--- 1/draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain-08.txt 2013-11-26 06:14:25.932924202 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain-09.txt 2013-11-26 06:14:25.952924705 -0800 @@ -1,81 +1,81 @@ IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Updates: 2460 (if approved) V. Manral Intended status: Standards Track Hewlett-Packard Corp. -Expires: April 5, 2014 R. Bonica +Expires: May 30, 2014 R. Bonica Juniper Networks - October 2, 2013 + November 26, 2013 Implications of Oversized IPv6 Header Chains - draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain-08 + draft-ietf-6man-oversized-header-chain-09 Abstract The IPv6 specification allows IPv6 header chains of an arbitrary size. The specification also allows options which can in turn extend each of the headers. In those scenarios in which the IPv6 header chain or options are unusually long and packets are fragmented, or scenarios in which the fragment size is very small, the first fragment of a packet may fail to include the entire IPv6 header chain. This document discusses the interoperability and security problems of such traffic, and updates RFC 2460 such that the first fragment of a packet is required to contain the entire IPv6 header chain. -Status of this Memo +Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2014. + This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2014. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents - 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 5. Updates to RFC 2460 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 + 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 4. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 5. Updates to RFC 2460 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. Introduction With IPv6, optional internet-layer information is carried in one or more IPv6 Extension Headers [RFC2460]. Extension headers are placed between the IPv6 header and the upper-layer header in a packet. The term "header chain" refers collectively to the IPv6 header, extension headers and upper-layer header occurring in a packet. In those scenarios in which the IPv6 header chain is unusually long and packets are fragmented, or scenarios in which the fragment size is @@ -85,22 +85,22 @@ present in a single IPv4 packet, IPv6 does not have any equivalent maximum limit at present. This document updates the set of IPv6 specifications to create an overall limit on the size of the combination of IPv6 options and IPv6 Extension Headers that is allowed in a single IPv6 packet. Namely, it updates RFC 2460 such that the first fragment of a fragmented datagram is required to contain the entire IPv6 header chain. It should be noted that this requirement does not preclude the use of large payloads but instead merely requires that all headers, starting - from IPv6 base header and continuing up to the upper layer header - (e.g. TCP or the like) be present in the first fragment. + from the IPv6 base header and continuing up to the upper layer header + (e.g., TCP or the like) be present in the first fragment. 2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 3. Terminology For the purposes of this document, the terms Extension Header, Header @@ -172,72 +172,73 @@ However, when the firewall is presented with a fragmented packet and the header chain spans multiple fragments, the first fragment does not contain enough information for the firewall to enforce its forwarding policy. Lacking sufficient information, the stateless firewall either forwards or discards that fragment. Regardless of the action that it takes, it may fail to enforce its forwarding policy. 5. Updates to RFC 2460 - When a host fragments a IPv6 datagram, it MUST include the entire + When a host fragments an IPv6 datagram, it MUST include the entire header chain in the first fragment. A host that receives a first-fragment that does not satisfy the - above- stated requirement SHOULD discard the packet (e.g., including - a configuration option that allows such fragments to be accepted for - backwards compatibility) and SHOULD send an ICMPv6 error message to - the source address of the offending packet (subject to the rules for - ICMPv6 errors specified in [RFC4443]). + above- stated requirement SHOULD discard the packet and SHOULD send + an ICMPv6 error message to the source address of the offending packet + (subject to the rules for ICMPv6 errors specified in [RFC4443]). - Likewise, an intermediate system (e.g. router, firewall) that + However, for backwards compatibility, implementations MAY include a + configuration option that allows such fragments to be accepted. + + Likewise, an intermediate system (e.g., router or firewall) that receives an IPv6 first-fragment that does not satisfy the above- - stated requirements MAY discard that packet, and MAY send an ICMPv6 + stated requirement MAY discard that packet, and MAY send an ICMPv6 error message to the source address of the offending packet (subject to the rules for ICMPv6 error messages specified in [RFC4443]). Intermediate systems having this capability SHOULD support - configuration (e.g. enable/disable) of whether such packets are + configuration (e.g., enable/disable) of whether such packets are dropped or not by the intermediate system. If a host or intermediate system discards a first-fragment because it - does not satisfy the above-stated requirements, and sends an ICMPv6 + does not satisfy the above-stated requirement, and sends an ICMPv6 error message due to the discard, then the ICMPv6 error message MUST be Type 4 ("Parameter Problem") and MUST use Code TBD ("First- fragment has incomplete IPv6 Header Chain"). The Pointer field contained by the ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message MUST be set to - zero. Whether a host or intermediate system originates this ICMP - message, its format is identical. + zero. The format for the ICMPv6 error message is the same regardless + of whether a host or intermediate system originates it. - As a result of the above mentioned requirements, a packet's header + As a result of the above mentioned requirement, a packet's header chain length cannot exceed the Path MTU associated with its - destination. Hosts MAY discover the Path MTU, using procedures such - as those defined in [RFC1981] and [RFC4821]. However, if a host does - not discover the Path MTU, it MUST limit the header chain length to - 1280 bytes. Limiting the header chain length to 1280 bytes ensures - that the header chain length does not exceed the IPv6 minimum MTU - [RFC2460]. + destination. Hosts discover the Path MTU using procedures such as + those defined in [RFC1981] and [RFC4821]. Hosts that do not discover + the Path MTU MUST limit the header chain length to 1280 bytes. + Limiting the header chain length to 1280 bytes ensures that the + header chain length does not exceed the IPv6 minimum MTU [RFC2460]. 6. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to add a the following entry to the "Reason Code" registry for ICMPv6 "Type 4 - Parameter Problem" messages: CODE NAME/DESCRIPTION TBD IPv6 first-fragment has incomplete IPv6 header chain 7. Security Considerations - This document describes how improperly-fragmented packets can prevent - traditional stateless packet filtering. - - This document updates RFC 2460 such that those packets are forbidden, - thus enabling stateless packet filtering for IPv6. + No new security exposures or issues are raised by this document. + This document describes how undesirably-fragmented packets can be + leveraged to evade stateless packet filtering. Having made that + observation, this document updates RFC 2460 [RFC2460] so that so + undesirably-fragmented packets are forbidden. Therefore, a security + vulnerability is removed. This specification allows nodes that drop the aforementioned packets to signal such packet drops with ICMPv6 "Parameter Problem, IPv6 first-fragment has incomplete IPv6 header chain" (Type 4, Code TBD) error messages. As with all ICMPv6 error/diagnostic messages, deploying Source Address Forgery Prevention filters helps reduce the chances of an attacker successfully performing a reflection attack by sending forged illegal packets with the victim/target's IPv6 address as the @@ -248,24 +249,24 @@ correctly process fragmented packets, even if the IPv6 header chain is not fragmented. 8. Acknowledgements The authors of this document would like to thank Ran Atkinson for contributing text and ideas that were incorporated into this document. The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Ran Atkinson, - Fred Baker, Brian Carpenter, Dominik Elsbroek, Wes George, Mike - Heard, Bill Jouris, Suresh Krishnan, Dave Thaler, Ole Troan, and Eric - Vyncke, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of this - document. + Fred Baker, Stewart Bryant, Brian Carpenter, Benoit Claise, Dominik + Elsbroek, Wes George, Mike Heard, Bill Jouris, Suresh Krishnan, Dave + Thaler, Ole Troan, Eric Vyncke, and Peter Yee, for providing valuable + comments on earlier versions of this document. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. @@ -275,37 +276,36 @@ [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006. [RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery", RFC 4821, March 2007. [I-D.ietf-6man-ext-transmit] Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing - of IPv6 Extension Headers", - draft-ietf-6man-ext-transmit-04 (work in progress), - September 2013. + of IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-ietf-6man-ext- + transmit-05 (work in progress), October 2013. 9.2. Informative References [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000. [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004. [IANA-PROTO] Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Protocol Numbers", - February 2013, . + February 2013, . Authors' Addresses Fernando Gont SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Evaristo Carriego 2644 Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706 Argentina Phone: +54 11 4650 8472 @@ -313,20 +313,18 @@ URI: http://www.si6networks.com Vishwas Manral Hewlett-Packard Corp. 191111 Pruneridge Ave. Cupertino, CA 95014 US Phone: 408-447-1497 Email: vishwas.manral@hp.com - URI: - Ronald P. Bonica Juniper Networks 2251 Corporate Park Drive Herndon, VA 20171 US Phone: 571 250 5819 Email: rbonica@juniper.net