draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-00.txt   draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-01.txt 
ACE Working Group L. Seitz ACE Working Group L. Seitz
Internet-Draft RISE SICS AB Internet-Draft RISE SICS AB
Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini
Expires: June 15, 2018 Ericsson AB Expires: September 6, 2018 Ericsson AB
M. Gunnarsson M. Gunnarsson
RISE SICS AB RISE SICS AB
December 12, 2017 G. Selander
Ericsson AB
March 5, 2018
OSCORE profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained OSCORE profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
Environments Framework Environments Framework
draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-00 draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-01
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies a profile for the Authentication and This memo specifies a profile for the Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework. It
utilizes Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments utilizes Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE) to provide communication security, server authentication, (OSCORE) to provide communication security, server authentication,
and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an and proof-of-possession for a key owned by the client and bound to an
OAuth 2.0 access token. OAuth 2.0 access token.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 15, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Client to Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Client to Resource Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Signaling the use of OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Signaling the use of OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Key establishment for OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Key establishment for OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Client to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Client to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Resource Server to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Resource Server to Authorization Server . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Profile Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Profile Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Using the pop-key with EDHOC (EDHOC+OSCORE) . . . . 10 Appendix B. Using the pop-key with EDHOC (EDHOC+OSCORE) . . . . 11
B.1. Using Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B.1. Using Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B.2. Using Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 B.2. Using Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B.3. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B.3. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This memo specifies a profile of the ACE framework This memo specifies a profile of the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In this profile, a client and a resource [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In this profile, a client and a resource
server use CoAP [RFC7252] to communicate. The client uses an access server use CoAP [RFC7252] to communicate. The client uses an access
token, bound to a key (the proof-of-possession key) to authorize its token, bound to a key (the proof-of-possession key) to authorize its
access to the resource server. In order to provide communication access to the resource server. In order to provide communication
security, proof of possession, and server authentication they use security, proof of possession, and server authentication they use
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
skipping to change at page 3, line 39 skipping to change at page 3, line 39
document that a given resource on a specific RS is associated to a document that a given resource on a specific RS is associated to a
unique AS. unique AS.
2. Client to Resource Server 2. Client to Resource Server
The use of OSCORE for arbitrary CoAP messages is specified in The use of OSCORE for arbitrary CoAP messages is specified in
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. This section defines the specific [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. This section defines the specific
uses and their purpose for securing the communication between a uses and their purpose for securing the communication between a
client and a resource server, and the parameters needed to negotiate client and a resource server, and the parameters needed to negotiate
the use of this profile with the token resource at the authorization the use of this profile with the token resource at the authorization
server as specified in section 5.5 of the ACE framework server as specified in section 5.6 of the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
2.1. Signaling the use of OSCORE 2.1. Signaling the use of OSCORE
A client requests a token at an AS via the /token resource. This A client requests a token at an AS via the /token resource. This
follows the message formats specified in section 5.5.1 of the ACE follows the message formats specified in section 5.6.1 of the ACE
framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
The AS responding to a successful access token request as defined in The AS responding to a successful access token request as defined in
section 5.5.2 of the ACE framework can signal that the use of OSCORE section 5.6.2 of the ACE framework can signal that the use of OSCORE
is REQUIRED for a specific access token by including the "profile" is REQUIRED for a specific access token by including the "profile"
parameter with the value "coap_oscore" in the access token response. parameter with the value "coap_oscore" in the access token response.
This means that the client MUST use OSCORE towards all resource This means that the client MUST use OSCORE towards all resource
servers for which this access token is valid, and follow Section 2.2 servers for which this access token is valid, and follow Section 2.2
to derive the security context to run OSCORE. to derive the security context to run OSCORE.
The error response procedures defined in section 5.5.3 of the ACE The error response procedures defined in section 5.6.3 of the ACE
framework are unchanged by this profile. framework are unchanged by this profile.
Note the the client and the authorization server MAY OPTIONALLY use Note the the client and the authorization server MAY OPTIONALLY use
OSCORE to protect the interaction via the /token resource. See OSCORE to protect the interaction via the /token resource. See
Section 3 for details. Section 3 for details.
2.2. Key establishment for OSCORE 2.2. Key establishment for OSCORE
Section 3.2 of OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] defines how to Section 3.2 of OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] defines how to
derive a security context based on a shared master secret and a set derive a security context based on a shared master secret and a set
skipping to change at page 4, line 27 skipping to change at page 4, line 27
derive a security context based on a shared master secret and a set derive a security context based on a shared master secret and a set
of other parameters, established between client and server. The of other parameters, established between client and server. The
proof-of-possession key (pop-key) provisioned from the AS MAY, in proof-of-possession key (pop-key) provisioned from the AS MAY, in
case of pre-shared keys, be used directly as master secret in OSCORE. case of pre-shared keys, be used directly as master secret in OSCORE.
If OSCORE is used directly with the symmetric pop-key as master If OSCORE is used directly with the symmetric pop-key as master
secret, then the AS MUST provision the following data, in response to secret, then the AS MUST provision the following data, in response to
the access token request: the access token request:
o a master secret o a master secret
o the sender identifier o the sender identifier
o the recipient identifier o the recipient identifier
Additionally, the AS MAY provision the following data, in the same Additionally, the AS MAY provision the following data, in the same
response. In case these parameters are omitted, the default values response. In case these parameters are omitted, the default values
are used as described in section 3.2 of are used as described in section 3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].
o an AEAD algorithm o an AEAD algorithm
o a KDF algorithm o a KDF algorithm
o a salt o a salt
o a replay window type and size o a replay window type and size
The master secret MUST be communicated as COSE_Key in the 'cnf' The master secret MUST be communicated as COSE_Key in the 'cnf'
parameter of the access token response as defined in section 5.5.4.5 parameter of the access token response as defined in section 5.6.4.5
of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The AEAD algorithm MAY be included as of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. The AEAD algorithm MAY be included as
the 'alg' parameter in the COSE_Key; the KDF algorithm MAY be the 'alg' parameter in the COSE_Key; the KDF algorithm MAY be
included as the 'kdf' parameter of the COSE_Key and the salt MAY be included as the 'kdf' parameter of the COSE_Key and the salt MAY be
included as the 'slt' parameter of the COSE_Key as defined in table included as the 'slt' parameter of the COSE_Key as defined in table
1. The same parameters MUST be included as metadata of the access 1.
token; if the token is a CWT [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the same
The same parameters MUST be included as metadata of the access token;
if the token is a CWT [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the same
COSE_Key structure MUST be placed in the 'cnf' claim of this token. COSE_Key structure MUST be placed in the 'cnf' claim of this token.
If a CWT is used it MUST be encrypted, since the token is transferred
from the client to the RS over an unprotected channel.
The AS MUST also assign identifiers to both client and RS, which are The AS MUST also assign identifiers to both client and RS, which are
then used as Sender ID and Recipient ID in the OSCORE context as then used as Sender ID and Recipient ID in the OSCORE context as
described in section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. These described in section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. These
identifiers MUST be unique in the set of all clients and RS identifiers MUST be unique in the set of all clients and RS
identifiers for a certain AS. Moreover, these MUST be included in identifiers for a certain AS. Moreover, these MUST be included in
the COSE_Key as header parameters, as defined in table 1. the COSE_Key as header parameters, as defined in table 1.
We assume in this document that a resource is associated to one We assume in this document that a resource is associated to one
single AS, which makes it possible to assume unique identifiers for single AS, which makes it possible to assume unique identifiers for
each client requesting a particular resource to a RS. If this is not each client requesting a particular resource to a RS. If this is not
skipping to change at page 5, line 27 skipping to change at page 5, line 29
case the RS needs to have a mechanism in place to disambiguate case the RS needs to have a mechanism in place to disambiguate
identifiers or mitigate their effect. identifiers or mitigate their effect.
Note that C should set the Sender ID of its security context to the Note that C should set the Sender ID of its security context to the
clientId value received and the Recipient ID to the serverId value, clientId value received and the Recipient ID to the serverId value,
and RS should do the opposite. and RS should do the opposite.
+----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+ +----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+
| name | label | CBOR type | registry | description | | name | label | CBOR type | registry | description |
+----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+ +----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+
| clientId | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the | | clientId | 6 | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | client in an | | | | | | client in an |
| | | | | OSCORE context | | | | | | OSCORE context |
| | | | | using this key | | | | | | using this key |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| serverId | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the | | serverId | 7 | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | server in an | | | | | | server in an |
| | | | | OSCORE context | | | | | | OSCORE context |
| | | | | using this key | | | | | | using this key |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| kdf | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the | | kdf | 8 | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | KDF algorithm in | | | | | | KDF algorithm in |
| | | | | an OSCORE context | | | | | | an OSCORE context |
| | | | | using this key | | | | | | using this key |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| slt | TBD | bstr | | Identifies the | | slt | 9 | bstr | | Identifies the |
| | | | | master salt in | | | | | | master salt in |
| | | | | an OSCORE context | | | | | | an OSCORE context |
| | | | | using this key | | | | | | using this key |
+----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+ +----------+-------+--------------+------------+-------------------+
Table 1: Additional common header parameters for COSE_Key Table 1: Additional common header parameters for COSE_Key
Figure 1 shows an example of such an AS response, in CBOR diagnostic Figure 1 shows an example of such an AS response, in CBOR diagnostic
notation without the tag and value abbreviations. notation without the tag and value abbreviations.
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
skipping to change at page 6, line 47 skipping to change at page 6, line 50
"kty" : "Symmetric", "kty" : "Symmetric",
"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128", "alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128",
"clientId" : b64'Qg', "clientId" : b64'Qg',
"serverId" : b64'qA', "serverId" : b64'qA',
"k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw' "k" : b64'+a+Dg2jjU+eIiOFCa9lObw'
} }
} }
Figure 2: Example CWT with OSCORE parameters. Figure 2: Example CWT with OSCORE parameters.
Note that the proof-of-possession required to bind the access token
to the client is implicitly performed by generating the shared OSCORE
context using the pop-key as master secret, both on the client and RS
side. An attacker using a stolen token will not be able to generate
a valid OSCORE context and thus not be able to prove possession of
the pop-key.
3. Client to Authorization Server 3. Client to Authorization Server
As specified in the ACE framework section 5.5 As specified in the ACE framework section 5.6
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the Client and AS can also use CoAP [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the Client and AS can also use CoAP
instead of HTTP to communicate via the token resource. This section instead of HTTP to communicate via the token resource. This section
specifies how to use OSCORE between Client and AS together with CoAP. specifies how to use OSCORE between Client and AS together with CoAP.
The use of OSCORE for this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile, The use of OSCORE for this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile,
other security protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead. other security protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead.
The client and the AS are expected to have pre-established security The client and the AS are expected to have pre-established security
contexts in place. How these security contexts are established is contexts in place. How these security contexts are established is
out of scope for this profile. Furthermore the client and the AS out of scope for this profile. Furthermore the client and the AS
communicate using OSCORE ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) through communicate using OSCORE ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) through
the introspection resource as specified in section 5.6 of the introspection resource as specified in section 5.7 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
4. Resource Server to Authorization Server 4. Resource Server to Authorization Server
As specified in the ACE framework section 5.6 As specified in the ACE framework section 5.7
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the RS and AS can also use CoAP instead [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the RS and AS can also use CoAP instead
of HTTP to communicate via the introspection resource. This section of HTTP to communicate via the introspection resource. This section
specifies how to use OSCORE between RS and AS. The use of OSCORE for specifies how to use OSCORE between RS and AS. The use of OSCORE for
this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile, other security this communication is OPTIONAL in this profile, other security
protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead. protocols (such as DTLS) MAY be used instead.
The RS and the AS are expected to have pre-established security The RS and the AS are expected to have pre-established security
contexts in place. How these security contexts are established is contexts in place. How these security contexts are established is
out of scope for this profile. Furthermore the RS and the AS out of scope for this profile. Furthermore the RS and the AS
communicate using OSCORE ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) through communicate using OSCORE ([I-D.ietf-core-object-security]) through
the introspection resource as specified in section 5.6 of the introspection resource as specified in section 5.7 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
TBD. This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Thus the general security considerations
from the framework also apply to this profile.
Furthermore the general security considerations of OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security] also apply to this specific use of
the OSCORE protocol.
OSCORE is designed to secure point-to-point communication, providing
a secure binding between the request and the response(s). Thus the
basic OSCORE protocol is not intended for use in point-to-multipoint
communication (e.g. multicast, publish-subscribe). Implementers of
this profile should make sure that their usecase corresponds to the
expected use of OSCORE, to prevent weakening the security assurances
provided by OSCORE.
6. Privacy Considerations 6. Privacy Considerations
TBD. TBD.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
TBD. 'coap_oscore' as profile id. Header parameters 'sid', 'rid', Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this
'kdf' and 'slt' for COSE_Key. specification]]" with the RFC number of this specification and delete
this paragraph.
The following registration is done for the ACE OAuth Profile Registry
following the procedure specified in section 8.6 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]:
o Profile name: coap_oscore
o Profile Description: Profile for using OSCORE to secure
communication between constrained nodes using the Authentication
and Authorization for Constrained Environments framework.
o Profile ID: 2
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): [[this specification]]
The following registrations are done for the COSE Key Common
Parameter Registry specified in section 16.5 of [RFC8152]:
o Name: clientId
o Label: 6
o CBOR Type: bstr
o Value Registry: N/A
o Description: Identifies the client in an OSCORE context
o Reference: [[this specification]]
o Name: serverId
o Label: 7
o Value Type: bstr
o Value Registry: N/A
o Description: Identifies the server in an OSCORE context
o Reference: [[this specification]]
o Name: kdf
o Label: 8
o Value Type: bstr
o Value Registry: COSE Algorithms registry
o Description: Identifies the KDF algorithm to be used in an OSCORE
context
o Reference: [[this specification]]
o Name: slt
o Label: 9
o Value Type: bstr
o Value Registry: N/A
o Description: Identifies the master salt of to be used in an OSCORE
context
o Reference: [[this specification]]
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]
Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-09 "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-12
(work in progress), October 2017. (work in progress), February 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth- Constrained Environments (ACE)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-09 (work in progress), November 2017. authz-10 (work in progress), February 2018.
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security] [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz, Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments "Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-07 (work in (OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-08 (work in
progress), November 2017. progress), January 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>. editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize] [I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize]
Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., and C. Bormann, "Delegated CoAP Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., and C. Bormann, "Delegated CoAP
Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)", draft- Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)", draft-
skipping to change at page 9, line 15 skipping to change at page 10, line 42
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
Appendix A. Profile Requirements Appendix A. Profile Requirements
This section lists the specifications on this profile based on the This section lists the specifications on this profile based on the
requirements on the framework, as requested in Appendix C. of requirements on the framework, as requested in Appendix C. of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
o (Optional) discovery process of how the client finds the right AS o (Optional) discovery process of how the client finds the right AS
for an RS it wants to send a request to: Not specified for an RS it wants to send a request to: Not specified
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Note that in the case described in this section, the 'expires_in' Note that in the case described in this section, the 'expires_in'
parameter, defined in section 4.2.2. of [RFC6749] defines the parameter, defined in section 4.2.2. of [RFC6749] defines the
lifetime in seconds of both the access token and the shared secret. lifetime in seconds of both the access token and the shared secret.
After expiration, C MUST acquire a new access token from the AS, and After expiration, C MUST acquire a new access token from the AS, and
run EDHOC again, as specified in this section run EDHOC again, as specified in this section
B.1. Using Asymmetric Keys B.1. Using Asymmetric Keys
In case of an asymmetric key, C MUST communicate its own asymmetric In case of an asymmetric key, C MUST communicate its own asymmetric
key to the AS in the 'cnf' parameter of the access token request, as key to the AS in the 'cnf' parameter of the access token request, as
specified in section 5.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]; the AS MUST specified in section 5.6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]; the AS MUST
communicate the RS's public key to C in the response, in the 'rs_cnf' communicate the RS's public key to C in the response, in the 'rs_cnf'
parameter, as specified in section 5.5.1 of parameter, as specified in section 5.6.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that the RS's public key MUST [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that the RS's public key MUST
include a 'kid' parameter, and that the value of the 'kid' MUST be include a 'kid' parameter, and that the value of the 'kid' MUST be
included in the access token, to let the RS know which of its public included in the access token, to let the RS know which of its public
keys C used. If the access token is a CWT keys C used. If the access token is a CWT
[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the key identifier MUST be placed [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token], the key identifier MUST be placed
directly in the 'cnf' structure (if the key is only referenced). directly in the 'cnf' structure (if the key is only referenced).
Figure 3 shows an example of such a request in CBOR diagnostic Figure 3 shows an example of such a request in CBOR diagnostic
notation without tag and value abbreviations. notation without tag and value abbreviations.
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} }
} }
} }
Figure 4: Example AS response (EDHOC+OSCORE, asymmetric). Figure 4: Example AS response (EDHOC+OSCORE, asymmetric).
B.2. Using Symmetric Keys B.2. Using Symmetric Keys
In the case of a symmetric key, the AS MUST communicate the key to In the case of a symmetric key, the AS MUST communicate the key to
the client in the 'cnf' parameter of the access token response, as the client in the 'cnf' parameter of the access token response, as
specified in section 5.5.2. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. AS MUST specified in section 5.6.2. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. AS MUST
also select a key identifier, that MUST be included as the 'kid' also select a key identifier, that MUST be included as the 'kid'
parameter either directly in the 'cnf' structure, as in figure 4 of parameter either directly in the 'cnf' structure, as in figure 4 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], or as the 'kid' parameter of the [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], or as the 'kid' parameter of the
COSE_key, as in figure 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. COSE_key, as in figure 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Figure 5 shows an example of the necessary parameters in the AS Figure 5 shows an example of the necessary parameters in the AS
response to the access token request when EDHOC is used. The example response to the access token request when EDHOC is used. The example
uses CBOR diagnostic notation without tag and value abbreviations. uses CBOR diagnostic notation without tag and value abbreviations.
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
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To provide forward secrecy and mutual authentication in the case of To provide forward secrecy and mutual authentication in the case of
pre-shared keys, pre-established raw public keys or with X.509 pre-shared keys, pre-established raw public keys or with X.509
certificates it is RECOMMENDED to use EDHOC certificates it is RECOMMENDED to use EDHOC
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] to generate the keying material. EDHOC [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] to generate the keying material. EDHOC
MUST be used as defined in Appendix C of MUST be used as defined in Appendix C of
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], with the following additions and [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], with the following additions and
modifications. modifications.
The first EDHOC message is sent after the access token is posted to The first EDHOC message is sent after the access token is posted to
the /authz-info resource of the RS as specified in section 5.7.1 of the /authz-info resource of the RS as specified in section 5.8.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Then the EDHOC message_1 is sent and the [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Then the EDHOC message_1 is sent and the
EDHOC protocol is initiated [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]). EDHOC protocol is initiated [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]).
Before the RS continues with the EDHOC protocol and responds to this Before the RS continues with the EDHOC protocol and responds to this
token submission request, additional verifications on the access token submission request, additional verifications on the access
token are done: the RS SHALL process the access token according to token are done: the RS SHALL process the access token according to
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the token is valid then the RS [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the token is valid then the RS
continues processing EDHOC following Appendix C of continues processing EDHOC following Appendix C of
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], otherwise it discontinues EDHOC and [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], otherwise it discontinues EDHOC and
responds with the error code as specified in responds with the error code as specified in
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token submission request, additional verifications on the access token submission request, additional verifications on the access
token are done: the RS SHALL process the access token according to token are done: the RS SHALL process the access token according to
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the token is valid then the RS [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the token is valid then the RS
continues processing EDHOC following Appendix C of continues processing EDHOC following Appendix C of
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], otherwise it discontinues EDHOC and [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], otherwise it discontinues EDHOC and
responds with the error code as specified in responds with the error code as specified in
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
o In case the EDHOC verification fails, the RS MUST return an error o In case the EDHOC verification fails, the RS MUST return an error
response to the client with code 4.01 (Unauthorized). response to the client with code 4.01 (Unauthorized).
o If RS has an access token for C but not for the resource that C o If RS has an access token for C but not for the resource that C
has requested, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden). has requested, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.03 (Forbidden).
o If RS has an access token for C but it does not cover the action C o If RS has an access token for C but it does not cover the action C
requested on the resource, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.05 requested on the resource, RS MUST reject the request with a 4.05
(Method Not Allowed). (Method Not Allowed).
o If all verifications above succeeds, further communication between o If all verifications above succeeds, further communication between
client and RS is protected with OSCORE, including the RS response client and RS is protected with OSCORE, including the RS response
to the OSCORE request. to the OSCORE request.
In the case of EDHOC being used with symmetric keys, the protocol in In the case of EDHOC being used with symmetric keys, the protocol in
section 5 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] MUST be used. If the key section 5 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] MUST be used. If the key
is asymmetric, the RS MUST also use an asymmetric key for is asymmetric, the RS MUST also use an asymmetric key for
authentication. This key is known to the client through the access authentication. This key is known to the client through the access
token response (see section 5.5.2 of the ACE framework). In this token response (see section 5.6.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]). In
case the protocol in section 4 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] MUST this case the protocol in section 4 of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]
be used. MUST be used.
Figure 7 illustrates the message exchanges for using OSCORE+EDHOC Figure 7 illustrates the message exchanges for using OSCORE+EDHOC
(step C in figure 1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]). (step C in figure 1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).
Resource Resource
Client Server Client Server
| | | |
| | | |
+--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02) +--------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
| POST | Uri-Path:"authz-info" | POST | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
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Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
Martin Gunnarsson Martin Gunnarsson
RISE SICS AB RISE SICS AB
Scheelevagen 17 Scheelevagen 17
Lund 22370 Lund 22370
Sweden Sweden
Email: martin.gunnarsson@ri.se Email: martin.gunnarsson@ri.se
Goeran Selander
Ericsson AB
Farogatan 6
Kista SE-16480 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
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