draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-01.txt   draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-02.txt 
Network Working Group O. Bergmann ACE Working Group O. Bergmann
Internet-Draft TZI Internet-Draft TZI
Updates: draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize (if J. Preuß Mattsson Updates: draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize (if J. Preuß Mattsson
approved) G. Selander approved) G. Selander
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: 8 August 2022 4 February 2022 Expires: 8 September 2022 7 March 2022
Extension of the ACE CoAP-DTLS Profile to TLS Extension of the CoAP-DTLS Profile for ACE to TLS
draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-01 draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-02
Abstract Abstract
This document updates the ACE CoAP-DTLS profile by specifying that This document updates the CoAP-DTLS profile for ACE
the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying that the profile applies
to TLS as well as DTLS.
Discussion Venues Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments Working Group mailing list Authorization for Constrained Environments Working Group mailing list
(ace@ietf.org), which is archived at (ace@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/. https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.
skipping to change at page 1, line 45 skipping to change at page 1, line 46
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] only specifies use of DTLS [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] only specifies the use of DTLS
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] but works equally well for TLS. For many [RFC6347] but works equally well for TLS [RFC8446]. For many
constrained implementations, CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] is the first constrained implementations, CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] is the first
choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other
entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path
between the client and the RS, and the client might have to fall back between the client and the RS, and the client might have to fall back
to CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal. This to CoAP over TCP [RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal. This
feature is supported by the OSCORE profile feature is supported by the OSCORE profile
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] but is lacking from the DTLS profile. [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] but is lacking in the DTLS profile.
This document updates [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying This document updates [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] by specifying
that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. The same access that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. The same access
rights are valid in case transport layer security is either DTLS or rights are valid in case transport layer security is provided by
TLS, and the same access token can be used. either DTLS or TLS, and the same access token can be used.
Therefore, the value coap_dtls in the ace_profile parameter of an AS-
to-Client response or in the ace_profile claim of an access token
indicates that either DTLS or TLS can be used for transport layer
security.
2. IANA Considerations 2. Terminology
No IANA Considerations. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Security Considerations Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and
[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize].
3. Connection Establishment
Following the procedures defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], a
Client can retrieve an Access Token from an Authorization Server (AS)
in order to establish a security association with a specific Resource
Server. The ace_profile parameter in the Client-to-AS request and
AS-to-client response is used to determine the ACE profile that the
Client uses towards the Resource Server (RS).
In case the ace_profile parameter indicates the use of the DTLS
profile for ACE as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize], the
Client MAY try to connect to the Resource Server via TLS, or try TLS
and DTLS in parallel to accelerate the session setup.
As resource-constrained devices are not expected to support both
transport layer security mechanisms, a Client that implements either
TLS or DTLS but not both might fail in establishing a secure
communication channel with the Resource Server altogether. This
error SHOULD be handled by the Client in the same way as unsupported
ACE profiles. If the Client is modified accordingly or it learns
that the Resource Server has been, the Client may try to connect to
the Resource Server using the transport layer security mechanism that
was previously not mutually supported.
Note that a communication setup with an a priori unknown Resource
Server typically employs an initial unauthorized resource request as
illustrated in Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]. If this
message exchange succeeds, the Client SHOULD first use the same
underlying transport protocol for the establishment of the security
association as well (i.e., DTLS for UDP, and TLS for TCP).
As a consequence, the selection of the transport protocol used for
the initial unauthorized resource request also depends on the
transport layer security mechanism supported by the Client. Clients
that support either DTLS or TLS but not both SHOULD use the transport
protocol underlying the supported transport layer security mechanism
also for an initial unauthorized resource request.
4. IANA Considerations
The following updates have been done for the "ACE Profiles" registry
for the profile with Profile ID 1 and Profile name coap_dtls:
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.
Description: Profile for delegating client Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments by establishing a Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
channel between resource-constrained nodes.
Change Controller: IESG
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
5. Security Considerations
The security consideration and requirements in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and The security consideration and requirements in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and
BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] also apply to this document. BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] also apply to this document.
4. References 6. References
4.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize]
Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and
L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Profile for Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress, Constrained Environments (ACE)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-18, 4 June Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-18, 4 June
2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace- 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-
dtls-authorize-18.txt>. dtls-authorize-18.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls- Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
dtls13-43, 30 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/internet- Framework (ACE-OAuth)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43.txt>. draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-46, 8 November 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-46.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8323] Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K., [RFC8323] Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets", Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018, RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
4.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson, Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
"OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization "OSCORE Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments Framework", Work in Progress, for Constrained Environments Framework", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-19, 6 May Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-oscore-profile-19, 6 May
2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace- 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-
oscore-profile-19.txt>. oscore-profile-19.txt>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
skipping to change at page 4, line 25 skipping to change at page 6, line 17
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS [RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021, 1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Marco Tiloca for reviewing this
specification.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Olaf Bergmann Olaf Bergmann
Universität Bremen TZI Universität Bremen TZI
Bremen, D-28359 Bremen, D-28359
Germany Germany
Email: bergmann@tzi.org Email: bergmann@tzi.org
John Preuß Mattsson John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Göran Selander Göran Selander
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
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