wdiff draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-06.txt draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-07.txt

IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont
Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Standards Track April 12, May 19, 2013
Expires: October 14, November 20, 2013

A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-06
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-07

Abstract

This document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface
Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
(SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable
within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts
move from one network to another. The aforementioned This method is meant to be an
alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on IEEE
identifiers, such that the benefits of stable addresses can be
achieved without sacrificing the privacy of users.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 14, November 20, 2013.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Design goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Algorithm specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Resolving Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) conflicts . . . . 10 12
5. Specified Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. 15
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. 17
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. 18
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. 18
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 18
Appendix A. Possible sources for the Net_Iface parameter . . . . 21
A.1. Interface Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. Interface Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. Link-layer Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Privacy issues still present with RFC 4941 when temporary
addresses are employed . . . . . 16
A.1. . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.1. Host tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1.1. 23
B.1.1. Tracking hosts across networks #1 . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1.2. 23
B.1.2. Tracking hosts across networks #2 . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1.3. 24
B.1.3. Revealing the identity of devices performing
server-like functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. Address scanning 24
B.2. Address-scanning attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 24
B.3. Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 26

1. Introduction

[RFC4862] specifies the Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for
IPv6 [RFC2460], which typically results in hosts configuring one or
more "stable" addresses composed of a network prefix advertised by a
local router, and an Interface Identifier (IID) that typically embeds
a hardware address (e.g., using IEEE identifiers) [RFC4291].

Cryptograhically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [RFC3972] are yet
another method for generating Interface Identifiers, which bind a
public signature key to an IPv6 address in the SEcure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] protocol.

Generally, stable the traditional SLAAC addresses are thought to simplify
network management, since they simplify Access Control Lists (ACLs)
and logging. However, they have a number of drawbacks:

o since IEEE identifiers the resulting Interface Identifiers do not vary over time,
they allow correlation of node activities within the same network,
thus negatively affecting the privacy of users.

o since the resulting Interface Identifiers are typically globally
unique, constant across
networks, the resulting IPv6 addresses can be leveraged to track
and correlate the activity of a node over time and across multiple
subnets networks
(e.g. track and networks, correlate the activities of a typical client
connecting to the public Internet from different locations), thus
negatively affecting the privacy of users.

The "Privacy

o since embedding the underlying link-layer address in the Interface
Identifier results in specific address patterns, such patterns may
be leveraged by attackers to reduce the search space when
performing address scanning attacks.

o embedding the underlying link-layer address in the Interface
Identifier means that changing the interface hardware results in a
different Interface Identifier (and hence different IPv6 address).

The "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6" [RFC4941] (henceforth referred to as "temporary addresses")
were introduced to complicate the task of eavesdroppers and other
information collectors to correlate the activities of a node, and
basically result in temporary (and random) Interface Identifiers that Identifiers.
These temporary addresses are typically more difficult generated *in addition* to leverage
than those the
traditional IPv6 addresses based on IEEE identifiers. When privacy extensions are
enabled, "privacy identifiers, with the
"temporary addresses" are being employed for "outgoing communications", while
and the traditional IPv6 SLAAC addresses based on IEEE
identifiers are still used being employed for "server"
functions (i.e., receiving incoming connections).

As noted

However, even with "temporary addresses" in [RFC4941], "anytime place, a fixed identifier is used in
multiple contexts, it becomes possible number of issues
remain to correlate seemingly
unrelated activity using this identifier". Therefore, be mitigated. Namely,

o since
"privacy "temporary addresses" [RFC4941] do not eliminate the use of
fixed identifiers for server-like functions, they only *partially*
mitigate the host-tracking and activity correlation of host activities across networks
(see Appendix A B.1 for some example attacks that are still possible
with privacy temporary addresses). Therefore, it is vital that the privacy
characteristics of "stable" addresses are improved such that the
ability of an attacker correlating host activities across networks
is reduced.

Another important aspect not mitigated by "Privacy Addresses"

o since "temporary addresses" [RFC4941] is that of IPv6 address scanning. Since IPv6 addresses
that embed IEEE identifiers have specific patterns, do not replace the
traditional SLAAC addresses, an attacker
could can still leverage such
patterns in those addresses to greatly reduce the search space for "live" hosts. Since "privacy addresses" do not eliminate the
use of IPv6 addresses that embed IEEE identifiers, address
scanning attacks are still feasible even if "privacy extensions"
are employed
"alive" nodes [Gont-DEEPSEC2011] [CPNI-IPv6]. This [CPNI-IPv6]
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning].

Hence, there is yet another a motivation to improve the privacy characteristics properties of "stable"
addresses (currently embedding IEEE identifiers).

Privacy/temporary regardless of whether temporary addresses are employed or
not.

Additionally, it should be noted that temporary addresses can be
challenging in a number of areas. For example, from a network-management network-
management point of view, they tend to increase the complexity of
event logging, trouble-shooting, and
enforcing enforcement of access controls and
quality of service, etc. As a result, some organizations disable the
use of privacy temporary addresses even at the expense of reduced privacy
[Broersma]. Also, they Temporary addresses may also result in increased
implementation complexity, which might not be possible or desirable
in some implementations (e.g., some embedded devices).

In scenarios in which "Privacy Extensions" temporary addresses are deliberately not used
(possibly for any of the aforementioned reasons), all a host is left
with is the stable addresses that have been generated using e.g.
IEEE
identifiers, and this is yet another case in which identifiers. In such scenarios, it is also vital may still be desirable to
have addresses that mitigate address scanning attacks, and that at
the privacy characteristics very least do not reveal the node's identity when roaming from
one network to another -- without complicating the operation of these stable the
corresponding networks.

However, even with temporary addresses are
improved.

We note that [RFC4941] in most place,
preventing correlation of activities of a node within a network
may be difficult (if not all) at all possible) to achieve. As a trivial
example, consider a scenario where there is a single node (or a
reduced number of those scenarios nodes) connected to a specific network. An
attacker could detect new addresses in use at that network, an
infer which
"Privacy Extensions" addresses are disabled, there being employed by which hosts. This
task is usually no actual desire
to negatively affect user privacy, but rather a desire to simplify
operation of the network (simplify made particularly easier by the fact that use of ACLs, logging, etc.).
"temporary addresses" can be easily inferred (since the follow
different patterns from that of traditional SLAAC addresses), and
since they are re-generated periodically (i.e., after a specific
amount of time has elapsed).

This document specifies a method to generate interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
that are stable/constant for each network interface within each
subnet, but that change as hosts move from one network to another,
thus keeping the "stability" properties of the interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
specified in [RFC4291], while still mitigating address-scanning
attacks and preventing correlation of the activities of a node as it
moves from one network to another.

For nodes that currently disable "temporary addresses" [RFC4941] for
some of the reasons stated above, this mechanism provides stable
privacy-enhanced addresses which address some of the concerns related
to addresses that embed IEEE identifiers [RFC4291]. On the other
hand, in scenarios in which "temporary addresses" are employed
together with stable addresses such as those based on IEEE
identifiers, implementation of the mechanism described in this
document would mitigate address-scanning attacks and also mitigate
some vectors for correlating host activities that are not mitigated
by the use of temporary addresses.

We note that this method is incrementally deployable, since it does
not pose any interoperability implications when deployed on networks
where other nodes do not implement or employ it.

This Additionally, we
note that this document does not update or modify IPv6 StateLess
Address Auto-
Configuration Auto-Configuration (SLAAC) [RFC4862] itself, but rather only
specifies an alternative algorithm to generate Interface IDs. Identifiers.
Therefore, the usual address lifetime properties (as specified in the
corresponding Prefix Information Options) apply when IPv6 addresses
are generated as a result of employing the algorithm specified in
this document with SLAAC [RFC4862]. Additionally, from the point of
view of renumbering, we note that these addresses behave like the
traditional IPv6 addresses (that embed a hardware address) resulting
from SLAAC [RFC4862].

For nodes that currently disable "Privacy extensions" [RFC4941] for
some of the reasons stated above, this mechanism provides stable
privacy-enhanced addresses which may already address most of the
privacy concerns related to addresses that embed IEEE identifiers

[RFC4291]. On the other hand, in scenarios in which "Privacy
Extensions" are employed, implementation of the mechanism described
in this document would mitigate host-scanning attacks and also
mitigate correlation of host activities.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Design goals

This document specifies a method for selecting interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
to be used with IPv6 SLAAC, with the following goals:

o The resulting interface identifiers Interface Identifiers remain constant/stable for
each prefix used with SLAAC within each subnet. That is, the
algorithm generates the same interface identifier Interface Identifier when configuring
an address (for the same interface) belonging to the same prefix
within the same subnet.

o The resulting interface identifiers do not depend on the
underlying hardware (e.g. link-layer address). This means that
e.g. replacing a Network Interface Card (NIC) will not have the
(generally undesirable) effect of changing the IPv6 addresses used
for that network interface.

o The resulting interface identifiers Identifiers do change when addresses are
configured for different prefixes. That is, if different
autoconfiguration prefixes are used to configure addresses for the
same network interface card, the resulting interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
must be (statistically) different.

o It must be difficult for an outsider to predict the interface
identifiers Interface
Identifiers that will be generated by the algorithm, even with
knowledge of the interface identifiers Interface Identifiers generated for configuring
other addresses.

o Depending on the specific implementation approach (see Section 3
and Appendix A), the resulting Interface Identifiers may be
independent of the underlying hardware (e.g. link-layer address).
This means that e.g. replacing a Network Interface Card (NIC) will
not have the (generally undesirable) effect of changing the IPv6
addresses used for that network interface.

o The aforementioned interface identifiers Interface Identifiers are meant to be an
alternative to those based on e.g. IEEE identifiers, such as
those specified in [RFC2464].

We note that of use of the algorithm specified in this document is
(to a large extent) orthogonal to the use of "Privacy Extensions" "temporary addresses"
[RFC4941]. Hosts that do not implement/use "Privacy Extensions" "temporary addresses"
would have the benefit that they would not be subject to the host-
tracking and address scanning issues discussed in the previous
section. On the other hand, in the case of hosts employing "Privacy
Extensions",
"temporary addresses", the method specified in this document would prevent
address scanning
mitigate address-scanning attacks and correlation of node activities
across networks (see Appendix A). B and [IAB-PRIVACY]).

3. Algorithm specification

IPv6 implementations conforming to this specification MUST generate
interface identifiers
Interface Identifiers using the algorithm specified in this section
in replacement of any other algorithms used for generating "stable"
addresses (such as that specified in [RFC2464]). The aforementioned
algorithm MUST be employed for generating the interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
for all of the IPv6 addresses configured with SLAAC for a given
interface, including IPv6 link-local addresses.

This means that this document does not formally obsolete or
deprecate any of the existing algorithms to generate Interface IDs
Identifiers (e.g. such as that specified in [RFC2464]). However,
those IPv6 implementations that employ this specification must MUST
generate all of their "stable" addresses as specified in this
document.

Implementations conforming to this specification SHOULD provide the
means for a system administrator to enable or disable the use of this
algorithm for generating Interface Identifiers. Implementations
conforming to this specification MAY employ the algorithm specified
in [RFC4941] to generate temporary addresses in addition to the
addresses generated with the algorithm specified in this document.

Unless otherwise noted, all of the parameters included in the
expression below MUST be included when generating an Interface ID.
Identifier.

1. Compute a random (but stable) identifier with the expression:

RID = F(Prefix, Interface_Index, Net_Iface, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, secret_key)

Where:

RID:
Random (but stable) Interface Identifier

F():
A pseudorandom function (PRF) that is not computable from the
outside (without knowledge of the secret key). The key), which
shouldproduce an output of at least 64 bits.The PRF could be
implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of
each of the function parameters.

Prefix:
The prefix to be used for SLAAC, as learned from an ICMPv6
Router Advertisement message.

Interface_Index:
The interface index [RFC3493] [RFC3542] corresponding to this
network interface.

Network_ID:
Some network specific data that identifies

Net_Iface:
An implementation-dependent stable identifier associated with
the subnet to which
this network interface is attached. For example for which the RID is being generated.
An implementation MAY provide a configuration option to select
the source of the identifier to be used for the Net_Iface
parameter. A discussion of possible sources for this value
(along with the corresponding trade-offs) can be found in
Appendix A.

Network_ID:
Some network specific data that identifies the subnet to which
this interface is attached. For example the IEEE 802.11
Service Set Identifier (SSID) corresponding to the network to
which this interface is associated. This parameter is
OPTIONAL.

DAD_Counter:
A counter that is employed to resolve Duplicate Address
Detection (DAD) conflicts. It MUST be initialized to 0, and
incremented by 1 for each new tentative address that is
configured as a result of a DAD conflict. Implementations
that record DAD_Counter in non-volatile memory for each
{Prefix, Interface_Index, Net_Iface, Network_ID} tuple MUST initialize
DAD_Counter to the recorded value if such an entry exists in
non-volatile memory). See Section 4 for additional details.

secret_key:
A secret key that is not known by the attacker. The secret
key MUST be initialized at operating system installation time
to a pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness
requirements for security). An implementation MAY provide the
means for the user the system administrator to change or display
the secret key.

2. The Interface Identifier is finally obtained by taking the
leftmost 64 as many
bits of from the RID value computed (computed in the previous step. step) as
necessary, starting from the rightmost bit.

We note that [RFC4291] requires that, the Interface IDs of all
unicast addresses (except those that start with the binary
value 000) be 64-bit long. However, the method discussed in
this document could be employed for generating Interface IDs
of any arbitrary length, albeit at the expense of reduced
entropy (when employing Interface IDs smaller than 64 bits).

The resulting Interface Identifier should be compared against the
Subnet-Router Anycast [RFC4291] and the Reserved Subnet Anycast
Addresses [RFC2526], and against those interface identifiers Interface Identifiers
already employed in an address of the same network interface and
the same network prefix. In the event that an unacceptable
identifier has been generated, this situation should be handled
in the same way as the case of duplicate addresses (see
Section 4).

This document does not require the use of any specific PRF for the
function F() above, since the choice of such PRF is usually a trade-
off between a number of properties (processing requirements, ease of
implementation, possible intellectual property rights, etc.), and
since the best possible choice for F() might be different for
different types of devices (e.g. embedded systems vs. regular
servers) and might possibly change over time.

Note that the result of F() in the algorithm above is no more secure
than the secret key. If an attacker is aware of the PRF that is
being used by the victim (which we should expect), and the attacker
can obtain enough material (i.e. addresses configured by the victim),
the attacker may simply search the entire secret-key space to find
matches. To protect against this, the secret key should be of a
reasonable length. Key lengths of at least 128 bits should be
adequate. The secret key is initialized at system installation time
to a pseudo-random number, thus allowing this mechanism to be
enabled/used automatically, without user intervention.

Including the SLAAC prefix in the PRF computation causes the
Interface ID Identifier to vary across networks that employ different
prefixes, thus mitigating host-tracking attacks and any other attacks
that benefit from predictable Interface IDs Identifiers (such as address scanning).
scanning attacks).

The Interface Index Net_Iface is expected to remain a value that identifies the network interface for
which an IPv6 address is being generated. The following properties
are desirable for the Net_Iface:

o it MUST be constant across system
reboots bootstrap sequences and other events. However, we note that it might change upon
removal or installation of a
network events (e.g., bringing another interface (typically one with a
smaller value up or down)

o it MUST be different for each network interface

Since the Interface Index, when such a naming scheme is
used). When such change occurs, stability of the IPv6 addresses resulting from generated with this algorithm for the corresponding interface will change, thus
affecting method
relies on the stability property of this method. We note all arguments of F(), it is key that we
expect these scenarios to be unusual. Some implementations are known
to provide configuration knobs to set the Interface Index for a given
interface. Such configuration knobs could
Net_Iface be employed to prevent constant across system bootstrap sequences and other
network events. Additionally, the
Interface Index Net_Iface must uniquely identify
an interface within the node, such that two interfaces connecting to
the same network do not result in duplicate addresses. Different
types of operating systems might benefit from changing (e.g. as different stability
properties of the Net_Iface parameter. For example, a result client-
oriented operating system might want to employ Net_Iface identifiers
that are attached to the underlying network interface card (NIC),
such that a removable NIC always gets the same IPv6 address,
irrespective of the removal system communications port to which it is
attached. On the other hand, a server-oriented operating system
might prefer Net_Iface identifers that are attached to system slots/
ports, such that replacement of a network interface). interface card does not
result in an IPv6 address change. Appendix A discusses possible
sources for the Net_Iface, along with their pros and cons.

Including the optional Network_ID parameter when computing the RID
value above would cause the algorithm to produce a different
Interface Identifier when connecting to different networks, even when
configuring addresses belonging to the same prefix. This means that
a host would employ a different Interface ID Identifier as it moves from
one network to another even for IPv6 link-local addresses or Unique
Local Addresses (ULAs). In those scenarios where the Network_ID is
unknown to the attacker, including this parameter might help mitigate
attacks where a victim node connects to the same subnet as the
attacker, and the attacker tries to learn the Interface Identifier
used by the victim node for a remote network (see Section 7 for
further details).

The DAD_Counter parameter provides the means to intentionally cause
this algorithm produce a different IPv6 addresses (all other
parameters being the same). This could be necessary to resolve
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) conflicts, as discussed in detail
in Section 4.

4. Resolving Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) conflicts

Finally, we note that all of the bits in the resulting Interface IDs
are treated as a result "opaque" bits. For example, the universal/local bit
of performing Modified EUI-64 format identifiers is treated as any other bit of
such identifier. In theory, this might result in Duplicate Address
Detection (DAD)
[RFC4862] a host finds failures that the tentative address generated with the
algorithm specified in Section 3 would otherwise not be encountered.
However, this is not deemed as a duplicate address, it SHOULD
resolve real issue, because of the address conflict by trying a new tentative address as
follows:

o DAD_Counter is incremented by 1. following
considerations:

o A new Interface ID is generated The interface IDs of all addresses (except those of addresses that
that start with the algorithm binary value 000) are 64-bit long. Since the
method specified in
Section 3, this document results in random Interface IDs,
the probability of DAD failures is very small.

o Real world data indicates that MAC address reuse is far more
common than assumed [HDMoore]. This means that even IPv6
addresses that employ (allegedly) unique identifiers (such as IEEE
identifiers) might result in DAD failures, and hence
implementations should be prepared to gracefully handle such
occurrences.

Finally, we note that some popular and widely-deployed operating
systems (such as Microsoft Windows) do not employ unique identifiers
for the Interface IDs of their stable addresses. Therefore, such
implementations would not be affected by the method specified in this
document.

4. Resolving Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) conflicts

If as a result of performing Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
[RFC4862] a host finds that the tentative address generated with the
algorithm specified in Section 3 is a duplicate address, it SHOULD
resolve the address conflict by trying a new tentative address as
follows:

o DAD_Counter is incremented by 1.

o A new Interface Identifier is generated with the algorithm
specified in Section 3, using the incremented DAD_Counter value.

This procedure may be repeated a number of times until the address
conflict is resolved. We RECOMMEND hosts to Hosts SHOULD try at least IDGEN_RETRIES (hereby specified as "3") (see
Section 5) tentative addresses if DAD fails for successive generated
addresses, in the hopes of resolving the address conflict. We also
note that hosts MUST limit the number of tentative addresses that are
tried (rather than indefinitely try a new tentative address until the
conflict is resolved).

In those (unlikely) scenarios in which duplicate addresses are
detected and in which the order in which the conflicting nodes
configure their addresses may vary (e.g., because they may be
bootstrapped in different order), the algorithm specified in this
section for resolving DAD conflicts could lead to addresses that are
not stable within the same subnet. In order to mitigate this
potential problem, nodes MAY record the DAD_Counter value employed
for a specific {Prefix, Interface_Index, Net_Iface, Network_ID} tuple in non-
volatile non-volatile
memory, such that the same DAD_Counter value is employed when
configuring an address for the same Prefix and subnet at any other
point in time.

In the event that a DAD conflict cannot be solved (possibly after
trying a number of different addresses), address configuration would
fail. In those scenarios, nodes MUST NOT automatically fall back to
employing other algorithms for generating interface identifiers. Interface Identifiers.

5. Specified Constants

This document specifies the following constant:

IDGEN_RETRIES:
defaults to 3.

6. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor
can remove this section before publication of this document as an
RFC.

7. Security Considerations

This document specifies an algorithm for generating interface
identifiers Interface
Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
(SLAAC), as an alternative to e.g. interface identifiers Interface Identifiers that embed
IEEE identifiers (such as those specified in [RFC2464]). When
compared to such identifiers, the identifiers specified in this
document have a number of advantages:

o They prevent trivial host-tracking, since when a host moves from
one network to another the network prefix used for
autoconfiguration and/or the Network ID (e.g., IEEE 802.11 SSID)
will typically change, and hence the resulting interface
identifier Interface
Identifier will also change (see Appendix A. B.1).

o They mitigate address-scanning techniques which leverage
predictable interface identifiers Interface Identifiers (e.g., known Organizational Organizationally
Unique Identifiers) [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning].

o They may result in IPv6 addresses that are independent of the
underlying hardware (i.e. the resulting IPv6 addresses do not
change if a network interface card is replaced).

We note that this algorithm is meant to be replaced) if an alternative to
interface identifiers such as those specified in [RFC2464], but appropriate
source for Net_Iface (Section 3) is
not meant as an alternative to temporary Interface IDs (such as those
specified employed.

In scenarios in [RFC4941]). Clearly, temporary addresses may help which an attacker can connect to
mitigate the correlation of activities of a node within the same
network, and may also reduce subnet as a
victim node, the attacker might be able to learn the Interface
Identifier employed by the victim node for an arbitrary prefix, by
simply sending a forged Router Advertisement [RFC4861] for that
prefix, and subsequently learning the corresponding address
configured by the victim node (either listening to the Duplicate
Address Detection packets, or to any other traffic that employs the
newly configued address). We note that a number of factors might
limit the ability of an attaker from successfully performing such
attack:

o First-Hop security mechanisms such as RA-Guard [RFC6105]
[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation] could prevent the forged
Router Advertisement from reaching the victim node

o If the victim implementation includes the (optional) Network_ID
parameter for computing F() (see Section 3), and the Network_ID
employed by the victim for a remote network is unknown to the
attacker, the Interface Identifier learned by the attacker would
differ from the one used by the victim when connecting to the
legitimate network.

In any case, we note that at the point in which this kind of attack
becomes a concern, a host should consider employing Secure Neighbor
Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] to prevent an attacker from illegitimately
claiming authority for a network prefix.

We note that this algorithm is meant to be an alternative to
Interface Identifiers such as those specified in [RFC2464], but is
not meant as an alternative to temporary Interface Identifiers (such
as those specified in [RFC4941]). Clearly, temporary addresses may
help to mitigate the correlation of activities of a node within the
same network, and may also reduce the attack exposure window (since
privacy/temporary
temporary addresses are short-lived when compared to the addresses
generated with the method specified in this document). We note that
implementation of this algorithm would still benefit those hosts
employing "Privacy Addresses", "temporary addresses", since it would mitigate host-
tracking vectors still present when privacy such addresses are used (see
Appendix A), B.1), and would also mitigate host-scanning address-scanning techniques
that leverage patterns in IPv6 addresses that embed IEEE identifiers.

Finally, we note that the method described in this document may
mitigate most addresses
some of the privacy concerns arising from the use of IPv6 addresses
that embed IEEE identifiers, without the use of temporary addresses,
thus possibly offering an interesting trade-off for those scenarios
in which the use of temporary addresses is not feasible.

8. Acknowledgements

The algorithm specified in this document has been inspired by Steven
Bellovin's work ([RFC1948]) in the area of TCP sequence numbers.

The author would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Ran Atkinson,
Karl Auer, Steven Bellovin, Matthias Bethke, Ben Campbell, Brian
Carpenter, Tassos Chatzithomaoglou, Alissa Cooper, Dominik Elsbroek,
Brian Haberman, Bob Hinden, Christian Huitema, Ray Hunter, Jouni
Korhonen, Eliot Lear, Jong-Hyouk Lee, Andrew McGregor, Tom Petch,
Michael Richardson, Mark Smith, and Ole Troan, and He Xuan, for providing
valuable comments on earlier versions of this document.

This document is based on the technical report "Security Assessment
of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)" [CPNI-IPv6] authored by
Fernando Gont on behalf of the UK Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure (CPNI).

Fernando Gont would like to thank CPNI (http://www.cpni.gov.uk) for
their continued support.

9. References

8.1.

9.1. Normative References

[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2526] Johnson, D. and S. Deering, "Reserved IPv6 Subnet Anycast
Addresses", RFC 2526, March 1999.

[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.

[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.

[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.

8.2. Informative References

[RFC1948] Bellovin, S., "Defending

[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
February 2011.

9.2. Informative References

[RFC1948] Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks",
RFC 1948, May 1996.

[RFC2464] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet
Networks", RFC 2464, December 1998.

[RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6",
RFC 3493, February 2003.

[RFC3542] Stevens, W., Thomas, M., Nordmark, E., and T. Jinmei,
"Advanced Sockets Application Program Interface (API) for
IPv6", RFC 3542, May 2003.

[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning]
Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
Networks", draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-00 draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-01 (work in
progress), December April 2013.

[I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation]
Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)",
draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation-07 (work in
progress), November 2012.

[HDMoore] HD Moore, "The Wild West", Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A.
September 25-29, 2012., September 2012,
<https://speakerdeck.com/hdm/derbycon-2012-the-wild-west>.

[Gont-DEEPSEC2011]
Gont, "Results of a Security Assessment of the Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", DEEPSEC 2011 Conference,
Vienna, Austria, November 2011, <http://
www.si6networks.com/presentations/deepsec2011/
fgont-deepsec2011-ipv6-security.pdf>.

[Gont-BRUCON2012]
Gont, "Recent Advances in IPv6 Security", BRUCON 2012
Conference, Ghent, Belgium, September 2012, <http://
www.si6networks.com/presentations/brucon2012/
fgont-brucon2012-recent-advances-in-ipv6-security.pdf>.

[Broersma]
Broersma, R., "IPv6 Everywhere: Living with a Fully IPv6-
enabled environment", Australian IPv6 Summit 2010,
Melbourne, VIC Australia, October 2010,
<http://www.ipv6.org.au/summit/talks/Ron_Broersma.pdf>. <http://
www.ipv6.org.au/10ipv6summit/talks/Ron_Broersma.pdf>.

[IAB-PRIVACY]
IAB, "Privacy and IPv6 Addresses", July 2011, <http://
www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/07/
IPv6-addresses-privacy-review.txt>.

[CPNI-IPv6]
Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6)", UK Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure, (available on request).

Appendix A. Possible sources for the Net_Iface parameter

The following subsections describe a number of possible sources for
the Net_Iface parameter employed by the F() function in Section 3.
The choice of a specific source for this value represents a number of
trade-offs, which may vary from one implementation to another.

A.1. Interface Index

The Interface Index [RFC3493] [RFC3542] of an interface uniquely
identifies an interface within a node. However, these identifiers
might or might not have the stability properties required for the
Net_Iface value employed by this method. For example, the Interface
Index might change upon removal or installation of a network
interface (typically one with a smaller value for the Interface
Index, when such a naming scheme is used), or when network interface
happen to be initialized in a different order. We note that some
implementations are known to provide configuration knobs to set the
Interface Index for a given interface. Such configuration knobs
could be employed to prevent the Interface Index from changing (e.g.
as a result of the removal of a network interface).

A.2. Interface Name

The Interface Name (e.g., "eth0", "em0", etc) tends to be more stable
than the underlying Interface Index, since such stability is
required/desired when interface names are employed in network
configuration (firewall rules, etc.). The stability properties of
Interface Names depend on implementation details, such as what is the
namespace used for Interface Names. For example, "generic" interface
names such as "eth0" or "wlan0" will generally be invariant with
respect to network interface card replacements. On the other hand,
vendor-dependent interface names such as "rtk0" or the like will
generally change when a network interface card is replaced with one
from a different vendor.

We note that Interface Names might still change when network
interfaces are added or removed once the system has been bootstrapped
(for example, consider Universal Serial Bus-based network interface
cards which might be added or removed once the system has been
bootstrapped).

A.3. Link-layer Addresses

Link-layer addresses typically provide for unique identfiers for
network interfaces; although, for obvious reasons, they generally
change when a network interface card is replaced. In scenarios where
neither Interface Indexes nor Interface Names have the stability
properties specified in Section 3 for Net_Iface, an implementation
might want to employ the link-layer address of the interface for the
Net_Iface parameter, albeit at the expense of making the
corresponding IPv6 addresses dependent on the underlying network
interface card (i.e., the corresponding IPv6 address would typically
change upon replacement of the underlying network interface card).

Appendix B. Privacy issues still present with RFC 4941

This section aims when temporary addresses are
employed

It is not unusual for people to clarify assume or expect that all the motivation
security/privacy implications of using the method
specified traditional SLAAC addresses to me
mitigated when "temporary addresses" [RFC4941] are employed.
However, as noted in Section 1 of this document even when privacy/temporary and [IAB-PRIVACY],
since temporary addresses
[RFC4941] are employed. It employed in addition to (rather than in
replacement of) traditional SLAAC addresses, many of the security/
privacy implications of traditional SLAAC addresses are not mitigated
by the use of temporary addresses.

This section discusses a (non-exaustive) (non-exhaustive) number of scenarios in
which host privacy security/privacy is still sacrificed even when
privacy/temporary addresses [RFC4941] are employed, negatively affected as a result
of employing interface identifiers Interface Identifiers that are constant across networks
(e.g., those resulting from embedding IEEE identifiers).

A.1. identifiers), even when
temporary addresses [RFC4941] are employed. It aims to clarify the
motivation of employing the method specified in this document in
replacement of the traditional SLAAC addresses even when privacy/
temporary addresses [RFC4941] are employed.

B.1. Host tracking

This section describes one possible attack scenario that illustrates
that host-tracking may still be possible when privacy/temporary
addresses [RFC4941] are employed.

A.1.1.

B.1.1. Tracking hosts across networks #1

A host configures its stable addresses with the constant
Interface-ID, Interface
Identifier, and runs any application that needs to perform a
server-like server-
like function (e.g. a peer-to-peer application). As a result of
that, an attacker/user participating in the same application (e.g.,
P2P) would learn the constant Interface-ID Interface Identifier used by the host
for that network interface.

Some time later, the same host moves to a completely different
network, and employs the same P2P application, probably even with a
different username. The attacker now interacts with the same host
again, and hence can learn its newly-configured stable address.
Since the interface ID Interface Identifier is the same as the one used before,
the attacker can infer that it is communicating with the same device
as before.

This is just *one* possible attack scenario, which should remind us
that one should not disclose more than it is really needed for
achieving a specific goal (and an Interface-ID Interface Identifier that is
constant across different networks does exactly that: it discloses
more information than is needed for providing a stable address).

A.1.2.

B.1.2. Tracking hosts across networks #2

Once an attacker learns the constant Interface-ID Interface Identifier employed by
the victim host for its stable address, the attacker is able to
"probe" a network for the presence of such host at any given network.

See Appendix A.1.1 B.1.1 for just one example of how an attacker could
learn such value. Other examples include being able to share the
same network segment at some point in time (e.g. a conference
network or any public network), etc.

For example, if an attacker learns that in one network the victim
used the Interface-ID Interface Identifier 1111:2222:3333:4444 for its stable
addresses, then he could subsequently probe for the presence of such
device in the network 2011:db8::/64 by sending a probe packet (ICMPv6
Echo Request, or any other probe packet) to the address 2001:db8::1111:
2222:3333:4444.

A.1.3. 2001:db8::
1111:2222:3333:4444.

B.1.3. Revealing the identity of devices performing server-like
functions

Some devices, such as storage devices or printers, devices, may typically perform server-like server-
like functions and may be usually moved from one network to another.
Such devices are likely to simply disable (or not even implement)
privacy/temporary addresses [RFC4941]. If the aforementioned devices
employ Interface-IDs Interface Identifiers that are constant across networks, it
would be trivial for an attacker to tell whether the same device is
being used across networks by simply looking at the Interface ID.
Identifier. Clearly, performing server-like functions should not
imply that a device discloses its identity (i.e., that the attacker
can tell whether it is the same device providing some function in two
different networks, at two different points in time).

The scheme proposed in this document prevents such information
leakage by causing nodes to generate different Interface-IDs Interface Identifiers
when moving to from one network to another, thus mitigating this kind of
privacy attack.

A.2. Address scanning

B.2. Address-scanning attacks

While it is usually assumed that IPv6 address-scanning attacks are
unfeasible, an attacker could can leverage address patterns in IPv6
addresses to greatly reduce the search space
[I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning] [Gont-BRUCON2012]. Addresses
that embed IEEE identifiers result in one of such patterns that could
be leveraged to reduce the search space when other nodes employ the
same IEEE OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier).

As noted earlier in this document, privacy/temporary temporary addresses [RFC4941] do
not
eliminate replace/eliminate the use of IPv6 addresses that embed IEEE identifiers,
identifiers (they are employed *in addition* to those), and hence such
hosts implementing [RFC4941] would still be vulnerable to address-scanning address-
scanning attacks. The method specified in this document is meant as
an alternative to addresses that embed IEEE identifiers, and hence
eliminates such patterns and would thus mitigate (thus mitigating the aforementioned address-scanning
attacks. address-
scanning attacks).

B.3. Information Leakage

IPv6 addresses embedding IEEE identifiers leak information about the
device (Network Interface Card vendor, or even Operating System
and/or software type), which could be leveraged by an attacker with
device/software-specific vulnerabilities knowledge to quickly find
possible targets. Since temporary addresses do not replace the
traditional SLAAC addresses that typically embedd IEEE identifiers,
employing temporary addresses does not eliminate this possible
information leakage.

Author's Address

Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Evaristo Carriego 2644
Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706
Argentina

Phone: +54 11 4650 8472
Email: fgont@si6networks.com
URI: http://www.si6networks.com