draft-ietf-anima-stable-connectivity-02.txt   draft-ietf-anima-stable-connectivity-03.txt 
ANIMA T. Eckert ANIMA T. Eckert
Internet-Draft Huawei Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Informational M. Behringer Intended status: Informational M. Behringer
Expires: August 11, 2017 Cisco Expires: January 4, 2018 July 3, 2017
February 7, 2017
Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM Using Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network OAM
draft-ietf-anima-stable-connectivity-02 draft-ietf-anima-stable-connectivity-03
Abstract Abstract
OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data
networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies
when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for
the OAM operations itself. Provisioning during device/network bring the OAM operations itself. Provisioning during device/network bring
up tends to be far less easy to automate than service provisioning up tends to be far less easy to automate than service provisioning
later on, changes in core network functions impacting reachability later on, changes in core network functions impacting reachability
can not be automated either because of ongoing connectivity can not be automated either because of ongoing connectivity
skipping to change at page 1, line 44 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 11, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Self dependent OAM connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Self dependent OAM connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Data Communication Networks (DCNs) . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Data Communication Networks (DCNs) . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Leveraging the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Leveraging the ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Stable connectivity for centralized OAM operations . . . 4 2.1. Stable connectivity for centralized OAM operations . . . 4
2.1.1. Simple connectivity for non-autonomic NOC application 2.1.1. Simple connectivity for non-autonomic NMS hosts . . . 5
devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1.2. Challenges and limitation of simple connectivity . . 6
2.1.2. Limitations and enhancement overview . . . . . . . . 5 2.1.3. Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity . . . . 7
2.1.3. Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity . . . . 6 2.1.4. IPv4 only NMS hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4. IPv4 only NOC application devices . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1.5. Path selection policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.5. Path selection policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.6. Autonomic NOC device/applications . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.6. Autonomic NOC device/applications . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.7. Encryption of data-plane connections . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.7. Encryption of data-plane connections . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.8. Long term direction of the solution . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.8. Long term direction of the solution . . . . . . . . . 11 2.2. Stable connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions 13
2.2. Stable connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions 12 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. No IPv4 for ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. No IPv4 for ACP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Further considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
1.1. Self dependent OAM connectivity 1.1. Self dependent OAM connectivity
OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data
networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies
when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for
the OAM operations itself: the OAM operations itself:
The ability to perform OAM operations on a network device requires The ability to perform OAM operations on a network device requires
first the execution of OAM procedures necessary to create network first the execution of OAM procedures necessary to create network
connectivity to that device in all intervening devices. This connectivity to that device in all intervening devices. This
skipping to change at page 3, line 15 skipping to change at page 3, line 4
OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data OAM (Operations, Administration and Management) processes for data
networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies networks are often subject to the problem of circular dependencies
when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for when relying on network connectivity of the network to be managed for
the OAM operations itself: the OAM operations itself:
The ability to perform OAM operations on a network device requires The ability to perform OAM operations on a network device requires
first the execution of OAM procedures necessary to create network first the execution of OAM procedures necessary to create network
connectivity to that device in all intervening devices. This connectivity to that device in all intervening devices. This
typically leads to sequential, 'expanding ring configuration' from a typically leads to sequential, 'expanding ring configuration' from a
NOC. It also leads to tight dependencies between provisioning tools NOC (Network Operations Center). It also leads to tight dependencies
and security enrollment of devices. Any process that wants to enroll between provisioning tools and security enrollment of devices. Any
multiple devices along a newly deployed network topology needs to process that wants to enroll multiple devices along a newly deployed
tightly interlock with the provisioning process that creates network topology needs to tightly interlock with the provisioning
connectivity before the enrollment can move on to the next device. process that creates connectivity before the enrollment can move on
to the next device.
When performing change operations on a network, it likewise is When performing change operations on a network, it likewise is
necessary to understand at any step of that process that there is no necessary to understand at any step of that process that there is no
interruption of connectivity that could lead to removal of interruption of connectivity that could lead to removal of
connectivity to remote devices. This includes especially change connectivity to remote devices. This includes especially change
provisioning of routing, security and addressing policies in the provisioning of routing, security and addressing policies in the
network that often occur through mergers and acquisitions, the network that often occur through mergers and acquisitions, the
introduction of IPv6 or other mayor re-hauls in the infrastructure introduction of IPv6 or other mayor re-hauls in the infrastructure
design. design. Examples include change of IGP protocols or areas, PD
(Provider Dependent) to PI (Provider Independent) addressing,
systematic topology changes.
All this circular dependencies make OAM processes complex and All this circular dependencies make OAM processes complex and
potentially fragile. When automation is being used, for example potentially fragile. When automation is being used, for example
through provisioning systems or network controllers, this complexity through provisioning systems or network controllers, this complexity
extends into that automation software. extends into that automation software.
1.2. Data Communication Networks (DCNs) 1.2. Data Communication Networks (DCNs)
In the late 1990'th and early 2000, IP networks became the method of In the late 1990'th and early 2000, IP networks became the method of
choice to build separate OAM networks for the communications choice to build separate OAM networks for the communications
infrastructure in service providers. This concept was standardized infrastructure in service providers. This concept was standardized
in G.7712/Y.1703 and called "Data Communications Networks" (DCN). in G.7712/Y.1703 and called "Data Communications Networks" (DCN).
These where (and still are) physically separate IP(/MPLS) networks These where (and still are) physically separate IP(/MPLS) networks
that provide access to OAM interfaces of all equipment that had to be that provide access to OAM interfaces of all equipment that had to be
managed, from PSTN switches over optical equipment to nowadays managed, from PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) switches over
ethernet and IP/MPLS production network equipment. optical equipment to nowadays ethernet and IP/MPLS production network
equipment.
Such DCN provide stable connectivity not subject to aforementioned Such DCN provide stable connectivity not subject to aforementioned
problems because they are separate network entirely, so change problems because they are separate network entirely, so change
configuration of the production IP network is done via the DCN but configuration of the production IP network is done via the DCN but
never affects the DCN configuration. Of course, this approach comes never affects the DCN configuration. Of course, this approach comes
at a cost of buying and operating a separate network and this cost is at a cost of buying and operating a separate network and this cost is
not feasible for many networks, most notably smaller service not feasible for many networks, most notably smaller service
providers, most enterprises and typical IoT networks. providers, most enterprises and typical IoT networks.
1.3. Leveraging the ACP 1.3. Leveraging the ACP
One goal of the Autonomic Networks Autonomic Control plane (ACP) is One goal of the Autonomic Networks Autonomic Control plane (ACP as
to provide similar stable connectivity as a DCN, but without having defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] ) in Autonomic
to build a separate DCN. It is clear that such 'in-band' approach Networks is to provide similar stable connectivity as a DCN, but
can never achieve fully the same level of separation, but the goal is without having to build a separate DCN. It is clear that such 'in-
to get as close to it as possible. band' approach can never achieve fully the same level of separation,
but the goal is to get as close to it as possible.
This solution approach has several aspects. One aspect is designing This solution approach has several aspects. One aspect is designing
the implementation of the ACP in network devices to make it actually the implementation of the ACP in network devices to make it actually
perform without interruption by changes in what we will call in this perform without interruption by changes in what we will call in this
document the "data-plane", aka: the operator or controller configured document the "data-plane", aka: the operator or controller configured
services planes of the network equipment. This aspect is not services planes of the network equipment. This aspect is not
currently covered in this document. currently covered in this document.
Another aspect is how to leverage the stable IPv6 connectivity Another aspect is how to leverage the stable IPv6 connectivity
provided by the ACP to build actual OAM solutions. This is the provided by the ACP to build actual OAM solutions. This is the
current scope of this document. current scope of this document.
2. Solutions 2. Solutions
2.1. Stable connectivity for centralized OAM operations 2.1. Stable connectivity for centralized OAM operations
The ANI is the "Autonomic Networking Infrastructure" consisting of
secure zero touch Bootstrap (BRSKI -
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]), Generic Signaling (GRASP -
[I-D.ietf-anima-grasp] and Autonomic Control Plane (ACP -
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] ). See
[I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] for an overview of the ANI and how
its components interact and [RFC7575] for concepts and terminology of
ANI and autonomic networks.
This section describes stable connectivity for centralized OAM
operations via ACP/ANI starting by what we expect to be the easiest
short-term deployment option. It then describes limitation/
challenges of that approach and their solutions/workarounds to finish
with the preferred target option of autonomic NOC devices in
Section 2.1.6.
This order was choosen because it helps to explain how simple initial
use of ACP can be, how difficult workarounds can become (and
therefore what to avoid), and finally because one very promising
long-term solution alternative is exactly like the most easy short-
term solution only virtualized and automated.
In the most common case, OAM operations will be performed by one or In the most common case, OAM operations will be performed by one or
more applications running on a variety of centralized NOC systems more applications running on a variety of centralized NOC systems
that communicate with network devices. We describe differently that communicate with network devices. We describe differently
advanced approaches to leverage the ACP for stable connectivity advanced approaches to leverage the ACP for stable connectivity
leveraging the ACP. The descriptions will show that there is a wide leveraging the ACP. The descriptions will show that there is a wide
range of options, some of which are simple, some more complex. range of options, some of which are simple, some more complex.
Most easily we think there are three stages of interest: Most easily we think there are three stages of interest:
o There are simple options described first that we consider to be o There are simple options described first that we consider to be
good starting points to operationalize the use of the ACP for good starting points to operationalize the use of the ACP for
stable connectivity. stable connectivity.
o The are more advanced intermediate options that try to establish o The are more advanced intermediate options that try to establish
backward compatibility with existing deployed approached such as backward compatibility with existing deployed approached such as
leveraging NAT. Selection and deployment of these approaches leveraging NAT (Network Address Translation). Selection and
needs to be carefully vetted to ensure that they provide positive deployment of these approaches needs to be carefully vetted to
RoI. This very much depends on the operational processes of the ensure that they provide positive RoI. This very much depends on
network operator. the operational processes of the network operator.
o It seems clearly feasible to build towards a long-term o It seems clearly feasible to build towards a long-term
configuration that provides all the desired operational, zero configuration that provides all the desired operational, zero
touch and security benefits of an autonomic network, but a range touch and security benefits of an autonomic network, but a range
of details for this still have to be worked out. of details for this still have to be worked out.
2.1.1. Simple connectivity for non-autonomic NOC application devices 2.1.1. Simple connectivity for non-autonomic NMS hosts
In the most simple deployment case, the ACP extends all the way into In the most simple deployment case, the ACP extends all the way into
the NOC via a network device that is set up to provide access into the NOC via an autonomic device set up as an ACP edge device
the ACP natively to non-autonomic devices. It acts as the default- providing native access to the ACP for NMS hosts (as defined in
router to those hosts and provides them with only IPv6 connectivity section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]. It acts as
into the ACP - but no IPv4 connectivity. NOC devices with this setup the default-router to those hosts and provides them with only IPv6
need to support IPv6 but require no other modifications to leverage connectivity into the ACP - but no IPv4 connectivity. NMS hosts with
the ACP. this setup need to support IPv6 but require no other modifications to
leverage the ACP.
Note that even though the ACP only uses IPv6, it can and should be
used to provide stable connectivity for management of any network:
IPv4 only, dual-stack or IPv6 only.
This setup is sufficient for troubleshooting OAM operations such as This setup is sufficient for troubleshooting OAM operations such as
SSH into network devices, NMS that perform SNMP read operations for SSH into network devices, NMS that perform SNMP read operations for
status checking, for software downloads into autonomic devices and so status checking, for software downloads into autonomic devices and so
on. In conjunction with otherwise unmodified OAM operations via on. In conjunction with otherwise unmodified OAM operations via
separate NOC devices/applications it can provide a good subset of the separate NMS hosts it can provide a good subset of the interesting
interesting stable connectivity goals from the ACP. stable connectivity goals from the ACP.
Because the ACP provides 'only' for IPv6 connectivity, and because Because the ACP provides 'only' for IPv6 connectivity, and because
the addressing provided by the ACP does not include any addressing the addressing provided by the ACP does not include any addressing
structure that operations in a NOC often relies on to recognize where structure that operations in a NOC often relies on to recognize where
devices are on the network, it is likely highly desirable to set up devices are on the network, it is likely highly desirable to set up
DNS so that the ACP IPv6 addresses of autonomic devices are known via DNS (Domain Name System - see [RFC1034]) so that the ACP IPv6
domain names with logical names. For example, if DNS in the network addresses of autonomic devices are known via domain names with
was set up with names for network devices as logical names. For example, if DNS in the network was set up with
devicename.noc.example.com, then the ACP address of that device could names for network devices as devicename.noc.example.com, then the ACP
be mapped to devicename-acp.noc.exmaple.com. address of that device could be mapped to devicename-
acp.noc.exmaple.com.
2.1.2. Limitations and enhancement overview 2.1.2. Challenges and limitation of simple connectivity
This most simple type of attachment of NOC applications to the ACP This simple connectivity of non-autonomic NMS hosts suffers from a
suffers from a range of limitations: range of possible challenges (operators may not be able to do it this
way) or limitations (operator can not achieve desired goals with this
setup). The following list summarizes these and the following
sections describe additional mechanisms to overcome them.
1. NOC applications can not directly probe whether the desired so Note that these challenges and limitations exist because the ACP is
called 'data-plane' network connectivity works because they do primarily designed to support distributed ASA in the most
leightweight fashion but not mandatorily require support for
additional mechanisms to best support centralized NOC operations. It
is this document that describes additional (short term) workarounds
and (long term) extensions.
1. Limitation: NMS hosts can not directly probe whether the desired
so called 'data-plane' network connectivity works because they do
not directly have access to it. This problem is not dissimilar not directly have access to it. This problem is not dissimilar
to probing connectivity for other services (such as VPN services) to probing connectivity for other services (such as VPN services)
that they do not have direct access to, so the NOC may already that they do not have direct access to, so the NOC may already
employ appropriate mechanisms to deal with this issue (probing employ appropriate mechanisms to deal with this issue (probing
proxies). proxies). See Section 2.1.3 for solutions.
2. NOC applications need to support IPv6 which often is still not 2. Challenge: NMS hosts need to support IPv6 which often is still
the case in many enterprise networks. not possible in many enterprise networks. See Section 2.1.4 for
(highly undesirable) workarounds.
3. Performance of the ACP will be limited versus normal 'data-plane' 3. Limitation: Performance of the ACP will be limited versus normal
connectivity. The setup of the ACP will often support only non- 'data-plane' connectivity. The setup of the ACP will often
hardware accelerated forwarding. Running a large amount of support only non-hardware accelerated forwarding. Running a
traffic through the ACP, especially for tasks where it is not large amount of traffic through the ACP, especially for tasks
necessary will reduce its performance/effectiveness for those where it is not necessary will reduce its performance/
operations where it is necessary or highly desirable. effectiveness for those operations where it is necessary or
highly desirable. See Section 2.1.5 for solutions.
4. Security of the ACP is reduced by exposing the ACP natively (and 4. Limitation: Security of the ACP is reduced by exposing the ACP
unprotected) into a LAN In the NOC where the NOC devices are natively (and unencrypted) into a LAN In the NOC where the NOC
attached to it. devices are attached to it. See Section 2.1.7 for solutions.
These four problems can be tackled independently of each other by These four problems can be tackled independently of each other by
solution improvements. Combining these solutions improvements solution improvements. Combining these solutions improvements
together ultimately leads towards the the target long term solution. together ultimately leads towards the target long term solution.
2.1.3. Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity 2.1.3. Simultaneous ACP and data plane connectivity
Simultaneous connectivity to both ACP and data-plane can be achieved Simultaneous connectivity to both ACP and data-plane can be achieved
in a variety of ways. If the data-plane is only IPv4, then any in a variety of ways. If the data-plane is only IPv4, then any
method for dual-stack attachment of the NOC device/application will method for dual-stack attachment of the NOC device/application will
suffice: IPv6 connectivity from the NOC provides access via the ACP, suffice: IPv6 connectivity from the NOC provides access via the ACP,
IPv4 will provide access via the data-plane. If as explained above IPv4 will provide access via the data-plane. If as explained above
in the most simple case, an autonomic device supports native in the most simple case, an autonomic device supports native
attachment to the ACP, and the existing NOC setup is IPv4 only, then attachment to the ACP, and the existing NOC setup is IPv4 only, then
it could be sufficient to simply attach the ACP device(s) as the IPv6 it could be sufficient to simply attach the ACP device(s) as the IPv6
default-router to the NOC LANs and keep the existing IPv4 default default-router to the NOC LANs and keep the existing IPv4 default
router setup unchanged. router setup unchanged.
If the data-plane of the network is also supporting IPv6, then the If the data-plane of the network is also supporting IPv6, then the
NOC devices that need access to the ACP should have a dual-homing NOC devices that need access to the ACP should have a dual-homing
IPv6 setup. One option is to make the NOC devices multi-homed with IPv6 setup. One option is to make the NOC devices multi-homed with
one logical or physical IPv6 interface connecting to the data-plane, one logical or physical IPv6 interface connecting to the data-plane,
and another into the ACP. The LAN that provides access to the ACP and another into the ACP. The LAN that provides access to the ACP
should then be given an IPv6 prefix that shares a common prefix with should then be given an IPv6 prefix that shares a common prefix with
the IPv6 ULA of the ACP so that the standard IPv6 interface selection the IPv6 ULA (see [RFC4193]) of the ACP so that the standard IPv6
rules on the NOC host would result in the desired automatic selection interface selection rules on the NOC host would result in the desired
of the right interface: towards the ACP facing interface for automatic selection of the right interface: towards the ACP facing
connections to ACP addresses, and towards the data-plane interface interface for connections to ACP addresses, and towards the data-
for anything else. If this can not be achieved automatically, then plane interface for anything else. If this can not be achieved
it needs to be done via simple IPv6 static routes in the NOC host. automatically, then it needs to be done via simple IPv6 static routes
in the NOC host.
Providing two virtual (eg: dot1q subnet) connections into NOC hosts Providing two virtual (eg: dot1q subnet) connections into NOC hosts
may be seen as undesired complexity. In that case the routing policy may be seen as undesired complexity. In that case the routing policy
to provide access to both ACP and data-plane via IPv6 needs to happen to provide access to both ACP and data-plane via IPv6 needs to happen
in the NOC network itself: The NOC application device gets a single in the NOC network itself: The NMS host gets a single attachment
attachment interface but still with the same two IPv6 addresses as in interface but still with the same two IPv6 addresses as in before -
before - one for use towards the ACP, one towards the data-plane. one for use towards the ACP, one towards the data-plane. The first-
The first-hop router connecting to the NOC application device would hop router connecting to the NMS host would then have separate
then have separate interfaces: one towards the data-plane, one interfaces: one towards the data-plane, one towards the ACP. Routing
towards the ACP. Routing of traffic from NOC application hosts would of traffic from NMS hosts would then have to be based on the source
then have to be based on the source IPv6 address of the host: Traffic IPv6 address of the host: Traffic from the address designated for ACP
from the address designated for ACP use would get routed towards the use would get routed towards the ACP, traffic from the designated
ACP, traffic from the designated data-plane address towards the data- data-plane address towards the data-plane.
plane.
In the most simple case, we get the following topology: Existing NOC In the most simple case, we get the following topology: Existing NMS
application devices connect via an existing NOClan and existing first hosts connect via an existing NOClan and existing first hop Rtr1 to
hop Rtr1 to the data-plane. Rtr1 is not made autonomic, but instead the data-plane. Rtr1 is not made autonomic, but instead the edge
the edge router of the Autonomic network ANrtr is attached via a router of the Autonomic network ANrtr is attached via a separate
separate interface to Rtr1 and ANrtr provides access to the ACP via interface to Rtr1 and ANrtr provides access to the ACP via
ACPaccessLan. Rtr1 is configured with the above described IPv6 ACPaccessLan. Rtr1 is configured with the above described IPv6
source routing policies and the NOC-app-devices are given the source routing policies and the NOC-app-devices are given the
secondary IPv6 address for connectivity into the ACP. secondary IPv6 address for connectivity into the ACP.
--... (data-plane) --... (data-plane)
NOC-app-device(s) -- NOClan -- Rtr1 NOC-app-device(s) -- NOClan -- Rtr1
--- ACPaccessLan -- ANrtr ... (ACP) --- ACPaccessLan -- ANrtr ... (ACP)
Figure 1 Figure 1
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 8, line 24
---- ... (data-plane) ---- ... (data-plane)
NOC-app-device(s) ---- NOClan --- ANrtr1 NOC-app-device(s) ---- NOClan --- ANrtr1
. . ---- ... (ACP) . . ---- ... (ACP)
\-/ \-/
(ACP to data-plane loopback) (ACP to data-plane loopback)
Figure 2 Figure 2
In this case, ANrtr1 would have to implement some more advanced In this case, ANrtr1 would have to implement some more advanced
routing such as cross-VRF routing because the data-plane and ACP are routing such as cross-VRF routing because the data-plane and ACP are
most likely run via separate VRFs. A simple short-term workaround most likely run via separate VRFs. A workaround without additional
could be a physical external loopback cable into two ports of ANrtr1 software functionality could be a physical external loopback cable
to connect the data-plane and ACP VRF as shown in the picture. into two ports of ANrtr1 to connect the data-plane and ACP VRF as
shown in the picture. A (virtual) software loopback between the ACP
and data plane VRF would of course be the better solution.
2.1.4. IPv4 only NOC application devices 2.1.4. IPv4 only NMS hosts
With the ACP being intentionally IPv6 only, attachment of IPv4 only The ACP does not support IPv4 to ensure long term simplicity: Single
NOC application devices to the ACP requires the use of IPv4 to IPv6 stack IPv6 management of the network via ACP and (as needed) data
NAT. This NAT setup could for example be done in Rt1r1 in above plane. Independent of whether the data plane is dual-stack, has IPv4
picture to also support IPv4 only NOC application devices connected as a service or is single stack IPv6. Dual plane management, IPv6
to NOClan. for the ACP, IPv4 for the data plane is likewise an architecturally
simple option.
To support connections initiated from IPv4 only NOC applications The downside of this architectural decision is the potential need for
towards the ACP of network devices, it is necessary to create a short-term workarounds when the operational practices in a network
static mapping of ACP IPv6 addresses into an unused IPv4 address that can not meet these target expectations. This section motivates
space and dynamic or static mapping of the IPv4 NOC application when and why these workarounds may be necessary and describes them.
device address (prefix) into IPv6 routed in the ACP. The main issue All the workarounds described in this section are HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE.
in this setup is the mapping of all ACP IPv6 addresses to IPv4. The only long term solution is to enable IPv6 on NMS hosts.
Without further network intelligence, this needs to be a 1:1 address
mapping because the prefix used for ACP IPv6 addresses is too long to Most network equipment today supports IPv6 but it is by far not
be mapped directly into IPv4 on a prefix basis. ubiquitously supported in NOC backend solutions (HW/SW), especially
not in the product space for enterprises. Even when it is supported,
there are often additional limitations or issues using it in a dual
stack setup or the operator mandates for simplicity single stack for
all operations. For these reasons an IPv4 only management plane is
still required and common practice in many enterprises. Without the
desire to leverage the ACP, this required and common practice is not
a problem for those enterprises even when they run dual stack in the
network. Therefore we document these workarounds here because it is
a short term deployment challence specific to the operations of the
ACP.
To bridge an IPv4 only management plane with the ACP, IPv4 to IPv6
NAT can be used. This NAT setup could for example be done in Rt1r1
in above picture to also support IPv4 only NMS hots connected to
NOClan.
To support connections initiated from IPv4 only NMS hosts towards the
ACP of network devices, it is necessary to create a static mapping of
ACP IPv6 addresses into an unused IPv4 address space and dynamic or
static mapping of the IPv4 NOC application device address (prefix)
into IPv6 routed in the ACP. The main issue in this setup is the
mapping of all ACP IPv6 addresses to IPv4. Without further network
intelligence, this needs to be a 1:1 address mapping because the
prefix used for ACP IPv6 addresses is too long to be mapped directly
into IPv4 on a prefix basis.
One could implement in router software dynamic mappings by leveraging One could implement in router software dynamic mappings by leveraging
DNS, but it seems highly undesirable to implement such complex DNS, but it seems highly undesirable to implement such complex
technologies for something that ultimately is a temporary problem technologies for something that ultimately is a temporary problem
(IPv4 only NOC application devices). With today's operational (IPv4 only NMS hosts). With today's operational directions it is
directions it is likely more preferable to automate the setup of 1:1 likely more preferable to automate the setup of 1:1 NAT mappings in
NAT mappings in that NAT router as part of the automation process of that NAT router as part of the automation process of network device
network device enrollment into the ACP. enrollment into the ACP.
The ACP can also be used for connections initiated by the network The ACP can also be used for connections initiated by the network
device into the NOC application devices. For example syslog from device into the NMS hosts. For example syslog from autonomic
autonomic devices. In this case, static mappings of the NOC devices. In this case, static mappings of the NMS hosts IPv4
application devices IPv4 addresses are required. This can easily be addresses are required. This can easily be done with a static prefix
done with a static prefix mapping into IPv6. mapping into IPv6.
Overall, the use of NAT is especially subject to the RoI Overall, the use of NAT is especially subject to the RoI (Return of
considerations, but the methods described here may not be too Investment) considerations, but the methods described here may not be
different from the same problems encountered totally independent of too different from the same problems encountered totally independent
AN/ACP when some parts of the network are to introduce IPv6 but NOC of AN/ACP when some parts of the network are to introduce IPv6 but
application devices are not (yet) upgradeable. NMS hosts are not (yet) upgradeable.
2.1.5. Path selection policies 2.1.5. Path selection policies
As mentioned above, the ACP is not expected to have high performance As mentioned above, the ACP is not expected to have high performance
because its primary goal is connectivity and security, and for because its primary goal is connectivity and security, and for
existing networ device platforms this often means that it is a lot existing network device platforms this often means that it is a lot
more effort to implement that additional connectivity with hardware more effort to implement that additional connectivity with hardware
acceleration than without - especially because of the desire to acceleration than without - especially because of the desire to
support full encryption across the ACP to achieve the desired support full encryption across the ACP to achieve the desired
security. security.
Some of these issues may go away in the future with further adoption Some of these issues may go away in the future with further adoption
of the ACP and network device designs that better tender to the needs of the ACP and network device designs that better tender to the needs
of a separate OAM plane, but it is wise to plan for even long-term of a separate OAM plane, but it is wise to plan for even long-term
designs of the solution that does NOT depend on high-performance of designs of the solution that does NOT depend on high-performance of
the ACP. This is opposite to the expectation that future NOC the ACP. This is opposite to the expectation that future NMS hosts
application devices will have IPv6, so that any considerations for will have IPv6, so that any considerations for IPv4/NAT in this
IPv4/NAT in this solution are temporary. solution are temporary.
To solve the expected performance limitations of the ACP, we do To solve the expected performance limitations of the ACP, we do
expect to have the above describe dual-connectivity via both ACP and expect to have the above describe dual-connectivity via both ACP and
data-plane between NOC application devices and AN devices with ACP. data-plane between NOC application devices and AN devices with ACP.
The ACP connectivity is expected to always be there (as soon as a The ACP connectivity is expected to always be there (as soon as a
device is enrolled), but the data-plane connectivity is only present device is enrolled), but the data-plane connectivity is only present
under normal operations but will not be present during eg: early under normal operations but will not be present during eg: early
stages of device bootstrap, failures, provisioning mistakes or during stages of device bootstrap, failures, provisioning mistakes or during
network configuration changes. network configuration changes.
The desired policy is therefore as follows: In the absence of further The desired policy is therefore as follows: In the absence of further
security considerations (see below), traffic between NOC application security considerations (see below), traffic between NMS hosts and AN
and AN devices should prefer data-plane connectivity and resort only devices should prefer data-plane connectivity and resort only to
to using the ACP when necessary, unless it is an operation known to using the ACP when necessary, unless it is an operation known to be
be so much tied to the cases where the ACP is necessary that it makes so much tied to the cases where the ACP is necessary that it makes no
no sense to try using the data plane. An example here is of course sense to try using the data plane. An example here is of course the
the SSH connection from the NOC into a network device to troubleshoot SSH connection from the NOC into a network device to troubleshoot
network connectivity. This could easily always rely on the ACP. network connectivity. This could easily always rely on the ACP.
Likewise, if a NOC application is known to transmit large amounts of Likewise, if an NMS host is known to transmit large amounts of data,
data, and it uses the ACP, then its performance need to be controlled and it uses the ACP, then its performance need to be controlled so
so that it will not overload the ACP performance. Typical examples that it will not overload the ACP performance. Typical examples of
of this are software downloads. this are software downloads.
There is a wide range of methods to build up these policies. We There is a wide range of methods to build up these policies. We
describe a few: describe a few:
Ideally, a NOC system would learn and keep track of all addresses of
a device (ACP and the various data plane addresses). Every action of
the NOC system would indicate via a "path-policy" what type of
connection it needs (eg: only data-plane, ACP-only, default to data-
plane, fallback to ACP,...). A connection policy manager would then
build connection to the target using the right address(es). Shorter
term, a common practice is to identify different paths to a device
via different names (eg: loopback vs. interface addresses). This
approach can be expanded to ACP uses, whether it uses NOC system
local names or DNS. We describe example schemes using DNS:
DNS can be used to set up names for the same network devices but with DNS can be used to set up names for the same network devices but with
different addresses assigned: One name (name.noc.example.com) with different addresses assigned: One name (name.noc.example.com) with
only the data-plane address(es) (IPv4 and/or IPv6) to be used for only the data-plane address(es) (IPv4 and/or IPv6) to be used for
probing connectivity or performing routine software downloads that probing connectivity or performing routine software downloads that
may stall/fail when there are connectivity issues. One name (name- may stall/fail when there are connectivity issues. One name (name-
acp.noc.example.com) with only the ACP reachable address of the acp.noc.example.com) with only the ACP reachable address of the
device for troubleshooting and probing/discovery that is desired to device for troubleshooting and probing/discovery that is desired to
always only use the ACP. One name with data plane and ACP addresses always only use the ACP. One name with data plane and ACP addresses
(name-both.noc.example.com). (name-both.noc.example.com).
Traffic policing and/or shaping of at the ACP edge in the NOC can be Traffic policing and/or shaping of at the ACP edge in the NOC can be
used to throttle applications such as software download into the ACP. used to throttle applications such as software download into the ACP.
MP-TCP is a very attractive candidate to automate the use of both MP-TCP (Multipath TCP -see [RFC6824]) is a very attractive candidate
data-plane and ACP and minimize or fully avoid the need for the above to automate the use of both data-plane and ACP and minimize or fully
mentioned logical names to pre-set the desired connectivity (data- avoid the need for the above mentioned logical names to pre-set the
plane-only, ACP only, both). For example, a set-up for non MP-TCP desired connectivity (data-plane-only, ACP only, both). For example,
aware applications would be as follows: a set-up for non MP-TCP aware applications would be as follows:
DNS naming is set up to provide the ACP IPv6 address of network DNS naming is set up to provide the ACP IPv6 address of network
devices. Unbeknownst to the application, MP-TCP is used. MP-TCP devices. Unbeknownst to the application, MP-TCP is used. MP-TCP
mutually discovers between the NOC and network device the data-plane mutually discovers between the NOC and network device the data-plane
address and caries all traffic across it when that MP-TCP sub-flow address and caries all traffic across it when that MP-TCP sub-flow
across the data-plane can be built. across the data-plane can be built.
In the Autonomic network devices where data-plane and ACP are in In the Autonomic network devices where data-plane and ACP are in
separate VRFs, it is clear that this type of MP-TCP sub-flow creation separate VRFs, it is clear that this type of MP-TCP sub-flow creation
across different VRFs is new/added functionality. Likewise the across different VRFs is new/added functionality. Likewise the
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a standard. a standard.
2.1.6. Autonomic NOC device/applications 2.1.6. Autonomic NOC device/applications
Setting up connectivity between the NOC and autonomic devices when Setting up connectivity between the NOC and autonomic devices when
the NOC device itself is non-autonomic is as mentioned in the the NOC device itself is non-autonomic is as mentioned in the
beginning a security issue. It also results as shown in the previous beginning a security issue. It also results as shown in the previous
paragraphs in a range of connectivity considerations, some of which paragraphs in a range of connectivity considerations, some of which
may be quite undesirable or complex to operationalize. may be quite undesirable or complex to operationalize.
Making NOC application devices autonomic and having them participate Making NMS hosts autonomic and having them participate in the ACP is
in the ACP is therefore not only a highly desirable solution to the therefore not only a highly desirable solution to the security
security issues, but can also provide a likely easier issues, but can also provide a likely easier operationalization of
operationalization of the ACP because it minimizes NOC-special edge the ACP because it minimizes NOC-special edge considerations - the
considerations - the ACP is simply built all the way automatically, ACP is simply built all the way automatically, even inside the NOC
even inside the NOC and only authorized and authenticate NOC devices/ and only authorized and authenticate NOC devices/applications will
applications will have access to it. have access to it.
Supporting the ACP all the way into an application device requires Supporting the ACP all the way into an application device requires
implementing the following aspects in it: AN bootstrap/enrollment implementing the following aspects in it: AN bootstrap/enrollment
mechanisms, the secure channel for the ACP and at least the host side mechanisms, the secure channel for the ACP and at least the host side
of IPv6 routing setup for the ACP. Minimally this could all be of IPv6 routing setup for the ACP. Minimally this could all be
implemented as an application and be made available to the host OS implemented as an application and be made available to the host OS
via eg: a tap driver to make the ACP show up as another IPv6 enabled via eg: a tap driver to make the ACP show up as another IPv6 enabled
interface. interface.
Having said this: If the structure of NOC applications is transformed Having said this: If the structure of NMS hosts is transformed
through virtualization anyhow, then it may be considered equally through virtualization anyhow, then it may be considered equally
secure and appropriate to construct a (physical) NOC application secure and appropriate to construct (physical) NMS host system by
system by combining a virtual AN/ACP enabled router with non-AN/ACP combining a virtual AN/ACP enabled router with non-AN/ACP enabled
enabled NOC-application VMs via a hypervisor, leveraging the NOC-application VMs via a hypervisor, leveraging the configuration
configuration options described in the previous sections but jut options described in the previous sections but just virtualizing
virtualizing them. them.
2.1.7. Encryption of data-plane connections 2.1.7. Encryption of data-plane connections
When combining ACP and data-plane connectivity for availability and When combining ACP and data-plane connectivity for availability and
performance reasons, this too has an impact on security: When using performance reasons, this too has an impact on security: When using
the ACP, the traffic will be mostly encryption protected, especially the ACP, the traffic will be mostly encryption protected, especially
when considering the above described use of AN application devices. when considering the above described use of AN application devices.
If instead the data-plane is used, then this is not the case anymore If instead the data-plane is used, then this is not the case anymore
unless it is done by the application. unless it is done by the application.
The most simple solution for this problem exists when using AN NOC The simplest solution for this problem exists when using AN capable
application devices, because in that case the communicating AN NOC NMS hosts, because in that case the communicating AN capable NMS host
application and the AN network device have certificates through the and the AN network device have certificates through the AN enrollment
AN enrollment process that they can mutually trust (same AN domain). process that they can mutually trust (same AN domain). In result,
In result, data-plane connectivity that does support this can simply data-plane connectivity that does support this can simply leverage
leverage TLS/dTLS with mutual AN-domain certificate authentication - TLS/dTLS with mutual AN-domain certificate authentication - and does
and does not incur new key management. not incur new key management.
If this automatic security benefit is seen as most important, but a If this automatic security benefit is seen as most important, but a
"full" ACP stack into the NOC application device is unfeasible, then "full" ACP stack into the NMS host is unfeasible, then it would still
it would still be possible to design a stripped down version of AN be possible to design a stripped down version of AN functionality for
functionality for such NOC hosts that only provides enrollment of the such NOC hosts that only provides enrollment of the NOC host into the
NOC host into the AN domain to the extend that the host receives an AN domain to the extend that the host receives an AN domain
AN domain certificate, but without directly participating in the ACP certificate, but without directly participating in the ACP
afterwards. Instead, the host would just leverage TLS/dTLS using its afterwards. Instead, the host would just leverage TLS/dTLS using its
AN certificate via the data-plane with AN network devices as well as AN certificate via the data-plane with AN network devices as well as
indirectly via the ACP with the above mentioned in-NOC network edge indirectly via the ACP with the above mentioned in-NOC network edge
connectivity into the ACP. connectivity into the ACP.
When using the ACP itself, TLS/dTLS for the transport layer between When using the ACP itself, TLS/dTLS for the transport layer between
NOC application and network device is somewhat of a double price to NMS hosts and network device is somewhat of a double price to pay
pay (ACP also encrypts) and could potentially be optimized away, but (ACP also encrypts) and could potentially be optimized away, but
given the assumed lower performance of the ACP, it seems that this is given the assumed lower performance of the ACP, it seems that this is
an unnecessary optimization. an unnecessary optimization.
2.1.8. Long term direction of the solution 2.1.8. Long term direction of the solution
If we consider what potentially could be the most lightweight and If we consider what potentially could be the most lightweight and
autonomic long term solution based on the technologies described autonomic long term solution based on the technologies described
above, we see the following direction: above, we see the following direction:
1. NOC applications should at least support IPv6. IPv4/IPv6 NAT in 1. NMS hosts should at least support IPv6. IPv4/IPv6 NAT in the
the network to enable use of ACP is long term undesirable. network to enable use of ACP is long term undesirable. Having
Having IPv4 only applications automatically leverage IPv6 IPv4 only applications automatically leverage IPv6 connectivity
connectivity via host-stack options is likely non-feasible (NOTE: via host-stack options is likely non-feasible (NOTE: this has
this has still to be vetted more). still to be vetted more).
2. Build the ACP as a lightweight application for NOC application 2. Build the ACP as a lightweight application for NMS hosts so ACP
devices so ACP extends all the way into the actual NOC extends all the way into the actual NMS hosts.
application devices.
3. Leverage and as necessary enhance MP-TCP with automatic dual- 3. Leverage and as necessary enhance MP-TCP with automatic dual-
connectivity: If the MP-TCP unaware application is using ACP connectivity: If the MP-TCP unaware application is using ACP
connectivity, the policies used should add sub-flow(s) via the connectivity, the policies used should add sub-flow(s) via the
data-plane and prefer them. data-plane and prefer them.
4. Consider how to best map NOC application desires to underlying 4. Consider how to best map NMS host desires to underlying transport
transport mechanisms: With the above mentioned 3 points, not all mechanisms: With the above mentioned 3 points, not all options
options are covered. Depending on the OAM operation, one may are covered. Depending on the OAM operation, one may still want
still want only ACP, only data-plane, or automatically prefer one only ACP, only data-plane, or automatically prefer one over the
over the other and/or use the ACP with low performance or high- other and/or use the ACP with low performance or high-performance
performance (for emergency OAM actions such as countering DDoS). (for emergency OAM actions such as countering DDoS). It is as of
It is as of today not clear what the simplest set of tools is to today not clear what the simplest set of tools is to enable
enable explicitly the choice of desired behavior of each OAM explicitly the choice of desired behavior of each OAM operations.
operations. The use of the above mentioned DNS and MP-TCP The use of the above mentioned DNS and MP-TCP mechanisms is a
mechanisms is a start, but this will require additional thoughts. start, but this will require additional thoughts. This is likely
This is likely a specific case of the more generic scope of TAPS. a specific case of the more generic scope of TAPS.
2.2. Stable connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions 2.2. Stable connectivity for distributed network/OAM functions
The ACP can provide common direct-neighbor discovery and capability The ANI (ACP, Bootstrap, GRASP) can provide via the GRASP protocol
negotiation and stable and secure connectivity for functions running common direct-neighbor discovery and capability negotiation (GRASP
distributed in network devices. It can therefore eliminate the need via ACP and/or data-plane) and stable and secure connectivity for
to re-implement similar functions in each distributed function in the functions running distributed in network devices (GRASP via ACP). It
network. Today, every distributed protocol does this with functional can therefore eliminate the need to re-implement similar functions in
elements usually called "Hello" mechanisms and with often protocol each distributed function in the network. Today, every distributed
specific security mechanisms. protocol does this with functional elements usually called "Hello"
mechanisms and with often protocol specific security mechanisms.
KARP has tried to start provide common directions and therefore
reduce the re-invention of at least some of the security aspects, but
it only covers routing-protocols and it is unclear how well it
applicable to a potentially wider range of network distributed agents
such as those performing distributed OAM functions. The ACP can help
in these cases.
This section is TBD for further iterations of this draft. KARP (Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols, see [RFC6518])
has tried to start provide common directions and therefore reduce the
re-invention of at least some of the security aspects, but it only
covers routing-protocols and it is unclear how well it applicable to
a potentially wider range of network distributed agents such as those
performing distributed OAM functions. The ACP can help in these
cases.
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
We discuss only security considerations not covered in the In this section, we discuss only security considerations not covered
appropriate sub-sections of the solutions described. in the appropriate sub-sections of the solutions described.
Even though ACPs are meant to be isolated, explicit operator Even though ACPs are meant to be isolated, explicit operator
misconfiguration to connect to insecure OAM equipment and/or bugs in misconfiguration to connect to insecure OAM equipment and/or bugs in
ACP devices may cause leakage into places where it is not expected. ACP devices may cause leakage into places where it is not expected.
Mergers/Aquisitions and other complex network reconfigurations Mergers/Aquisitions and other complex network reconfigurations
affecting the NOC are typical examples. affecting the NOC are typical examples.
ULA addressing as proposed in this document is preferred over ULA addressing as proposed in this document is preferred over
globally reachable addresses because it is not routed in the global globally reachable addresses because it is not routed in the global
Internet and will therefore be subject to more filtering even in Internet and will therefore be subject to more filtering even in
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If packets with unexpected ULA addresses are seen and one expects If packets with unexpected ULA addresses are seen and one expects
them to be from another networks ACP from which they leaked, then them to be from another networks ACP from which they leaked, then
some form of ULA prefix registrastion (not allocation) can be some form of ULA prefix registrastion (not allocation) can be
beneficial. Some voluntary registries exist, for example beneficial. Some voluntary registries exist, for example
https://www.sixxs.net/tools/grh/ula/, although none of them is https://www.sixxs.net/tools/grh/ula/, although none of them is
preferrable because of being operated by some recognized authority. preferrable because of being operated by some recognized authority.
If an operator would want to make its ULA prefix known, it might need If an operator would want to make its ULA prefix known, it might need
to register it with multiple existing registries. to register it with multiple existing registries.
ULA Centrally assigned ULA addresses (ULA-C) was an attempt to ULA Centrally assigned ULA addresses (ULA-C) was an attempt to
introduce centralized registration of randomnly assigned addresses introduce centralized registration of randomly assigned addresses and
and potentially even carve out a different ULA prefix for such potentially even carve out a different ULA prefix for such addresses.
addresses. This proposal is currently not proceeding, and it is This proposal is currently not proceeding, and it is questionable
questionable whether the stable connectivity use case provides whether the stable connectivity use case provides sufficient
sufficient motivation to revive this effort. motivation to revive this effort.
Using current registration options implies that there will not be Using current registration options implies that there will not be
reverse DNS mapping for ACP addresses. For that one will have to reverse DNS mapping for ACP addresses. For that one will have to
rely on looking up the unknown/unexpected network prefix in the rely on looking up the unknown/unexpected network prefix in the
registry registry to determine the owner of these addresses. registry registry to determine the owner of these addresses.
Reverse DNS resolution may be beneficial for specific already Reverse DNS resolution may be beneficial for specific already
deployed insecure legacy protocols on NOC OAM systems that intend to deployed insecure legacy protocols on NOC OAM systems that intend to
communicate via the ACP (eg: TFTP) and leverages reverse-DNS for communicate via the ACP (eg: TFTP) and leverages reverse-DNS for
authentication. Given how the ACP provides path security except authentication. Given how the ACP provides path security except
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up in an automated fashion, linked to the autonomic registrar backend up in an automated fashion, linked to the autonomic registrar backend
so that the DNS and reverse DNS records are actually derived from the so that the DNS and reverse DNS records are actually derived from the
subject name elements of the ACP device certificates in the same way subject name elements of the ACP device certificates in the same way
as the autonomic devices themselves will derive their ULA addresses as the autonomic devices themselves will derive their ULA addresses
from their certificates to ensure correct and consistent DNS entries. from their certificates to ensure correct and consistent DNS entries.
If an operator feels that reverse DNS records are beneficial to its If an operator feels that reverse DNS records are beneficial to its
own operations but that they should not be made available publically own operations but that they should not be made available publically
for "security" by concealment reasons, then the case of ACP DNS for "security" by concealment reasons, then the case of ACP DNS
entries is probably one of the least problematic use cases for split- entries is probably one of the least problematic use cases for split-
DNS: The ACP DNS names are only needed for the NOC applications DNS: The ACP DNS names are only needed for the NMS hosts intending to
intending to use the ACP - but not network wide across the use the ACP - but not network wide across the enterprise.
enterprise.
4. No IPv4 for ACP 4. No IPv4 for ACP
The ACP is targeted to be IPv6 only, and the prior explanations in The ACP is targeted to be IPv6 only, and the prior explanations in
this document show that this can lead to some complexity when having this document show that this can lead to some complexity when having
to connect IPv4 only NOC solutions, and that it will be impossible to to connect IPv4 only NOC solutions, and that it will be impossible to
leverage the ACP when the OAM agents on an ACP network device do not leverage the ACP when the OAM agents on an ACP network device do not
support IPv6. Therefore, the question was raised whether the ACP support IPv6. Therefore, the question was raised whether the ACP
should optionally also support IPv4. should optionally also support IPv4.
skipping to change at page 14, line 42 skipping to change at page 16, line 21
into IPv4 support for ACP will have a longer term benefit or enough into IPv4 support for ACP will have a longer term benefit or enough
critical short-term use-cases. Support for only IPv4 for ACP is critical short-term use-cases. Support for only IPv4 for ACP is
purely a strategic choice to focus on the known important long term purely a strategic choice to focus on the known important long term
goals. goals.
In other type of networks as well, we think that efforts to support In other type of networks as well, we think that efforts to support
autonomic networking is better spent in ensuring that one address autonomic networking is better spent in ensuring that one address
family will be support so all use cases will long-term work with it, family will be support so all use cases will long-term work with it,
instead of duplicating effort into IPv4. Especially because auto- instead of duplicating effort into IPv4. Especially because auto-
addressing for the ACP with IPv4 would be more ecomplex than in IPv6 addressing for the ACP with IPv4 would be more ecomplex than in IPv6
due to the the IPv4 addressing space. due to the IPv4 addressing space.
5. Further considerations
6. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document requests no action by IANA. This document requests no action by IANA.
7. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at cisco This work originated from an Autonomic Networking project at cisco
Systems, which started in early 2010 including customers involved in Systems, which started in early 2010 including customers involved in
the design and early testing. Many people contributed to the aspects the design and early testing. Many people contributed to the aspects
described in this document, including in alphabetical order: BL described in this document, including in alphabetical order: BL
Balaji, Steinthor Bjarnason, Yves Herthoghs, Sebastian Meissner, Ravi Balaji, Steinthor Bjarnason, Yves Herthoghs, Sebastian Meissner, Ravi
Kumar Vadapalli. The author would also like to thank Michael Kumar Vadapalli. The author would also like to thank Michael
Richardson, James Woodyatt and Brian Carpenter for their review and Richardson, James Woodyatt and Brian Carpenter for their review and
comments. comments. Special thanks to Sheng Jiang for his thorough review.
8. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove] 7. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]
03: Integrated fixed from Shepherd review (Sheng Jiang).
01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, change in author 01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, change in author
association. association.
01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, no changes. 01: Refresh timeout. Stable document, no changes.
00: Changed title/dates. 00: Changed title/dates.
individual-02: Updated references. individual-02: Updated references.
skipping to change at page 15, line 38 skipping to change at page 17, line 13
better anymore, but still mention it. better anymore, but still mention it.
individual-02: Added explanation why no IPv4 for ACP. individual-02: Added explanation why no IPv4 for ACP.
individual-01: Added security section discussing the role of individual-01: Added security section discussing the role of
address prefix selection and DNS for ACP. Title change to address prefix selection and DNS for ACP. Title change to
emphasize focus on OAM. Expanded abstract. emphasize focus on OAM. Expanded abstract.
individual-00: Initial version. individual-00: Initial version.
9. References 8. References
[I-D.behringer-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
Liu, B., Jeff, J., and J. Strassner, "A Reference Model
for Autonomic Networking", draft-behringer-anima-
reference-model-04 (work in progress), October 2015.
[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] [I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane]
Behringer, M., Eckert, T., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic Behringer, M., Eckert, T., and S. Bjarnason, "An Autonomic
Control Plane", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control- Control Plane", draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
plane-05 (work in progress), January 2017. plane-06 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason, Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping- Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-04 (work in progress), October 2016. keyinfra-06 (work in progress), May 2017.
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-an-gap-analysis] [I-D.ietf-anima-grasp]
Jiang, S., Carpenter, B., and M. Behringer, "General Gap Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., and B. Liu, "A Generic
Analysis for Autonomic Networking", draft-irtf-nmrg-an- Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", draft-ietf-anima-
gap-analysis-06 (work in progress), April 2015. grasp-14 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model]
Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A., Behringer, M., Carpenter, B., Eckert, T., Ciavaglia, L.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic Pierre, P., Liu, B., Nobre, J., and J. Strassner, "A
Networking - Definitions and Design Goals", draft-irtf- Reference Model for Autonomic Networking", draft-ietf-
nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions-07 (work in progress), anima-reference-model-04 (work in progress), July 2017.
March 2015.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6518] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", RFC 6518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6518, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518>.
[RFC6824] Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
"TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
Addresses", RFC 6824, DOI 10.17487/RFC6824, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6824>.
[RFC7575] Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
Networking: Definitions and Design Goals", RFC 7575,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7575, June 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7575>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Toerless Eckert Toerless Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc. Futurewei Technologies Inc.
2330 Central Expy 2330 Central Expy
Santa Clara 95050 Santa Clara 95050
USA USA
Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de
Michael H. Behringer Michael H. Behringer
Cisco
Email: mbehring@cisco.com Email: michael.h.behringer@gmail.com
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