User-Agent-Driven Privacy Mechanism for SIP

Abstract

This document defines a guideline for a User Agent (UA) to generate an anonymous Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) message by utilizing mechanisms such as Globally Routable User Agent URIs (GRUUs) and Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) without the need for a privacy service defined in RFC 3323.

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1. Introduction

[RFC3323] defines a privacy mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261], based on techniques available at the time of its publication. This mechanism relies on the use of a separate privacy service to remove privacy-sensitive information from SIP messages sent by a User Agent (UA) before forwarding those messages to the final destination. Since then, numerous SIP extensions have been proposed and standardized. Some of those enable a UA to withhold its user’s identity and related information without the need for privacy services, which was not possible when RFC 3323 was defined.

The purpose of this document is not to obsolete RFC 3323, but to enhance the overall privacy mechanism in SIP by allowing a UA to take control of its privacy, rather than being completely dependent on an external privacy service.

The UA-driven privacy mechanism defined in this document will not eliminate the need for the RFC 3323 usage defined in [RFC3325], which instructs a privacy service not to forward a P-Asserted-Identity header field outside the Trust Domain. In order to prevent forwarding a P-Asserted-Identity header field outside the Trust Domain, a UA needs to include the Privacy header field with value
This document defines a guideline in which a UA controls all the privacy functions on its own utilizing SIP extensions such as Globally Routable User Agent URIs (GRUUs) [RFC5627] and Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) [RFC5766].

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

privacy-sensitive information: The information that identifies a user who sends the SIP message, as well as other information that can be used to guess the user’s identity.

3. Concept of Privacy

The concept of privacy in this document is the act of concealing privacy-sensitive information. The protection of network privacy (e.g., topology hiding) is outside the scope of this document. Privacy-sensitive information includes display-name and Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) in a From header field that can reveal the user’s name and affiliation (e.g., company name), and IP addresses or host names in a Contact header field, a Via header field, a Call-ID header field, or a Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC4566] body that might reveal the location of a UA.

4. Treatment of Privacy-Sensitive Information

Some fields of a SIP message potentially contain privacy-sensitive information but are not essential for achieving the intended purpose of the message and can be omitted without any side effects. Other fields are essential for achieving the intended purpose of the message and need to contain anonymized values in order to avoid disclosing privacy-sensitive information. Of the privacy-sensitive information listed in Section 3, URIs, host names, and IP addresses in Contact, Via, and SDP are required to be functional (i.e., suitable for purpose) even when they are anonymized.

With the use of GRUU [RFC5627] and TURN [RFC5766], a UA can obtain URIs and IP addresses for media and signaling that are functional yet anonymous, and do not identify either the UA or the user.
Instructions on how to obtain a functional anonymous URI and IP address are given in Section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.

Host names need to be concealed because the user’s identity can be guessed from them, but they are not always regarded as critical privacy-sensitive information.

In addition, a UA needs to be careful not to include any information that identifies the user in optional SIP header fields such as Subject and User-Agent.

4.1. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous URI Using the GRUU Mechanism

A UA wanting to obtain a functional anonymous URI MUST support and utilize the GRUU mechanism unless it is able to obtain a functional anonymous URI through other means outside the scope for this document. By sending a REGISTER request requesting GRUU, the UA can obtain an anonymous URI, which can later be used for the Contact header field.

The detailed process on how a UA obtains a GRUU is described in [RFC5627].

In order to use the GRUU mechanism to obtain a functional anonymous URI, the UA MUST request GRUU in the REGISTER request. If a "temp-gruu" SIP URI parameter and value are present in the REGISTER response, the user agent MUST use the value of the "temp-gruu" as an anonymous URI representing the UA. This means that the UA MUST use this URI as its local target and that the UA MUST place this URI in the Contact header field of subsequent requests and responses that require the local target to be sent.

If there is no "temp-gruu" SIP URI parameter in the 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request, a UA SHOULD NOT proceed with its anonymization process, unless something equivalent to "temp-gruu" is provided through some administrative means.

It is RECOMMENDED that the UA consult the user before sending a request without a functional anonymous URI when privacy is requested from the user.

Due to the nature of how GRUU works, the domain name is always revealed when GRUU is used. If revealing the domain name in the Contact header field is a concern, use of a third-party GRUU server is a possible solution, but this is outside the scope of this document. Refer to the Security Considerations section for details.
4.2. Obtaining a Functional Anonymous IP Address Using the TURN Mechanism

A UA that is not provided with a functional anonymous IP address through some administrative means MUST obtain a relayed address (IP address of a relay) if anonymity is desired for use in SDP and in the Via header field. Such an IP address is to be derived from a Session Traversal Utilities of NAT (STUN) relay server through the TURN mechanism, which allows a STUN server to act as a relay.

Anonymous IP addresses are needed for two purposes. The first is for use in the Via header field of a SIP request. By obtaining an IP address from a STUN relay server, using that address in the Via header field of the SIP request, and sending the SIP request to the STUN relay server, the IP address of the UA will not be revealed beyond the relay server.

The second is for use in SDP as an address for receiving media. By obtaining an IP address from a STUN relay server and using that address in SDP, media will be received via the relay server. Also, media can be sent via the relay server. In this way, neither SDP nor media packets reveal the IP address of the UA.

It is assumed that a UA is either manually or automatically configured through means such as the configuration framework [SIPPING-CONFIG] with the address of one or more STUN (Session Traversal Utilities for NAT) [RFC5766] relay servers to obtain anonymous IP address.

5. UA Behavior

This section describes how to generate an anonymous SIP message at a UA.

A UA fully compliant with this document MUST obscure or conceal all the critical UA-inserted privacy-sensitive information in SIP requests and responses as shown in Section 5.1 when user privacy is requested. In addition, the UA SHOULD conceal the non-critical privacy-sensitive information as shown in Section 5.2.

Furthermore, when a UA uses a relay server to conceal its identity, the UA MUST send requests to the relay server to ensure request and response follow the same signaling path.
5.1. Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information

5.1.1. Contact Header Field

When using this header field in a dialog-forming request or response or in a mid-dialog request or response, this field contains the local target, i.e., a URI used to reach the UA for mid-dialog requests and possibly out-of-dialog requests, such as a REFER request [RFC3515]. The Contact header field can also contain a display-name. Since the Contact header field is used for routing further requests to the UA, the UA MUST include a functional URI even when it is anonymized.

When using this header field in a dialog-forming request or response or in a mid-dialog request or response, the UA MUST anonymize the Contact header field using an anonymous URI ("temp-gruu") obtained through the GRUU mechanism, unless an equivalent functional anonymous URI is provided by some other means. For other requests and responses, with the exception of 3xx responses, REGISTER requests and 200 (OK) responses to a REGISTER request, the UA MUST either omit the Contact header field or use an anonymous URI.

Refer to Section 4.1 for details on how to obtain an anonymous URI through GRUU.

The UA MUST omit the display-name in a Contact header field or set the display-name to "Anonymous".

5.1.2. From Header Field in Requests

Without privacy considerations, this field contains the identity of the user, such as display-name and URI.

RFCs 3261 and 3323 recommend setting "sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid" as a SIP URI in a From header field when user privacy is requested. This raises an issue when the SIP-Identity mechanism [RFC4474] is applied to the message, because SIP-Identity requires an actual domain name in the From header field.

A UA generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this specification MUST anonymize the From header field in one of the two ways described below.

Option 1:

A UA anonymizes a From header field using an anonymous display-name and an anonymous URI following the procedure noted in Section 4.1.1.3 of RFC 3323.
The example form of the From header field of option 1 is as follows:

   From: "Anonymous" <sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid>;tag=1928301774

Option 2:

A UA anonymizes a From header field using an anonymous display-name and an anonymous URI with user’s valid domain name instead of "anonymous.invalid".

The example form of the From header field of option 2 is as follows:

   From: "Anonymous" <sip:anonymous@example.com>;tag=1928301774

A UA SHOULD go with option 1 to conceal its domain name in the From header field. However, SIP-Identity cannot be used with a From header field in accordance with option 1, because the SIP-Identity mechanism uses authentication based on the domain name.

If a UA expects the SIP-Identity mechanism to be applied to the request, it is RECOMMENDED to go with option 2. However, the user’s domain name will be revealed from the From header field of option 2.

If the user wants both anonymity and strong identity, a solution would be to use a third-party anonymization service that issues an Address of Record (AoR) for use in the From header field of a request and that also provides a SIP-Identity Authentication Service. Third-party anonymization service is out of scope for this document.

5.1.3. Via Header Field in Requests

Without privacy considerations, the bottommost Via header field added to a request by a UA contains the IP address and port or hostname that are used to reach the UA for responses.

A UA generating an anonymous SIP request supporting this specification MUST anonymize the IP address in the Via header field using an anonymous IP address obtained through the TURN mechanism, unless an equivalent functional anonymous IP address is provided by some other means.

The UA SHOULD NOT include a host name in a Via header field.
5.1.4. IP Addresses in SDP

A UA generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this specification MUST anonymize IP addresses in SDP, if present, using an anonymous IP address obtained through the TURN mechanism, unless an equivalent functional anonymous IP address is provided by some other means.

Refer to Section 4.2 for details on how to obtain an IP address through TURN.

5.2. Non-Critical Privacy-Sensitive Information

5.2.1. Host Names in Other SIP Header Fields

A UA generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this specification SHOULD conceal host names in any SIP header fields, such as Call-ID and Warning header fields, if considered privacy-sensitive.

5.2.2. Optional SIP Header Fields

Other optional SIP header fields (such as Call-Info, In-Reply-To, Organization, Referred-By, Reply-To, Server, Subject, User-Agent, and Warning) can contain privacy-sensitive information.

A UA generating an anonymous SIP message supporting this specification SHOULD NOT include any information that identifies the user in such optional header fields.

6. Security Considerations

This specification uses GRUU and TURN and inherits any security considerations described in these documents.

Furthermore, if the provider of the caller intending to obscure its identity consists of a small number of people (e.g., small enterprise, Small Office, Home Office (SOHO)), the domain name alone can reveal the identity of the caller.

The same can be true when the provider is large but the receiver of the call only knows a few people from the source of call.

There are mainly two places in the message, the From header field and Contact header field, where the domain name is expected to be functional.
The domain name in the From header field can be obscured as described in Section 5.1.2, whereas the Contact header field needs to contain a valid domain name at all times in order to function properly.

Note: Generally, a device will not show the contact address to the receiver, but this does not mean that one cannot find the domain name in a message. In fact, as long as this specification is used to obscure identity, the message will always contain a valid domain name as it inherits key characteristics of GRUU.

Note: For UAs that use a temporary GRUU, confidentiality does not extend to parties that are permitted to register to the same AoR or are permitted to obtain temporary GRUUs when subscribed to the 'reg' event package [RFC3680] for the AoR. To limit this, it is suggested that the authorization policy for the 'reg' event package permit only those subscribers authorized to register to the AoR to receive temporary GRUUs. With this policy, the confidentiality of the temporary GRUU will be the same whether or not the 'reg' event package is used.

If one wants to assure anonymization, it is suggested that the user seek and rely on a third-party anonymization service, which is outside the scope of this document.

A third-party anonymization service provides registrar and TURN service that have no affiliation with the caller's provider, allowing caller to completely withhold its identity.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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