draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-08.txt		draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-09.txt
	ACE Working Group L. Seitz		ACE Working Group L. Seitz
	Internet-Draft RISE SICS		Internet-Draft RISE SICS
	Intended status: Standards Track G. Selander		Intended status: Standards Track G. Selander
	Expires: April 22, 2018 Ericsson		Expires: May 20, 2018 Ericsson
	E. Wahlstroem		E. Wahlstroem
	(no affiliation)		(no affiliation)
	S. Erdtman		S. Erdtman
	Spotify AB		Spotify AB
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Ltd.		ARM Ltd.
	October 19, 2017		November 16, 2017
	Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)		Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
	draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-08		draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-09
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification defines a framework for authentication and		This specification defines a framework for authentication and
	authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments. The		authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments. The
	framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0		framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0
	and CoAP, thus making a well-known and widely used authorization		and CoAP, thus making a well-known and widely used authorization
	solution suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used		solution suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used
	where possible, but where the constraints of IoT devices require it,		where possible, but where the constraints of IoT devices require it,
	extensions are added and profiles are defined.		extensions are added and profiles are defined.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 20, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1. OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2. CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	4. Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5.1. Discovering Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5.1. Discovering Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	5.1.1. Unauthorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . 15		5.1.1. Unauthorized Resource Request Message . . . . . . . . 15
	5.1.2. AS Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5.1.2. AS Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.2. Authorization Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		5.2. Authorization Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	5.3. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.3. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	5.4. AS Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.4. AS Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.5. The Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.5. The Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.6. The Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.6. The Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.6.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.6.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	5.6.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		5.6.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	5.6.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		5.6.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	5.6.4. Request and Response Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.6.4. Request and Response Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	5.6.4.1. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.6.4.1. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	5.6.4.2. Grant Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		5.6.4.2. Grant Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	5.6.4.3. Token Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		5.6.4.3. Token Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	5.6.4.4. Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		5.6.4.4. Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	5.6.4.5. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		5.6.4.5. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	5.6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		5.6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	5.7. The 'Introspect' Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		5.7. The 'Introspect' Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	5.7.1. RS-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.7.1. RS-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	5.7.2. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.7.2. AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	5.7.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		5.7.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.7.4. Client Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		5.7.4. Client Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	5.7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR . . . . . . 33		5.7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR . . . . . . 32
	5.8. The Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		5.8. The Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	5.8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Endpoint . . . . . . 34		5.8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Endpoint . . . . . . 33
	5.8.2. Token Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		5.8.2. Token Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	6.1. Unprotected AS Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		6.1. Unprotected AS Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	6.2. Use of Nonces for Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 37		6.2. Use of Nonces for Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	6.3. Combining profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		6.3. Combining profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	6.4. Error responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37		6.4. Error responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	8.1. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 39		8.1. Authorization Server Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	8.2. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		8.2. OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 38
	8.3. OAuth Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		8.3. OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	8.4. OAuth Token Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . 40		8.4. OAuth Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	8.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		8.5. OAuth Token Type CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	8.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		8.5.1. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	8.5. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		8.6. ACE OAuth Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	8.6. ACE OAuth Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		8.7. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	8.6.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		8.8. OAuth CBOR Parameter Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 41
	8.7. OAuth CBOR Parameter Mappings Registry . . . . . . . . . 41		8.9. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . . 41
	8.7.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.10. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . 42
	8.7.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		8.11. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	8.8. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry . . . . . . 44		8.12. CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	8.8.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44		8.13. CoAP Option Number Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	8.8.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	8.9. CoAP Option Number Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		Appendix A. Design Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		Appendix B. Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
	Appendix A. Design Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		Appendix C. Requirements on Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
	Appendix B. Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55		Appendix D. Assumptions on AS knowledge about C and RS . . . . . 54
	Appendix C. Requirements on Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Appendix E. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
	Appendix D. Assumptions on AS knowledge about C and RS . . . . . 58		E.1. Local Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
	Appendix E. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58		E.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . 58
	E.1. Local Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58		Appendix F. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
	E.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . 62		F.1. Version -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
	Appendix F. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66		F.2. Version -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
	F.1. Version -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66		F.3. Version -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
	F.2. Version -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		F.4. Version -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
	F.3. Version -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		F.5. Version -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
	F.4. Version -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		F.6. Version -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
	F.5. Version -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		F.7. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
	F.6. Version -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67		F.8. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
	F.7. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68		F.9. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
	F.8. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
	F.9. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to		Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to
	access a resource [RFC4949]. The authorization task itself can best		access a resource [RFC4949]. The authorization task itself can best
	be described as granting access to a requesting client, for a		be described as granting access to a requesting client, for a
	resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS). This exchange		resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS). This exchange
	is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (AS). Managing		is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (AS). Managing
	authorization for a large number of devices and users can be a		authorization for a large number of devices and users can be a
	complex task.		complex task.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 51 ¶
	The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] framework, which enjoys		The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] framework, which enjoys
	widespread deployment. Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0		widespread deployment. Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0
	without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained		without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained
	settings additional profiling is needed.		settings additional profiling is needed.
	Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP		Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP
	[RFC7252], for those communication environments where HTTP is not		[RFC7252], for those communication environments where HTTP is not
	appropriate. CoAP typically runs on top of UDP, which further		appropriate. CoAP typically runs on top of UDP, which further
	reduces overhead and message exchanges. While this specification		reduces overhead and message exchanges. While this specification
	defines extensions for the use of OAuth over CoAP, other underlying		defines extensions for the use of OAuth over CoAP, other underlying
	protocols are not prohibited from beeing supported in the future,		protocols are not prohibited from being supported in the future, such
	such as HTTP/2, MQTT, BLE and QUIC.		as HTTP/2, MQTT, BLE and QUIC.
	A third building block is CBOR [RFC7049], for encodings where JSON		A third building block is CBOR [RFC7049], for encodings where JSON
	[RFC7159] is not sufficiently compact. CBOR is a binary encoding		[RFC7159] is not sufficiently compact. CBOR is a binary encoding
	designed for small code and message size, which may be used for		designed for small code and message size, which may be used for
	encoding of self contained tokens, and also for encoding payload		encoding of self contained tokens, and also for encoding payload
	transferred in protocol messages.		transferred in protocol messages.
	A fourth building block is the compact CBOR-based secure message		A fourth building block is the compact CBOR-based secure message
	format COSE [RFC8152], which enables application layer security as an		format COSE [RFC8152], which enables application layer security as an
	alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS [RFC6347]		alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS [RFC6347]
	skipping to change at page 7, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 50 ¶
	scoped access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner.		scoped access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner.
	Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the		Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the
	nodes using access tokens. These access tokens are issued to clients		nodes using access tokens. These access tokens are issued to clients
	by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner.		by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner.
	The client uses the access token to access the protected resources		The client uses the access token to access the protected resources
	hosted by the resource server.		hosted by the resource server.
	A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:		A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:
	The token and introspection Endpoints:		The token and introspection Endpoints:
	The AS hosts the token endpoint that allows a client to request		The AS hosts the token endpoint that allows a client to request
	access tokens. The client makes a POST request to the token		access tokens. The client makes a POST request to the token
	endpoint on the AS and receives the access token in the response		endpoint on the AS and receives the access token in the response
	(if the request was successful).		(if the request was successful).
			In some deployments, a token introspection endpoint is provided by
	In some deployments, a token introspection endpoint is provied by
	the AS, which can be used by the RS if it needs to request		the AS, which can be used by the RS if it needs to request
	additional information regarding a received access token. The RS		additional information regarding a received access token. The RS
	makes a POST request to the introspecton endpoint on the AS and		makes a POST request to the introspection endpoint on the AS and
	receives information about the access token in the response. (See		receives information about the access token in the response. (See
	"Introspection" below.)		"Introspection" below.)
	Access Tokens:		Access Tokens:
	Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected		Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected
	resources. An access token is a data structure representing		resources. An access token is a data structure representing
	authorization permissions issued by the AS to the client. Access		authorization permissions issued by the AS to the client. Access
	tokens are generated by the AS and consumed by the RS. The access		tokens are generated by the AS and consumed by the RS. The access
	token content is opaque to the client.		token content is opaque to the client.
	Access tokens can have different formats, and various methods of		Access tokens can have different formats, and various methods of
	utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security		utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security
	requirements of the given deployment.		requirements of the given deployment.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 45 ¶
	verify that the key used by the client matches the one bound to		verify that the key used by the client matches the one bound to
	the access token. When this specification uses the term "access		the access token. When this specification uses the term "access
	token" it is assumed to be a PoP access token token unless		token" it is assumed to be a PoP access token token unless
	specifically stated otherwise.		specifically stated otherwise.
	The key bound to the access token (the PoP key) may use either		The key bound to the access token (the PoP key) may use either
	symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. The appropriate choice of		symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. The appropriate choice of
	the kind of cryptography depends on the constraints of the IoT		the kind of cryptography depends on the constraints of the IoT
	devices as well as on the security requirements of the use case.		devices as well as on the security requirements of the use case.
	Symmetric PoP key: The AS generates a random symmetric PoP key.		Symmetric PoP key:
	The key is either stored to be returned on introspection calls		The AS generates a random symmetric PoP key. The key is either
	or encrypted and included in the access token. The PoP key is		stored to be returned on introspection calls or encrypted and
	also encrypted for the client and sent together with the access		included in the access token. The PoP key is also encrypted
	token to the client.		for the client and sent together with the access token to the
			client.
	Asymmetric PoP key: An asymmetric key pair is generated on the		Asymmetric PoP key:
	client and the public key is sent to the AS (if it does not		An asymmetric key pair is generated on the client and the
	already have knowledge of the client's public key).		public key is sent to the AS (if it does not already have
	Information about the public key, which is the PoP key in this		knowledge of the client's public key). Information about the
	case, is either stored to be returned on introspection calls or		public key, which is the PoP key in this case, is either stored
	included inside the access token and sent back to the		to be returned on introspection calls or included inside the
	requesting client. The RS can identify the client's public key		access token and sent back to the requesting client. The RS
	from the information in the token, which allows the client to		can identify the client's public key from the information in
	use the corresponding private key for the proof of possession.		the token, which allows the client to use the corresponding
			private key for the proof of possession.
	The access token is either a simple reference, or a structured		The access token is either a simple reference, or a structured
	information object (e.g., CWT [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]),		information object (e.g., CWT [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]),
	protected by a cryptographic wrapper (e.g., COSE [RFC8152]). The		protected by a cryptographic wrapper (e.g., COSE [RFC8152]). The
	choice of PoP key does not necessarily imply a specific credential		choice of PoP key does not necessarily imply a specific credential
	type for the integrity protection of the token.		type for the integrity protection of the token.
	Scopes and Permissions:		Scopes and Permissions:
	In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is		In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is
	seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access token		seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access token
	request. In turn, the AS may use the scope response parameter to		request. In turn, the AS may use the scope response parameter to
	inform the client of the scope of the access token issued. As the		inform the client of the scope of the access token issued. As the
	client could be a constrained device as well, this specification		client could be a constrained device as well, this specification
	uses CBOR encoding as data formt, defined in Section 5, to request		uses CBOR encoding as data format, defined in Section 5, to
	scopes and to be informed what scopes the access token actually		request scopes and to be informed what scopes the access token
	authorizes.		actually authorizes.
	The values of the scope parameter are expressed as a list of		The values of the scope parameter in OAuth 2.0 are expressed as a
	space-delimited, case-sensitive strings, with a semantic that is		list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings, with a semantic
	well-known to the AS and the RS. More details about the concept		that is well-known to the AS and the RS. More details about the
	of scopes is found under Section 3.3 in [RFC6749].		concept of scopes is found under Section 3.3 in [RFC6749].
	Claims:		Claims:
	Information carried in the access token or returned from		Information carried in the access token or returned from
	introspection, called claims, is in the form of name-value pairs.		introspection, called claims, is in the form of name-value pairs.
	An access token may, for example, include a claim identifying the		An access token may, for example, include a claim identifying the
	AS that issued the token (via the "iss" claim) and what audience		AS that issued the token (via the "iss" claim) and what audience
	the access token is intended for (via the "aud" claim). The		the access token is intended for (via the "aud" claim). The
	audience of an access token can be a specific resource or one or		audience of an access token can be a specific resource or one or
	many resource servers. The resource owner policies influence what		many resource servers. The resource owner policies influence what
	claims are put into the access token by the authorization server.		claims are put into the access token by the authorization server.
	While the structure and encoding of the access token varies		While the structure and encoding of the access token varies
	skipping to change at page 14, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 39 ¶
	The RS uses the dynamically established keys to protect the		The RS uses the dynamically established keys to protect the
	response, according to used communication security protocol.		response, according to used communication security protocol.
	5. Framework		5. Framework
	The following sections detail the profiling and extensions of OAuth		The following sections detail the profiling and extensions of OAuth
	2.0 for constrained environments, which constitutes the ACE		2.0 for constrained environments, which constitutes the ACE
	framework.		framework.
	Credential Provisioning		Credential Provisioning
	For IoT, it cannot be assumed that the client and RS are part of a		For IoT, it cannot be assumed that the client and RS are part of a
	common key infrastructure, so the AS provisions credentials or		common key infrastructure, so the AS provisions credentials or
	associated information to allow mutual authentication. These		associated information to allow mutual authentication. These
	credentials need to be provided to the parties before or during		credentials need to be provided to the parties before or during
	the authentication protocol is executed, and may be re-used for		the authentication protocol is executed, and may be re-used for
	subsequent token requests.		subsequent token requests.
	Proof-of-Possession		Proof-of-Possession
	The ACE framework, by default, implements proof-of-possession for		The ACE framework, by default, implements proof-of-possession for
	access tokens, i.e., that the token holder can prove being a		access tokens, i.e., that the token holder can prove being a
	holder of the key bound to the token. The binding is provided by		holder of the key bound to the token. The binding is provided by
	the "cnf" claim [I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] indicating		the "cnf" claim [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] indicating
	what key is used for proof-of-possession. If a client needs to		what key is used for proof-of-possession. If a client needs to
	submit a new access token e.g., to obtain additional access		submit a new access token e.g., to obtain additional access
	rights, they can request that the AS binds this token to the same		rights, they can request that the AS binds this token to the same
	key as the previous one.		key as the previous one.
	ACE Profiles		ACE Profiles
	The client or RS may be limited in the encodings or protocols it		The client or RS may be limited in the encodings or protocols it
	supports. To support a variety of different deployment settings,		supports. To support a variety of different deployment settings,
	specific interactions between client and RS are defined in an ACE		specific interactions between client and RS are defined in an ACE
	profile. In ACE framework the AS is expected to manage the		profile. In ACE framework the AS is expected to manage the
	matching of compatible profile choices between a client and an RS.		matching of compatible profile choices between a client and an RS.
	The AS informs the client of the selected profile using the		The AS informs the client of the selected profile using the
	"profile" parameter in the token response.		"profile" parameter in the token response.
	OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS both to protect the communication		OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS both to protect the communication
	between AS and client when requesting an access token; between client		between AS and client when requesting an access token; between client
	skipping to change at page 16, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 19 ¶
	the Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS's AS. The AS		the Unauthorized Resource Request message to RS's AS. The AS
	information is a set of attributes containing an absolute URI (see		information is a set of attributes containing an absolute URI (see
	Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that specifies the AS in charge of RS.		Section 4.3 of [RFC3986]) that specifies the AS in charge of RS.
	The message MAY also contain a nonce generated by RS to ensure		The message MAY also contain a nonce generated by RS to ensure
	freshness in case that the RS and AS do not have synchronized clocks.		freshness in case that the RS and AS do not have synchronized clocks.
	Figure 2 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the AS		Figure 2 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the AS
	Information.		Information.
	/----------------+----------+-------------------\		/-------+----------+-----------------\
	| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Major Type |		| Name | CBOR Key | Major Type |
	|----------------+----------+-------------------|		|-------+----------+-----------------|
	| AS | 0 | 3 (text string) |		| AS | 0 | 3 (text string) |
	| nonce | 5 | 2 (byte string) |		| nonce | 5 | 2 (byte string) |
	\----------------+----------+-------------------/		\-------+----------+-----------------/
	Figure 2: AS Information parameters		Figure 2: AS Information parameters
	Figure 3 shows an example for an AS Information message payload using		Figure 3 shows an example for an AS Information message payload using
	CBOR [RFC7049] diagnostic notation, using the parameter names instead		CBOR [RFC7049] diagnostic notation, using the parameter names instead
	of the CBOR keys for better human readability.		of the CBOR keys for better human readability.
	4.01 Unauthorized		4.01 Unauthorized
	Content-Format: application/ace+cbor		Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
	{AS: "coaps://as.example.com/token",		{AS: "coaps://as.example.com/token",
	skipping to change at page 19, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 48 ¶
	functionality of the token endpoint, giving the AS the possibility to		functionality of the token endpoint, giving the AS the possibility to
	help the client and RS to establish shared keys or to exchange their		help the client and RS to establish shared keys or to exchange their
	public keys. Furthermore, this framework defines encodings using		public keys. Furthermore, this framework defines encodings using
	CBOR, as a substitute for JSON.		CBOR, as a substitute for JSON.
	For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client MUST be		For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client MUST be
	authenticated and present a valid grant for the scopes requested.		authenticated and present a valid grant for the scopes requested.
	Profiles of this framework MUST specify how the AS authenticates the		Profiles of this framework MUST specify how the AS authenticates the
	client and how the communication between client and AS is protected.		client and how the communication between client and AS is protected.
			The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is 'token', however
			implementations are not required to use this name and can define
			their own instead.
	The figures of this section use CBOR diagnostic notation without the		The figures of this section use CBOR diagnostic notation without the
	integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for		integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for
	illustrative purposes. Note that implementations MUST use the		illustrative purposes. Note that implementations MUST use the
	integer abbreviations and the binary CBOR encoding.		integer abbreviations and the binary CBOR encoding.
	5.6.1. Client-to-AS Request		5.6.1. Client-to-AS Request
	The client sends a POST request to the token endpoint at the AS. The		The client sends a POST request to the token endpoint at the AS. The
	profile MUST specify the Content-Type and wrapping of the payload.		profile MUST specify the Content-Type and wrapping of the payload.
	The content of the request consists of the parameters specified in		The content of the request consists of the parameters specified in
	section 4 of the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749], encoded as a CBOR		section 4 of the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749], encoded as a CBOR
	map.		map, where the "scope" parameter can additionally be formatted as a
			byte array, in order to allow compact encoding of complex scope
			structures.
	In addition to these parameters, this framework defines the following		In addition to these parameters, this framework defines the following
	parameters for requesting an access token from a token endpoint:		parameters for requesting an access token from a token endpoint:
	aud		aud
	OPTIONAL. Specifies the audience for which the client is		OPTIONAL. Specifies the audience for which the client is
	requesting an access token. If this parameter is missing, it is		requesting an access token. If this parameter is missing, it is
	assumed that the client and the AS have a pre-established		assumed that the client and the AS have a pre-established
	understanding of the audience that an access token should address.		understanding of the audience that an access token should address.
	If a client submits a request for an access token without		If a client submits a request for an access token without
	skipping to change at page 20, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 6 ¶
	The following examples illustrate different types of requests for		The following examples illustrate different types of requests for
	proof-of-possession tokens.		proof-of-possession tokens.
	Figure 5 shows a request for a token with a symmetric proof-of-		Figure 5 shows a request for a token with a symmetric proof-of-
	possession key. Note that in this example it is assumed that		possession key. Note that in this example it is assumed that
	transport layer communication security is used, therefore the		transport layer communication security is used, therefore the
	Content-Type is "application/cbor". The content is displayed in CBOR		Content-Type is "application/cbor". The content is displayed in CBOR
	diagnostic notation, without abbreviations for better readability.		diagnostic notation, without abbreviations for better readability.
	Header: POST (Code=0.02)		Header: POST (Code=0.02)
	Uri-Host: "server.example.com"		Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
	Uri-Path: "token"		Uri-Path: "token"
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	Payload:		Payload:
	{		{
	"grant_type" : "client_credentials",		"grant_type" : "client_credentials",
	"client_id" : "myclient",		"client_id" : "myclient",
	"aud" : "tempSensor4711"		"aud" : "tempSensor4711"
	}		}
	Figure 5: Example request for an access token bound to a symmetric		Figure 5: Example request for an access token bound to a symmetric
	key.		key.
	Figure 6 shows a request for a token with an asymmetric proof-of-		Figure 6 shows a request for a token with an asymmetric proof-of-
	possession key. Note that in this example COSE is used to provide		possession key. Note that in this example COSE is used to provide
	object-security, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cose".		object-security, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cose".
	Header: POST (Code=0.02)		Header: POST (Code=0.02)
	Uri-Host: "server.example.com"		Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
	Uri-Path: "token"		Uri-Path: "token"
	Content-Type: "application/cose"		Content-Type: "application/cose"
	Payload:		Payload:
	"COSE_Encrypted" : {		16( # COSE_ENCRYPTED
	16(
	[ h'a1010a', # protected header: {"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128"}		[ h'a1010a', # protected header: {"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128"}
	{5 : b64'ifUvZaHFgJM7UmGnjA'}, # unprotected header, IV		{5 : b64'ifUvZaHFgJM7UmGnjA'}, # unprotected header, IV
	b64'WXThuZo6TMCaZZqi6ef/8WHTjOdGk8kNzaIhIQ' # ciphertext		b64'WXThuZo6TMCaZZqi6ef/8WHTjOdGk8kNzaIhIQ' # ciphertext
	]		]
	)		)
	}
	Decrypted payload:		Decrypted payload:
	{		{
	"grant_type" : "client_credentials",		"grant_type" : "client_credentials",
	"client_id" : "myclient",		"client_id" : "myclient",
	"cnf" : {		"cnf" : {
	"COSE_Key" : {		"COSE_Key" : {
	"kty" : "EC",		"kty" : "EC",
	"kid" : h'11',		"kid" : h'11',
	"crv" : "P-256",		"crv" : "P-256",
	skipping to change at page 22, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 14 ¶
	Figure 7 shows a request for a token where a previously communicated		Figure 7 shows a request for a token where a previously communicated
	proof-of-possession key is only referenced. Note that a transport		proof-of-possession key is only referenced. Note that a transport
	layer based communication security profile is assumed in this		layer based communication security profile is assumed in this
	example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cbor". Also note		example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cbor". Also note
	that the client performs a password based authentication in this		that the client performs a password based authentication in this
	example by submitting its client_secret (see section 2.3.1. of		example by submitting its client_secret (see section 2.3.1. of
	[RFC6749]).		[RFC6749]).
	Header: POST (Code=0.02)		Header: POST (Code=0.02)
	Uri-Host: "server.example.com"		Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
	Uri-Path: "token"		Uri-Path: "token"
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	Payload:		Payload:
	{		{
	"grant_type" : "client_credentials",		"grant_type" : "client_credentials",
	"client_id" : "myclient",		"client_id" : "myclient",
	"client_secret" : "mysecret234",		"client_secret" : "mysecret234",
	"aud" : "valve424",		"aud" : "valve424",
	"scope" : "read",		"scope" : "read",
	"cnf" : {		"cnf" : {
	skipping to change at page 22, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 22, line 5 ¶
	issuing a successful response. It is assumed that the AS has prior		issuing a successful response. It is assumed that the AS has prior
	knowledge of the capabilities of the client and the RS (see		knowledge of the capabilities of the client and the RS (see
	Appendix D. This prior knowledge may, for example, be set by the use		Appendix D. This prior knowledge may, for example, be set by the use
	of a dynamic client registration protocol exchange [RFC7591].		of a dynamic client registration protocol exchange [RFC7591].
	The content of the successful reply is the RS Information. It MUST		The content of the successful reply is the RS Information. It MUST
	be encoded as CBOR map, containing parameters as specified in section		be encoded as CBOR map, containing parameters as specified in section
	5.1 of [RFC6749]. In addition to these parameters, the following		5.1 of [RFC6749]. In addition to these parameters, the following
	parameters are also part of a successful response:		parameters are also part of a successful response:
	profile		profile OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the client MUST
	OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the client MUST use		use towards the RS. See Section 5.6.4.4 for the formatting of
	towards the RS. See Section 5.6.4.4 for the formatting of this		this parameter.
	parameter.
	. If this parameter is absent, the AS assumes that the client		. If this parameter is absent, the AS assumes that the client
	implicitly knows which profile to use towards the RS.		implicitly knows which profile to use towards the RS.
	cnf		cnf REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used.
	REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used.
	MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains the symmetric		MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains the symmetric
	proof-of-possession key the client is supposed to use. See		proof-of-possession key the client is supposed to use. See
	Section 5.6.4.5 for details on the use of this parameter.		Section 5.6.4.5 for details on the use of this parameter.
	rs_cnf		rs_cnf OPTIONAL if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are
	OPTIONAL if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used.		used. MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains
	MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains information		information about the public key used by the RS to authenticate.
	about the public key used by the RS to authenticate. See		See Section 5.6.4.5 for details on the use of this parameter. If
	Section 5.6.4.5 for details on the use of this parameter. If this		this parameter is absent, the AS assumes that the client already
	parameter is absent, the AS assumes that the client already knows		knows the public key of the RS.
	the public key of the RS.		token_type OPTIONAL. By default implementations of this framework
	token_type		SHOULD assume that the token_type is "pop". If a specific use
	OPTIONAL. By default implementations of this framework SHOULD		case requires another token_type (e.g., "Bearer") to be used then
	assume that the token_type is "pop". If a specific use case		this parameter is REQUIRED.
	requires another token_type (e.g., "Bearer") to be used then this
	parameter is REQUIRED.
	Note that if CBOR Web Tokens [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] are used,		Note that if CBOR Web Tokens [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] are used,
	the access token can also contain a "cnf" claim		the access token can also contain a "cnf" claim
	[I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. This claim is however		[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. This claim is however
	consumed by a different party. The access token is created by the AS		consumed by a different party. The access token is created by the AS
	and processed by the RS (and opaque to the client) whereas the RS		and processed by the RS (and opaque to the client) whereas the RS
	Information is created by the AS and processed by the client; it is		Information is created by the AS and processed by the client; it is
	never forwarded to the resource server.		never forwarded to the resource server.
	Figure 8 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the RS		Figure 8 summarizes the parameters that may be part of the RS
	Information.		Information.
	/-------------------+--------------------------\		/-------------------+-----------------\
	| Parameter name | Specified in |		| Parameter name | Specified in |
	|-------------------+--------------------------|		|-------------------+-----------------|
	| access_token | RFC 6749 |		| access_token | RFC 6749 |
	| token_type | RFC 6749 |		| token_type | RFC 6749 |
	| expires_in | RFC 6749 |		| expires_in | RFC 6749 |
	| refresh_token | RFC 6749 |		| refresh_token | RFC 6749 |
	| scope | RFC 6749 |		| scope | RFC 6749 |
	| state | RFC 6749 |		| state | RFC 6749 |
	| error | RFC 6749 |		| error | RFC 6749 |
	| error_description | RFC 6749 |		| error_description | RFC 6749 |
	| error_uri | RFC 6749 |		| error_uri | RFC 6749 |
	| profile | [[ this specification ]] |		| profile | [this document] |
	| cnf | [[ this specification ]] |		| cnf | [this document] |
	| rs_cnf | [[ this specification ]] |		| rs_cnf | [this document] |
	\-------------------+--------------------------/		\-------------------+-----------------/
	Figure 8: RS Information parameters		Figure 8: RS Information parameters
	Figure 9 shows a response containing a token and a "cnf" parameter		Figure 9 shows a response containing a token and a "cnf" parameter
	with a symmetric proof-of-possession key. Note that transport layer		with a symmetric proof-of-possession key. Note that transport layer
	security is assumed in this example, therefore the Content-Type is		security is assumed in this example, therefore the Content-Type is
	"application/cbor".		"application/cbor".
	Header: Created (Code=2.01)		Header: Created (Code=2.01)
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	skipping to change at page 25, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 24, line 25 ¶
	o A response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request)		o A response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request)
	MUST be used for all error responses, except for invalid_client		MUST be used for all error responses, except for invalid_client
	where a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01		where a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
	(Unauthorized) MAY be used under the same conditions as specified		(Unauthorized) MAY be used under the same conditions as specified
	in section 5.2 of [RFC6749].		in section 5.2 of [RFC6749].
	o The parameters "error", "error_description" and "error_uri" MUST		o The parameters "error", "error_description" and "error_uri" MUST
	be abbreviated using the codes specified in Figure 12.		be abbreviated using the codes specified in Figure 12.
	o The error code (i.e., value of the "error" parameter) MUST be		o The error code (i.e., value of the "error" parameter) MUST be
	abbreviated as specified in Figure 10.		abbreviated as specified in Figure 10.
	/------------------------+-------------------\		/------------------------+----------\
	| error code | CBOR Value (uint) |		| Name | CBOR Key |
	|------------------------+-------------------|		|------------------------+----------|
	| invalid_request | 0 |		| invalid_request | 0 |
	| invalid_client | 1 |		| invalid_client | 1 |
	| invalid_grant | 2 |		| invalid_grant | 2 |
	| unauthorized_client | 3 |		| unauthorized_client | 3 |
	| unsupported_grant_type | 4 |		| unsupported_grant_type | 4 |
	| invalid_scope | 5 |		| invalid_scope | 5 |
	| unsupported_pop_key | 6 |		| unsupported_pop_key | 6 |
	\------------------------+-------------------/		\------------------------+----------/
	Figure 10: CBOR abbreviations for common error codes		Figure 10: CBOR abbreviations for common error codes
	In addition to the error responses defined in OAuth 2.0, the		In addition to the error responses defined in OAuth 2.0, the
	following behavior MUST be implemented by the AS: If the client		following behavior MUST be implemented by the AS: If the client
	submits an asymmetric key in the token request that the RS cannot		submits an asymmetric key in the token request that the RS cannot
	process, the AS MUST reject that request with a response code		process, the AS MUST reject that request with a response code
	equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request) including the error		equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request) including the error
	code "unsupported_pop_key" defined in Figure 10.		code "unsupported_pop_key" defined in Figure 10.
	skipping to change at page 26, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 25, line 17 ¶
	This parameter specifies for which audience the client is requesting		This parameter specifies for which audience the client is requesting
	a token. It should be encoded as CBOR text string (major type 3).		a token. It should be encoded as CBOR text string (major type 3).
	The formatting and semantics of these strings are application		The formatting and semantics of these strings are application
	specific.		specific.
	5.6.4.2. Grant Type		5.6.4.2. Grant Type
	The abbreviations in Figure 11 MUST be used in CBOR encodings instead		The abbreviations in Figure 11 MUST be used in CBOR encodings instead
	of the string values defined in [RFC6749].		of the string values defined in [RFC6749].
	/--------------------+-------------------\		/--------------------+----------+------------------------\
	| grant_type | CBOR Value (uint) |		| Name | CBOR Key | Original Specification |
	|--------------------+-------------------|		|--------------------+----------+------------------------|
	| password | 0 |		| password | 0 | RFC6749 |
	| authorization_code | 1 |		| authorization_code | 1 | RFC6749 |
	| client_credentials | 2 |		| client_credentials | 2 | RFC6749 |
	| refresh_token | 3 |		| refresh_token | 3 | RFC6749 |
	\--------------------+-------------------/		\--------------------+----------+------------------------/
	Figure 11: CBOR abbreviations for common grant types		Figure 11: CBOR abbreviations for common grant types
	5.6.4.3. Token Type		5.6.4.3. Token Type
	The token_type parameter is defined in [RFC6749], allowing the AS to		The token_type parameter is defined in [RFC6749], allowing the AS to
	indicate to the client which type of access token it is receiving		indicate to the client which type of access token it is receiving
	(e.g., a bearer token).		(e.g., a bearer token).
	This document registers the new value "pop" for the OAuth Access		This document registers the new value "pop" for the OAuth Access
	skipping to change at page 27, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 26, line 17 ¶
	Profiles MAY define additional parameters for both the token request		Profiles MAY define additional parameters for both the token request
	and the RS Information in the access token response in order to		and the RS Information in the access token response in order to
	support negotiation or signaling of profile specific parameters.		support negotiation or signaling of profile specific parameters.
	5.6.4.5. Confirmation		5.6.4.5. Confirmation
	The "cnf" parameter identifies or provides the key used for proof-of-		The "cnf" parameter identifies or provides the key used for proof-of-
	possession, while the "rs_cnf" parameter provides the raw public key		possession, while the "rs_cnf" parameter provides the raw public key
	of the RS. Both parameters use the same formatting and semantics as		of the RS. Both parameters use the same formatting and semantics as
	the "cnf" claim specified in [I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].		the "cnf" claim specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
	In addition to the use as a claim in a CWT, the "cnf" parameter is		In addition to the use as a claim in a CWT, the "cnf" parameter is
	used in the following contexts with the following meaning:		used in the following contexts with the following meaning:
	o In the token request C -> AS, to indicate the client's raw public		o In the token request C -> AS, to indicate the client's raw public
	key, or the key-identifier of a previously established key between		key, or the key-identifier of a previously established key between
	C and RS.		C and RS.
	o In the token response AS -> C, to indicate the symmetric key		o In the token response AS -> C, to indicate the symmetric key
	generated by the AS for proof-of-possession.		generated by the AS for proof-of-possession.
	o In the introspection response AS -> RS, to indicate the proof-of-		o In the introspection response AS -> RS, to indicate the proof-of-
	skipping to change at page 28, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 27, line 5 ¶
	5.6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR		5.6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR
	All OAuth parameters in access token requests and responses MUST be		All OAuth parameters in access token requests and responses MUST be
	mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 12, using the given		mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 12, using the given
	integer abbreviation for the key.		integer abbreviation for the key.
	Note that we have aligned these abbreviations with the claim		Note that we have aligned these abbreviations with the claim
	abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].		abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].
	/-------------------+----------+------------------\		/-------------------+----------+---------------------\
	| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Type |		| Name | CBOR Key | Major Type |
	|-------------------+----------+------------------|		|-------------------+----------+---------------------|
	| aud | 3 | text string |		| aud | 3 | text string |
	| client_id | 8 | text string |		| client_id | 8 | text string |
	| client_secret | 9 | byte string |		| client_secret | 9 | byte string |
	| response_type | 10 | text string |		| response_type | 10 | text string |
	| redirect_uri | 11 | text string |		| redirect_uri | 11 | text string |
	| scope | 12 | text string |		| scope | 12 | text or byte string |
	| state | 13 | text string |		| state | 13 | text string |
	| code | 14 | byte string |		| code | 14 | byte string |
	| error | 15 | text string |		| error | 15 | text string |
	| error_description | 16 | text string |		| error_description | 16 | text string |
	| error_uri | 17 | text string |		| error_uri | 17 | text string |
	| grant_type | 18 | unsigned integer |		| grant_type | 18 | unsigned integer |
	| access_token | 19 | text string |		| access_token | 19 | text string |
	| token_type | 20 | unsigned integer |		| token_type | 20 | unsigned integer |
	| expires_in | 21 | unsigned integer |		| expires_in | 21 | unsigned integer |
	| username | 22 | text string |		| username | 22 | text string |
	| password | 23 | text string |		| password | 23 | text string |
	| refresh_token | 24 | text string |		| refresh_token | 24 | text string |
	| cnf | 25 | map |		| cnf | 25 | map |
	| profile | 26 | text string |		| profile | 26 | text string |
	| rs_cnf | 31 | map |		| rs_cnf | 31 | map |
	\-------------------+----------+------------------/		\-------------------+----------+---------------------/
	Figure 12: CBOR mappings used in token requests		Figure 12: CBOR mappings used in token requests
	5.7. The 'Introspect' Endpoint		5.7. The 'Introspect' Endpoint
	Token introspection [RFC7662] can be OPTIONALLY provided by the AS,		Token introspection [RFC7662] can be OPTIONALLY provided by the AS,
	and is then used by the RS and potentially the client to query the AS		and is then used by the RS and potentially the client to query the AS
	for metadata about a given token e.g., validity or scope. Analogous		for metadata about a given token e.g., validity or scope. Analogous
	to the protocol defined in RFC 7662 [RFC7662] for HTTP and JSON, this		to the protocol defined in RFC 7662 [RFC7662] for HTTP and JSON, this
	section defines adaptations to more constrained environments using		section defines adaptations to more constrained environments using
	skipping to change at page 29, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 5 ¶
	profile.		profile.
	Communication between the RS and the introspection endpoint at the AS		Communication between the RS and the introspection endpoint at the AS
	MUST be integrity protected and encrypted. Furthermore AS and RS		MUST be integrity protected and encrypted. Furthermore AS and RS
	MUST perform mutual authentication. Finally the AS SHOULD verify		MUST perform mutual authentication. Finally the AS SHOULD verify
	that the RS has the right to access introspection information about		that the RS has the right to access introspection information about
	the provided token. Profiles of this framework that support		the provided token. Profiles of this framework that support
	introspection MUST specify how authentication and communication		introspection MUST specify how authentication and communication
	security between RS and AS is implemented.		security between RS and AS is implemented.
			The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is 'introspect',
			however implementations are not required to use this name and can
			define their own instead.
	The figures of this section uses CBOR diagnostic notation without the		The figures of this section uses CBOR diagnostic notation without the
	integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for better		integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for better
	readability.		readability.
	Note that supporting introspection is OPTIONAL for implementations of		Note that supporting introspection is OPTIONAL for implementations of
	this framework.		this framework.
	5.7.1. RS-to-AS Request		5.7.1. RS-to-AS Request
	The RS sends a POST request to the introspection endpoint at the AS,		The RS sends a POST request to the introspection endpoint at the AS,
	skipping to change at page 29, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 35 ¶
	The same parameters are required and optional as in section 2.1 of		The same parameters are required and optional as in section 2.1 of
	RFC 7662 [RFC7662].		RFC 7662 [RFC7662].
	For example, Figure 13 shows a RS calling the token introspection		For example, Figure 13 shows a RS calling the token introspection
	endpoint at the AS to query about an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession		endpoint at the AS to query about an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession
	token. Note that object security based on COSE is assumed in this		token. Note that object security based on COSE is assumed in this
	example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cose+cbor".		example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cose+cbor".
	Header: POST (Code=0.02)		Header: POST (Code=0.02)
	Uri-Host: "server.example.com"		Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
	Uri-Path: "introspect"		Uri-Path: "introspect"
	Content-Type: "application/cose+cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cose+cbor"
	Payload:		Payload:
	{		{
	"token" : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',		"token" : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
	"token_type_hint" : "pop"		"token_type_hint" : "pop"
	}		}
	Figure 13: Example introspection request.		Figure 13: Example introspection request.
	skipping to change at page 30, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 29, line 9 ¶
	If the introspection request is authorized and successfully		If the introspection request is authorized and successfully
	processed, the AS sends a response with the response code equivalent		processed, the AS sends a response with the response code equivalent
	to the CoAP code 2.01 (Created). If the introspection request was		to the CoAP code 2.01 (Created). If the introspection request was
	invalid, not authorized or couldn't be processed the AS returns an		invalid, not authorized or couldn't be processed the AS returns an
	error response as described in Section 5.7.3.		error response as described in Section 5.7.3.
	In a successful response, the AS encodes the response parameters in a		In a successful response, the AS encodes the response parameters in a
	CBOR map including with the same required and optional parameters as		CBOR map including with the same required and optional parameters as
	in section 2.2. of RFC 7662 [RFC7662] with the following additions:		in section 2.2. of RFC 7662 [RFC7662] with the following additions:
	cnf		cnf OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the proof-of-
	OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the proof-of-
	possession key that binds the client to the access token. See		possession key that binds the client to the access token. See
	Section 5.6.4.5 for more details on the use of the "cnf"		Section 5.6.4.5 for more details on the use of the "cnf"
	parameter.		parameter.
			profile OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the RS MUST use
	profile		with the client. See Section 5.6.4.4 for more details on the
	OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the RS MUST use with
	the client. See Section 5.6.4.4 for more details on the
	formatting of this parameter.		formatting of this parameter.
			client_token OPTIONAL. This parameter contains information that the
	client_token		RS MUST pass on to the client. See Section 5.7.4 for more
	OPTIONAL. This parameter contains information that the RS MUST		details.
	pass on to the client. See Section 5.7.4 for more details.
	For example, Figure 14 shows an AS response to the introspection		For example, Figure 14 shows an AS response to the introspection
	request in Figure 13. Note that transport layer security is assumed		request in Figure 13. Note that transport layer security is assumed
	in this example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cbor".		in this example, therefore the Content-Type is "application/cbor".
	Header: Created Code=2.01)		Header: Created Code=2.01)
	Content-Type: "application/cbor"		Content-Type: "application/cbor"
	Payload:		Payload:
	{		{
	"active" : true,		"active" : true,
	skipping to change at page 32, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 31, line 29 ¶
	| | + Client Token |		| | + Client Token |
	|<---------------+ |		|<---------------+ |
	| 2.01 Created | |		| 2.01 Created | |
	| + Client Token |		| + Client Token |
	Figure 15: Use of the client_token parameter.		Figure 15: Use of the client_token parameter.
	The client token is a COSE_Encrypted object, containing as payload a		The client token is a COSE_Encrypted object, containing as payload a
	CBOR map with the following claims:		CBOR map with the following claims:
	cnf		cnf REQUIRED if the token type is "pop", OPTIONAL otherwise.
	REQUIRED if the token type is "pop", OPTIONAL otherwise. Contains		Contains information about the proof-of-possession key the client
	information about the proof-of-possession key the client is to use		is to use with its access token. See Section 5.6.4.5.
	with its access token. See Section 5.6.4.5.		token_type OPTIONAL. See Section 5.6.4.3.
			profile REQUIRED. See Section 5.6.4.4.
	token_type		rs_cnf OPTIONAL. Contains information about the key that the RS
	OPTIONAL. See Section 5.6.4.3.		uses to authenticate towards the client. If the key is symmetric
			then this claim MUST NOT be part of the Client Token, since this
	profile		is the same key as the one specified through the "cnf" claim.
	REQUIRED. See Section 5.6.4.4.		This claim uses the same encoding as the "cnf" parameter. See
	rs_cnf
	OPTIONAL. Contains information about the key that the RS uses to
	authenticate towards the client. If the key is symmetric then
	this claim MUST NOT be part of the Client Token, since this is the
	same key as the one specified through the "cnf" claim. This claim
	uses the same encoding as the "cnf" parameter. See
	Section 5.6.4.4.		Section 5.6.4.4.
	The AS encrypts this token using a key shared between the AS and the		The AS encrypts this token using a key shared between the AS and the
	client, so that only the client can decrypt it and access its		client, so that only the client can decrypt it and access its
	payload. How this key is established is out of scope of this		payload. How this key is established is out of scope of this
	framework, however it can be established at the same time at which		framework, however it can be established at the same time at which
	the client's long term token is created.		the client's long term token is created.
	An RS that is configured to perform introspection, MUST do so		An RS that is configured to perform introspection, MUST do so
	immediately after receiving an access token, in order to be able to		immediately after receiving an access token, in order to be able to
	return a potential client token to the client. This does not		return a potential client token to the client. This does not
	preclude the RS to perform additional introspection asynchronously,		preclude the RS to perform additional introspection asynchronously,
	e.g., when the token is later used.		e.g., when the token is later used.
	5.7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR		5.7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR
	The introspection request and response parameters MUST be mapped to		The introspection request and response parameters MUST be mapped to
	CBOR types as specified in Figure 16, using the given integer		CBOR types as specified in Figure 16, using the given integer
	abbreviation for the key.		abbreviation for the key.
	Note that we have aligned these abbreviatations with the claim		Note that we have aligned these abbreviations with the claim
	abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].		abbreviations defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].
	/-----------------+----------+-----------------\		/-----------------+----------+-----------------------\
	| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Major Type |		| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Major Type |
	|-----------------+----------+-----------------|		|-----------------+----------+-----------------------|
	| iss | 1 | 3 (text string) |		| iss | 1 | text string |
	| sub | 2 | 3 |		| sub | 2 | text string |
	| aud | 3 | 3 |		| aud | 3 | text string |
	| exp | 4 | 6 tag value 1 |		| exp | 4 | Epoch-based date/time |
	| nbf | 5 | 6 tag value 1 |		| nbf | 5 | Epoch-based date/time |
	| iat | 6 | 6 tag value 1 |		| iat | 6 | Epoch-based date/time |
	| cti | 7 | 2 (byte string) |		| cti | 7 | byte string |
	| client_id | 8 | 3 |		| client_id | 8 | text string |
	| scope | 12 | 3 |		| scope | 12 | text OR byte string |
	| token_type | 20 | 3 |		| token_type | 20 | text string |
	| username | 22 | 3 |		| username | 22 | text string |
	| cnf | 25 | 5 (map) |		| cnf | 25 | map |
	| profile | 26 | 0 (uint) |		| profile | 26 | unsigned integer |
	| token | 27 | 3 |		| token | 27 | text string |
	| token_type_hint | 28 | 3 |		| token_type_hint | 28 | text string |
	| active | 29 | 0 |		| active | 29 | unsigned integer |
	| client_token | 30 | 3 |		| client_token | 30 | byte string |
	| rs_cnf | 31 | 5 |		| rs_cnf | 31 | map |
	\-----------------+----------+-----------------/		\-----------------+----------+-----------------------/
	Figure 16: CBOR Mappings to Token Introspection Parameters.		Figure 16: CBOR Mappings to Token Introspection Parameters.
	5.8. The Access Token		5.8. The Access Token
	This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CBOR web token (CWT) as		This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CBOR web token (CWT) as
	specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].		specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].
	In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this		In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this
	draft uses the "cnf" claim from		draft uses the "cnf" claim from
			[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] and specifies the "scope"
	[I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] and specifies the "scope"		claim for both JSON and CBOR web tokens.
	claim for CBOR web tokens.
	The "scope" claim explicitly encodes the scope of a given access		The "scope" claim explicitly encodes the scope of a given access
	token. This claim follows the same encoding rules as defined in		token. This claim follows the same encoding rules as defined in
	section 3.3 of [RFC6749]. The meaning of a specific scope value is		section 3.3 of [RFC6749], but in addition implementers MAY use byte
	application specific and expected to be known to the RS running that		arrays as scope values, to achieve compact encoding of large scope
	application.		elements. The meaning of a specific scope value is application
			specific and expected to be known to the RS running that application.
	5.8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Endpoint		5.8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Endpoint
	The access token, containing authorization information and		The access token, containing authorization information and
	information about the key used by the client, needs to be transported		information about the key used by the client, needs to be transported
	to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and authorize the client		to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and authorize the client
	request.		request.
	This section defines a method for transporting the access token to		This section defines a method for transporting the access token to
	the RS using a RESTful protocol such as CoAP. Profiles of this		the RS using a RESTful protocol such as CoAP. Profiles of this
	skipping to change at page 35, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 34, line 5 ¶
	responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint. If the		responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint. If the
	introspection response contains a client token (Section 5.7.4) then		introspection response contains a client token (Section 5.7.4) then
	this token SHALL be included in the payload of the 2.01 (Created)		this token SHALL be included in the payload of the 2.01 (Created)
	response.		response.
	Profiles MUST specify how the authz-info endpoint is protected. Note		Profiles MUST specify how the authz-info endpoint is protected. Note
	that since the token contains information that allow the client and		that since the token contains information that allow the client and
	the RS to establish a security context in the first place, mutual		the RS to establish a security context in the first place, mutual
	authentication may not be possible at this point.		authentication may not be possible at this point.
			The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is 'authz-info',
			however implementations are not required to use this name and can
			define their own instead.
	5.8.2. Token Expiration		5.8.2. Token Expiration
	Depending on the capabilities of the RS, there are various ways in		Depending on the capabilities of the RS, there are various ways in
	which it can verify the validity of a received access token. Here		which it can verify the validity of a received access token. Here
	follows a list of the possibilities including what functionality they		follows a list of the possibilities including what functionality they
	require of the RS.		require of the RS.
	o The token is a CWT and includes an "exp" claim and possibly the		o The token is a CWT and includes an "exp" claim and possibly the
	"nbf" claim. The RS verifies these by comparing them to values		"nbf" claim. The RS verifies these by comparing them to values
	from its internal clock as defined in [RFC7519]. In this case the		from its internal clock as defined in [RFC7519]. In this case the
	skipping to change at page 39, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 37, line 46 ¶
	relationship with C. It is advisable to include as little		relationship with C. It is advisable to include as little
	information as possible in an unencrypted response. Means of		information as possible in an unencrypted response. Means of
	encrypting communication between C and RS already exist, more		encrypting communication between C and RS already exist, more
	detailed information may be included with an error response to		detailed information may be included with an error response to
	provide C with sufficient information to react on that particular		provide C with sufficient information to react on that particular
	error.		error.
	8. IANA Considerations		8. IANA Considerations
	This specification registers new parameters for OAuth and establishes		This specification registers new parameters for OAuth and establishes
	registries for mappings to CBOR.		registries for mappings to CBOR abbreviations.
	8.1. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration		8.1. Authorization Server Information
	This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Authorization
	introspection response parameters		Server Information". The registry is to be created as Expert Review
			Required.
	o Name: "cnf"		The columns of this table are:
	o Description: Key to prove the right to use an access token,
	formatted as specified in [I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Name: "profile"		Name The name of the parameter
	o Description: The communication and communication security profile		CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
	used between client and RS, as defined in ACE profiles.		this parameter name. Registration in the table is based on the
	o Change Controller: IESG		value of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255
	o Specification Document(s): this document		are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer
			values from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Major Type The CBOR major type allowable for the values of this
			parameter.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			grant type abbreviation, if one exists.
	o Name: "client_token"		This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 2.
	o Description: Information that the RS MUST pass to the client e.g.,		The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.
	about the proof-of-possession keys.
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Name: "rs_cnf"		8.2. OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings Registry
	o Description: Describes the public key the RS uses to authenticate.
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	8.2. OAuth Parameter Registration		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "OAuth Error
			Code CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as
			Expert Review Required.
	This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth		The columns of this table are:
	Parameters Registry
	o Parameter name: "profile"		Name The OAuth Error Code name, refers to the name in section 5.2.
	o Parameter usage location: token request, and token response		of [RFC6749] e.g., "invalid_request".
	o Change Controller: IESG		CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
	o Specification Document(s): this document		this error code. Registration in the table is based on the value
			of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255 are
			designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values
			from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			grant type abbreviation, if one exists.
	o Name: "cnf"		This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 10.
	o Description: Key to prove the right to use an access token,		The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.
	formatted as defined in [I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	8.3. OAuth Access Token Types		8.3. OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings
			A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "OAuth Grant
			Type CBOR Mappings". The registry is to be created as Expert Review
			Required.
			The columns of this table are:
			Name The name of the grant type as specified in Section 1.3 of
			[RFC6749].
			CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
			this grant type. Registration in the table is based on the value
			of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255 are
			designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values
			from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			grant type abbreviation, if one exists.
			Original Specification This contains a pointer to the public
			specification of the grant type, if one exists.
			This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 11.
			The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.
			8.4. OAuth Access Token Types
	This specification registers the following new token type in the		This specification registers the following new token type in the
	OAuth Access Token Types Registry		OAuth Access Token Types Registry
	o Name: "PoP"		o Name: "PoP"
	o Description: A proof-of-possession token.		o Change Controller: IETF
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Reference: [this document]
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	8.4. OAuth Token Type CBOR Mappings		8.5. OAuth Token Type CBOR Mappings
	A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Type		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Type CBOR
	Mappings". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.		Mappings". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.
	8.4.1. Registration Template		The columns of this table are:
	Token Type:
	Name of token type as registered in the OAuth token type registry
	e.g., "Bearer".
	Mapped value:
	Integer representation for the token type value. The key value
	MUST be an integer. Integer values from -65536 to 65535 are
	designated as Specification Required. Integer values of greater
	than 65535 designated as expert review. Integer values less than
	-65536 are marked as private use.
	Change Controller:
	For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document or documents that specify the
	parameter,preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve
	copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections
	may also be included but is not required.
	8.4.2. Initial Registry Contents
	o Parameter name: "Bearer"
	o Mapped value: 1
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "pop"		Name The name of token type as registered in the OAuth Access Token
	o Mapped value: 2		Types registry e.g., "Bearer".
	o Change Controller: IESG		CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
	o Specification Document(s): this document		this access token type. Registration in the table is based on the
			value of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255
			are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer
			values from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			OAuth token type abbreviation, if one exists.
			Original Specification This contains a pointer to the public
			specification of the grant type, if one exists.
	8.5. CBOR Web Token Claims		8.5.1. Initial Registry Contents
	This specification registers the following new claims in the CBOR Web		o Name: "Bearer"
	Token (CWT) registry:		o Value: 1
			o Reference: [this document]
			o Original Specification: [RFC6749]
	o Claim Name: "scope"		o Name: "pop"
	o Claim Description: The scope of an access token as defined in		o Value: 2
	[RFC6749].		o Reference: [this document]
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Original Specification: [this document]
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	8.6. ACE OAuth Profile Registry		8.6. ACE OAuth Profile Registry
	A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "ACE Profile		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "ACE Profile
	Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.		Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.
	8.6.1. Registration Template		The columns of this table are:
	Profile name:
	Name of the profile to be included in the profile attribute.
	Profile description:
	Text giving an overview of the profile and the context it is
	developed for.
	Profile ID:
	Integer value to identify the profile. Integer values from -65536
	to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values
	of greater than 65535 designated as expert review. Integer values
	less than -65536 are marked as private use.
	Change Controller:
	For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document or documents that specify the
	parameter,preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve
	copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections
	may also be included but is not required.
	8.7. OAuth CBOR Parameter Mappings Registry
	A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Endpoint
	CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert
	Review Required.
	8.7.1. Registration Template
	Parameter name:
	OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth parameter
	registry e.g., "client_id".
	CBOR key value:
	Key value for the claim. The key value MUST be an integer.
	Integer values from -65536 to 65535 are designated as
	Specification Required. Integer values of greater than 65535
	designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are
	marked as private use.
	Change Controller:
	For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document or documents that specify the
	parameter,preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve
	copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections
	may also be included but is not required.
	8.7.2. Initial Registry Contents
	o Parameter name: "aud"
	o CBOR key value: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "client_id"
	o CBOR key value: 8
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "client_secret"		Name The name of the profile, to be used as value of the profile
	o CBOR key value: 9		attribute.
	o Change Controller: IESG		Description Text giving an overview of the profile and the context
	o Specification Document(s): this document		it is developed for.
			CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
			this profile name. Registration in the table is based on the
			value of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255
			are designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer
			values from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			profile abbreviation, if one exists.
	o Parameter name: "response_type"		8.7. OAuth Parameter Registration
	o CBOR key value: 10
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "redirect_uri"		This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth
	o CBOR key value: 11		Parameters Registry
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "scope"
	o CBOR key value: 12
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "state"		o Name: "profile"
	o CBOR key value: 13		o Parameter Usage Location: token request, token response
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.6.4.4 of [this document]
	o Parameter name: "code"		o Name: "cnf"
	o CBOR key value: 14		o Parameter Usage Location: token request, token response
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.6.4.5 of [this document]
	o Parameter name: "error"		o Name: "rs_cnf"
	o CBOR key value: 15		o Parameter Usage Location: token response
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.6.4.5 of [this document]
	o Parameter name: "error_description"		8.8. OAuth CBOR Parameter Mappings Registry
	o CBOR key value: 16
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "error_uri"		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Endpoint
	o CBOR key value: 17		CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert
	o Change Controller: IESG		Review Required.
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "grant_type"		The columns of this table are:
	o CBOR key value: 18
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "access_token"		Name The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth
	o CBOR key value: 19		parameter registry e.g., "client_id".
	o Change Controller: IESG		CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
	o Specification Document(s): this document		this parameter. Registration in the table is based on the value
			of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255 are
			designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values
			from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Major Type The allowable CBOR data types for values of this
			parameter.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			grant type abbreviation, if one exists.
	o Parameter name: "token_type"		This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 12.
	o CBOR key value: 20		The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "expires_in"		Note that these mappings intentionally coincide with the CWT claim
	o CBOR key value: 21		name mappings from [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "username"		8.9. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration
	o CBOR key value: 22
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "password"		This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth
	o CBOR key value: 23		Token Introspection Response registry.
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "refresh_token"		o Name: "cnf"
	o CBOR key value: 24		o Description: Key to prove the right to use an access token,
			formatted as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.7.2 of [this document]
	o Parameter name: "cnf"		o Name: "profile"
	o CBOR key value: 25		o Description: The communication and communication security profile
			used between client and RS, as defined in ACE profiles.
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.7.2 of [this document]
			o Name: "client_token"
	o Parameter name: "profile"		o Description: Information that the RS MUST pass to the client e.g.,
	o CBOR key value: 26		about the proof-of-possession keys.
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.7.2 of [this document]
	8.8. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry		8.10. Introspection Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry
	A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Introspection		A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Introspection
	Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as		Endpoint CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as
	Expert Review Required.		Expert Review Required.
	8.8.1. Registration Template		The columns of this table are:
	Response parameter name:
	Name of the response parameter as defined in the "OAuth Token
	Introspection Response" registry e.g., "active".
	CBOR key value:
	Key value for the claim. The key value MUST be an integer.
	Integer values from -65536 to 65535 are designated as
	Specification Required. Integer values of greater than 65535
	designated as expert review. Integer values less than -65536 are
	marked as private use.
	Change Controller:
	For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document or documents that specify the
	parameter,preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve
	copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections
	may also be included but is not required.
	8.8.2. Initial Registry Contents
	o Response parameter name: "iss"
	o CBOR key value: 1
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "sub"
	o CBOR key value: 2
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "aud"
	o CBOR key value: 3
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "exp"
	o CBOR key value: 4
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "nbf"
	o CBOR key value: 5
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "iat"
	o CBOR key value: 6
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "cti"
	o CBOR key value: 7
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "client_id"
	o CBOR key value: 8
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "scope"
	o CBOR key value: 12
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "token_type"
	o CBOR key value: 20
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "username"		Name The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth
	o CBOR key value: 22		parameter registry e.g., "client_id".
	o Change Controller: IESG		CBOR Key The unsigned integer value (CBOR major type 0) abbreviating
	o Specification Document(s): this document		this parameter. Registration in the table is based on the value
			of the mapping requested. Integer values between 1 and 255 are
			designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values
			from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required.
			Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as private use.
			Major Type The allowable CBOR data types for values of this
			parameter.
			Reference This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
			grant type abbreviation, if one exists.
	o Parameter name: "cnf"		This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 16.
	o CBOR key value: 25		The Reference column for all of these entries will be this document.
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Parameter name: "profile"		8.11. JSON Web Token Claims
	o CBOR key value: 26
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "token"		This specification registers the following new claims in the JSON Web
	o CBOR key value: 27		Token (JWT) registry of JSON Web Token Claims:
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "token_type_hint"		o Claim Name: "scope"
	o CBOR key value: 28		o Claim Description: The scope of an access token as defined in
			[RFC6749].
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Reference: Section 5.8 of [this document]
	o Response parameter name: "active"		8.12. CBOR Web Token Claims
	o CBOR key value: 29
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "client_token"		This specification registers the following new claims in the CBOR Web
	o CBOR key value: 30		Token (CWT) registry of CBOR Web Token Claim:s
	o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document
	o Response parameter name: "rs_cnf"		o Claim Name: "scope"
	o CBOR key value: 31		o Claim Description: The scope of an access token as defined in
			[RFC6749].
			o JWT Claim Name: N/A
			o Claim Key: 12
			o Claim Value Type(s): 0 (uint), 2 (byte string), 3 (text string)
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): this document		o Specification Document(s): Section 5.8 of [this document]
	8.9. CoAP Option Number Registration		8.13. CoAP Option Number Registration
	This section registers the "Access-Token" CoAP Option Number in the		This section registers the "Access-Token" CoAP Option Number in the
	"CoRE Parameters" sub-registry "CoAP Option Numbers" in the manner		"CoRE Parameters" sub-registry "CoAP Option Numbers" in the manner
	described in [RFC7252].		described in [RFC7252].
	Name		o Name: "Access-Token"
			o Number: TBD
	Access-Token		o Reference: [this document].
	Number		o Meaning in Request: Contains an Access Token according to [this
			document] containing access permissions of the client.
	TBD		o Meaning in Response: Not used in response.
	Reference		o Safe-to-Forward: Yes
			o Format: Based on the observer the format is perceived differently.
	[This document].		Opaque data to the client and CWT or reference token to the RS.
	Meaning in Request		o Length: Less than 255 bytes
	Contains an Access Token according to [This document] containing
	access permissions of the client.
	Meaning in Response
	Not used in response
	Safe-to-Forward
	Yes
	Format
	Based on the observer the format is perceived differently. Opaque
	data to the client and CWT or reference token to the RS.
	Length
	Less then 255 bytes
	9. Acknowledgments		9. Acknowledgments
	This document is a product of the ACE working group of the IETF.		This document is a product of the ACE working group of the IETF.
	Thanks to Eve Maler for her contributions to the use of OAuth 2.0 and		Thanks to Eve Maler for her contributions to the use of OAuth 2.0 and
	UMA in IoT scenarios, Robert Taylor for his discussion input, and		UMA in IoT scenarios, Robert Taylor for his discussion input, and
	Malisa Vucinic for his input on the predecessors of this proposal.		Malisa Vucinic for his input on the predecessors of this proposal.
	Thanks to the authors of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution, from		Thanks to the authors of draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution, from
	skipping to change at page 48, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 44, line 4 ¶
	where large parts of the security considerations where copied.		where large parts of the security considerations where copied.
	Thanks to Stefanie Gerdes, Olaf Bergmann, and Carsten Bormann for		Thanks to Stefanie Gerdes, Olaf Bergmann, and Carsten Bormann for
	contributing their work on AS discovery from draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-		contributing their work on AS discovery from draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-
	authorize (see Section 5.1).		authorize (see Section 5.1).
	Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of		Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
	the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.		the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.
	10. References		10. References
	10.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]		[I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]
	Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,		Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-08		"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-09
	(work in progress), August 2017.		(work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]		[I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]
	Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E.,		Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E.,
	Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key		Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key
	Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", draft-jones-ace-		Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", draft-ietf-ace-cwt-
	cwt-proof-of-possession-01 (work in progress), June 2017.		proof-of-possession-01 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
	editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
	RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,		RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	skipping to change at page 49, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 44, line 49 ¶
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	10.2. Informative References		10.2. Informative References
	[I-D.erdtman-ace-rpcc]		[I-D.erdtman-ace-rpcc]
	Seitz, L. and S. Erdtman, "Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-		Seitz, L. and S. Erdtman, "Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-
	Key as OAuth client credentials", draft-erdtman-ace-		Key as OAuth client credentials", draft-erdtman-ace-
	rpcc-01 (work in progress), August 2017.		rpcc-02 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-ace-actors]		[I-D.ietf-ace-actors]
	Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C. Bormann, "An		Gerdes, S., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and C. Bormann, "An
	architecture for authorization in constrained		architecture for authorization in constrained
	environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-05 (work in		environments", draft-ietf-ace-actors-06 (work in
	progress), March 2017.		progress), November 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]		[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
	Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,		Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
	"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments		"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
	(OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-05 (work in		(OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-06 (work in
	progress), September 2017.		progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]		[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
	Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., Stok, P., and C.		Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., Stok, P., and C.
	Amsuess, "CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-		Amsuess, "CoRE Resource Directory", draft-ietf-core-
	resource-directory-11 (work in progress), July 2017.		resource-directory-12 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-device-flow]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-device-flow]
	Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,		Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
	"OAuth 2.0 Device Flow for Browserless and Input		"OAuth 2.0 Device Flow for Browserless and Input
	Constrained Devices", draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-06		Constrained Devices", draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-07
	(work in progress), May 2017.		(work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]
	Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0		Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
	Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-		Authorization Server Metadata", draft-ietf-oauth-
	discovery-07 (work in progress), September 2017.		discovery-07 (work in progress), September 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-native-apps]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-native-apps]
	Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",		Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
	draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-12 (work in progress), June		draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-12 (work in progress), June
	2017.		2017.
	skipping to change at page 53, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 49 ¶
	concerning the RS that the AS returns to the client in an access		concerning the RS that the AS returns to the client in an access
	token response (see Section 5.6.2). This includes the "profile"		token response (see Section 5.6.2). This includes the "profile"
	and the "rs_cnf" parameters. This aims at enabling scenarios,		and the "rs_cnf" parameters. This aims at enabling scenarios,
	where a powerful client, supporting multiple profiles, needs to		where a powerful client, supporting multiple profiles, needs to
	interact with a RS for which it does not know the supported		interact with a RS for which it does not know the supported
	profiles and the raw public key.		profiles and the raw public key.
	Proof-of-Possession:		Proof-of-Possession:
	This framework makes use of proof-of-possession tokens, using the		This framework makes use of proof-of-possession tokens, using the
	"cnf" claim [I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. A		"cnf" claim [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]. A
	semantically and syntactically identical request and response		semantically and syntactically identical request and response
	parameter is defined for the token endpoint, to allow requesting		parameter is defined for the token endpoint, to allow requesting
	and stating confirmation keys. This aims at making token theft		and stating confirmation keys. This aims at making token theft
	harder. Token theft is specifically relevant in constrained use		harder. Token theft is specifically relevant in constrained use
	cases, as communication often passes through middle-boxes, which		cases, as communication often passes through middle-boxes, which
	could be able to steal bearer tokens and use them to gain		could be able to steal bearer tokens and use them to gain
	unauthorized access.		unauthorized access.
	Auth-Info endpoint:		Auth-Info endpoint:
	skipping to change at page 56, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 52, line 12 ¶
	* Process a token request using the authorization policies		* Process a token request using the authorization policies
	configured for the RS.		configured for the RS.
	* Optionally: Expose the introspection endpoint that allows RS's		* Optionally: Expose the introspection endpoint that allows RS's
	to submit token introspection requests.		to submit token introspection requests.
	* If providing an introspection endpoint: Authenticate RSs that		* If providing an introspection endpoint: Authenticate RSs that
	wish to get an introspection response.		wish to get an introspection response.
	* If providing an introspection endpoint: Process token		* If providing an introspection endpoint: Process token
	introspection requests.		introspection requests.
	* Optionally: Handle token revocation.		* Optionally: Handle token revocation.
	* Optionally: Provide discovery metadta. See		* Optionally: Provide discovery metadata. See
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-discovery]
	Client		Client
	* Discover the AS in charge of the RS that is to be targeted with		* Discover the AS in charge of the RS that is to be targeted with
	a request.		a request.
	* Submit the token request (see step (A) of Figure 1).		* Submit the token request (see step (A) of Figure 1).
	+ Authenticate to the AS.		+ Authenticate to the AS.
	+ Optionally (if not pre-configured): Specify which RS, which		+ Optionally (if not pre-configured): Specify which RS, which
	skipping to change at page 62, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 58, line 40 ¶
	to access the AS at the time of the access request, whereas the RS is		to access the AS at the time of the access request, whereas the RS is
	assumed to be connected to the back-end infrastructure. Thus the RS		assumed to be connected to the back-end infrastructure. Thus the RS
	can make use of token introspection. This access procedure involves		can make use of token introspection. This access procedure involves
	steps A-F of Figure 1, but assumes steps A and B have been carried		steps A-F of Figure 1, but assumes steps A and B have been carried
	out during a phase when the client had connectivity to AS.		out during a phase when the client had connectivity to AS.
	Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain		Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain
	period of time, a pre-provisioned access token has to be long-lived.		period of time, a pre-provisioned access token has to be long-lived.
	Since the client is constrained, the token will not be self contained		Since the client is constrained, the token will not be self contained
	(i.e. not a CWT) but instead just a reference. The resource server		(i.e. not a CWT) but instead just a reference. The resource server
	uses its connectivity to learn about the claims assoicated to the		uses its connectivity to learn about the claims associated to the
	access token by using introspection, which is shown in the example		access token by using introspection, which is shown in the example
	below.		below.
	In the example interactions between an offline client (key fob), a RS		In the example interactions between an offline client (key fob), a RS
	(online lock), and an AS is shown. It is assumed that there is a		(online lock), and an AS is shown. It is assumed that there is a
	provisioning step where the client has access to the AS. This		provisioning step where the client has access to the AS. This
	corresponds to message exchanges A and B which are shown in		corresponds to message exchanges A and B which are shown in
	Figure 22.		Figure 22.
	Authorization consent from the resource owner can be pre-configured,		Authorization consent from the resource owner can be pre-configured,
	skipping to change at page 66, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 62, line 32 ¶
	F: |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed		F: |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
	| 2.04 | Payload: <new state for the lock>		| 2.04 | Payload: <new state for the lock>
	| |		| |
	Figure 26: Resource request and response protected by OSCOAP		Figure 26: Resource request and response protected by OSCOAP
	Appendix F. Document Updates		Appendix F. Document Updates
	F.1. Version -08 to -09		F.1. Version -08 to -09
			o Allowed scope to be byte arrays.
			o Defined default names for endpoints.
			o Refactored the IANA section for briefness and consistency.
			o Refactored tables that define IANA registry contents for
			consistency.
			o Created IANA registry for CBOR mappings of error codes, grant
			types and Authorization Server Information.
			o Added references to other document sections defining IANA entries
			in the IANA section.
			F.2. Version -07 to -08
	o Moved AS discovery from the DTLS profile to the framework, see		o Moved AS discovery from the DTLS profile to the framework, see
	Section 5.1.		Section 5.1.
	o Made the use of CBOR mandatory. If you use JSON you can use		o Made the use of CBOR mandatory. If you use JSON you can use
	vanilla OAuth.		vanilla OAuth.
	o Made it mandatory for profiles to specify C-AS security and RS-AS		o Made it mandatory for profiles to specify C-AS security and RS-AS
	security (the latter only if introspection is supported).		security (the latter only if introspection is supported).
	o Made the use of CBOR abbreviations mandatory.		o Made the use of CBOR abbreviations mandatory.
	o Added text to clarify the use of token references as an		o Added text to clarify the use of token references as an
	alternative to CWTs.		alternative to CWTs.
	o Added text to clarify that introspection must not be delayed, in		o Added text to clarify that introspection must not be delayed, in
	case the RS has to return a client token.		case the RS has to return a client token.
	o Added security considerations about leakage through unprotected AS		o Added security considerations about leakage through unprotected AS
	discovery information, combining profiles and leakage through		discovery information, combining profiles and leakage through
	error responses.		error responses.
	o Added privacy considerations about leakage through unprotected AS		o Added privacy considerations about leakage through unprotected AS
	discovery.		discovery.
	o Added text that clarifies that introspection is optional.		o Added text that clarifies that introspection is optional.
	o Made profile parameter optional since it can be implicit.		o Made profile parameter optional since it can be implicit.
	o Clarified that CoAP is not mandatory and other protocols can be		o Clarified that CoAP is not mandatory and other protocols can be
	skipping to change at page 67, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 63, line 16 ¶
	case the RS has to return a client token.		case the RS has to return a client token.
	o Added security considerations about leakage through unprotected AS		o Added security considerations about leakage through unprotected AS
	discovery information, combining profiles and leakage through		discovery information, combining profiles and leakage through
	error responses.		error responses.
	o Added privacy considerations about leakage through unprotected AS		o Added privacy considerations about leakage through unprotected AS
	discovery.		discovery.
	o Added text that clarifies that introspection is optional.		o Added text that clarifies that introspection is optional.
	o Made profile parameter optional since it can be implicit.		o Made profile parameter optional since it can be implicit.
	o Clarified that CoAP is not mandatory and other protocols can be		o Clarified that CoAP is not mandatory and other protocols can be
	used.		used.
	o Clarified the design justification for specific features of the		o Clarified the design justification for specific features of the
	framework in appendix A.		framework in appendix A.
	o Clarified appendix E.2.		o Clarified appendix E.2.
	F.2. Version -07 to -08
	o Removed specification of the "cnf" claim for CBOR/COSE, and		o Removed specification of the "cnf" claim for CBOR/COSE, and
	replaced with references to		replaced with references to [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]
	[I-D.jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]
	F.3. Version -06 to -07		F.3. Version -06 to -07
	o Various clarifications added.		o Various clarifications added.
	o Fixed erroneous author email.		o Fixed erroneous author email.
	F.4. Version -05 to -06		F.4. Version -05 to -06
	o Moved sections that define the ACE framework into a subsection of		o Moved sections that define the ACE framework into a subsection of
	the framework Section 5.		the framework Section 5.
End of changes. 130 change blocks.
	615 lines changed or deleted		466 lines changed or added
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