.
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0. The use of ASCII encoding in this option SHOULD be considered 0. The use of ASCII encoding in this option SHOULD be considered
deprecated. deprecated.
A DHCP client which used ASCII encoding was permitted to suggest a A DHCP client which used ASCII encoding was permitted to suggest a
single label if it was not configured with a fully-qualified name. single label if it was not configured with a fully-qualified name.
Such clients send a single label as a series of ASCII characters in Such clients send a single label as a series of ASCII characters in
the Domain Name field, excluding the "." (dot) character. the Domain Name field, excluding the "." (dot) character.
Clients and servers SHOULD follow the character-set recommendations Clients and servers SHOULD follow the character-set recommendations
of RFC 1034 [2] and RFC 1035 [3]. However, implementers SHOULD also of RFC 1034 [2] and RFC 1035 [3]. However, implementers SHOULD also
be aware that some client software could be using UTF-8 [9] character be aware that some client software could be using UTF-8 [10]
encoding. This specification does not require any support for UTF-8. character encoding. This specification does not require any support
for UTF-8.
4. DHCP Client Behavior 4. DHCP Client Behavior
The following describes the behavior of a DHCP client that implements The following describes the behavior of a DHCP client that implements
the Client FQDN option. the Client FQDN option.
4.1 Interaction With Other Options 4.1 Interaction With Other Options
Other DHCP options MAY carry data that is related to the Domain Name Other DHCP options MAY carry data that is related to the Domain Name
field of the Client FQDN option. The Host Name option [8], for field of the Client FQDN option. The Host Name option [9], for
example, contains an ASCII string representation of the client's host example, contains an ASCII string representation of the client's host
name. In general, a client does not need to send redundant data, and name. In general, a client does not need to send redundant data, and
therefore clients which send the Client FQDN option in their messages therefore clients which send the Client FQDN option in their messages
MUST NOT also send the Host Name option. Clients which receive both MUST NOT also send the Host Name option. Clients which receive both
the Host Name option and the Client FQDN option from a server SHOULD the Host Name option and the Client FQDN option from a server SHOULD
prefer Client FQDN option data. Section 5 instructs servers to prefer Client FQDN option data. Section 5 instructs servers to
ignore the Host Name option in client messages which include the ignore the Host Name option in client messages which include the
Client FQDN option. Client FQDN option.
4.2 Client Desires to Update A RRs 4.2 Client Desires to Update A RRs
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DHCP client MAY choose to include the Client FQDN option in its DHCP client MAY choose to include the Client FQDN option in its
DHCPDISCOVER messages as well as its DHCPREQUEST messages. The "S" DHCPDISCOVER messages as well as its DHCPREQUEST messages. The "S"
bit in the Flags field in the option MUST be 0. The "O" and "N" bits bit in the Flags field in the option MUST be 0. The "O" and "N" bits
MUST be 0. MUST be 0.
Once the client's DHCP configuration is completed (the client Once the client's DHCP configuration is completed (the client
receives a DHCPACK message and successfully completes a final check receives a DHCPACK message and successfully completes a final check
on the parameters passed in the message), the client MAY originate an on the parameters passed in the message), the client MAY originate an
update for the A RR (associated with the client's FQDN) unless the update for the A RR (associated with the client's FQDN) unless the
server has set the "S" bit to 1. If the "S" is 1, the DHCP client server has set the "S" bit to 1. If the "S" is 1, the DHCP client
MUST NOT initiate an update for the name in the Domain Name field. SHOULD NOT initiate an update for the name in the server's returned
Client FQDN option Domain Name field. However, a DHCP client that is
explicitly configured with a FQDN MAY ignore the state of the "S" bit
if the server's returned name matches the client's configured name.
4.3 Client Desires Server to Do DNS Updates 4.3 Client Desires Server to Do DNS Updates
A client can choose to delegate the responsibility for updating the A client can choose to delegate the responsibility for updating the
FQDN to IP address mapping for the FQDN and address(es) used by the FQDN to IP address mapping for the FQDN and address(es) used by the
client to the server. In order to inform the server of this choice, client to the server. In order to inform the server of this choice,
the client SHOULD include the Client FQDN option in its DHCPREQUEST the client SHOULD include the Client FQDN option in its DHCPREQUEST
message and MAY include the Client FQDN option in its DHCPDISCOVER. message and MAY include the Client FQDN option in its DHCPDISCOVER.
The "S" bit in the Flags field in the option MUST be 1. The "O" and The "S" bit in the Flags field in the option MUST be 1. The "O" and
"N" bits MUST be 0. "N" bits MUST be 0.
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If a client releases its lease prior to the lease expiration time and If a client releases its lease prior to the lease expiration time and
the client is responsible for updating its A RR, the client SHOULD the client is responsible for updating its A RR, the client SHOULD
delete the A RR associated with the leased address before sending a delete the A RR associated with the leased address before sending a
DHCPRELEASE message. Similarly, if a client was responsible for DHCPRELEASE message. Similarly, if a client was responsible for
updating its A RR, but is unable to renew its lease, the client updating its A RR, but is unable to renew its lease, the client
SHOULD attempt to delete the A RR before its lease expires. A DHCP SHOULD attempt to delete the A RR before its lease expires. A DHCP
client which has not been able to delete an A RR which it added client which has not been able to delete an A RR which it added
(because it has lost the use of its DHCP IP address) SHOULD attempt (because it has lost the use of its DHCP IP address) SHOULD attempt
to notify its administrator, perhaps by emitting a log message. to notify its administrator, perhaps by emitting a log message.
A client that desires to perform DNS updates to A RRs SHOULD NOT do
so if the client's address is a private address [6].
5. DHCP Server Behavior 5. DHCP Server Behavior
The following describes the behavior of a DHCP server that implements The following describes the behavior of a DHCP server that implements
the Client FQDN option when the client's message includes the Client the Client FQDN option when the client's message includes the Client
FQDN option. FQDN option.
The server examines its configuration and the Flag bits in the The server examines its configuration and the Flag bits in the
client's Client FQDN option to determine how to respond: client's Client FQDN option to determine how to respond:
o If the client's "E" bit is 0 and the server does not support ASCII o If the client's "E" bit is 0 and the server does not support ASCII
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before the server sends the DHCPACK message to the client. before the server sends the DHCPACK message to the client.
Alternatively, the server MAY send the DHCPACK message to the client Alternatively, the server MAY send the DHCPACK message to the client
without waiting for the update to be completed. Whether the DNS without waiting for the update to be completed. Whether the DNS
update occurs before or after the DHCPACK is sent is entirely up to update occurs before or after the DHCPACK is sent is entirely up to
the DHCP server's configuration. the DHCP server's configuration.
If the server's A RR DNS update does not complete until after the If the server's A RR DNS update does not complete until after the
server has replied to the DHCP client, the server's interaction with server has replied to the DHCP client, the server's interaction with
the DNS server MAY cause the DHCP server to change the domain name the DNS server MAY cause the DHCP server to change the domain name
that it associates with the client. This can occur, for example, if that it associates with the client. This can occur, for example, if
the server detects and resolves a domain-name conflict [6]. In such the server detects and resolves a domain-name conflict [7]. In such
cases, the domain name that the server returns to the DHCP client cases, the domain name that the server returns to the DHCP client
would change between two DHCP exchanges. would change between two DHCP exchanges.
If the server previously performed DNS updates for the client and the If the server previously performed DNS updates for the client and the
client's information has not changed, the server MAY skip performing client's information has not changed, the server MAY skip performing
additional DNS updates. additional DNS updates.
When a server detects that a lease on an address that the server When a server detects that a lease on an address that the server
leases to a client has expired, the server SHOULD delete any PTR RR leases to a client has expired, the server SHOULD delete any PTR RR
which it added via DNS update. In addition, if the server added an A which it added via DNS update. In addition, if the server added an A
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This document does not resolve how a DHCP client or server prevent This document does not resolve how a DHCP client or server prevent
name conflicts. This document addresses only how a DHCP client and name conflicts. This document addresses only how a DHCP client and
server negotiate who will perform the DNS updates and the fully server negotiate who will perform the DNS updates and the fully
qualified domain name requested or used. qualified domain name requested or used.
Implementers of this work will need to consider how name conflicts Implementers of this work will need to consider how name conflicts
will be prevented. If a DNS updater needs a security token in order will be prevented. If a DNS updater needs a security token in order
to successfully perform DNS updates on a specific name, name to successfully perform DNS updates on a specific name, name
conflicts can only occur if multiple clients are given a security conflicts can only occur if multiple clients are given a security
token for that name. Or, if the fully qualified domains are based on token for that name. Or, if the fully qualified domains are based on
the specific address bound to a client, conflicts SHOULD NOT occur. the specific address bound to a client, conflicts will not occur.
Or, a name conflict resolution technique as described in "Resolving Or, a name conflict resolution technique as described in "Resolving
Name Conflicts" [6]) SHOULD be used. Name Conflicts" [7]) SHOULD be used.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
IANA has already assigned DHCP option 81 to the Client FQDN option. IANA has already assigned DHCP option 81 to the Client FQDN option.
As this document updates the option's use, IANA is requested to As this document updates the option's use, IANA is requested to
reference this document for option 81. reference this document for option 81.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Unauthenticated updates to the DNS can lead to tremendous confusion, Unauthenticated updates to the DNS can lead to tremendous confusion,
through malicious attack or through inadvertent misconfiguration. through malicious attack or through inadvertent misconfiguration.
Administrators need to be wary of permitting unsecured DNS updates to Administrators need to be wary of permitting unsecured DNS updates to
zones which are exposed to the global Internet. Both DHCP clients zones which are exposed to the global Internet. Both DHCP clients
and servers should use some form of update request origin and servers should use some form of update request origin
authentication procedure (e.g., Secure DNS Dynamic Update [11]) when authentication procedure (e.g., Secure DNS Dynamic Update [12]) when
performing DNS updates. performing DNS updates.
Whether a DHCP client is responsible for updating an FQDN to IP Whether a DHCP client is responsible for updating an FQDN to IP
address mapping or whether this is the responsibility of the DHCP address mapping or whether this is the responsibility of the DHCP
server is a site-local matter. The choice between the two server is a site-local matter. The choice between the two
alternatives is likely based on the security model that is used with alternatives is likely based on the security model that is used with
the DNS update protocol (e.g., only a client may have sufficient the DNS update protocol (e.g., only a client may have sufficient
credentials to perform updates to the FQDN to IP address mapping for credentials to perform updates to the FQDN to IP address mapping for
its FQDN). its FQDN).
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cases where a DHCP server is performing DNS updates on behalf of a cases where a DHCP server is performing DNS updates on behalf of a
client, the DHCP server should be sure of the DNS name to use for the client, the DHCP server should be sure of the DNS name to use for the
client, and of the identity of the client. client, and of the identity of the client.
Currently, it is difficult for DHCP servers to develop much Currently, it is difficult for DHCP servers to develop much
confidence in the identities of its clients, given the absence of confidence in the identities of its clients, given the absence of
entity authentication from the DHCP protocol itself. There are many entity authentication from the DHCP protocol itself. There are many
ways for a DHCP server to develop a DNS name to use for a client, but ways for a DHCP server to develop a DNS name to use for a client, but
only in certain relatively unusual circumstances will the DHCP server only in certain relatively unusual circumstances will the DHCP server
know for certain the identity of the client. If DHCP Authentication know for certain the identity of the client. If DHCP Authentication
[12] becomes widely deployed this may become more customary. [13] becomes widely deployed this may become more customary.
One example of a situation which offers some extra assurances is one One example of a situation which offers some extra assurances is one
where the DHCP client is connected to a network through an MCNS cable where the DHCP client is connected to a network through an MCNS cable
modem, and the CMTS (head-end) ensures that MAC address spoofing modem, and the CMTS (head-end) ensures that MAC address spoofing
simply does not occur. Another example of a configuration that might simply does not occur. Another example of a configuration that might
be trusted is one where clients obtain network access via a network be trusted is one where clients obtain network access via a network
access server using PPP. The NAS itself might be obtaining IP access server using PPP. The NAS itself might be obtaining IP
addresses via DHCP, encoding a client identification into the DHCP addresses via DHCP, encoding a client identification into the DHCP
client-id option. In this case, the network access server as well as client-id option. In this case, the network access server as well as
the DHCP server might be operating within a trusted environment, in the DHCP server might be operating within a trusted environment, in
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[3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[4] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic [4] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136, April Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136, April
1997. 1997.
[5] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131, [5] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
March 1997. March 1997.
[6] Stapp, M. and B. Volz, "Resolution of DNS Name Conflicts Among [6] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G. and E.
Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", BCP 5,
RFC 1918, February 1996.
[7] Stapp, M. and B. Volz, "Resolution of DNS Name Conflicts Among
DHCP Clients (draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-*.txt)", September DHCP Clients (draft-ietf-dhc-ddns-resolution-*.txt)", September
2004. 2004.
10.2 Informative References 10.2 Informative References
[7] Marine, A., Reynolds, J. and G. Malkin, "FYI on Questions and [8] Marine, A., Reynolds, J. and G. Malkin, "FYI on Questions and
Answers - Answers to Commonly asked "New Internet User" Answers - Answers to Commonly asked "New Internet User"
Questions", RFC 1594, March 1994. Questions", RFC 1594, March 1994.
[8] Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor [9] Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997. Extensions", RFC 2132, March 1997.
[9] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", [10] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
RFC 2279, January 1998. RFC 2279, January 1998.
[10] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2671, [11] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2671,
August 1999. August 1999.
[11] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic [12] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000. Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
[12] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages", [13] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages",
RFC 3118, June 2001. RFC 3118, June 2001.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mark Stapp Mark Stapp
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Ave. 1414 Massachusetts Ave.
Boxborough, MA 01719 Boxborough, MA 01719
USA USA
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