draft-ietf-6man-node-req-bis-05.txt   draft-ietf-6man-node-req-bis-06.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force E. Jankiewicz Internet Engineering Task Force E. Jankiewicz
Internet-Draft SRI International Internet-Draft SRI International
Intended status: Informational J. Loughney Intended status: Informational J. Loughney
Expires: January 13, 2011 Nokia Expires: April 29, 2011 Nokia
T. Narten T. Narten
IBM Corporation IBM Corporation
July 12, 2010 October 26, 2010
IPv6 Node Requirements RFC 4294-bis IPv6 Node Requirements RFC 4294-bis
draft-ietf-6man-node-req-bis-05.txt draft-ietf-6man-node-req-bis-06.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document defines requirements for IPv6 nodes. It is expected This document defines requirements for IPv6 nodes. It is expected
that IPv6 will be deployed in a wide range of devices and situations. that IPv6 will be deployed in a wide range of devices and situations.
Specifying the requirements for IPv6 nodes allows IPv6 to function Specifying the requirements for IPv6 nodes allows IPv6 to function
well and interoperate in a large number of situations and well and interoperate in a large number of situations and
deployments. deployments.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Scope of This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Scope of This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Description of IPv6 Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Description of IPv6 Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Abbreviations Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Abbreviations Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Sub-IP Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Sub-IP Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IP Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. IP Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Internet Protocol Version 6 - RFC 2460 . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Internet Protocol Version 6 - RFC 2460 . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) - RFC 3971 . . . . . . . 8 5.3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) - RFC 3971 . . . . . . . 8
5.4. IPv6 Router Advertisement Flags Option - RFC 5175 . . . . 8 5.4. IPv6 Router Advertisement Flags Option - RFC 5175 . . . . 9
5.5. Path MTU Discovery and Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Path MTU Discovery and Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.5.1. Path MTU Discovery - RFC 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5.1. Path MTU Discovery - RFC 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.6. IPv6 Jumbograms - RFC 2675 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.6. IPv6 Jumbograms - RFC 2675 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.7. ICMP for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) - RFC 5.7. ICMP for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) - RFC
4443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4443 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.8. Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.8. Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.8.1. IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture - RFC 4291 . . . 9 5.8.1. IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture - RFC 4291 . . . 9
5.8.2. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - RFC 4862 . 9 5.8.2. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - RFC 4862 . 9
5.8.3. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in 5.8.3. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in
IPv6 - RFC 4941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 IPv6 - RFC 4941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.8.4. Default Address Selection for IPv6 - RFC 3484 . . . . 10 5.8.4. Default Address Selection for IPv6 - RFC 3484 . . . . 10
5.8.5. Stateful Address Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.8.5. Stateful Address Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.9. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC 2710 . . 10 5.9. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC 2710 . . 11
6. DHCP vs. Router Advertisement Options for Host 6. DHCP vs. Router Advertisement Options for Host
Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. DNS and DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. DNS and DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1. DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) 7.2. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)
- RFC 3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - RFC 3315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.1. Managed Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.2.1. Other Configuration Information . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.2. Other Configuration Information . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.2.2. Use of Router Advertisements in Managed
7.2.3. Use of Router Advertisements in Managed
Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS 7.3. IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS
Configuration - RFC XXXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Configuration - RFC XXXX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IPv4 Support and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. IPv4 Support and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Transition Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.1. Transition Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1.1. Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and 8.1.1. Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and
Routers - RFC 4213 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Routers - RFC 4213 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Basic Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.2. Transforms and Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.3. Transforms and Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 11. Router-Specific Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.4. Key Management Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Router-Specific Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11.1.1. IPv6 Router Alert Option - RFC 2711 . . . . . . . . . 16
11.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11.1.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . 16
11.1.1. IPv6 Router Alert Option - RFC 2711 . . . . . . . . . 15 12. Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11.1.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861 . . . . . . . . 15
12. Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12.1. Management Information Base Modules (MIBs) . . . . . . . . 16 12.1. Management Information Base Modules (MIBs) . . . . . . . . 16
12.1.1. IP Forwarding Table MIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 12.1.1. IP Forwarding Table MIB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12.1.2. Management Information Base for the Internet 12.1.2. Management Information Base for the Internet
Protocol (IP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Protocol (IP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 13. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
15. Authors and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 15. Authors and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
15.1. Authors and Acknowledgments (Current Document) . . . . . . 16 15.1. Authors and Acknowledgments (Current Document) . . . . . . 17
15.2. Authors and Acknowledgments From RFC 4279 . . . . . . . . 16 15.2. Authors and Acknowledgments From RFC 4279 . . . . . . . . 17
16. Appendix: Changes from -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 16. Appendix: Changes from -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
17. Appendix: Changes from -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 17. Appendix: Changes from -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
18. Appendix: Changes from RFC 4294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 18. Appendix: Changes from -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
19. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 19. Appendix: Changes from RFC 4294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
19.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 20. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
19.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 20.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 20.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Requirements Language 1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
The goal of this document is to define the common functionality The goal of this document is to define the common functionality
required from both IPv6 hosts and routers. Many IPv6 nodes will required from both IPv6 hosts and routers. Many IPv6 nodes will
implement optional or additional features, but this document collects implement optional or additional features, but this document collects
and summarizes requirements from other published Standards Track and summarizes requirements from other published Standards Track
documents in one place. documents in one place.
This document tries to avoid discussion of protocol details, and This document tries to avoid discussion of protocol details, and
references RFCs for this purpose. This document is intended to be an references RFCs for this purpose. This document is intended to be an
Applicability Statement and provide guidance as to which IPv6 Applicability Statement and provide guidance as to which IPv6
specifications should be implemented in the general case. This specifications should be implemented in the general case, and which
document does not update any individual protocol document RFCs. specification may be of interest to specific deployment scenarios.
This document does not update any individual protocol document RFCs.
Although the document points to different specifications, it should Although the document points to different specifications, it should
be noted that in most cases, the granularity of requirements are be noted that in many cases, the granularity of a particular
smaller than a single specification, as many specifications define requirement will be smaller than a single specification, as many
multiple, independent pieces, some of which may not be mandatory. specifications define multiple, independent pieces, some of which may
not be mandatory. In addition, most specifications define both
client and server behavior in the same specification, while many
implementations will be focused on only one of those roles.
This document defines a minimal level of requirement needed for a
device to provide useful internet service and considers a broad range
of device types and deployment scenarios. Because of the wide range
of deployment scenarios, the minimal requirements specified in this
document may not be sufficient for all deployment scenarios. It is
perfectly reasonable (and indeed expected) for other profiles to
define additional or stricter requirements appropriate for specific
usage and deployment environments. For example, this document does
not mandate that all clients support DHCP, but some some deployment
scenarios may deem it appropriate to make such a requirement. As one
specific example, the USGv6 [USGv6] profile includes speciallized
requirements for its target environment.
As it is not always possible for an implementer to know the exact As it is not always possible for an implementer to know the exact
usage of IPv6 in a node, an overriding requirement for IPv6 nodes is usage of IPv6 in a node, an overriding requirement for IPv6 nodes is
that they should adhere to Jon Postel's Robustness Principle: that they should adhere to Jon Postel's Robustness Principle:
Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from Be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from
others [RFC0793]. others [RFC0793].
2.1. Scope of This Document 2.1. Scope of This Document
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ND Neighbor Discovery ND Neighbor Discovery
NS Neighbor Solicitation NS Neighbor Solicitation
NUD Neighbor Unreachability Detection NUD Neighbor Unreachability Detection
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
PVC Permanent Virtual Circuit PVC Permanent Virtual Circuit
SVC Switched Virtual Circuit SVC Switched Virtual Circuit
4. Sub-IP Layer 4. Sub-IP Layer
An IPv6 node must include support for one or more IPv6 link-layer An IPv6 node must include support for one or more IPv6 link-layer
specifications. Which link-layer specifications are included will specifications. Which link-layer specifications an implementation
depend upon what link-layers are supported by the hardware available should include will depend upon what link-layers are supported by the
on the system. It is possible for a conformant IPv6 node to support hardware available on the system. It is possible for a conformant
IPv6 on some of its interfaces and not on others. IPv6 node to support IPv6 on some of its interfaces and not on
others.
As IPv6 is run over new layer 2 technologies, it is expected that new As IPv6 is run over new layer 2 technologies, it is expected that new
specifications will be issued. In the following, we list some of the specifications will be issued. In the following, we list some of the
link-layers for which an IPv6 specification has been developed. It link-layers for which an IPv6 specification has been developed. It
is provided for information purposes only, and may not be complete. is provided for information purposes only, and may not be complete.
- Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks [RFC2464] - Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks [RFC2464]
- IPv6 over ATM Networks [RFC2492] - IPv6 over ATM Networks [RFC2492]
- Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Frame Relay Networks - Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Frame Relay Networks
Specification [RFC2590] Specification [RFC2590]
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the operation of IP over a particular link type). The services the operation of IP over a particular link type). The services
described in this document that are not directly dependent on described in this document that are not directly dependent on
multicast, such as Redirects, Next-hop determination, Neighbor multicast, such as Redirects, Next-hop determination, Neighbor
Unreachability Detection, etc., are expected to be provided as Unreachability Detection, etc., are expected to be provided as
specified in this document. The details of how one uses ND on specified in this document. The details of how one uses ND on
NBMA links is an area for further study. NBMA links is an area for further study.
Some detailed analysis of Neighbor Discovery follows: Some detailed analysis of Neighbor Discovery follows:
Router Discovery is how hosts locate routers that reside on an Router Discovery is how hosts locate routers that reside on an
attached link. Router Discovery MUST be supported for attached link. Hosts MUST support Router Discovery functionality.
implementations.
Prefix Discovery is how hosts discover the set of address prefixes Prefix Discovery is how hosts discover the set of address prefixes
that define which destinations are on-link for an attached link. that define which destinations are on-link for an attached link.
Prefix discovery MUST be supported for implementations. Neighbor Hosts MUST support Prefix discovery.
Unreachability Detection (NUD) MUST be supported for all paths
between hosts and neighboring nodes. It is not required for paths
between routers. However, when a node receives a unicast Neighbor
Solicitation (NS) message (that may be a NUD's NS), the node MUST
respond to it (i.e., send a unicast Neighbor Advertisement).
Duplicate Address Detection MUST be supported on all links supporting
link-layer multicast (RFC 4862, Section 5.4, specifies DAD MUST take
place on all unicast addresses).
A host implementation MUST support sending Router Solicitations. Hosts MUST also implement Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) for
all paths between hosts and neighboring nodes. NUD is not required
for paths between routers. However, all nodes MUST respond to
unicast Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages.
Receiving and processing Router Advertisements MUST be supported for Hosts MUST support the sending of Router Solicitations and the
host implementations. The ability to understand specific Router recieving of Router Advertisements. The ability to understand
Advertisement options is dependent on supporting the specification individual Router Advertisement options is dependent on supporting
where the RA is specified. the functionality making use of the particular option.
Sending and Receiving Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor All nodes MUST support the Sending and Receiving of Neighbor
Advertisement (NA) MUST be supported. NS and NA messages are Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA) messages. NS and
required for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD). NA messages are required for Duplicate Address Detection (DAD).
Redirect functionality SHOULD be supported. If the node is a router, Hosts SHOULD support the processing of Redirect functionality.
Redirect functionality MUST be supported. Routers MUST support the sending of Redirects, though not necessarily
for every individual packet (e.g., due to rate limiting). Redirects
are only useful on networks supporting hosts. In core networks
dominated by routers, redirects are typically disabled. The sending
of redirects SHOULD be disabled by default on backbone routers. They
MAY be enabled by default on routers intended to support hosts on
edge networks.
5.3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) - RFC 3971 5.3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) - RFC 3971
SEND [RFC3971] and Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) SEND [RFC3971] and Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
[RFC3972] provide a way to secure the message exchanges of Neighbor [RFC3972] provide a way to secure the message exchanges of Neighbor
Discovery. SEND is a new technology, in that it has no IPv4 Discovery. SEND is a new technology, in that it has no IPv4
counterpart but it has significant potential to address certain counterpart but it has significant potential to address certain
classes of spoofing attacks. While there have been some classes of spoofing attacks. While there have been some
implementations of SEND, there has been only limited deployment implementations of SEND, there has been only limited deployment
experience to date in using the technology. In addition, the IETF experience to date in using the technology. In addition, the IETF
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ICMPv6 [RFC4443] MUST be supported. ICMPv6 [RFC4443] MUST be supported.
5.8. Addressing 5.8. Addressing
5.8.1. IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture - RFC 4291 5.8.1. IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture - RFC 4291
The IPv6 Addressing Architecture [RFC4291] MUST be supported. The IPv6 Addressing Architecture [RFC4291] MUST be supported.
5.8.2. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - RFC 4862 5.8.2. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - RFC 4862
IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is defined in [RFC4862]. Hosts MUST support IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration as
This specification MUST be supported for nodes that are hosts. defined in [RFC4862]. Static address may be supported as well.
Static address can be supported as well.
Nodes that are routers MUST be able to generate link local addresses Nodes that are routers MUST be able to generate link local addresses
as described in RFC 4862 [RFC4862]. as described in RFC 4862 [RFC4862].
From 4862: From 4862:
The autoconfiguration process specified in this document applies The autoconfiguration process specified in this document applies
only to hosts and not routers. Since host autoconfiguration uses only to hosts and not routers. Since host autoconfiguration uses
information advertised by routers, routers will need to be information advertised by routers, routers will need to be
configured by some other means. However, it is expected that configured by some other means. However, it is expected that
routers will generate link-local addresses using the mechanism routers will generate link-local addresses using the mechanism
described in this document. In addition, routers are expected to described in this document. In addition, routers are expected to
successfully pass the Duplicate Address Detection procedure successfully pass the Duplicate Address Detection procedure
described in this document on all addresses prior to assigning described in this document on all addresses prior to assigning
them to an interface. them to an interface.
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) MUST be supported. All nodes MUST implement Duplicate Address Detection. Quoting from
Section 5.4 of RFC 4862:
Duplicate Address Detection MUST be performed on all unicast
addresses prior to assigning them to an interface, regardless of
whether they are obtained through stateless autoconfiguration,
DHCPv6, or manual configuration, with the following exceptions:
5.8.3. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in IPv6 - RFC 4941 5.8.3. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in IPv6 - RFC 4941
Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4941] Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4941]
addresses a specific problem involving a client device whose user is addresses a specific problem involving a client device whose user is
concerned about its activity or location being tracked. The problem concerned about its activity or location being tracked. The problem
arises both for a static client and for one that regularly changes arises both for a static client and for one that regularly changes
its point of attachment to the Internet. When using Stateless its point of attachment to the Internet. When using Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4862], the Interface Identifier portion Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4862], the Interface Identifier portion
of formed addresses stays constant and is globally unique. Thus, of formed addresses stays constant and is globally unique. Thus,
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pattern of activity if it remains in one place. This may raise pattern of activity if it remains in one place. This may raise
privacy concerns as described in [RFC4862]. privacy concerns as described in [RFC4862].
In such situations, RFC4941 SHOULD be implemented. In other cases, In such situations, RFC4941 SHOULD be implemented. In other cases,
such as with dedicated servers in a data center, RFC4941 provides such as with dedicated servers in a data center, RFC4941 provides
limited or no benefit. limited or no benefit.
5.8.4. Default Address Selection for IPv6 - RFC 3484 5.8.4. Default Address Selection for IPv6 - RFC 3484
The rules specified in the Default Address Selection for IPv6 The rules specified in the Default Address Selection for IPv6
[RFC3484] document MUST be implemented. It is expected that IPv6 [RFC3484] document MUST be implemented. IPv6 nodes will need to deal
nodes will need to deal with multiple addresses. with multiple addresses configured simultaneously, .
5.8.5. Stateful Address Autoconfiguration 5.8.5. Stateful Address Autoconfiguration
Stateful Address Autoconfiguration MAY be supported. DHCPv6 DHCP can be used to obtain and configure addresses. In general, a
[RFC3315] is the standard stateful address configuration protocol; network may provide for the configuration of addresses through Router
see Section 6.2 for DHCPv6 support. Advertisements, DHCP or both. At the present time, the configuration
of stateless address autoconfiguraiton is more widely implemented in
hosts than address configuration through DHCP. However, some
environments may require the use of DHCP and may not support the
configuration of addresses via RAs. Implementations should be aware
of what operating environment their devices will be deployed. Hosts
MAY implement address configuration via DHCP.
Nodes which do not support Stateful Address Autoconfiguration may be In the absence of a router, IPv6 nodes using DHCP for address
unable to obtain any IPv6 addresses, aside from link-local addresses, assignment MAY initiate DHCP to obtain IPv6 addresses and other
when it receives a router advertisement with the 'M' flag (Managed configuration information, as described in Section 5.5.2 of
address configuration) set and that contains no prefixes advertised [RFC4862].
for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (see Section 4.5.2).
Additionally, such nodes will be unable to obtain other configuration
information, such as the addresses of DNS servers when it is
connected to a link over which the node receives a router
advertisement in which the 'O' flag (Other stateful configuration) is
set.
5.9. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC 2710 5.9. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6 - RFC 2710
Nodes that need to join multicast groups MUST support MLDv1 Nodes that need to join multicast groups MUST support MLDv1
[RFC3590]. MLDv1 is needed by any node that is expected to receive [RFC3590]. MLDv1 is needed by any node that is expected to receive
and process multicast traffic. Note that Neighbor Discovery (as used and process multicast traffic. Note that Neighbor Discovery (as used
on most link types -- see Section 5.2) depends on multicast and on most link types -- see Section 5.2) depends on multicast and
requires that nodes join Solicited Node multicast addresses. requires that nodes join Solicited Node multicast addresses.
Nodes that need to join multicast groups SHOULD implement MLDv2 Nodes that need to join multicast groups SHOULD implement MLDv2
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6. DHCP vs. Router Advertisement Options for Host Configuration 6. DHCP vs. Router Advertisement Options for Host Configuration
In IPv6, there are two main protocol mechanisms for propagating In IPv6, there are two main protocol mechanisms for propagating
configuration information to hosts: Router Advertisements and DHCP. configuration information to hosts: Router Advertisements and DHCP.
Historically, RA options have been restricted to those deemed Historically, RA options have been restricted to those deemed
essential for basic network functioning and for which all nodes are essential for basic network functioning and for which all nodes are
configured with exactly the same information. Examples include the configured with exactly the same information. Examples include the
Prefix Information Options, the MTU option, etc. On the other hand, Prefix Information Options, the MTU option, etc. On the other hand,
DHCP has generally been preferred for configuration of more general DHCP has generally been preferred for configuration of more general
parameters and for parameters that may be client-specific. That parameters and for parameters that may be client-specific. That
said, identifying the exact line on when whether a particular option said, identifying the exact line on whether a particular option
should be configured via DHCP vs an RA option has not always been should be configured via DHCP vs. an RA option has not always been
easy. Generally speaking, however, there has been a desire to define easy. Generally speaking, however, there has been a desire to define
only one mechanism for configuring a given option, rather than only one mechanism for configuring a given option, rather than
defining multiple (different) ways of configurating the same defining multiple (different) ways of configurating the same
information. information.
One issue with having multiple ways of configuring the same One issue with having multiple ways of configuring the same
information is that if a host choses one mechanism, but the network information is that if a host choses one mechanism, but the network
operator chooses a different mechanism, interoperability suffers. operator chooses a different mechanism, interoperability suffers.
For "closed" environments, where the network operator has significant For "closed" environments, where the network operator has significant
influence over what devices connect to the network and thus what influence over what devices connect to the network and thus what
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octets. octets.
Those nodes are RECOMMENDED to support DNS security extensions Those nodes are RECOMMENDED to support DNS security extensions
[RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035]. [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035].
Those nodes are NOT RECOMMENDED to support the experimental A6 Those nodes are NOT RECOMMENDED to support the experimental A6
Resource Records [RFC3363]. Resource Records [RFC3363].
7.2. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) - RFC 3315 7.2. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) - RFC 3315
7.2.1. Managed Address Configuration 7.2.1. Other Configuration Information
DHCP can be used to obtain and configure addresses. In general, a
network may provide for the configuration of addresses through RAs,
DHCP or both. At the present time, the configuration of stateless
address autoconfiguraiton is more widely implemented in hosts than
address configuration through DHCP. However, some environments may
require the use of DHCP and may not support the configuration of
addresses via RAs. Implementations should be aware of what operating
environment their devices will be deployed. Hosts MAY implement
address configuration via DHCP.
In the absence of a router, IPv6 nodes using DHCP for address
assignment MAY initiate DHCP to obtain IPv6 addresses and other
configuration information, as described in Section 5.5.2 of
[RFC4862].
7.2.2. Other Configuration Information
IPv6 nodes use DHCP to obtain additional (non-address) configuration. IPv6 nodes use DHCP to obtain address configuration information (See
If a host implementation will support applications or other protocols Section 5.8.5) and to obtain additional (non-address) configuration.
If a host implementation supports applications or other protocols
that require configuration that is only available via DHCP, hosts that require configuration that is only available via DHCP, hosts
SHOULD implement DHCP. For specialized devices on which no such SHOULD implement DHCP. For specialized devices on which no such
configuration need is present, DHCP is not necessary. configuration need is present, DHCP may not be necessary.
An IPv6 node can use the subset of DHCP (described in [RFC3736]) to An IPv6 node can use the subset of DHCP (described in [RFC3736]) to
obtain other configuration information. obtain other configuration information.
7.2.3. Use of Router Advertisements in Managed Environments 7.2.2. Use of Router Advertisements in Managed Environments
Nodes using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) Nodes using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)
are expected to determine their default router information and on- are expected to determine their default router information and on-
link prefix information from received Router Advertisements. link prefix information from received Router Advertisements.
7.3. IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration - RFC XXXX 7.3. IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration - RFC XXXX
Router Advertisements have historically limited options to those that Router Advertisements have historically limited options to those that
are critical to basic IPv6 functioning. Originally, DNS are critical to basic IPv6 functioning. Originally, DNS
configuration was not included as an RA option and DHCP was the configuration was not included as an RA option and DHCP was the
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Recently, additional work has been done to support mobility in mixed- Recently, additional work has been done to support mobility in mixed-
mode IPv4 and IPv6 networks[RFC5555]. mode IPv4 and IPv6 networks[RFC5555].
More usage and deployment experience is needed with mobility before More usage and deployment experience is needed with mobility before
any one can be recommended for broad implementation in all hosts and any one can be recommended for broad implementation in all hosts and
routers. Consequently, [RFC3775], [RFC5555], and associated routers. Consequently, [RFC3775], [RFC5555], and associated
standards such as [RFC4877] are considered a MAY at this time. standards such as [RFC4877] are considered a MAY at this time.
10. Security 10. Security
This section describes the specification of IPsec for the IPv6 node. This section describes the specification for security for IPv6 nodes.
Note: This section needs a rethink. According to RFC4301, IKEv2 MUST
be supported. This section cites RFC 4301 as a MUST, yet the
remainder of this section only makes IKEv2 a SHOULD. The IPv6 WG has
discussed the topic of mandating key management in the past, but has
not been willing to make IKE (v1 or v2) a MUST. Is it time to
revisit this recommendation? Does it make sense to leave key
management as a SHOULD? And what about how that contradicts RFC
4301?
10.1. Basic Architecture
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol [RFC4301] MUST be Achieving security in practice is a complex undertaking. Operational
supported. procedures, protocols, key distribution mechanisms, certificate
management approaches, etc. are all components that impact the level
of security actually achieved in practice. More importantly,
deficiencies or a poor fit in any one individual component can
significantly reduce the overall effectiveness of a particular
security approach.
10.2. Security Protocols IPsec provides channel security at the Internet layer, making it
possible to provide secure communication for all (or a subset of)
communication flows at the IP layer between pairs of internet nodes.
IPsec provides sufficient flexibility and granularity that individual
TCP connections can (selectively) be protected, etc.
ESP [RFC4303] MUST be supported. AH [RFC4302] MAY be supported. Although IPsec can be used with manual keying in some cases, such
usage has limited applicability and is not recommended.
10.3. Transforms and Algorithms A range of security technologies and approaches proliferate today
(e.g., IPsec, TLS, SSH, etc.) No one approach has emerged as an
ideal technology for all needs and environments. Moreover, IPsec is
not viewed as the ideal security technology in all cases and is
unlikely to displace the others.
The current set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms for ESP and AH Previously, IPv6 mandated implementation of IPsec and recommended the
are defined in 'Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements key management approach of IKE. This document updates that
For ESP and AH' [RFC4835]. IPv6 nodes SHOULD conform to the recommendation by making support of the IP Security Architecture [RFC
requirements in [RFC4835]. 4301] a SHOULD for all IPv6 nodes. Note that the IPsec Architecture
requires (e.g., Sec. 4.5 of RFC 4301) the implementation of both
manual and automatic key management. Currently the default automated
key management protocol to implement is IKEv2.
10.4. Key Management Methods This document recognizes that there exists a range of device types
and environments where other approaches to security than IPsec can be
justified. For example, special-purpose devices may support only a
very limited number or type of applications and an application-
specific security approach may be sufficient for limited management
or configuration capabilities. Alternatively, some devices my run on
extremely constrained hardware (e.g., sensors) where the full IP
Security Architecture is not justified.
An implementation MUST support the manual configuration of the 10.1. Requirements
security key and SPI. The SPI configuration is needed in order to
delineate between multiple keys.
Key management SHOULD be supported. Examples of key management "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [RFC4301] SHOULD be
systems include IKEv2 [RFC4306] and Kerberos; S/MIME and TLS include supported by all IPv6 nodes. Note that the IPsec Architecture
key management functions. requires (e.g., Sec. 4.5 of RFC 4301) the implementation of both
manual and automatic key management. Currently the default automated
key management protocol to implement is IKEv2.
Where key refresh, anti-replay features of AH and ESP, or on-demand 10.2. Transforms and Algorithms
creation of Security Associations (SAs) is required, automated keying
MUST be supported.
Key management methods for multicast traffic are also being worked on The current set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms for the IP
by the MSEC WG. Security Architcture are defined in 'Cryptographic Algorithm
Implementation Requirements For ESP and AH' [RFC4835]. IPv6 nodes
implementing the IP Security Architecture MUST conform to the
requirements in [RFC4835]. Preferred cryptographic algorithms often
change more frequently than security protocols. Therefore
implementations MUST allow for migration in new algorithms, as
RFC4835 is replaced or updated in the future.
11. Router-Specific Functionality 11. Router-Specific Functionality
This section defines general host considerations for IPv6 nodes that This section defines general host considerations for IPv6 nodes that
act as routers. Currently, this section does not discuss routing- act as routers. Currently, this section does not discuss routing-
specific requirements. specific requirements.
11.1. General 11.1. General
11.1.1. IPv6 Router Alert Option - RFC 2711 11.1.1. IPv6 Router Alert Option - RFC 2711
The IPv6 Router Alert Option [RFC2711] is an optional IPv6 Hop-by-Hop The IPv6 Router Alert Option [RFC2711] is an optional IPv6 Hop-by-Hop
Header that is used in conjunction with some protocols (e.g., RSVP Header that is used in conjunction with some protocols (e.g., RSVP
[RFC2205] or MLD [RFC2710]). The Router Alert option will need to be [RFC2205] or MLD [RFC2710]). The Router Alert option will need to be
implemented whenever protocols that mandate its usage are implemented whenever protocols that mandate its usage are
implemented. See Section 4.6. implemented. See Section 5.8.5.
11.1.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861 11.1.2. Neighbor Discovery for IPv6 - RFC 4861
Sending Router Advertisements and processing Router Solicitation MUST Sending Router Advertisements and processing Router Solicitation MUST
be supported. be supported.
12. Network Management 12. Network Management
Network Management MAY be supported by IPv6 nodes. However, for IPv6 Network Management MAY be supported by IPv6 nodes. However, for IPv6
nodes that are embedded devices, network management may be the only nodes that are embedded devices, network management may be the only
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IP Forwarding Table MIB [RFC4292] SHOULD be supported by nodes that IP Forwarding Table MIB [RFC4292] SHOULD be supported by nodes that
support an SNMP agent. support an SNMP agent.
12.1.2. Management Information Base for the Internet Protocol (IP) 12.1.2. Management Information Base for the Internet Protocol (IP)
IP MIB [RFC4293] SHOULD be supported by nodes that support an SNMP IP MIB [RFC4293] SHOULD be supported by nodes that support an SNMP
agent. agent.
13. Open Issues 13. Open Issues
1. The recommendations regarding when to invoke DHCP are 1. None?
problematical with out being able to reference the M&0 bits.
2. Security Recommendations needs updating. See note in that
Section.
14. Security Considerations 14. Security Considerations
This document does not directly affect the security of the Internet, This document does not directly affect the security of the Internet,
but implementations of IPv6 are expected to support a minimum set of beyond the security considerations associated with the individual
security features to ensure security on the Internet. protocols.
Security is also discussed in Section XXX above. Security is also discussed in Section 10 above.
15. Authors and Acknowledgments 15. Authors and Acknowledgments
15.1. Authors and Acknowledgments (Current Document) 15.1. Authors and Acknowledgments (Current Document)
15.2. Authors and Acknowledgments From RFC 4279 15.2. Authors and Acknowledgments From RFC 4279
The original version of this document (RFC 4279) was written by the The original version of this document (RFC 4279) was written by the
IPv6 Node Requirements design team: IPv6 Node Requirements design team:
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dthaler@windows.microsoft.com dthaler@windows.microsoft.com
Juha Wiljakka Juha Wiljakka
juha.wiljakka@Nokia.com juha.wiljakka@Nokia.com
The authors would like to thank Ran Atkinson, Jim Bound, Brian The authors would like to thank Ran Atkinson, Jim Bound, Brian
Carpenter, Ralph Droms, Christian Huitema, Adam Machalek, Thomas Carpenter, Ralph Droms, Christian Huitema, Adam Machalek, Thomas
Narten, Juha Ollila, and Pekka Savola for their comments. Thanks to Narten, Juha Ollila, and Pekka Savola for their comments. Thanks to
Mark Andrews for comments and corrections on DNS text. Thanks to Mark Andrews for comments and corrections on DNS text. Thanks to
Alfred Hoenes for tracking the updates to various RFCs. Alfred Hoenes for tracking the updates to various RFCs.
16. Appendix: Changes from -04 to -05 16. Appendix: Changes from -05 to -06
1. Completely revised IPsec/IKEv2 section. Text has been discussed
by 6man and saag.
2. Added text to introduction clarifying that this document applies
to general nodes and that other profiles may be more specific in
their requirements
3. Editorial cleanups in Neighbor Discovery section in particular.
Text made more crisp.
4. Moved some of the DHCP text around. Moved stateful address
discussion to Section 5.8.5.
5. Added additional nuance to the redirect requirements w.r.t.
default configuration setting.
17. Appendix: Changes from -04 to -05
1. Cleaned up IPsec section, but key questions (MUST vs. SHOULD) 1. Cleaned up IPsec section, but key questions (MUST vs. SHOULD)
still open. still open.
2. Added background section on DHCP vs. RA options. 2. Added background section on DHCP vs. RA options.
3. Added SHOULD recomendation for DNS configuration vi RAs 3. Added SHOULD recommendation for DNS configuration vi RAs
(RFC5006bis). (RFC5006bis).
4. Cleaned up DHCP section, as it was referring to the M&O bits. 4. Cleaned up DHCP section, as it was referring to the M&O bits.
5. Cleaned up the Security Considerations Section. 5. Cleaned up the Security Considerations Section.
17. Appendix: Changes from -03 to -04 18. Appendix: Changes from -03 to -04
1. Updated the Introduction to indicate document is an applicabity 1. Updated the Introduction to indicate document is an applicabity
statement statement
2. Updated the section on Mobility protocols 2. Updated the section on Mobility protocols
3. Changed Sub-IP Layer Section to just list relevant RFCs, and 3. Changed Sub-IP Layer Section to just list relevant RFCs, and
added some more RFCs. added some more RFCs.
4. Added Section on SEND (make it a MAY) 4. Added Section on SEND (make it a MAY)
5. Redid Section on Privacy Extensions (RFC4941) to add more nuance 5. Redid Section on Privacy Extensions (RFC4941) to add more nuance
to recommendation to recommendation
6. Redid section on Mobility, and added additional RFCs [ 6. Redid section on Mobility, and added additional RFCs [
18. Appendix: Changes from RFC 4294 19. Appendix: Changes from RFC 4294
This appendix keeps track of the chances from RFC 4294 This appendix keeps track of the chances from RFC 4294
1. Section 5.1, removed "and DNAME" from the discussion about RFC- 1. Section 5.1, removed "and DNAME" from the discussion about RFC-
3363. 3363.
2. RFC 2463 references updated to RFC 4443. 2. RFC 2463 references updated to RFC 4443.
3. RFC 3513 references updated to RFC 4291. 3. RFC 3513 references updated to RFC 4291.
skipping to change at page 18, line 45 skipping to change at page 19, line 45
5. RFC 2893 references updated to RFC 4213. 5. RFC 2893 references updated to RFC 4213.
6. AH [RFC4302] support chanced from MUST to MAY. 6. AH [RFC4302] support chanced from MUST to MAY.
7. The reference for RFC 3152 has been deleted, as the RFC has been 7. The reference for RFC 3152 has been deleted, as the RFC has been
obsoleted, and has been incorporated into RFC 3596. obsoleted, and has been incorporated into RFC 3596.
8. The reference for RFC 3879 has been removed as the material from 8. The reference for RFC 3879 has been removed as the material from
RFC 3879 has been incorporated into RFC 4291. RFC 3879 has been incorporated into RFC 4291.
19. References 20. References
19.1. Normative References 20.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery [RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996. for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
skipping to change at page 20, line 20 skipping to change at page 21, line 20
[RFC4293] Routhier, S., "Management Information Base for the [RFC4293] Routhier, S., "Management Information Base for the
Internet Protocol (IP)", RFC 4293, April 2006. Internet Protocol (IP)", RFC 4293, April 2006.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
December 2005. December 2005.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006. Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
[RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for [RFC4607] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for
IP", RFC 4607, August 2006. IP", RFC 4607, August 2006.
[RFC4835] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation [RFC4835] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and
Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007. Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007.
skipping to change at page 21, line 7 skipping to change at page 22, line 5
"IPv6 Router Advertisement Option for DNS Configuration", "IPv6 Router Advertisement Option for DNS Configuration",
RFC 5006, September 2007. RFC 5006, September 2007.
[RFC5072] S.Varada, Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 over [RFC5072] S.Varada, Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 over
PPP", RFC 5072, September 2007. PPP", RFC 5072, September 2007.
[RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation [RFC5095] Abley, J., Savola, P., and G. Neville-Neil, "Deprecation
of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095, of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6", RFC 5095,
December 2007. December 2007.
19.2. Informative References 20.2. Informative References
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, September 1981. RFC 793, September 1981.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC2205] Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S. [RFC2205] Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S.
Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1 Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997. Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.
skipping to change at page 22, line 17 skipping to change at page 23, line 15
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005. RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms [RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005. for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4338] DeSanti, C., Carlson, C., and R. Nixon, "Transmission of [RFC4338] DeSanti, C., Carlson, C., and R. Nixon, "Transmission of
IPv6, IPv4, and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packets IPv6, IPv4, and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Packets
over Fibre Channel", RFC 4338, January 2006. over Fibre Channel", RFC 4338, January 2006.
[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through [RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380, Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
February 2006. February 2006.
[RFC4877] Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Operation with [RFC4877] Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Operation with
IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture", RFC 4877, IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture", RFC 4877,
 End of changes. 58 change blocks. 
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