draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop-10.txt   draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop-11.txt 
Network Working Group D. Katz Network Working Group D. Katz
Internet Draft Juniper Networks Internet Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Proposed Standard D. Ward Intended status: Proposed Standard D. Ward
Cisco Systems Juniper Networks
Expires: April, 2010 October 16, 2009 Expires: July, 2010 January 5, 2010
BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop) BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)
draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop-10.txt draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop-11.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
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Echo function, or need make an exception for ingress filtering Echo Echo function, or need make an exception for ingress filtering Echo
packets. packets.
An implementation of the Echo function also requires Application An implementation of the Echo function also requires Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that may not exist on all systems. A Programming Interfaces (APIs) that may not exist on all systems. A
system implementing the Echo function MUST be capable of sending system implementing the Echo function MUST be capable of sending
packets to its own address, which will typically require bypassing packets to its own address, which will typically require bypassing
the normal forwarding lookup. This typically requires access to APIs the normal forwarding lookup. This typically requires access to APIs
that bypass IP layer functionality. that bypass IP layer functionality.
Please note that BFD is intended as a connectivity check/connection
verification OAM mechanism. It is applicable for network-based
services (e.g. router-to-router, subscriber-to-gateway, LSP/circuit
endpoints and service appliance failure detection). In these
scenarios it is required that the operator correctly provision the
rates at which BFD is transmitted to avoid congestion (e.g link, I/O,
CPU) and false failure detection. It is not applicable for
application-to-application failure detection across the Internet
because it does not have sufficient capability to do necessary
congestion detection and avoidance and therefore cannot prevent
congestion collapse. Host-to-host or application-to-application
deployment across the Internet will require the encapsulation of BFD
within a transport that provides "TCP-friendly" [TFRC] behavior.
3. Initialization and Demultiplexing 3. Initialization and Demultiplexing
In this application, there will be only a single BFD session between In this application, there will be only a single BFD session between
two systems over a given interface (logical or physical) for a two systems over a given interface (logical or physical) for a
particular protocol. The BFD session must be bound to this particular protocol. The BFD session must be bound to this
interface. As such, both sides of a session MUST take the "Active" interface. As such, both sides of a session MUST take the "Active"
role (sending initial BFD Control packets with a zero value of Your role (sending initial BFD Control packets with a zero value of Your
Discriminator) and any BFD packet from the remote machine with a zero Discriminator) and any BFD packet from the remote machine with a zero
value of Your Discriminator MUST be associated with the session bound value of Your Discriminator MUST be associated with the session bound
to the remote system, interface, and protocol. to the remote system, interface, and protocol.
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unauthorized packets and may be useful in implementations in which unauthorized packets and may be useful in implementations in which
cryptographic checksum use is susceptible to denial of service cryptographic checksum use is susceptible to denial of service
attacks. The use or non-use of this mechanism does not impact attacks. The use or non-use of this mechanism does not impact
interoperability. interoperability.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[BFD] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection", [BFD] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection",
draft-ietf-bfd-base-10.txt, October, 2009. draft-ietf-bfd-base-10.txt, January, 2010.
[BFD-GENERIC] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "Generic Application of BFD", [BFD-GENERIC] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "Generic Application of BFD",
draft-ietf-bfd-generic-05.txt, February, 2009. draft-ietf-bfd-generic-05.txt, February, 2009.
[GTSM] Gill, V., et al, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism [GTSM] Gill, V., et al, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
(GTSM)", RFC 5082, October, 2007. (GTSM)", RFC 5082, October, 2007.
[KEYWORD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [KEYWORD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[BCP38] Ferguson, P, and Senie, D., "Network Ingress Filtering: [BCP38] Ferguson, P, and Senie, D., "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Spoofing", RFC 2827, May 2000. Address Spoofing", RFC 2827, May 2000.
[TFRC] Floyd, S., et al, "TCP Friendly Rate Control (TFRC): Protocol
Specification", RFC 5348, September, 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dave Katz Dave Katz
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave. 1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206 USA Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206 USA
Phone: +1-408-745-2000 Phone: +1-408-745-2000
Email: dkatz@juniper.net Email: dkatz@juniper.net
Dave Ward Dave Ward
Cisco Systems Juniper Networks
170 W. Tasman Dr. 1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
San Jose, CA 95134 USA Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206 USA
Phone: +1-408-526-4000 Phone: +1-408-745-2000
Email: dward@cisco.com Email: dward@juniper.net
Changes from the previous draft Changes from the previous draft
The Encapsulation section was reorganized, and the details of Echo The applications section was clarified.
packet encapsulation and transmission were expanded. The IANA
Considerations section was updated to include the port number
assignments.
This document expires in April, 2010. This document expires in July, 2010.
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