--- 1/draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-04.txt 2013-03-23 01:57:29.344076298 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-05.txt 2013-03-23 01:57:29.372088406 +0100 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH -Intended status: Standards Track March 21, 2013 -Expires: September 22, 2013 +Intended status: Standards Track March 22, 2013 +Expires: September 23, 2013 A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) - draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-04 + draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-05 Abstract This document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts move from one network to another. The aforementioned method is meant to be an alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on IEEE identifiers, such that the benefits of stable addresses can be @@ -27,21 +27,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2013. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -241,21 +241,21 @@ expression below MUST be included when generating an Interface ID. 1. Compute a random (but stable) identifier with the expression: RID = F(Prefix, Interface_Index, Network_ID, DAD_Counter, secret_key) Where: RID: - Random (but stable) identifier + Random (but stable) Interface Identifier F(): A pseudorandom function (PRF) that is not computable from the outside (without knowledge of the secret key). The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of each of the function parameters. Prefix: The prefix to be used for SLAAC, as learned from an ICMPv6 Router Advertisement message. @@ -284,26 +284,27 @@ secret_key: A secret key that is not known by the attacker. The secret key MUST be initialized at system installation time to a pseudo-random number (see [RFC4086] for randomness requirements for security). An implementation MAY provide the means for the user to change the secret key. 2. The Interface Identifier is finally obtained by taking the leftmost 64 bits of the RID value computed in the previous step. The resulting Interface Identifier should be compared against the - list of reserved interface identifiers [IANA-RESERVED-IID], and - against those interface identifiers already employed in an - address of the same network interface and the same network - prefix. In the event that an unacceptable identifier has been - generated, this situation should be handled in the same way as - the case of duplicate addresses (see Section 4). + Subnet-Router Anycast [RFC4291] and the Reserved Subnet Anycast + Addresses [RFC2526], and against those interface identifiers + already employed in an address of the same network interface and + the same network prefix. In the event that an unacceptable + identifier has been generated, this situation should be handled + in the same way as the case of duplicate addresses (see + Section 4). This document does not require the use of any specific PRF for the function F() above, since the choice of such PRF is usually a trade- off between a number of properties (processing requirements, ease of implementation, possible intellectual property rights, etc.), and since the best possible choice for F() might be different for different types of devices (e.g. embedded systems vs. regular servers) and might possibly change over time. Note that the result of F() in the algorithm above is no more secure @@ -439,20 +440,23 @@ 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + [RFC2526] Johnson, D. and S. Deering, "Reserved IPv6 Subnet Anycast + Addresses", RFC 2526, March 1999. + [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007. [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy @@ -473,24 +477,20 @@ [RFC3542] Stevens, W., Thomas, M., Nordmark, E., and T. Jinmei, "Advanced Sockets Application Program Interface (API) for IPv6", RFC 3542, May 2003. [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning] Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6 Networks", draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-00 (work in progress), December 2012. - [IANA-RESERVED-IID] - Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers, "http://www.iana.org/ - assignments/ipv6-interface-ids/ipv6-interface-ids.xml". - [Gont-DEEPSEC2011] Gont, "Results of a Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", DEEPSEC 2011 Conference, Vienna, Austria, November 2011, . [Gont-BRUCON2012] Gont, "Recent Advances in IPv6 Security", BRUCON 2012 Conference, Ghent, Belgium, September 2012,