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Network Working Group                                      D. Voyer, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                               Bell Canada
Intended status: Informational                                  J. Leddy
Expires: July 15, 2019                            Individual Contributor
                                                             C. Filsfils
                                                           D. Dukes, Ed.
                                                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                              S. Previdi
                                                  Individual Contributor
                                                           S. Matsushima
                                                        January 11, 2019

    Insertion of IPv6 Segment Routing Headers in a Controlled Domain


   The network operator and vendor community has clearly indicated that
   IPv6 header insertion is useful and required.  This is notably the
   case when the entire journey of the packet remains in its source
   domain.  In such a context, it does not matter where the extension
   header is inserted.  The source domain may decide to place the IPv6
   extension header insertion where it suits its best: at the source of
   the packet or at any midpoint within the source domain.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Source Domain and Packet Journey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Transit Through a Source Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Impact of SRH Insertion Within a Source Domain  . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  ICMP Error message processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.1.  ICMP Error message processing with routing header . .   5
     4.2.  Destination outside the Source Domain . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Manageability Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   We define the concept of "domain" as the set of nodes under the same
   administration.  For example, a network operator infrastructure
   including routers and links grouped into BGP autonomous systems (ASs)
   and routing domains (running OSFP or IS-IS).

   We define "source domain" as the domain of the source of the packet.

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2.  Source Domain and Packet Journey

    (-- Source Domain D --)
    (                     )
    ( 1-----2-----3-----9 )
    (       |     |       )
    (       4-----5       )

                          Figure 1: Source Domain

   In the previous diagram:

   o  All the nodes 1 to 9 are in the same Source Domain D.

   o  Node 1 originates a packet P1 destined to 9 (SA=1, DA=9).

   o  Domain D runs a link-state routing protocols which implements the
      Fast Reroute (FRR) service through the Topology Independent Loop
      Free Alternates (TI-LFA,

   o  All link metrics are set to 10.

   o  Node 2's TI-LFA pre-computed backup path for the destination 9 is
      the Segment Routing Policy <5, 9> via outgoing interface (OIF) to
      node 4 according to [I-D.filsfils-spring-segment-routing-policy],
      [I-D.filsfils-spring-srv6-network-programming], and

   Within the 50 milliseconds of link 2-3 failure detection, node 2
   reroutes the traffic destined to 9 by inserting the pre-computed
   segment routing header (SRH) with SID list <5, 9> and forwards the
   packet to node 4.  Node 4 forwards based on DA=5 to neighbor 5.  Node
   5 updates the DA to 9 and removes the SRH.  Node 9 receives the
   packet with (SA=1, DA=9).

   This FRR service is clearly beneficial for the operator of domain D:
   without this FRR operation, depending on the scale of the domain and
   the quality of the routing convergence implementation, traffic could
   be dropped for hundreds to thousands of milliseconds waiting for the
   routing plane to converge.

   This FRR service is largely deployed with MPLS.

   It is important to note that the operators industry is strongly
   requiring the same TI-LFA FRR service without the need to deploy or
   maintain the MPLS layer.

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   Obviously, this FRR service increases the size of the packet during
   its journey within domain D.  This is well-known to operators.  Well-
   known mitigation techniques have been deployed for more than 15 years
   for the MPLS-based FRR service and the numerous VPN services.  This
   is often achieved by deploying a greater MTU value higher in the core
   than at the ingress edge.

3.  Transit Through a Source Domain

        (-- Source Domain D --)
        (                     )
    A---( 1-----2-----3-----9 )---B
        (       |     |       )
        (       4-----5       )

                 Figure 2: Transit Through a Source Domain

   Consider a packet sent from A to B called P2 (A,B).  A and B are
   external nodes to the Source Domain D.

   Any packet transiting through source domain D must be unchanged when
   it exits domain D.

   Therefore, node 1 encapsulates the packet P2 in an outer IPv6 header
   with SA=1 and DA=9.  Resulting in packet P3 (1,9)(A,B).

   From the viewpoint of domain D, packet P3 is the same as packet P1 of
   the previous use-case.  Indeed, domain D only considers the outer
   header when forwarding P3 and the outer header is: (SA=1, DA=9).  As
   with packet P1, the entire journey of packet P3 is contained within
   source domain D.

   Node 2 may thus rightfully insert an SRH on packet P3 to implement a
   sub-50 milliseconds FRR operation upon the loss of the link 2-to-3
   and node 5 can remove this SRH.

   The transparency of the service is guaranteed: the insertion and
   removal of the SRH on packet P3 has no impact on packet P2.  P2 at
   the exit of the domain D is the same as at the entrance of the domain

   Customers of the transit service offered by source domain D do demand
   FRR services.  The 50 millisecond FRR operation provides a much
   better service availability than 100's to 1000's of milliseconds of
   loss for each routing transition.

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4.  Impact of SRH Insertion Within a Source Domain

   This section discusses the impact of SRH insertion within a source
   domain for traffic transiting the source domain, or traffic generated
   within the source domain.

   Any SRH inserted on a packet within a source domain MUST be removed
   before delivery to destination.  This requirement ensures the
   destination node will not receive a packet with an SRH not inserted
   by the source SR Node.  Therefore there is no impact of an
   inadvertent SRH being received at a destination node.

   There are however two points of impact associated with ICMP error
   generation back to the source:

      Path MTU discovery [RFC8201] may generate ICMP error messages to
      the packet source.

      Hop Limit may be exhausted and generate ICMP error messages to the
      packet source.

4.1.  ICMP Error message processing

   Using the example packet P1 from Section 3.  If Hop Limit decrements
   to 0 or a Packet Too Big (PTB) error is generated at node 4, after
   the SRH is inserted, the destination address in P1 is 5.

   This results in an ICMP error message generated to node 1, as per
   [RFC4443] but with an unfamiliar destination address.

4.1.1.  ICMP Error message processing with routing header

   During parsing of the ICMP error message at node 1, the invoking
   packet's protocol receives the error.  In the case of UDP and TCP,
   the invoking packet four-tuple (source address, source port,
   destination address, destination port) identifies a UDP or TCP

   Since the original destination (node 9) is not the current
   destination of the invoking packet, the lookup cannot succeed in
   current implementations, and the error is not delivered to the source
   UDP or TCP session.

   This is common for any use of routing headers regardless of whether a
   routing header is inserted at source or by an intermediate node.

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4.2.  Destination outside the Source Domain

   Since the SRH inserted within an intermediate node MUST be removed
   when all segments within the SRH have been visited, it is not
   possible to leak the SRH to the destination outside the source

5.  Security Considerations

   This document proposes to insert an SRH to a transit packet if such
   packet is originated and destined within a controlled/trusted domain.

   Insertion of SRH is safe when confined within a source domain.

   In such conditions, the security of the original packet is not
   compromised by header insertion.  The packet reaches the destination
   or leaves the source domain without any inserted header.

   A source domain can operate SRv6-based services for internal traffic
   while preventing any external traffic from accessing these internal
   SRv6-based services.  Several mechanisms exists and are currently
   used today, for example:

   o  Access-lists (ACL) on the each externally facing interface in
      order to drop any incoming traffic with SA or DA belonging to the
      internal SID space.

   o  ACL to prevent access to local SIDs from outside the operator's

   o  Support Unicast-RPF on source address on external interface.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document doesn't introduce any IANA request.

7.  Manageability Considerations


8.  Contributors

   The authors would like to thank the following for their
   contributions: Stefano Salsano, Antonio Cianfrani, David Lebrun,
   Olivier Bonaventure, Prem Jonnalagadda, Milad Sharif, Hani Elmalky,
   Ahmed Abdelsalam, Robert Raszuk, Arthi Ayyangar, Dirk Steinberg, Wim

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9.  Acknowledgements


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC4443]  Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
              Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
              Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
              RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,

   [RFC8201]  McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
              "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,

10.2.  Informative References

              Bashandy, A., Filsfils, C., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S.,
              Francois, P., daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d., Clad, F., and P.
              Camarillo, "Topology Independent Fast Reroute using
              Segment Routing", draft-bashandy-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-
              lfa-05 (work in progress), October 2018.

              Filsfils, C., Sivabalan, S., Hegde, S.,
              daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d., Lin, S., bogdanov@google.com,
              b., Krol, P., Horneffer, M., Steinberg, D., Decraene, B.,
              Litkowski, S., Mattes, P., Ali, Z., Talaulikar, K., Liste,
              J., Clad, F., and K. Raza, "Segment Routing Policy
              Architecture", draft-filsfils-spring-segment-routing-
              policy-06 (work in progress), May 2018.

              Filsfils, C., Camarillo, P., Leddy, J.,
              daniel.voyer@bell.ca, d., Matsushima, S., and Z. Li, "SRv6
              Network Programming", draft-filsfils-spring-srv6-network-
              programming-06 (work in progress), October 2018.

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              Filsfils, C., Previdi, S., Leddy, J., Matsushima, S., and
              d. daniel.voyer@bell.ca, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header
              (SRH)", draft-ietf-6man-segment-routing-header-15 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

Authors' Addresses

   Daniel Voyer (editor)
   Bell Canada

   Email: daniel.voyer@bell.ca

   John Leddy
   Individual Contributor

   Email: john@leddy.net

   Clarence Filsfils
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: cfilsfil@cisco.com

   Darren Dukes (editor)
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: ddukes@cisco.com

   Stefano Previdi
   Individual Contributor

   Email: stefano@previdi.net

   Satoru Matsushima

   Email: satoru.matsushima@g.softbank.co.jp

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