wdiff draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-00.txt draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-01.txt

ACE P. van der Stok
Internet-Draft Consultant
Intended status: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
Expires: September 1, December 8, 2018 Cisco Systems
S. Kumar
Philips Lighting Research
M. Richardson
SSW
M. Furuhed
Nexus Group
S. Raza
RISE SICS
February 28,
June 6, 2018

EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-00
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-01

Abstract

Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used as a certificate management
provisioning protocol over HTTPS. Low-resource devices often use the
lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] for message
exchanges. This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
secure CoAP (EST-
coaps). This (EST-coaps), which allows low-resource constrained
devices to re-use use existing EST functionality. Example low-resource use cases functionality for EST
are: secure bootstrapping and certificate enrollment. provisioning
certificates.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, December 8, 2018.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. EST operational differences
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology
3. Conformance to RFC7925 profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Protocol Design . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conformance to RFC7925 profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Protocol Design and Layering
4.1. Payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Payload format . . . . 5
4.2. Message Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Message Bindings . 6
4.3. CoAP response codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. CoAP response codes
4.4. Delayed Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4.
4.5. Server-side Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Message fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. 8
4.7. Deployment limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. 9
5. Discovery and URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. 9
6. DTLS Transport Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Proxying
7. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Parameters . . . . . . . 11
7. Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Media-Type Registry . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Content-Format registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Content-Format Registry . . . . . . 12
8.2. Resource Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2.1. Content Format application/multict . . . . . . . . 14
9. Security Considerations . 16
9.3. Resource Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. Security Considerations . 15
9.1. proxy considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. 17
10.1. EST server considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations . . 15
10. . . . . . . . . 18
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. 18
12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12. 19
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12.1. 19
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12.2. 19
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 21
Appendix A. EST messages to EST-coaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 22
A.1. cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23
A.2. csrattrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 26
A.3. enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 27
A.4. serverkeygen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 29
Appendix B. Encoding for server side key generation . . . . . . 26
Appendix C. EST-coaps Block message examples . . . . . . . . . . 26 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 35

1. Introduction

"Classical" Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used
for authenticated/authorized endpoint certificate enrollment (and
optionally key provisioning) through a Certificate Authority (CA) or
Registration Authority (RA). This functionality is also needed for
low resource devices.

"Classical" EST uses HTTPS and this specification messages run over HTTPS.

This document defines a new transport for EST using CoAP. It also profiles based on the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) since some Internet of Things
(IoT) devices use CoAP instead of EST to a
smaller subset.

IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)
[RFC4944] on IEEE 802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] wireless networks are
becoming common in many industry application domains such as lighting
controls. Although IEEE 802.15.4 defines how security can be enabled
between nodes within a single mesh network, it does not specify the
provisioning and management of the keys. HTTP. Therefore, securing a
6LoWPAN network with devices from multiple manufacturers with
different provisioning techniques is often tedious and time
consuming. An example use case is the application of Bootstrapping
of Remote Secure Infrastructures (BRSKI)
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. The low resource aspects
are detailed for 6tisch in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] and
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join].

Constrained networks use this
specification utilizes DTLS [RFC6347], CoAP [RFC7252], and UDP
instead of TLS [RFC5246], HTTP [RFC7230] and TCP. EST-coaps replaces
the invocations of TLS and HTTP by DTLS and CoAP invocations thus
enabling EST for CoAP-based low-resource devices.

Because the relatively large

EST messages cannot may be readily
transported over constrained (6LoWPAN, LLN) wireless networks, relatively large and for this reason this
document specifies the use of also uses CoAP Block-Wise Transfer ("Block") [RFC7959] to fragment offer a
fragmentation mechanism of EST messages at the application CoAP layer.

1.1. EST operational differences

Only the differences COAP
Observe options [RFC7641] are also used to convey delayed EST with respect
responses to operational scenarios are
described in this section. EST-coaps server differs from EST server
as follows:

o Replacement clients.

This specification also profiles the use of TLS by DTLS and HTTP by CoAP, resulting in:

* DTLS-secured CoAP sessions between EST-coaps client and EST-
coaps server.

o Only EST to only support
certificate-based client authentication is supported, which
results in:

* The EST-coaps client does not support Authentication. HTTP Basic or Digest
authentication (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030]).

* The EST-coaps client does [RFC7030] are not support authentication at the
application layer (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030]).

1.2.
supported.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Many of the concepts in this document are taken over from [RFC7030].
Consequently, much text is directly traceable to [RFC7030]. The same
document structure is followed to point out the differences and
commonalities between EST and EST-coaps.

3. Conformance to RFC7925 profiles

This section shows how EST-coaps fits into the profiles of low-
resource devices as described in [RFC7925].

EST-coaps can transport certificates and private keys. Certificates
are responses to (re-)enrollment requests or request for a trusted
certificate list. Private keys can be transported as response responses to a
request to a server-side key
generation keygeneration as described in section 4.4 of [RFC7030].
[RFC7030] and discussed in Section 4.5 of this document.

The mandatory cipher suite for DTLS in EST-coaps is
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 defined in [RFC7251] which is the
mandatory-to-implement cipher suite in CoAP. Additionally, the curve
secp256r1 MUST be supported [RFC4492]; this curve is equivalent to
the NIST P-256 curve. The hash algorithm [Q-EDNOTE: the NIST P-256 curve is SHA-256. DTLS a MUST-
according to the terminology of RFC8247, and Curve25519 is a
SHOULD+].

DTLS1.2 implementations MUST use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
Supported Point Formats Extensions [RFC4492]; the uncompressed [RFC4492]. Uncompressed point
format MUST also be supported; supported. [RFC6090] can be used as an implementation method.

The EST-coaps client MUST be configured with an explicit TA database
or at least summary of
the ECC algorithms. DTLS 1.3 implementations differ from DTLS 1.2
because they do not support point format negotiation in favor of a
single point format for each curve and thus support for DTLS 1.3 does
not mandate point formation extensions and negotiation.

The EST-coaps client MUST be configured with at least an implicit TA
database from its manufacturer. The authentication of the EST-coaps
server by the EST-coaps client is based on Certificate certificate authentication
in the DTLS handshake.

The authentication of the EST-coaps client is based on a client
certificate in the DTLS handshake. This can either be

o DTLS with a previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
simple re-enrollment of clients;

o DTLS with a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer-
installed manufacturer-installed
certificate or a certificate issued by some other party);

3. the
server is expected to trust the manufacturer's root CA certificate
in this case.

4. Protocol Design and Layering

EST-coaps uses CoAP to transfer EST messages, aided by Block-Wise
Transfer [RFC7959] to transport CoAP messages in blocks thus avoiding
(excessive) 6LoWPAN fragmentation of UDP datagrams. The use of "Block" for
the transfer of larger EST messages is specified in Section 3.4. 4.6. The
Figure 1 below shows the layered EST-coaps architecture.

+------------------------------------------------+
| EST request/response messages |
+------------------------------------------------+
| CoAP for message transfer and signaling |
+------------------------------------------------+
| DTLS for transport security |
+------------------------------------------------+
| UDP for transport |
+------------------------------------------------+

Figure 1: EST-coaps protocol layers

The EST-coaps protocol design follows closely the EST design. The
parts
actions supported by EST-coaps are identified by their message types:

o Simple enroll and reenroll, for CA to sign public client-identity
key.

o CA certificate retrieval, needed to receive the complete set of CA
certificates.

o CSR Simple enroll and reenroll, for CA to sign public client-identity
key.

o Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attributes request messages,
informs the client of the fields to include in generated CSR.

o Server-side key generation messages, to provide a private client-
identity key when the client is too restricted or because of lack
of choses for an entropy source. [EDNOTE: Encrypting these keys is
important. RFC7030 specifies how the external entity to
generate its private key can be encrypted
with CMS using symmetric or asymmetric keys. Mention how
symmetric key can be derived for EST server side key generation
from the TLS KEM draft.]

3.1. key.

4.1. Payload format

The content-format (media type equivalent) of the CoAP message
determines which EST message is transported in the CoAP payload. The
media types specified in the HTTP Content-Type header (see section (section 3.2.2
of [RFC7030]) are in EST-coaps specified by the Content-Format Option
(12) of CoAP. The combination of URI path-suffix path and content-
format content-format used
for CoAP MUST map to an allowed combination of path-
suffix URI and media type as
defined for EST. The required content-
formats content-formats for these request requests and
response messages are defined in Section 8. 9. The CoAP response codes
are defined in Section 3.3. 4.3.

EST-coaps is designed for use between low-resource devices using CoAP and hence
does not need to send base64-encoded data. Simple binary is more
efficient (30% less payload compared to base64) smaller payload) and well supported by CoAP.
Therefore, the content formats specification in Section 8 requires 9 specifies
that the use of binary payload is transported as a CBOR major type 2, a byte
string, for all EST-coaps Content-
Formats.

3.2. Content-Formats. In the examples of
Appendix A, the base16 diagnostic notation is used for CBOR major
type 2, where h'450aafbb' represents an example binary payload.

4.2. Message Bindings

This section describes the

The general EST CoAP message characteristics.

It is RECOMMENDED to use CoAP CON messages. This recommendation does
not influence the communication efficiency because all characteristics are:

o All EST-coaps messages expect a response. response from the server, thus the
client MUST send the requests over confirmable CON COAP messages.

o The Ver, TKL, Token, and Message ID values of the CoAP header are
not
influenced affected by EST.

o The CoAP options are used to convey are Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port,
Content-Format Content-
Format, and more Location-Path in CoAP. The These CoAP Options are used to
communicate the HTTP fields specified in the EST REST messages.

o EST URLs are HTTPS based (https://), in CoAP these will be assumed
to be transformed to coaps (coaps://)

Appendix A includes some practical examples of EST messages
translated to CoAP.

3.3.

4.3. CoAP response codes

Section 5.9 of [RFC7252] specifies the mapping of HTTP response codes
to CoAP response codes. Every time the HTTP response code 200 is
specified in [RFC7030] in response to a GET (POST) request, in EST-
coaps EST-coaps the
equivalent CoAP response code 2.05 (2.01) or 2.03 MUST be used. Similarly,
2.01, 2.02 or 2.04 MUST be used in response to POST EST requests.
Response code HTTP 202 has no equivalent in EST is mapped to CoAP _.__. CoAP. In
[I-D.hartke-core-pending] Section 4.4 it
is specified how multiple concurrently
open EST requests may be handled. over CoAP handle delayed messages.

All other HTTP 2xx response codes are not used by EST. For the
following HTTP 4xx error codes that may occur: 400, 401, 403, 404,
405, 406, 412, 413, 415; the equivalent CoAP response code for EST-coaps EST-
coaps is 4.xx. For the HTTP 5xx error codes: 500, 501, 502, 503, 504
the equivalent CoAP response code is 5.xx.

3.4. Message fragmentation

DTLS defines fragmentation only for

4.4. Delayed Results

It is possible that responses are not always directly available by
the handshake part server, and not for
secure data exchange (DTLS records). [RFC6347] states that may even require manual intervention to avoid
using IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram
reconstitution, invokers of generate the DTLS record layer SHOULD size DTLS
records so that they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained from
certificate for the record layer. In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over
IEEE 802.15.4 network SHOULD attempt server response. Delays of minutes to size CoAP messages such that hours are
possible. Therefore, each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4 frames.

That GET request MUST be accompanied by the
observe option. When the result is not always possible. Even though ECC certificates are small
in size, they can vary greatly based on signature algorithms, key
sizes, and OID fields used. For 256-bit curves, common ECDSA cert
sizes are 500-1000 bytes which could fluctuate further based on directly available, the
algorithms, OIDs, SANs client
receives the result and cert fields. For 384-bit curves, ECDSA
certs increase forgets about the observe as specified in size and can sometimes reach 1.5KB. Additionally,
there are times when
section 3.6 of [RFC7641]. When a POST response is delayed, the EST cacerts POST
returns a 2.01 (Created) response from code, having put a value in the server can
include multiple certs that amount to large payloads. Section 4.6
Location-Path option. After reception of
CoAP [RFC7252] describes 2.01 the possible payload sizes: "if nothing client does a GET
request with the observe option to the newly returned location. Once
the delayed result is
known notified by the server, the client forgets
about the size of observe.

Next to the headers, good upper bounds are 1152 bytes
for observe option the message size and 1024 bytes for server MUST specify the payload size".
Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also suggests Max-Age option
that IPv4 implementations may
want indicates the maximum waiting time in minutes.

4.5. Server-side Key Generation

Constrained devices sometimes do not have the necessary hardware to limit themselves
generate statistically random numbers for private keys and DTLS
ephemeral keys. Past experience has shown that low-resource
endpoints sometimes generate numbers which could allow someone to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes
such
decrypt the communication or guess the private key and impersonate as 576 bytes. From [RFC0791] follows
the device. Studies have shown that the absolute minimum
value of same keys are generated by
the IP MTU for IPv4 same model devices deployed on-line.

Additionally, random number key generation is as low as 68 bytes, which would leave
only 40 bytes minus security overhead costly, thus energy
draining. Even though the random numbers that constitute the
identity/cert do not get generated often, an endpoint may not want to
spend time and energy generating keypairs, and just ask for a UDP payload. Thus, even
with ECC certs, EST-coaps messages one from
the server.

In these scenarios, server-side key generation can still exceed sizes in MTU of
1280 be used. The
client asks for IPv6 the server or 60-80 bytes for 6LoWPAN [RFC4919] as explained in
section 2 of [RFC7959]. EST-coaps needs to be able proxy to fragment EST
messages into multiple DTLS datagrams. Fine-grained fragmentation of
EST messages generate the private key and
the certificate which is essential.

To perform fragmentation transferred back to the client in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies the "Block1"
option
server-side key generation response.

[RFC7030] recommends for fragmentation of the request payload and the "Block2"
option for fragmentation of private key returned by the return payload of a CoAP flow. server to be
encrypted. The BLOCK draft defines SZX in specification provides two methods to encrypt the Block1
generated key, symmetric and Block2 option fields.
These asymmetric. The methods are used to convey the size of the blocks in signalled
by the requests or
responses.

The CoAP client MAY specify by using the Block1 size relevant attributes (SMIMECapabilities and MAY also specify the
Block2 size. The CoAP server MAY specify
DecryptKeyIdentifier or AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier) in the Block2 size, but not CSR
request. In the Block1 size. As explained in Section 1 of [RFC7959]), blockwise
transfers SHOULD be used in Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid symmetric key case, the
exacerbation of lost blocks.

The Size1 response MAY key can be parsed established out-
of-band or alternatively derived by the client established TLS connection as a size indication
of the Block2 resource
described in the server [RFC5705].

The sever-side key generation response or by is returned using a CBOR array
Section 9.2.1. The certificate part exactly matches the server as response
from a
request for enrollment response. The private key is placed inside of a size estimate
CMS SignedData. The SignedData is signed by the client. Similarly, Size2 option
defined in BLOCK should party that generated
the private key, which may or may not be parsed by the EST server as an indication of
the size of or the resource carried in Block1 options and EST
CA. The SignedData is further protected by the client
as placing it inside of a maximum size expected
CMS EnvelopedData as explained in the 4.13 (Request Entity Too Large)
response to a request.

Examples Section 4.4.2 of fragmented messages are shown in Appendix C.

3.5. Deployment limits

Although EST-coaps paves the way [RFC7030].

4.6. Message fragmentation

DTLS defines fragmentation only for the utilization of EST for
constrained devices on constrained networks, some devices will handshake part and not
have enough resources to handle the large payloads for
secure data exchange (DTLS records). [RFC6347] states that come with
EST-coaps. The specification of EST-coaps is intended to ensure that
EST works for networks avoid
using IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram
reconstitution, invokers of constrained devices the DTLS record layer SHOULD size DTLS
records so that choose to limit
their communications stack to UDP/CoAP. It is up to they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained from
the record layer. In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over
IEEE 802.15.4 network
designer SHOULD attempt to decide which devices execute the EST protocol size CoAP messages such that
each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4 frames.

That is not always possible. Even though ECC certificates are small
in size, they can vary greatly based on signature algorithms, key
sizes, and OID fields used. For 256-bit curves, common ECDSA cert
sizes are 500-1000 bytes which
not.

4. Discovery could fluctuate further based on the
algorithms, OIDs, SANs and URI

EST-coaps is targeted to low-resource networks with small packets.
Saving header space is important cert fields. For 384-bit curves, ECDSA
certs increase in size and an additional EST-coaps URI is
specified that is shorter than can sometimes reach 1.5KB. Additionally,
there are times when the EST URI.

In cacerts response from the context server can
include multiple certs that amount to large payloads. Section 4.6 of CoAP,
CoAP [RFC7252] describes the presence and location possible payload sizes: "if nothing is
known about the size of (path to) the
management data headers, good upper bounds are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with 1152 bytes
for the value
"ace.est" [RFC6690]. Upon success, message size and 1024 bytes for the return payload will contain
the root resource size".
Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also suggests that IPv4 implementations may
want to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes
such as 576 bytes. From [RFC0791] follows that the EST resources. It absolute minimum
value of the IP MTU for IPv4 is up as low as 68 bytes, which would leave
only 40 bytes minus security overhead for a UDP payload. Thus, even
with ECC certs, EST-coaps messages can still exceed sizes in MTU of
1280 for IPv6 or 60-80 bytes for 6LoWPAN [RFC4919] as explained in
section 2 of [RFC7959]. EST-coaps needs to the
implementation be able to choose its root resource; throughout this document
the example root resource /est fragment EST
messages into multiple DTLS datagrams. Fine-grained fragmentation of
EST messages is used. The example below shows essential.

To perform fragmentation in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies the
discovery "Block1"
option for fragmentation of the presence request payload and location of management data.

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est

RES: 2.05 Content
</est>; rt="ace.est"
The additional EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by
replacing "Block2"
option for fragmentation of the scheme https by coaps and by specifying return payload of a shorter
resource path names:

coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name

The CoAP short URI exists next to the URI defined in [RFC7030].

coaps://www.example.com/.well-known/est/est-name
OR
coaps://www.example.com/.well-known/est/ArbitraryLabel/est-name

Figure 5 flow.

The BLOCK draft defines SZX in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations Block1 and
corresponding paths which Block2 option fields.
These are supported by EST. Table 1 provides used to convey the
mapping from size of the EST URI path to blocks in the shorter EST-coaps URI path.

+------------------+-----------+
| EST | EST-coaps |
+------------------+-----------+
| /cacerts | /crts |
| /simpleenroll | /sen |
| /simplereenroll | /sren |
| /csrattrs | /att |
| /serverkeygen | /skg |
+------------------+-----------+

Table 1

When discovering the root path for requests or
responses.

The CoAP client MAY specify the EST resources, Block1 size and MAY also specify the
Block2 size. The CoAP server MAY
return specify the full resource paths and Block2 size, but not
the Block1 size. As explained in Section 1 of [RFC7959]), blockwise
transfers SHOULD be used content types. This is
useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps
server. For example, in Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid the following more complete response is
possible.

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est

RES: 2.05 Content
</est>; rt="ace.est"
</est/crts>; rt="ace.est";ct=TBD1
</est/sen>; rt="ace.est";ct=TBD1 TBD4
</est/sren>; rt="ace.est";ct=TBD1 TBD4
</est/att>; rt="ace.est";ct=TBD4
</est/skg>; rt="ace.est";ct=TBD1 TBD4 TBD2
exacerbation of lost blocks.

The return Size1 response MAY be parsed by the client as a size indication
of the content-types allows Block2 resource in the client to choose server response or by the most
appropriate one from multiple content types.

5. DTLS Transport Protocol

EST-coaps depends on server as a secure transport mechanism over UDP that can
secure (confidentiality, authenticity)
request for a size estimate by the CoAP messages exchanged.

DTLS is one such secure protocol. When "TLS" is referred to client. Similarly, Size2 option
defined in BLOCK should be parsed by the
context server as an indication of EST, it is understood that
the size of the resource carried in EST-coaps, security is
provided using DTLS instead. No other changes are necessary (all
provisional modes etc. are Block1 options and by the same client
as for TLS).

CoAP was designed to avoid fragmentation. DTLS is used to secure
CoAP messages. However, fragmentation is still possible at a maximum size expected in the DTLS
layer during the DTLS handshake when using ECC ciphersuites. If
fragmentation is necessary, "DTLS provides a mechanism for
fragmenting a handshake message over 4.13 (Request Entity Too Large)
response to a number of records, each of
which can be transmitted separately, thus avoiding IP fragmentation"
[RFC6347].

CoAP and DTLS can provide proof request.

Examples of identity for EST-coaps clients and
server with simple PKI fragmented messages conformant to section 3.1 of
[RFC5272]. are shown in Appendix B.

4.7. Deployment limits

Although EST-coaps supports paves the certificate types and Trust
Anchors (TA) that are specified way for EST in section 3 the utilization of [RFC7030].

Channel-binding information EST for linking proof-of-identity
constrained devices on constrained networks, some devices will not
have enough resources to handle the large payloads that come with
connection-based proof-of-possession is optional for
EST-coaps. When
proof-of-possession is desired, a set of actions are required
regarding the use of tls-unique, described in section 3.5 in
[RFC7030]. The tls-unique information translates specification of EST-coaps is intended to the contents ensure that
EST works for networks of
the first "Finished" message in the TLS handshake between server and
client [RFC5929]. The client constrained devices that choose to limit
their communications stack to UDP/CoAP. It is then supposed up to add this "Finished"
message as a ChallengePassword in the attributes section of network
designer to decide which devices execute the
PKCS#10 Request Info EST protocol and which
do not.

5. Discovery and URI

EST-coaps is targeted to prove low-resource networks with small packets.
Saving header space is important and an additional EST-coaps URI is
specified that the client is indeed in control of
the private key at shorter than the time of the TLS session when performing a
/simpleenroll, for example. In the case of EST-coaps, the same
operations can be performed during the DTLS handshake. EST URI.

In the event
of handshake message fragmentation, the Hash context of CoAP, the handshake
messages used in the MAC calculation presence and location of (path to) the Finished message

PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages))
[0..verify_data_length-1];

MUST be computed as if each handshake message had been sent as a
single fragment [RFC6347].

In a constrained CoAP environment, endpoints can't afford to
establish a DTLS connection for every EST transaction.
Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources on low-
end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth. The DTLS connection
SHOULD remain open for persistent EST connections. For example, an
EST cacerts request that is followed
management data are discovered by sending a simpleenroll GET request can
use the same authenticated DTLS connection. Given that after a
successful enrollment, it is more likely that to "/.well-
known/core" including a new EST transaction resource type (RT) parameter with the value
"ace.est" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will take place after a significant amount contain
the root resource of time, the DTLS
connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages that are
relatively close to each other.

Support for Observe CoAP options [RFC7641] resources. It is out-of-scope for up to the
implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this
document. Observe options could be used by document
the example root resource /est is used.

The individual EST-coaps server to notify
clients about a change in URIs differ from the cacerts or csr attributes (resources) EST URI by
replacing the scheme https by coaps and might be an area of future work.

6. Proxying

In real-world deployments, the EST server will not always reside
within the CoAP boundary. by specifying shorter
resource path names:

coaps://www.example.com/.well-known/est/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>.

The EST-server can exist outside ArbitraryLabel Path-Segment SHOULD be of the
constrained network shortest length
possible.

Figure 5 in a non-constrained network that supports TLS/
HTTP. In such environments EST-coaps is used by the client within section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the CoAP boundary operations and TLS is used to transport the EST messages
outside
corresponding paths which are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the CoAP boundary. A proxy entity at
mapping from the edge is required EST URI path to
operate between the CoAP environment and the external HTTP network.
The ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS proxy SHOULD terminate shorter EST-coaps downstream and
initiate URI path.

+------------------+-----------+
| EST connections over TLS upstream.

One possible use-case, shown in one figure below, is expected to be
deployed in practice:

o A proxy between any EST-client and EST-server

Constrained Network
.---------. .----------------------------. | RA EST-coaps | |.--------------------------.|
'---------' || ||
+------------------+-----------+
| || ||
.------. HTTP .-----------------. CoAPS .-----------. || /cacerts | EST |<------->|ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS|<-------->| EST Client| ||
|Server|over TLS /crts | Proxy
| '-----------' ||
'------' '-----------------' ||
|| ||
|'--------------------------'|
'----------------------------'

ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS proxy at the CoAP boundary. /simpleenroll | /sen |
| /simplereenroll | /sren |
| /csrattrs | /att |
| /serverkeygen | /skg |
+------------------+-----------+

Table 1 contains

The short resource URIs MUST be supported. The corresponding longer
URIs specified in [RFC7030] MAY be supported.

When discovering the URI mapping between root path for the EST-coaps and EST resources, the
proxy SHOULD adhere to. Section 7 of [RFC8075] server MAY
return all available resource paths and Section 3.3
define the mapping between EST-coaps and HTTP response codes, that
determines how a proxy translates CoAP response codes from/to HTTP
status codes. The mapping from Content-Type to media type is defined
in Section 8. The conversion from binary to BSD64 needs to be done
in the proxy. Conversion used content types. This
is possible because a TLS link exists
between EST-coaps-to-HTTP proxy and EST server and a corresponding
DTLS linked exists between EST-coaps-to-HTTP proxy and EST client.

Due to fragmentation of large messages into blocks, an EST-coaps-to-
HTTP proxy SHOULD reassemble the BLOCKs before translating the binary useful when multiple content to BSD64, and consecutively relay the message upstream into
the HTTP environment.

For types are specified for EST-coaps
server. The example below shows the discovery of the EST server by the EST client in the coap
environment, the EST-coaps-to-HTTP proxy MUST announce itself
according to the rules presence and
location of Section 4. management data.

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est

RES: 2.05 Content
</est>; rt="ace.est"
</est/crts>;ct=TBD2
</est/sen>;ct=TBD2 TBD7
</est/sren>;ct=TBD2 TBD7
</est/att>;ct=TBD6
</est/skg>;ct=TBD1 TBD7 TBD8

The available functions first line of the
proxies discovery response MUST be announced with as many resource paths. returned. The discovery five
consecutive lines MAY be returned. The return of EST server in the http environment follow the rules specified content-types
in
[RFC7030].

[ EDNOTE: PoP will be addressed here. ]

A proxy SHOULD authenticate the client downstream and it should be
authenticated by last four lines allows the EST server or CA upstream. The Registration
Authority (RA) is necessary client to (re-)create choose the secure connection most
appropriate one from multiple content types.

6. DTLS to TLS and vice versa. A trust relationship needs to be pre-
established between the proxy and Transport Protocol

EST-coaps depends on a secure transport mechanism over UDP that can
secure (confidentiality, authenticity) the EST servers exchanged CoAP messages.

DTLS is one such secure protocol. When "TLS" is referred to be able to proxy
these connections on behalf in the
context of various clients.

[EDNOTE: To add more details about trust relations EST, it is understood that in this section. ]

7. Parameters

[EDNOTE: This section EST-coaps, security is
provided using DTLS instead. No other changes are necessary (all
provisional modes etc. are the same as for TLS).

CoAP was designed to avoid fragmentation. DTLS is used to secure
CoAP messages. However, fragmentation is still possible at the DTLS
layer during the DTLS handshake when using ECC ciphersuites. If
fragmentation is necessary, "DTLS provides a mechanism for
fragmenting a handshake message over several records, each of which
can be populated. It will address transmission
parameters described in sections 4.7 transmitted separately, thus avoiding IP fragmentation"
[RFC6347].

CoAP and 4.8 DTLS can provide proof of identity for EST-coaps clients and
server with simple PKI messages conformant to section 3.1 of
[RFC5272]. EST-coaps supports the CoAP draft. EST
does not impose any unique parameters certificate types and Trust
Anchors (TA) that affect the CoAP parameters are specified for EST in Table 2 and section 3 of [RFC7030].

Channel-binding information for linking proof-of-identity with
connection-based proof-of-possession is optional for EST-coaps. When
proof-of-possession is desired, a set of actions are required
regarding the use of tls-unique, described in section 3.5 in
[RFC7030]. The tls-unique information translates to the CoAP draft but contents of
the ones first "Finished" message in CoAP could be
affecting EST. For example, the processing delay of CAs could be
less (D)TLS handshake between server
and client [RFC5929]. The client is then 2s, but in supposed to add this case they should send
"Finished" message as a CoAP ACK every 2s
while processing.]

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Content-Format registry

Additions ChallengePassword in the attributes section
of the PKCS#10 Request Info to prove that the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within client is indeed in
control of the
"CoRE Parameters" registry are needed private key at the time of the TLS session when
performing a /simpleenroll, for example. In the below media types.
These case of EST-coaps,
the same operations can be registered either performed during the DTLS handshake. For
DTLS 1.2, in the Expert Review range (0-255) or
IETF Review range (256-9999).

* application/pkcs7-mime

* Type name: application

* Subtype name: pkcs7-mime

* ID: TBD1

* Required parameters: None

* Optional parameters: None

* Encoding considerations: binary

* Security considerations: As defined event of handshake message fragmentation, the Hash
of the handshake messages used in this specification

* Published specification: [RFC5751]

* Applications that use this media type: EST

* application/pkcs8

* Type name: application

* Subtype name: pkcs8

* ID: TBD2

* Required parameters: None

* Optional parameters: None

* Encoding considerations: binary the MAC calculation of the Finished
message

PRF(master_secret, finished_label, Hash(handshake_messages))
[0..verify_data_length-1];

MUST be computed as if each handshake message had been sent as a
single fragment [RFC6347]. Similarly, for DTLS 1.3, the Finished
message

HMAC(finished_key,
Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context,
Certificate*, CertificateVerify*))

* Security considerations: As defined Only included if present.

MUST be computed as if each handshake message had been sent as a
single fragment following the algorithm described in this specification

* Published specification: [RFC5958]

* Applications that use this media type: 4.4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].

In a constrained CoAP environment, endpoints can't afford to
establish a DTLS connection for every EST

* application/csrattrs
* Type name: application

* Subtype name: csrattrs

* ID: TBD3

* transaction.
Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources on low-
end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth. The DTLS connection
SHOULD remain open for persistent EST connections. For example, an
EST cacerts request that is followed by a simpleenroll request can
use the same authenticated DTLS connection. Given that after a
successful enrollment, it is more likely that a new EST transaction
will take place after a significant amount of time, the DTLS
connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages that are
relatively close to each other. In some cases, such as NAT
rebinding, keeping the state of a connection is not possible when
devices sleep for extended periods of time. In such occasions,
[I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that
can eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost.

Support for Observe CoAP options [RFC7641] is compulsory. The
necessity of Observer for long delays (minutes - hours)is explained
in Section 4.4. Observe options could also be used by the server to
notify clients about a change in the cacerts or csr attributes
(resources) and might be an area of future work.

7. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar

In real-world deployments, the EST server will not always reside
within the CoAP boundary. The EST-server can exist outside the
constrained network in a non-constrained network that supports TLS/
HTTP. In such environments EST-coaps is used by the client within
the CoAP boundary and TLS is used to transport the EST messages
outside the CoAP boundary. A Registrar at the edge is required to
operate between the CoAP environment and the external HTTP network.
The EST coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps and
authenticate the client downstream and initiate EST connections over
TLS upstream.

The Registrar SHOULD authenticate the client downstream and it should
be authenticated by the EST server or CA upstream. The Registration
Authority (re-)creates the secure connection from DTLS to TLS and
vice versa. A trust relationship SHOULD be pre-established between
the Registrar and the EST servers to be able to proxy these
connections on behalf of various clients.

When enforcing Proof-of-Possession (POP), the (D)TLS tls-unique value
of the (D)TLS session needs to be used to prove that the private key
corresponding to the public key is in the possession of and can be
used by an end-entity or client. In other words, the CSR the client
is using needs to include information from the DTLS connection the
client establishes with the server. In EST, that information is the
(D)TLS tls-unique value of the (D)TLS session. In the presence of
ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS Registrar, the EST-coaps client MUST be
authenticated and authorized by the Registrar and the Registrar MUST
be authenticated as an EST Registrar client to the EST server. Thus
the POP information is lost between the EST-coaps client and the EST
server. The EST server becomes aware of the presence of an EST
Registrar from its TLS client certificate that includes id-kp-cmcRA
[RFC6402] extended key usage extension. As explained in Section 3.7
of [RFC7030], the EST server SHOULD apply an authorization policy
consistent with a Registrar client. For example, it could be
configured to accept POP linking information that does not match the
current TLS session because the authenticated EST client Registrar
has verified this information when acting as an EST server.

One possible use-case, shown in one figure below, is expected to be
deployed in practice:

Constrained Network
.---------. .----------------------------.
| CA | |.--------------------------.|
'---------' || ||
| || ||
.------. HTTP .-----------------. CoAPS .-----------. ||
| EST |<------->|ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS|<-------->| EST Client| ||
|Server|over TLS | Registrar | '-----------' ||
'------' '-----------------' ||
|| ||
|'--------------------------'|
'----------------------------'

ESTcoaps-to-HTTPS Registrar at the CoAP boundary.

Table 1 contains the URI mapping between the EST-coaps and EST the
Registrar SHOULD adhere to. Section 7 of [RFC8075] and Section 4.3
define the mapping between EST-coaps and HTTP response codes, that
determines how the Registrar translates CoAP response codes from/to
HTTP status codes. The mapping from Content-Type to media type is
defined in Section 9. The conversion from CBOR major type 2 to
base64 encoding needs to be done in the Registrar. Conversion is
possible because a TLS link exists between EST-coaps-to-HTTP
Registrar and EST server and a corresponding DTLS link exists between
EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar and EST client.

Due to fragmentation of large messages into blocks, an EST-coaps-to-
HTTP Registrar SHOULD reassemble the BLOCKs before translating the
binary content to Base-64, and consecutively relay the message
upstream.

For the discovery of the EST server by the EST client in the coap
environment, the EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar MUST announce itself
according to the rules of Section 5. The available actions of the
Registrars MUST be announced with as many resource paths. The
discovery of EST server in the http environment follow the rules
specified in [RFC7030].

When server-side key generation is used, if the private key is
protected using symmetric keys then the Registrar needs to encrypt
the private key down to the client with one symmetric key and decrypt
it from the server with another. If no private key encryption takes
place the Registrar will be able to see the key as it establishes a
separate connection to the server. In the case of asymmetrically
encrypted private key, the Registrar may not be able to decrypt it if
the server encrypted it with a public key that corresponds to a
private key that belongs to the client.

8. Parameters

[EDNOTE: This section to be populated. It will address transmission
parameters described in sections 4.7 and 4.8 of the CoAP draft. EST
does not impose any unique parameters that affect the CoAP parameters
in Table 2 and 3 in the CoAP draft but the ones in CoAP could be
affecting EST. For example, the processing delay of CAs could be
less then 2s, but in this case they should send a CoAP ACK every 2s
while processing.]

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. Media-Type Registry

This section registers the 'application/multict' media type in the
"Media Types" registry. This media type is used to indicate that the
payload is composed of multiple content formats.

Type name: application
Subtype name: multict
Required parameters: None

* none
Optional parameters: None

* none
Encoding considerations: CBOR array of content-format.
Security considerations: See Security Considerations Section
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be
broadly interoperable.
Published specification: THIS RFC <xref target="cborpair"/>.
Applications that use this media type: ACE, ANIMA, 6tisch,
and other low-resource EST applications.
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .cbor
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF
ACE WG
Intended usage: LIMITED
Restrictions on usage: NONE
Author: ACE WG
Change controller: IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO

9.2. Content-Format Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the
"CoRE Parameters" registry are specified in Table 2. These can be
registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review
range (256-9999).

+---------------------------------+----------+------+---------------+
| Media type | Encoding | ID | Reference |
+---------------------------------+----------+------+---------------+
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | - | TBD1 | [RFC5751] |
| type=server-generated-key | | | [RFC7030] |
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | - | TBD2 | [RFC5751] |
| type=certs-only | | | |
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | - | TBD3 | [RFC5751] |
| type=CMC-request | | | [RFC5273] |
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | - | TBD4 | [RFC5751] |
| type=CMC-response | | | [RFC5273] |
| application/pkcs8 | - | TBD5 | [RFC5751] |
| | | | [RFC5958] |
| application/csrattrs | - | TBD6 | [RFC7030] |
| | | | [RFC7231] |
| application/pkcs10 | - | TBD7 | [RFC5751] |
| | | | [RFC5967] |
| application/multict | - | TBD8 | Section 9.2.1 |
+---------------------------------+----------+------+---------------+

Table 2: New CoAP Content-Formats

9.2.1. Content Format application/multict

A representation with content format ID TBD8 contains a collection of
representations along with their respective content format.

The collection is encoded as a CBOR array [RFC7049] with an even
number of elements. The second, fourth, sixth, etc. element is a
binary

* Security considerations: As defined string containing a representation. The first, third, fifth,
etc. element is an unsigned integer specifying the content format ID
of the following representation.

For example, a collection containing two representations, one with
content format ID TBD5 and one with content format ID TBD2, looks
like this in diagnostic CBOR notation:
[TBD5,h'0123456789abcdef',TBD2,h'fedcba9876543210']. An example is
shown in Appendix A.4.

[EDNOTE: the intention is that this specification

* Published specification: text is replaced by draft-
fossati-core-multipart-ct, which has yet to be adopted. The above
text is a copy of the critical text, in the event that the CORE WG
does not adopt the document]

9.3. Resource Type registry

Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Resource Type", within the "CoRE
Parameters" registry are needed for a new resource type.

o rt="ace.est" needs registration with IANA.

10. Security Considerations

10.1. EST server considerations

The security considerations of Section 6 of [RFC7030]

* Applications are only
partially valid for the purposes of this document. As HTTP Basic
Authentication is not supported, the considerations expressed for
using passwords do not apply.

Given that the client has only limited resources and may not be able
to generate sufficiently random keys to encrypt its identity, it is
possible that the client uses server generated private/public keys to
encrypt its certificate. The transport of these keys is inherently
risky. A full probability analysis MUST be done to establish whether
server side key generation enhances or decreases the probability of
identity stealing.

When a client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate
validation, the client cannot verify that use this media type: the implicit database can
act as an RA. It is RECOMMENDED that such clients include "Linking
Identity and POP Information" Section 6 in requests (to prevent such
requests from being forwarded to a real EST

* application/pkcs10

* Type name: application

* Subtype name: pkcs10

* ID: TBD4

* Required parameters: None

* Optional parameters: None

* Encoding considerations: binary

* Security considerations: As defined server by a man in this specification

* Published specification: [RFC5967]

* Applications the
middle). It is RECOMMENDED that use this media type: the Implicit Trust Anchor database
used for EST

8.2. Resource Type registry

Additions server authentication be carefully managed to reduce the sub-registry "CoAP Resource Type", within the "CoRE
Parameters" registry are needed for
chance of a new resource type.

o rt="ace.est" needs registration third-party CA with IANA.

9. Security Considerations

9.1. proxy considerations

The proxy proposed poor certification practices from
being trusted. Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor database after
successfully receiving the Distribution of CA certificates response
(Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any risk to the first DTLS
exchange.

In accordance with [RFC7030], TLS cipher suites that include
"_EXPORT_" and "_DES_" in Section 6 must their names MUST NOT be deployed with great care, used. More
information about recommendations of TLS and
only when the recommended connections DTLS are impossible.

[EDNOTE: To add more details about trust relations through proxies included in
this section. ]

9.2. EST server considerations
[RFC7525].

As described in CMC, Section 6.7 of [RFC5272], "For keys that can be
used as signature keys, signing the certification request with the
private key serves as a POP on that key pair". The security considerations of section 6 inclusion of [RFC7030] are only
partially valid for tls-
unique in the purposes of this document. As HTTP Basic
Authentication is not supported, certification request links the considerations expressed for
using passwords do proof-of-possession to
the TLS proof-of-identity. This implies but does not apply.

Given prove that the
authenticated client currently has only limited resources and access to the private key.

Regarding the Certificate Signing Request (CSR), an adversary could
exclude attributes that a server may want, include attributes that a
server may not want, and render meaningless other attributes that a
server may want. The CA is expected to be able to generate sufficiently random keys enforce policies
to encrypt its identity, it is
possible that recover from improper CSR requests.

Interpreters of ASN.1 structures should be aware of the client uses server generated private/public keys use of
invalid ASN.1 length fields and should take appropriate measures to
encrypt its certificate.
guard against buffer overflows, stack overruns in particular, and
malicious content in general.

10.2. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations

The transport of these keys is inherently
risky. A full probability analysis MUST Registrar proposed in Section 7 must be done to establish whether
server side key generation enhances or decreases deployed with care, and
only when the probability of
identity stealing. recommended connections are impossible. When a client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate
validation, the client cannot verify that the implicit data base can
act as an RA. It is RECOMMENDED that such clients include "Linking
Identity and POP Information" Section 5 in requests (to prevent such
requests from being forwarded to a real EST server by is
used the Registrar terminating the TLS connection establishes a man in new
one with the
middle). It upstream CA. Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database
used impossible for POP to be
enforced throughout the EST transaction. The EST server authentication could be carefully managed
configured to reduce accept POP linking information that does not match the
chance
current TLS session because the authenticated EST Registrar client
has verified this information when acting as an EST server. The
introduction of a third-party CA with poor certification practices from
being trusted. Disabling an EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the Implicit Trust Anchor database after
successfully receiving client can
trust the Distribution of CA certificates response
(Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any vulnerability to registrar using its implicit or explicit TA database. It
also assumes the first
DTLS exchange.

In accordance Registrar has a trust relationship with [RFC7030], TLS cipher suites that include
"_EXPORT_" and "_DES_" in their names MUST NOT be used. More
information about recommendations of TLS and DTLS are included in
[RFC7525].

As described the upstream
EST server in CMC, Section 6.7 order to act on behalf of [RFC5272], "For keys that can be
used as signature keys, signing the certification request with clients.

In a server-side key generation case, depending on the private key serves
encryption method, the Registrar may be able see the private key as
it acts as a POP man-in-the-middle. Thus, the clients puts its trust on
the Registrar not exposing the private key.

For some use cases, clients that leverage server-side key pair". The inclusion of tls-
unique in the certification request links generation
might prefer for the proof-of-possession enrolled keys to be generated by the TLS proof-of-identity. This implies but Registrar
if the CA does not prove that support server-side key generation. In these
cases the Registrar must support the random number generation using
proper entropy. Since the
authenticated client currently has access to no knowledge if the private key.

Regarding Registrar
will be generating the keys and enrolling the CSR attributes that certificates with the
CA may list for inclusion in an
enrollment request, an adversary could exclude attributes that a
server may want, include attributes that a server may not want, and
render meaningless other attributes that a server may want. The or if the CA
is expected to be able to enforce policies to recover from improper
CSR requests.

Interpreters of ASN.1 structures should will be aware of responsible for generating the use keys, the
existence of
invalid ASN.1 length fields and should take appropriate measures a Registrar requires the client to
guard against buffer overflows, stack overruns in particular, and
malicious content in general.

10. put its trust on the
registrar doing the right thing if it is generating they private
keys.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors are very grateful to Klaus Hartke for his detailed
explanations on the use of Block with DTLS. DTLS and his support for the
content-format specification. The authors would like to thank Esko
Dijk and Michael Verschoor for the valuable discussions that helped
in shaping the solution. They would also like to thank Peter
Panburana from Cisco for his feedback on technical details of the
solution. Constructive comments were received from Benjamin Kaduk,
Eliot Lear, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Julien Vermillard.

11.

12. Change Log

-00:

-01:

Editorials done.

Redefinition of proxy to Registrar in Section 7. Explained better
the role of https-coaps Registrar, instead of "proxy"

Provide "observe" option examples

inserted new server key generation text in Section 4.5 and
motivated server key generation.

Broke down details for DTLS 1.3

New media type uses CBOR array for multiple content-format
payloads

provided new content format tables

new media format for IANA

-00

copied from vanderstok-ace-coap-est-04

12. vanderstok-ace-coap-04

13. References

12.1.

13.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28 (work in progress),
March 2018.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.

[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
Specification", RFC 5751, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751>.

[RFC5967] Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5967, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5967>.

[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

[RFC8075] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.

12.2.

13.2. Informative References

[I-D.hartke-core-pending]
Stok, P. and K. Hartke, ""Pending" Responses for the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-hartke-
core-pending-02 (work in progress), February 2018.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join]
Richardson, M., "6tisch Secure Join protocol", draft-ietf-
6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join-01 (work in progress),
February 2017.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K.,

[I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., Fossati, T., and M. Richardson,
"Minimal T. Gondrom,
"The Datagram Transport Layer Security Framework for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-
6tisch-minimal-security-04 (DTLS) Connection
Identifier", draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id-02
(work in progress), October November 2017.

[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-11 (work in progress), February 2018.

[ieee802.15.4]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard 802.15.4-2006", 2006.

[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.

[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.

[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.

[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

[RFC5273] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5273, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5273>.

[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.

[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.

[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.

[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.

Appendix A. EST messages to EST-coaps

This section takes all examples from Appendix A of [RFC7030], changes
the payload from Base64 to binary and replaces the http headers by
their CoAP equivalents.

The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in Appendix A.1.
Creating CoAP headers are assumed to be generally known.

Binary payload is a CBOR major type 2 (byte array), that is shown
with a base16 (hexadecimal) CBOR diagnostic notation.

[EDNOTE: The payloads of the examples need to be re-generated with
appropriate tools and example certificates.]

A.1. cacerts

These examples assume that the resource discovery, returned a short
URL of "/est".

In EST-coaps, a coaps cacerts IPv4 message can be:

GET coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/crts coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts

The corresponding CoAP header fields are shown below. The use of
block and DTLS are worked out in Appendix C. B.

Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
Token = 0x9a (client generated)
Options
Option1 (Uri-Host) [optional]
Option Delta = 0x3 (option nr = 3)
Option Length = 0x9
Option Value = 192.0.2.1
Option2 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x1 (option nr = 3+3=6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0 (register)
Option3 (Uri-Port) [optional]
Option Delta = 0x4 0x1 (option nr = 4+3=7) 6+1=7)
Option Length = 0x4
Option Value = 8085
Option3
Option4 (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option nr = 7+4= 11)
Option Length = 0x9 0x5
Option Value = "est"
Option5 (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11+0= 11)
Option Length = 0x6
Option Value = "crts"
Option6 (Max-Age)
Option Delta = 0x3 (option nr = 11+3= 14)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = /est/crts 0x1 (1 minute)
Payload = [Empty]

A 2.05 Content response with a cert in EST-coaps will then be:

2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/pkcs7-mime) TBD2)
{payload}

with CoAP fields

Ver = 1
T = 2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied by server)
Options
Option1 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option nr =6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 12 ( 12 > 0)
Option2 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option nr = 12) 6+6 =12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = TBD1 TBD2 (defined in this document)

Payload =
30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
h'30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
c0c3020bb302063c20102020900a61e75193b7acc0d06092a620673410105050030
1b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d313
3303530393033353333315a170d3134303530393033353333315a301b3119301706
0355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f302062300d06092a6206734
10101050003204f0030204a022041003a923a2968bae4aae136ca4e2512c5200680
358482ac39d6f640e4574e654ea35f48b1e054c5da3372872f7a1e429f4edf39584
32efb2106591d3eb783c1034709f251fc86566bda2d541c792389eac4ec9e181f4b
9f596e5ef2679cc321542b11337f90a44df3c85f1516561fa968a1914f265bc0b82
76ebe3106a790d97d34c8c37c74fe1c30b396424664ac426284a9f6022e02693843
6880adfcd95c98ca1dfc2e6d75319b85d0458de28a9d13fb16d620fff7541f6a25d
7daf004355020301000130b040300f0603551d130101f10530030101fc1d0603551
d0e04160414084d321ca0135e77217a486b686b334b00e0603551d0f0101f104030
20106300d06092a62067341010505000320410023703b965746a0c2c978666d787a
94f89b495a11f0d369b28936ec2475c0f0855c8e83f823f2b871a1d92282f323c45
904ba008579216cf5223b8b1bc425a0677262047f7700240631c17f3035d1c3780b
2385241cba1f4a6e98e6be6820306b3a786de5a557795d1893822347b5f825d34a7
ad2876f8feba4d525b31066f6505796f71530003431a3e6bbfe788b4565029a7e20
a51107677552586152d051e8eebf383e92288983421d5c5652a4870c3af74b9bdbe
d6b462e2263d30f6d3020c330206bc20102020101300d06092a6206734101050500
301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d3
133303530393033353333325a170d3134303530393033353333325a301b31193017
060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774f302062300d06092a62067
3410101050003204f0030204a02204100ef6b677a3247c1fc03d2b9baf113e5e7e1
1f49e0421120e6b8384160f2bf02630ef544d5fd0d5623b35713c79a7229283a790
8751a634aa420a3e2a4b1f10519d046f02f5a5dd6d760c2a842356e067b7bd94338
d1faa3b3ddd4813060a207b0a097067007e45b052b60fdbae4656e11562c4f5abb7
b0cf87a79d221f1127313c53371ce1245d63db45a1203a23340ba08042c768d03b8
076a028d3a51d87d2ef107bbd6f2305ce5e67668724002fb726df9c14476c37de0f
55033f192a5ad21f9a2a71c20301000134b050300e0603551d0f0101f104030204c
1d0603551d0e04160414112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c301f0603551d2304183
0165084d321ca0135e77217a486b686b334b00d06092a6206734101050500032041
00b382ba3355a50e287bae15758b3beff63d34d3e357b90031495d018868e49589b
9faf46a4ad49b1d35b06ef380106677440934663c2cc111c183655f4dc41c0b3401
123d35387389db91f1e1b4131b16c291d35730b3f9b33c7475124851555fe5fc647
e8fd029605367c7e01281bf6617110021b0d10847dce0e9f0ca6c764b6334784055
172c3983d1e3a3a82301a54fcc9b0670c543a1c747164619101ff23b240b2a26394
c1f7d38d0e2f4747928ece5c34627a075a8b3122011e9d9158055c28f020c330206
bc20102020102300d06092a6206734101050500301b311930170603550403131065
73744578616d706c654341204e774e301e170d3133303530393033353333325a170
d3134303530393033353333325a301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d
706c654341204f774e302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a022
041003a923a2968bae4aae136ca4e2512c5200680358482ac39d6f640e4574e654e
a35f48b1e054c5da3372872f7a1e429f4edf3958432efb2106591d3eb783c103470
9f251fc86566bda2d541c792389eac4ec9e181f4b9f596e5ef2679cc321542b1133
7f90a44df3c85f1516561fa968a1914f265bc0b8276ebe3106a790d97d34c8c37c7
4fe1c30b396424664ac426284a9f6022e026938436880adfcd95c98ca1dfc2e6d75
319b85d0458de28a9d13fb16d620fff7541f6a25d7daf004355020301000134b050
300e0603551d0f0101f104030204c1d0603551d0e04160414084d321ca0135e7721
7a486b686b334b01f0603551d230418301653112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c30
0d06092a6206734101050500032041002e106933a443070acf5594a3a584d08af7e
06c295059370a06639eff9bd418d13bc25a298223164a6cf1856b11a81617282e4a
410d82ef086839c6e235690322763065455351e4c596acc7c016b225dec094706c2
a10608f403b10821984c7c152343b18a768c2ad30238dc45dd653ee6092b0d5cd4c
2f7d236043269357f76d13f95fb5f00d0e19263c6833948e1ba612ce8197af650e2
5d882c12f4b6b9b67252c608ef064aca3f9bc867d71172349d510bb7651cd438837
73d927deb41c4673020bb302063c201020209009b9dda3324700d06092a62067341
01050500301b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e3
01e170d3133303530393033353333325a170d3134303530393033353333325a301b
31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204e774e302062300d060
92a620673410101050003204f0030204a02204100ef6b677a3247c1fc03d2b9baf1
13e5e7e11f49e0421120e6b8384160f2bf02630ef544d5fd0d5623b35713c79a722
9283a7908751a634aa420a3e2a4b1f10519d046f02f5a5dd6d760c2a842356e067b
7bd94338d1faa3b3ddd4813060a207b0a097067007e45b052b60fdbae4656e11562
c4f5abb7b0cf87a79d221f1127313c53371ce1245d63db45a1203a23340ba08042c
768d03b8076a028d3a51d87d2ef107bbd6f2305ce5e67668724002fb726df9c1447
6c37de0f55033f192a5ad21f9a2a71c20301000130b040300f0603551d130101f10
530030101fc1d0603551d0e04160414112966e304761732fbfe6a2c823c300e0603
551d0f0101f10403020106300d06092a620673410105050003204100423f06d4b76
0f4b42744a279035571696f272a0060f1325a40898509601ad14004f652db6312a1
475c4d7cd50f4b269035585d7856c5337765a66b38462d5bdaa7778aab24bbe2815
e37722cd10e7166c50e75ab75a1271324460211991e7445a2960f47351a1a629253
34119794b90e320bc730d6c1bee496e7ac125ce9a1eca595a3a4c54a865e6b623c9
247bfd0a7c19b56077392555c955e233642bec643ae37c166c5e221d797aea3748f
0391c8d692a5cf9bb71f6d0e37984d6fa673a30d0c006343116f58403100
0391c8d692a5cf9bb71f6d0e37984d6fa673a30d0c006343116f58403100'

After reception of the 2.05 response, the client can forget the
observe.

A.2. csrattrs

In the following valid /csrattrs exchange, the EST-coaps client
authenticates itself with a certificate issued by the connected CA.

The initial DTLS handshake is identical to the enrollment example.
The IPv6 CoAP GET request looks like:

REQ:
GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/att
(Content-Format: TBD6)(observe =0)(Max-Age =1)
A 2.05 Content response contains attributes which are relevant for
the authenticated client. In this example, the EST-coaps server
returns two attributes that the client can ignore when they are
unknown to him.: him.

A.3. enroll / reenroll

[EDNOTE: We might need a new Option for the Retry-After response
message. We might need a new Option for the WWW-Authenticate
response.]

During the Enroll/Reenroll exchange, the EST-coaps client uses a CSR
(PKCS#10)
(Content-Format TBD7) request in the POST request payload.

After verification of the certificate CSR by the server, a 2.05 Content response
with the issued certificate will be returned. returned to the client. As
described in Section 4.4, if the server is not able to provide a
response, then it ACKs the GET (with no payload), and the payload
will be sent later as part of the OBSERVE processing.

[EDNOTE: When redoing this example, given that proof of possession
(POP) is also used, make sure it is obvious that the
ChallengePassword attribute in the CSR is valid HMAC output. HMAC-
REAL.]
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen
(token 0x45)
(Content-Format: application/pkcs10)
30208530206d020100301f311d301b0603550403131464656d6f7374657034203 TBD7)(observe 0)
h'30208530206d020100301f311d301b0603550403131464656d6f7374657034203
1333638313431333532302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a
022041005d9f4dffd3c5949f646a9584367778560950b355c35b8e34726dd3764
54231734795b4c09b9c6d75d408311307a81f7adef7f5d241f7d5be85620c5d44
38bbb4242cf215c167f2ccf36c364ea2618a62f0536576369d6304e6a96877224
7d86824f079faac7a6f694cfda5b84c42087dc062d462190c525813f210a036a7
37b4f30d8891f4b75559fb72752453146332d51c937557716ccec624f5125c3a4
447ad3115020048113fef54ad554ee88af09a2583aac9024075113db4990b1786
b871691e0f02030100018701f06092a620673410907311213102b72724369722f
372b45597535305434300d06092a620673410105050003204100441b40177a3a6
5501487735a8ad5d3827a4eaa867013920e2afcda87aa81733c7c0353be47e1bf
a7cda5176e7ccc6be22ae03498588d5f2de3b143f2b1a6175ec544e8e7625af6b
836fd4416894c2e55ea99c6606f69075d6d53475d410729aa6d806afbb9986caf
7b844b5b3e4545f19071865ada007060cad6db26a592d4a7bda7d586b68110962
17071103407553155cddc75481e272b5ed553a8593fb7e25100a6f7605085dab4
fc7e0731f0e7fe305703791362d5157e92e6b5c2e3edbcadb40
fc7e0731f0e7fe305703791362d5157e92e6b5c2e3edbcadb40'

RET:
2.05 Content
(Content-Format: application/pkcs7-mime)
3020f806092a62067341070283293020e50201013100300b06092a62067341070 TBD2)(token =0x45)(observe =12)
2.01 Created
h'3020f806092a62067341070283293020e50201013100300b06092a62067341070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[EDNOTE: If POP is used, make sure tls-unique
171e4733ad3d13c0103100'

After reception of the 2.01 response the client can forget the
observe registration
The same example when delays occur (omitting the payloads in the CSR
examples) has a different behavior. The response to the POST is an
empty payload with response code 2.01 (Created) that also returns the
resource to query. The client issues a valid
HMAC output. ] GET with an observe and a new
token value, and waits for the notification after possibly receiving
an empty payload first.

POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen
(token 0x45)(observe = 0)
(Content-Format: TBD7)(Max-Age=120)
[payload]
RET:
(token =0x45)(observe =12)(Location-Path=/est/1245)
2.01 Created
[empty payload]

GET [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/1245
(token 0x53)
(observe =0)(Max-Age=120)

RET:
(token =0x53)(observe = 5)
2.01 Created
[empty payload]

RET:
(token =0x53)(observe = 6)
(Content-Format: TBD2)
2.04 Changed
[payload]

A.4. serverkeygen

During this valid /serverkeygen exchange, the EST-coaps client
authenticates itself using the certificate provided by the connected
CA.

[EDNOTE: the client incudes a CSR with a public key that the server
should ignore, so we need a content-format here. ]

[EDNote: If POP is used, make sure tls-unique in the CSR is a valid
HMAC output. ]

The initial DTLS handshake is identical to the enrollment example.
The CoAP GET request looks like:

[EDNOTE: same comment as HMAC-REAL above applies.]

[EDNOTE: Suggestion to have only one example with complete encrypted
payload (the short one) and point out the different fields. Update
this example according to the agreed upon solution from Section 4.5.
]
POST coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/skg
302081302069020100305b313e303c060355040313357365727665724b6579476 coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/skg
(token 0xa5)(observe = 0)
(Content-Format: TBD7)(Max-Age=120)

h'302081302069020100305b313e303c060355040313357365727665724b6579476
56e2072657120627920636c69656e7420696e2064656d6f207374657020313220
3133363831343139353531193017060355040513105049443a576964676574205
34e3a3130302062300d06092a620673410101050003204f0030204a02204100f4
dfa6c03f7f2766b23776c333d2c0f9d1a7a6ee36d01499bbe6f075d1e38a57e98
ecc197f51b75228454b7f19652332de5e52e4a974c6ae34e1df80b33f15f47d3b
cbf76116bb0e4d3e04a9651218a476a13fc186c2a255e4065ff7c271cff104e47
31fad53c22b21a1e5138bf9ad0187314ac39445949a48805392390e78c7659621
6d3e61327a534f5ea7721d2b1343c7362b37da502717cfc2475653c7a3860c5f4
0612a5db6d33794d755264b6327e3a3263b149628585b85e57e42f6b3277591b0
2030100018701f06092a6206734109073112131064467341586d4a6e6a6f6b427
4447672300d06092a620673410105050003204100472d11007e5a2b2c2023d47a
6d71d046c307701d8ebc9e47272713378390b4ee321462a3dbe54579f5a514f6f
4050af497f428189b63655d03a194ef729f101743e5d03fbc6ae1e84486d1300a
f9288724381909188c851fa9a5059802eb64449f2a3c9e441353d136768da27ff
4f277651d676a6a7e51931b08f56135a2230891fd184960e1313e7a1a9139ed19
28196867079a456cd2266cb754a45151b7b1b939e381be333fea61580fe5d25bf
4823dbd2d6a98445b46305c10637e202856611
4823dbd2d6a98445b46305c10637e202856611'

RET:
2.05
2.01 Content (Content-Format: application/pkcs8)
30213e020100300d06092a6206734101010500042128302124020100022041003 TBD8)
(observe = 5)(token=0xa5)

[TBD5,
h'30213e020100300d06092a6206734101010500042128302124020100022041003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--estServerExampleBoundary
3020c506092a62067341070283363020f20201013100300b06092a62067341070
f917438f607f18181684376e13a39e07',
TBD2,
h'3020c506092a62067341070283363020f20201013100300b06092a62067341070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84aa7d65726310252f6a4f41281ec10ca2243864e3c5743103100']

Without the DecryptKeyIdentifier attribute, the response has no
additional encryption beyond DTLS. [EDNOTE: Add comment about
deriving symmetric keys by using the TLS KEM draft. ]

The response contains first a preamble that can be ignored. The EST-
coaps server can use the preamble to include additional explanations,
like ownership or support information

Appendix B. Encoding for server side key generation

Sever side key generation for CoAP can be implemented efficiently
using multipart encoding

[EDNOTE: text to be written.]

Appendix C. EST-coaps Block message examples

This section provides a detailed example of the messages using DTLS
and BLOCK option Block2. The minimum PMTU is 1280 bytes, which is
the example value assumed for the DTLS datagram size. The example
block length is taken as 64 which gives an SZX value of 2.

The following is an example of a valid /cacerts exchange over DTLS.
The content length of the cacerts response in appendix A.1 of

[RFC7030] is 4246 bytes using base64. This leads to a length of 2509
bytes in binary. The CoAP message adds around 10 bytes, the DTLS
record 29 bytes. To avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP block option is
used and an MTU of 127 is assumed to stay within one IEEE 802.15.4
packet. To stay below the MTU of 127, the payload is split in 39
packets with a payload of 64 bytes each, followed by a packet of 13
bytes. The client sends an IPv6 packet containing the UDP datagram
with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP Request 40 times.
The server returns an IPv6 packet containing the UDP datagram with
the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP response. The CoAP
request-response exchange with block option is shown below. Block
option is shown in a decomposed way indicating the kind of Block
option (2 in this case because used in the response) followed by a
colon, and then the block number (NUM), the more bit (M = 0 means
last block), and block size exponent (2**(SZX+4)) separated by
slashes. The Length 64 is used with SZX= 2 to avoid IP
fragmentation. The CoAP Request is sent with confirmable (CON)
option and the content format of the Response is /application/
cacerts.

GET [192.0.2.1:8085]/est/crts /192.0.2.1:8085/est/crts -->
<-- (2:0/1/39) 2.05 Content
GET URI (2:1/1/39) -->
<-- (2:1/1/39) 2.05 Content
|
|
|
GET URI (2:65/1/39) -->
<-- (2:65/0/39) 2.05 Content

For further detailing the CoAP headers of the first two blocks are
written out.

The header of the first GET looks like:

Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.1 GET)
Token = 0x9a (client generated)
Options
Option1 (Uri-Host) [optional]
Option Delta = 0x3 (option nr = 3)
Option Length = 0x9
Option Value = 192.0.2.1
Option2 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x3 (option nr = 3+3=6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0 (register)
Option3 (Uri-Port) [optional]
Option Delta = 0x4 (option nr = 3+4=7)
Option Length = 0x4
Option Value = 8085
Option3
Option4 (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option nr = 7+4=11)
Option Length = 0x9 0x5
Option Value = "est"
Option5 (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11+0=11)
Option Length = 0x6
Option Value = "crts"
Option6 (Max-Age)
Option Delta = 0x3 (option nr = 11+3=14)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = /est/crts 0x1 ( 1 minute)
Payload = [Empty]

The header of the first response looks like:

Ver = 1
T = 2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content.) Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied by server)
Options
Option1 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option nr=6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 12 (12 > 0)
Option2 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option 12) nr =6+6=12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = TBD1 TBD2
Option2 (Block2)
Option Delta = 0xB (option 23 = 12 + 11)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0x0A (block number = 0, M=1, SZX=2)
Payload =
30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
c0c3020bb302063c20102020900a61e75193b7acc0d06092a6206734101
h'30233906092a6206734107028c2a3023260201013100300b06092a6206734107018
c0c3020bb302063c20102020900a61e75193b7acc0d06092a6206734101'

The second Block2:

Ver = 1
T = 2 (means ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content.) Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied by server)
Options
Option1 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option nr=6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 16 (16 > 12)
Option2 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option 12) nr =6+6=12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = TBD1 TBD2
Option2 (Block2)
Option Delta = 0xB (option 23 = 12 + 11)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0x1A (block number = 1, M=1, SZX=2)
Payload =
05050030
h'05050030
1b31193017060355040313106573744578616d706c654341204f774f301e170d313
3303530393033353333315a170d3134303530393033353333315a
3303530393033353333315a170d3134303530393033353333315a'

The 40th and final Block2:

Ver = 1
T = 2 (means ACK)
Code = 0x21 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied by server)
Options
Option1 (Observe)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option nr=6)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 55 (55 > 12)
Option2 (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option 12) nr =6+6=12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = TBD1 TBD2
Option2 (Block2)
Option Delta = 0xB (option 23 = 12 + 11)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 0x272 (block number = 39, M=0, SZX=2)
Payload = 73a30d0c006343116f58403100 h'73a30d0c006343116f58403100'

Authors' Addresses

Peter van der Stok
Consultant

Email: consultancy@vanderstok.org

Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems

Email: pkampana@cisco.com

Sandeep S. Kumar
Philips Lighting Research
High Tech Campus 7
Eindhoven 5656 AE
NL

Email: ietf@sandeep.de

Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works

Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Martin Furuhed
Nexus Group

Email: martin.furuhed@nexusgroup.com

Shahid Raza
RISE SICS
Isafjordsgatan 22
Kista, Stockholm 16440
SE

Email: shahid@sics.se