Discovery of the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis

Abstract

This document describes a method for detecting the presence of DNS64 and for learning the IPv6 prefix used for protocol translation on an access network. The method depends on the existence of a well-known IPv4-only fully qualified domain name "ipv4only.arpa.". The information learned enables nodes to perform local IPv6 address synthesis and to potentially avoid NAT64 on dual-stack and multi-interface deployments.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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1. Introduction

As part of the transition to IPv6, NAT64 [RFC6146] and DNS64 [RFC6147] technologies will be utilized by some access networks to provide IPv4 connectivity for IPv6-only nodes [RFC6144]. DNS64 utilizes IPv6 address synthesis to create local IPv6 addresses for peers having only IPv4 addresses, hence allowing DNS-using IPv6-only nodes to communicate with IPv4-only peers.

However, DNS64 cannot serve applications not using DNS, such as those receiving IPv4 address literals as referrals. Such applications could nevertheless be able to work through NAT64, provided they are able to create locally valid IPv6 addresses that would be translated to the peers’ IPv4 addresses.

Additionally, DNS64 is not able to do IPv6 address synthesis for nodes running validating DNS resolvers enabled by DNS Security (DNSSEC), but instead, the synthesis must be done by the nodes themselves. In order to perform IPv6 synthesis, nodes have to learn the IPv6 prefix(es) used on the access network for protocol translation. A prefix, which may be a Network-Specific Prefix (NSP) or a Well-Known Prefix (WKP) [RFC6052], is referred to in this document as Pref64::/n [RFC6146].

This document describes a best-effort method for applications and nodes to learn the information required to perform local IPv6 address synthesis. The IPv6 address synthesis procedure itself is out of the scope of this document. An example application is a browser encountering IPv4 address literals in an IPv6-only access network. Another example is a node running a validating security-aware DNS resolver in an IPv6-only access network.

The knowledge of IPv6 address synthesis taking place may also be useful if DNS64 and NAT64 are used in dual-stack-enabled access networks or if a node is multi-interfaced [RFC6418]. In such cases, nodes may choose to prefer IPv4 or an alternative network interface in order to avoid traversal through protocol translators.

It is important to note that use of this approach will not result in a system that is as robust, secure, and well-behaved as an all-IPv6 system would be. Hence, it is highly recommended to upgrade nodes’ destinations to IPv6 and utilize the described method only as a transition solution.
2. Requirements Notation and Terminology

2.1. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.2. Terminology

NAT64 FQDN: a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) for a NAT64 protocol translator.

Pref64::/n: an IPv6 prefix used for IPv6 address synthesis [RFC6146].

Pref64::WKA: an IPv6 address consisting of Pref64::/n and WKA at any of the locations allowed by [RFC 6052][RFC6052].

Secure Channel: a communication channel a node has between itself and a DNS64 server protecting DNS protocol-related messages from interception and tampering. The channel can be, for example, an IPsec-based virtual private network (VPN) tunnel or a link layer utilizing data encryption technologies.

Well-Known IPv4-only Name (WKN): the fully qualified domain name, "ipv4only.arpa.", well-known to have only A record(s).

Well-Known IPv4 Address (WKA): an IPv4 address that is well-known and present in an A record for the well-known name. Two well-known IPv4 addresses are defined for Pref64::/n discovery purposes: 192.0.0.170 and 192.0.0.171.

3. Node Behavior

A node requiring information about the presence (or absence) of NAT64, and one or more Pref64::/n used for protocol translation SHALL send a DNS query for AAAA resource records of the Well-Known IPv4-only Name (WKN) "ipv4only.arpa.". The node MAY perform the DNS query in both IPv6-only and dual-stack access networks.

When sending a DNS AAAA resource record query for the WKN, a node MUST set the "Checking Disabled (CD)" bit to zero [RFC4035], as otherwise the DNS64 server will not perform IPv6 address synthesis (Section 3 of [RFC6147]) and hence would not reveal the Pref64::/n used for protocol translation.
A DNS reply with one or more AAAA resource records indicates that the access network is utilizing IPv6 address synthesis. In some scenarios, captive portals, or NXDOMAIN and NODATA hijacking, performed by the access network may result in a false positive. One method to detect such hijacking is to query a fully qualified domain name that is known to be invalid (and normally returns an empty response or an error response) and see if it returns a valid resource record. However, as long as the hijacked domain does not result in AAAA resource record responses that contain a well-known IPv4 address in any location defined by [RFC6052], the response will not disturb the Pref64::/n learning procedure.

A node MUST look through all of the received AAAA resource records to collect one or more Pref64::/n. The Pref64::/n list might include the Well-Known Prefix 64:ff9b::/96 [RFC6052] or one or more Network-Specific Prefixes. In the case of NSPs, the node SHALL determine the used address format by searching the received IPv6 addresses for the WKN’s well-known IPv4 addresses. The node SHALL assume the well-known IPv4 addresses might be found at the locations specified by [RFC6052], Section 2.2. The node MUST check on octet boundaries to ensure a 32-bit well-known IPv4 address value is present only once in an IPv6 address. In case another instance of the value is found inside the IPv6 address, the node SHALL repeat the search with the other well-known IPv4 address.

If only one Pref64::/n was present in the DNS response, a node SHALL use that Pref64::/n for both local synthesis and for detecting synthesis done by the DNS64 server on the network.

If more than one Pref64::/n was present in the DNS response, a node SHOULD use all of them when determining whether other received IPv6 addresses are synthetic. The node MUST use all learned Pref64::/n when performing local IPv6 address synthesis and use the prefixes in the order received from the DNS64 server. That is, when the node is providing a list of locally synthesized IPv6 addresses to upper layers, IPv6 addresses MUST be synthesized by using all discovered Pref64::/n prefixes in the received order.

If the well-known IPv4 addresses are not found within the standard locations, the DNS response indicates that the network is not using a standard address format or unexpected IPv4 addresses were used in the AAAA resource record synthesis. In either case, the Pref64::/n cannot be determined and the heuristic procedure has failed. Developers can, over time, learn of IPv6-translated address formats that are extensions or alternatives to the standard formats. At that point, developers MAY add additional steps to the described discovery procedure. The additional steps are outside the scope of the present document.
In case a node does not receive a positive DNS reply to the AAAA resource record query, the node MAY perform a DNS A resource record query for the well-known name. Receiving a positive reply to the DNS A resource record query indicates that the recursive DNS server that is used is not a DNS64 server.

In the case of a negative response (NXDOMAIN, NODATA) or a DNS query timeout, a DNS64 server is not available on the access network, the access network filtered out the well-known query, or something went wrong in the DNS resolution. All unsuccessful cases result in a node being unable to perform local IPv6 address synthesis. In the case of timeout, the node SHOULD retransmit the DNS query like any other DNS query the node makes [RFC1035]. In the case of a negative response (NXDOMAIN, NODATA), the node MUST obey the Time to Live (TTL) [RFC1035] of the response before resending the AAAA resource record query. The node MAY monitor for DNS replies with IPv6 addresses constructed from the WKP, in which case if any are observed, the node SHOULD use the WKP as if it were learned during the query for the well-known name.

To save Internet resources if possible, a node should perform Pref64::/n discovery only when needed (e.g., when local synthesis is required, when a new network interface is connected to a new network, and so forth). The node SHALL cache the replies it receives during the Pref64::/n discovery procedure, and it SHOULD repeat the discovery process ten seconds before the TTL of the Well-Known Name’s synthetic AAAA resource record expires.

3.1. Validation of Discovered Pref64::/n

If a node is using an insecure channel between itself and a DNS64 server or the DNS64 server is untrusted, it is possible for an attacker to influence the node’s Pref64::/n discovery procedures. This may result in denial-of-service, redirection, man-in-the-middle, or other attacks.

To mitigate against attacks, the node SHOULD communicate with a trusted DNS64 server over a secure channel or use DNSSEC. NAT64 operators SHOULD provide facilities for validating discovery of Pref64::/n via a secure channel and/or DNSSEC protection.

It is important to understand that DNSSEC only validates that the discovered Pref64::/n is the one that belongs to a domain used by NAT64 FQDN. Importantly, the DNSSEC validation does not tell if the node is at the network where the Pref64::/n is intended to be used. Furthermore, DNSSEC validation cannot be utilized in the case of a WKP.
3.1.1. DNSSEC Requirements for the Network

If the operator has chosen to support nodes performing validation of discovered Pref64::/n with DNSSEC, the operator of the NAT64 device MUST perform the following configurations.

1. Have one or more fully qualified domain names for the NAT64 translator entities (later referred to as NAT64 FQDN). In the case of more than one Pref64::/n being used in a network, e.g., for load-balancing purposes, it is for network administrators to decide whether a single NAT64’s fully qualified domain name maps to more than one Pref64::/n, or whether there will be a dedicated NAT64 FQDN per Pref64::/n.

2. Each NAT64 FQDN MUST have one or more DNS AAAA resource records containing Pref64::WKA (Pref64::/n combined with WKA).

3. Each Pref64::WKA MUST have a PTR resource record that points to the corresponding NAT64 FQDN.

4. Sign the NAT64 FQDNs’ AAAA and A resource records with DNSSEC.

3.1.2. DNSSEC Requirements for the Node

A node SHOULD prefer a secure channel to talk to a DNS64 server whenever possible. In addition, a node that implements a DNSSEC validating resolver MAY use the following procedure to validate discovery of the Pref64::/n.

1. Heuristically find Pref64::/n candidates by making a AAAA resource record query for "ipv4only.arpa." by following the procedure in Section 3. This will result in IPv6 addresses consisting of Pref64::/n combined with WKA, i.e., Pref64::WKA. For each Pref64::/n that the node wishes to validate, the node performs the following steps.

2. Send a DNS PTR resource record query for the IPv6 address of the translator (for ".ip6.arpa." tree), using the Pref64::WKA learned in step 1. CNAME and DNAME results should be followed according to the rules in RFC 1034 [RFC1034], RFC 1035 [RFC1035], and RFC 6672 [RFC6672]. The ultimate response will include one or more NAT64 FQDNs.

3. The node SHOULD compare the domains of learned NAT64 FQDNs to a list of the node’s trusted domains and choose a NAT64 FQDN that matches. The means for a node to learn the trusted domains is
implementation specific. If the node has no trust for the
domain, the discovery procedure is not secure, and the remaining
steps described below MUST NOT be performed.

4. Send a DNS AAAA resource record query for the NAT64 FQDN.

5. Verify the DNS AAAA resource record contains Pref64::WKA
addresses received at step 1. It is possible that the NAT64 FQDN
has multiple AAAA records, in which case the node MUST check if
any of the addresses match the ones obtained in step 1. The node
MUST ignore other responses and not use them for local IPv6
address synthesis.

6. Perform DNSSEC validation of the DNS AAAA response.

After the node has successfully performed the above five steps, the
node can consider Pref64::/n validated.

3.2. Connectivity Check

After learning a Pref64::/n, the node SHOULD perform a connectivity
check to ensure the learned Pref64::/n is functional. It could be
non-functional for a variety of reasons -- the discovery failed to
work as expected, the IPv6 path to the NAT64 is down, the NAT64 is
down, or the IPv4 path beyond the NAT64 is down.

There are two main approaches to determine if the learned Pref64::/n
is functional. The first approach is to perform a dedicated
connectivity check. The second approach is to simply attempt to use
the learned Pref64::/n. Each approach has some trade-offs (e.g.,
additional network traffic or possible user-noticeable delay), and
implementations should carefully weigh which approach is appropriate
for their application and the network.

The node SHOULD use an implementation-specific connectivity check
server and a protocol of the implementation’s choice, but if that is
not possible, a node MAY do a PTR resource record query of the
Pref64::WKA to get a NAT64 FQDN. The node then does an A resource
query of the NAT64 FQDN, which will return zero or more A resource
records pointing to connectivity check servers used by the network
operator. A negative response to the PTR or A resource query means
there are no connectivity check servers available. A network
operator that provides NAT64 services for a mix of nodes with and
without implementation-specific connectivity check servers SHOULD
assist nodes in their connectivity checks by mapping each NAT64 FQDN
to one or more DNS A resource records with IPv4 address(es) pointing
to connectivity check server(s). The connectivity check approach
based on Pref64::/n works only with NSPs, as it is not possible to
register A records for each different domain using a WKP. The 
network operator MUST disable ICMPv6 rate limiting for connectivity 
check messages.

If multiple connectivity check servers are available for use, the 
node chooses the first one, preferring implementation-specific 
servers.

The connectivity check protocol used with implementation-specific 
connectivity check servers is implementation specific.

The connectivity check protocol used with connectivity check servers 
pointed to by the NAT64 FQDN’s A resource records is ICMPv6 
[RFC4443]. The node performing a connectivity check against these 
servers SHALL send an ICMPv6 Echo Request to an IPv6 address 
synthesized by combining discovered Pref64::/n with an IPv4 address 
of the server as specified in [RFC6052]. This will test the IPv6 
path to the NAT64, the NAT64’s operation, and the IPv4 path all the 
way to the connectivity check server. If no response is received for 
the ICMPv6 Echo Request, the node SHALL send another ICMPv6 Echo 
Request a second later. If still no response is received, the node 
shall send a third ICMPv6 Echo Request two seconds later. If an 
ICMPv6 Echo Response is received, the node knows the IPv6 path to the 
connectivity check server is functioning normally. If no response is 
received after three transmissions and after three seconds have 
elapsed since the last ICMPv6 Echo Request, the node learns this 
Pref64::/n might not be functioning, and the node MAY choose a 
different Pref64::/n (if available), choose to alert the user, or 
proceed anyway assuming the failure is temporary or is caused by the 
connectivity check itself. After all, ICMPv6 is unreliable by 
design, and failure to receive ICMPv6 responses may not indicate 
anything other than network failure to transport ICMPv6 messages.

If no separate connectivity check is performed before local IPv6 
address synthesis, a node MAY monitor success of connection attempts 
performed with locally synthesized IPv6 addresses. Based on success 
of these connections, and based on possible ICMPv6 error messages 
received (such as Destination Unreachable messages), the node MAY 
cease to perform local address synthesis and MAY restart the 
Pref64::/n discovery procedures.

3.2.1. No Connectivity Checks against "ipv4only.arpa."

Clients MUST NOT send a connectivity check to an address returned by 
the "ipv4only.arpa." query. This is because, by design, no server 
will be operated on the Internet at that address as such. Similarly, 
network operators MUST NOT operate a server on that address. The 
reason this address isn’t used for connectivity checks is that
operators who neglect to operate a connectivity check server will allow that traffic towards the Internet where it will be dropped and cause a false negative connectivity check with the client (that is, the NAT64 is working fine, but the connectivity check fails because a server is not operating at "ipv4only.arpa." on the Internet and a server is not operated by the NAT64 operator). Instead, for the connectivity check, an additional DNS resource record is looked up and used for the connectivity check. This ensures that packets don’t unnecessarily leak to the Internet and reduces the chance of a false negative connectivity check.

3.3. Alternative Fully Qualified Domain Names

Some applications, operating systems, devices, or networks may find it advantageous to operate their own DNS infrastructure to perform a function similar to "ipv4only.arpa." but use a different resource record. The primary advantage is to ensure availability of the DNS infrastructure and ensure the proper configuration of the DNS record itself. For example, a company named Example might have their application query "ipv4only.example.com". Other than the different DNS resource record being queried, the rest of the operations are anticipated to be identical to the steps described in this document.

3.4. Message Flow Illustration

The figure below gives an example illustration of a message flow in the case of prefix discovery utilizing Pref64::/n validation. The figure also shows a step where the procedure ends if no Pref64::/n validation is performed.

In this example, three Pref64::/n prefixes are provided by the DNS64 server. The first Pref64::/n is using an NSP, in this example, "2001:db8:42::/96". The second Pref64::/n is using an NSP, in this example, "2001:db8:43::/96". The third Pref64::/n is using the WKP. Hence, when the Pref64::/n prefixes are combined with the WKA to form Pref64::WKA, the synthetic IPv6 addresses returned by the DNS64 server are "2001:db8:42::192.0.0.170", "2001:db8:43::192.0.0.170", and "64:ff9b::192.0.0.170". The DNS64 server could also return synthetic addresses containing the IPv4 address 192.0.0.171.

The validation is not done for the WKP; see Section 3.1.
Node

"AAAA" query for "ipv4only.arpa."

-------------------------------

DNS64 server

"A" query for "ipv4only.arpa."

-------------------

"A" response:
"192.0.0.170"
"192.0.0.171"

<---------------

"AAAA" synthesis using three Pref64::/n.

-------------------------------

"AAAA" response with:
"2001:db8:42::192.0.0.170"
"2001:db8:43::192.0.0.170"
"64:ff9b::192.0.0.170"

<-----------------------------------------------

If Pref64::/n validation is not performed, a node can fetch prefixes from AAAA responses at this point and skip the steps below.

"PTR" query #1 for "2001:db8:42::192.0.0.170"

-------------------------------

"PTR" query #2 for "2001:db8:43::192.0.0.170"

-------------------------------

"PTR" response #1 "nat64_1.example.com"

<-------------------

"PTR" response #2 "nat64_2.example.com"

<-------------------

Compare received domains to a trusted domain list and if matches are found, continue.

"AAAA" query #1 for "nat64_1.example.com"

-------------------------------

"AAAA" query #2 for "nat64_2.example.com"
4. Operational Considerations for Hosting the IPv4-Only Well-Known Name

The authoritative name server for the well-known name SHALL have DNS record TTL set to at least 60 minutes in order to improve effectiveness of DNS caching. The exact TTL value will be determined and tuned based on operational experiences.

The domain serving the well-known name MUST be signed with DNSSEC. See also Section 7.

5. Operational Considerations for DNS64 Operator

A network operator of a DNS64 server can guide nodes utilizing heuristic discovery procedures by managing the responses a DNS64 server provides.

If the network operator would like nodes to utilize multiple Pref64::/n prefixes, the operator needs to configure DNS64 servers to respond with multiple synthetic AAAA records. As per Section 3, the nodes can then use them all.

There are no guarantees on which of the Pref64::/n prefixes nodes will end up using. If the operator wants nodes to specifically use a certain Pref64::/n or periodically change the Pref64::/n they use, for example, for load balancing reasons, the only guaranteed method is to make DNS64 servers return only a single synthetic AAAA resource record and have the TTL of that synthetic record such that the node repeats the Pref64::/n discovery when required.
Besides choosing how many Pref64::/n prefixes to respond and what TTL to use, DNS64 servers MUST NOT interfere with or perform other special procedures for the queries related to the well-known name.

5.1. Mapping of IPv4 Address Ranges to IPv6 Prefixes

RFC 6147 [RFC6147] allows DNS64 implementations to be able to map specific IPv4 address ranges to separate Pref64::/n prefixes. That allows handling of special use IPv4 addresses [RFC6890]. The example setup where this might be used is illustrated in Figure 2. The NAT64 "A" is used when accessing IPv4-only servers in the data center, and the NAT64 "B" is used for Internet access.

```
   NAT64 "A" ----- IPv4-only servers in a data center
   /IPv6-only node--->
   \                      
   NAT64 "B" ----- IPv4 Internet
```

Figure 2: NAT64s with IPv4 Address Ranges

The heuristic discovery method described herein does not support learning of the possible rules used by a DNS64 server for mapping specific IPv4 address ranges to separate Pref64::/n prefixes. Therefore, nodes will use the same discovered Pref64::/n to synthesize IPv6 addresses from any IPv4 address. This can cause issues for routing and connectivity establishment procedures. The operator of the NAT64 and the DNS64 ought to take this into account in the network design.

The network operators can help IPv6-only nodes by ensuring the nodes do not have to work with IPv4 address literals for which special mapping rules are used. That is, the IPv4-only servers addressed from the special IPv4 address ranges ought to have signed AAAA records, which allows IPv6-only nodes to avoid local address synthesis. If the IPv6-only nodes are not using DNSSEC, then it is enough if the network’s DNS64 server returns synthetic AAAA resource records pointing to IPv4-only servers. Avoiding the need for IPv6-only nodes to perform address synthesis for IPv4 addresses belonging to special ranges is the best approach to assist nodes.

If the IPv6-only nodes have no choice other than using IPv4-address literals belonging to special IPv4 address ranges and the IPv6-only node will perform local synthesis by using the discovered Pref64::/n, then the network ought to ensure with routing that the packets are delivered to the correct NAT64. For example, a router in the path from an IPv6-only host to NAT64s can forward the IPv6 packets to the correct NAT64 as illustrated in Figure 3. The routing could be based
on the last 32 bits of the IPv6 address, but the network operator can
also use some other IPv6 address format allowed by RFC 6052 [RFC6052]
if it simplifies routing setup. This setup requires additional logic
on the NAT64 providing connectivity to special IPv4 address ranges:
it needs to be able to translate packets it receives that are using
the Pref64::/n used with Internet connections.

\[
\text{NAT64 "A" ----- IPv4-only servers in a data center}
/ \
IPv6-only host---router \\
\text{NAT64 "B" ----- IPv4 Internet}
\]

Figure 3: NAT64s with Assisting Router

6. Exit Strategy

A day will come when this tool is no longer needed. A node SHOULD
implement a configuration knob for disabling the Pref64::/n discovery
feature.

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations follow closely those of RFC 6147
[RFC6147]. The possible attacks are very similar in the case where
an attacker controls a DNS64 server and returns tampered IPv6
addresses to a node and in the case where an attacker causes the node
to use tampered Pref64::/n for local address synthesis. DNSSEC
cannot be used to validate responses created by a DNS64 server with
which the node has no trust relationship. Hence, this document does
not change the big picture for untrusted network scenarios. If an
attacker alters the Pref64::/n used by a DNS64 server or a node, the
traffic generated by the node will be delivered to an altered
destination. This can result in either a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack (if the resulting IPv6 addresses are not assigned to any
device), a flooding attack (if the resulting IPv6 addresses are
assigned to devices that do not wish to receive the traffic), or an
eavesdropping attack (in case the altered NSP is routed through the
attacker).

Even though a well-known name’s DNS A resource record would not
necessarily need to be protected with DNSSEC as both the name and
IPv4 addresses well-known, DNSSEC protection is required for DNS AAAA
resource record queries. Without DNSSEC, fake positive AAAA
responses could cause hosts to erroneously detect Pref64::/n, thus
allowing an attacker to inject malicious Pref64::/n for hosts’
synthesis procedures. A signed "ipv4only.arpa." allows validating
DNS64 servers (see [RFC6147] Section 3, Case 5, for example) to
detect malicious AAAA resource records. Therefore, the zone serving
the well-known name has to be protected with DNSSEC.

For Pref64::/n discovery validation, the access network SHOULD sign
the NAT64 translator's fully qualified domain name. A node SHOULD
use the algorithm described in Section 3.1 to validate each
discovered Pref64::/n.

The procedure described in Section 3.1.2 requires a node using DNSSEC
to validate discovery of Pref64::/n to have a list of trusted
domains. If a matching domain is not found at Step 3 in
Section 3.1.2, an implementation might be tempted to ask a user to
temporarily or permanently add a received domain as trusted. History
has shown that average users are unable to properly handle such
queries and tend to answer positively without thinking in an attempt
to move forward quickly. Therefore, unless the DNSSEC-using
implementation has a way to dynamically and reliably add trusted
domains, it is better to fail the Pref64::/n discovery procedure.

Lastly, the best mitigation action against Pref64::/n discovery
attacks is to add IPv6 support for nodes' destinations and hence
reduce the need to perform local IPv6 address synthesis.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Domain Name Reservation Considerations

According to procedures described in [RFC3172] and [RFC6761], IANA
has delegated a new second-level domain in the .ARPA zone for the
well-known domain name "ipv4only.arpa.". The intention is that there
will not be any further delegation of names below the
"ipv4only.arpa." domain. The administrative and operational
management of this zone is performed by IANA. The answers to the
seven questions listed in [RFC6761] are as follows:

1. Are human users expected to recognize these names as special and
   use them differently? In what way?
   No, although this is a domain delegated under the .arpa
   infrastructural identifier top level domain.

2. Are writers of application software expected to make their
   software recognize these names as special and treat them
differently? In what way?
   Yes. Any application attempting to perform NAT64 discovery will
   query the name.
3. Are writers of name resolution APIs and libraries expected to make their software recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how?

Yes, to the extent the API or library is affected by NAT64.

4. Are developers of caching domain name servers expected to make their implementations recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how?

No.

5. Are developers of authoritative domain name servers expected to make their implementations recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how?

No.

6. Does this reserved Special-Use Domain Name have any potential impact on DNS server operators? If they try to configure their authoritative DNS server as authoritative for this reserved name, will compliant name server software reject it as invalid? Do DNS server operators need to know about that and understand why? Even if the name server software doesn’t prevent them from using this reserved name, are there other ways that it may not work as expected, of which the DNS server operator should be aware?

This name has effects for operators of NAT64/DNS64, but otherwise is just another delegated .arpa domain.

7. How should DNS Registries/Registrars treat requests to register this reserved domain name? Should such requests be denied? Should such requests be allowed, but only to a specially-designated entity?

The registry for .arpa is held at IANA, and only IANA needs to take action here.
8.2. IPv4 Address Allocation Considerations

The well-known name needs to map to two different global IPv4 addresses, which have been allocated as described in [RFC6890]. The addresses have been taken from the IANA IPv4 Special Purpose Address Registry [RFC6890], and 192.0.0.170 and 192.0.0.171 have been assigned to this document with the parameters shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address Block</td>
<td>192.0.0.170/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192.0.0.171/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>NAT64/DNS64 Discovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>RFC 7050, Section 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation Date</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination Date</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forwardable</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved-by-protocol</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Record for IPv4 Address Allocation for IPv4 Special Purpose Address Registry

The zone "ipv4only.arpa." is delegated from the ARPA zone to appropriate name servers chosen by the IANA. An apex A RRSet has been inserted in the "ipv4only.arpa." zone as follows:

```
IPV4ONLY.ARPA. IN A 192.0.0.170
IPV4ONLY.ARPA. IN A 192.0.0.171
```

8.3. IAB Statement Regarding This .arpa Request

With the publication of this document, the IAB approves of the delegation of "ipv4only" in the .arpa domain. Under [RFC3172], the IAB has requested that IANA delegate and provision "ipv4only.arpa." as written in this specification. However, the IAB does not take any architectural or technical position about this specification.
9. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dmitry Anipko, Cameron Byrne, Aaron Yi Ding, Christian Huitema, Washam Fan, Peter Koch, Stephan Lagerholm, Zhenqiang Li, Simon Perreault, Marc Petit-Huguenin, Andrew Sullivan, and Dave Thaler for significant improvement ideas and comments.

Jouni Korhonen would like to acknowledge his previous employer, Nokia Siemens Networks, where the majority of his work on this document was carried out.

10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Example of DNS Record Configuration

The following BIND-style examples illustrate how A and AAAA records could be configured by a NAT64 operator.

The examples use Pref64::/n of 2001:db8::/96, both WKAs, and the example.com domain.

The PTR record for reverse queries (Section 3.1.1, Bullet 3):

```
$ORIGIN A.A.0.0.0.0.0.0.C\n .0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.IP6.ARPA.
@         IN      SOA   ns1.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (2003080800 12h 15m 3w 2h)
         IN      NS    ns.example.com.
         IN      PTR   nat64.example.com.
```

```
$ORIGIN B.A.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.C\n .0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.IP6.ARPA.
@         IN      SOA   ns1.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (2003080800 12h 15m 3w 2h)
         IN      NS    ns.example.com.
         IN      PTR   nat64.example.com.
```

If example.com does not use DNSSEC, the following configuration file could be used. Please note that nat64.example.com has both an AAAA record with the Pref64::/n and an A record for the connectivity check (Section 3.1.1, Bullet 2).

```
example.com.  IN SOA  ns.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (2002050501 ; serial
100         ; refresh (1 minute 40 seconds)
200         ; retry (3 minutes 20 seconds)
604800      ; expire (1 week)
100         ; minimum (1 minute 40 seconds)
)

example.com.  IN NS  ns.example.com.

nat64.example.com.
  IN AAAA  2001:db8:0:0:0:0:C000:00AA
  IN AAAA  2001:db8:0:0:0:0:C000:00AB
  IN A    192.0.2.1
```
For DNSSEC to sign the records, the owner of the example.com zone would have RRSIG records for both the AAAA and A records for nat64.example.com. As a normal DNSSEC requirement, the zone and its parent also need to be signed.

Appendix B. About the IPv4 Address for the Well-Known Name

The IPv4 addresses for the well-known name cannot be non-global IPv4 addresses as listed in the Section 3 of [RFC5735]. Otherwise, DNS64 servers might not perform AAAA record synthesis when the well-known prefix is used, as stated in Section 3.1 of [RFC6052]. However, the addresses do not have to be routable or allocated to any real node as no communications will be initiated to these IPv4 address.

Allocation of at least two IPv4 addresses improves the heuristics in cases where the bit pattern of the primary IPv4 address appears more than once in the synthetic IPv6 address (i.e., the NSP prefix contains the same bit pattern as the IPv4 address).

If no well-known IPv4 addresses would be statically allocated for this method, the heuristic would require sending of an additional A query to learn the IPv4 addresses that would be then searched from inside of the received IPv6 address.
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